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ABSTRACT 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Yugoslavia was entangled in a fratricidal break-up. In 
none of the other former Yugoslav republics did the conflict turn as violent as in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which suffered genocide, the greatest number of victims and the highest 
percentage of infrastructural destruction. Although its three ethnic communities – Muslims, 
Serbs and Croats – were previously well integrated, the break-up of Yugoslavia exposed 
Bosnia’s unique Islamic component, which both Serbs and Croats perceived to be the major 
impediment to the continuation of a pluralistic society. Islam, however, only turned into a 
divisive and decisive factor in the conflict when combined with ethnic nationalism. 
Previous research into the causes of the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
break-up of Yugoslavia has identified Bosnia’s long Islamic heritage and large Muslim 
population on the doorstep of Europe as specific features influencing both its rationale and 
resolution. Yet there has been no analysis of the role and impact of ‘neo-Islam’ (a term I 
explained below) in the conflict – an omission this thesis seeks to redress. The thesis uses 
historical analysis to demonstrate that Bosnia and Herzegovina was frequently subject to 
international intervention during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it explores whether 
the unique Islamic component was the reason behind this phenomenon, and seeks to 
comprehend why Bosnia and Herzegovina has always appeared to pose a problem for the 
international community, from the papal persecutions of the medieval Bogumils through to 
the present day. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides a re-consideration of the Bosniaks’ identity (an ethnic name for 
Bosnian Muslims) and political consciousness in the period up until and during the 1992-95 
war. Conducting historical analysis of related issues, this research explores the position of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and 
the origins of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its impact on the conflict. The 
investigation is twofold: on the one hand, it examines the emergence of a contemporary 
ideology that I termed ‘neo-Islam’ (see section five, below, for a definition) through an 
analysis of the complex political relations of the contemporary international order; on the 
other, it conducts historical reserach of the role of Muslim identity and neo-Islam in 
shaping the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its aftermath. The war was brought to 
an end by international intervention, which resulted in the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. Dayton divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, de jure, into two parts: the Republic 
of Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. In addition, the UN Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) was endowed with unlimited governing powers and appointed to 
rule over the democratically elected Bosnian government. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was the only one of the former six Yugoslav republics to become a de facto international 
protectorate. This thesis suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina was rendered an 
international protectorate before and offers a contribution of historical context to 
understanding the 1992–5 war and settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The peace 
agreement proclaimed for Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen as a continuation of an inverted 
principle of nation and state building that was adopted towards Bosniaks during the 
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promulgation of the nineteenth century ethno-nationalism in Europe and Ottoman Tanzimat 
Reforms. The historical analysis of the origins of Islam in Bosnia and the close examination 
of the impact of the nineteenth century Tanzimat Reforms (discussed in chapters three and 
four) explain why at the end of the 1992-95 conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled as 
an international protectorate. 
 
This thesis also argues that the international peace mediation produced outcomes 
that did not serve the best interests of the Bosnian people; on the contrary, it was used as a 
buffer by various international political powers to advance their conflicting geostrategic 
aspirations. As neo-Islam emerged as a globalised political phenomenon in the twentieth 
century, a close examination of the significant role it played in the 1992-95 Bosnian war, as 
well as an analysis of the historical context of Islam and its origins in the region, are crucial 
to understanding the 1992-95 war and subsequent peace settlement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 
1.1 Research questions  
In order to explore the Muslim identity, neo-Islam and the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina it is necessary to pose a fundamental question as to whether the political 
development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the particular legacies of Ottoman 
rule and subsequent construction of the concept I have termed ‘neo-Islam’ shaped events 
and the responses during the 1992-95 conflict. In this context the thesis shall analyse three 
issues: first, why Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one of the six Yugoslav republics 
to end up as a protectorate; secondly, why the international community pursued a 
secessionist and parochial approach to the settlement of the war in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina; and thirdly, why, despite the contribution of manpower and significant 
amounts of financial aid from other Muslim countries (as discussed in chapter six), Bosnian 
Muslims were the principal victims of the war. 
 
1.2 Methodology and Data 
An exploration of the research questions requires a multifaceted, ‘multi-theoretical and 
multi-methodological’ approach (Wodak and Meyer 2001). I drew on a wide array of 
contemporary and historical literature. This study did not set out to be based on primary 
empirical research such as interviews with the Bosnian or ex-Yugoslav political Elites. I 
could not plan interviews because by the time of writing president Izetbegović was already 
dead, as were many around him. Following the end of the war, there was an extremely swift 
and incidental change of government partly caused by the Office of the High 
Representative’s interventions in removing officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
political situation at the time of writing was very volatile and it proved very difficult to find 
anybody with relevant information in relation to my dissertation.  In addition, Milosevic 
was in The Hague and the rest of the elites were simply inaccessible.  
 
In this thesis, I analysed both library resources and archival documents. In order to 
juxtapose various views, I used both primary and secondary sources. I consulted the 
following existing literature on a range of relevant topics: 
 the New World Order and the rise of the concept I termed neo-Islamism,  
 diplomatic history of state formation and nationalism in the processes known as 
globalisation and modernity,  
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 Tanzimat ideology and its impact on the Bosniaks’ nation-building,  
 the causes of poverty and Islamic response to the inequalities in the society, 
 issues of identity and ethnicity in the Yugoslav conflicts, in so far as they have a 
bearing on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In order to explain Islamic principles, I consulted the Qur’an and other classical 
sources, as well as more contemporary literature on Islam. Islam pays special attention to 
theories of social obligation, and this is crucial to bear in mind when analysing Islamic 
compatibility with the global neoliberal structure. Although the dissertation is written as a 
politico-economic history, it also draws selectively on theories of globalisation and 
international relations that have immediate relevance for interventionist paradigms and the 
premise of conflict resolution in relation to the Yugoslav crisis and the 1992-95 Bosnian 
war.  
In addition to contemporary literature and library sources, I also used other 
qualitative data such as archival materials in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. In order to 
analyse the extent of neo-Islamist influence in Yugoslavia preceding the break-up, I 
examined original transcripts of the taped proceedings of a meeting held by the communist 
leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 April 1983. These transcripts are part of the 
Sarajevo city archives and contain important references to the views on Islam and Muslims 
prevalent amongst the Yugoslav leadership. I chose these archival documents because they 
expose the leadership’s acute awareness of the fact that external forces were working 
towards the destabilisation of Yugoslavia via usurping ethnic upheavals in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. Examining the archival data makes it possible to conclude that 
instrumentalisation of neo-Islam seemed to have been successfully deployed towards this 
end. The analysis of the archival information serves as an important aid to understanding 
the domestic and international circumstances that formed the backdrop to Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ultimate partition under international 
arbitration; it offers a perspective that has remained unavailable or inaccessible to, or has 
been omitted from, modern scholarship.  
I used the original Ottoman documents whenever possible, as these enabled me to 
analyse historical events in the region effectively, as well as consulting the original reports 
that were generated in the wake of the Berlin Congress of 1878 (published by the Cornelius 
Library in the US). I also examined the Ottoman archives in Istanbul and Ankara that 
illustrate the Turkish policies on migration following the outcome of the Berlin Congress 
and the proliferation of nation-states in the Balkans.  
1.3 Scope and limitations 
To answer the research questions above there was a need to conduct an extensive historical 
research and consult documents of reliable authenticity and provenance (Garragham 1946). 
I chose material according to the scope of the thesis, which is limited to an examination of 
two specific periods in Bosniak history. I first concentrated on the nineteenth-century 
Ottoman Tanzimat (reform) period, which took place during the rise of nation-states across 
Europe.  It is because it was during this period that the national development of the 
Bosniaks was suppressed as discussed in chapters three and four. Second period I explored 
was the Islamic revival of 1970s and 1980s in socialist Yugoslavia, as this was the first 
time since the medieval period that the Bosniaks gained national recognition. Continuing 
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analysis of the topic of Islamic revival in Bosnia, I also examined neo-Islamisation during 
the 1992-95 conflict via critical assessment of the information available on links between 
Bosnian Muslim leadership and the neo-Islamist states. I address these issues in greater 
detail in chapters four and six respectively. The other periods of Bosniak history, such as 
the medieval Bosnian state and the Bosnian position during the two world wars, are 
mentioned when relevant. 
 
1.4 Academic contribution 
I bring a fresh perspective to the historical analysis of the nation-building process in former 
Yugoslavia by exploring the origins of Islam in Bosnia and discussing the impact of 
Tanzimat Reforms on the process of Turcification of Bosniaks. In relation to this, I 
conceptualise a novel analysis of the controversial issue of Bosniak identity politics 
internalising its formation in the globalised process of creating New World Order. In this 
respect, I offer a new perspective on globalisation from the Muslim angle, and 
contextualise it using the concept of ‘neo-Islamism’. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first such study in this form. Materials are sourced in three languages, English, Bosnian 
and Turkish, which adds to the originality of the work. Given the nature and complexity of 
the research, this appears to be the most appropriate approach for the theoretical framework 
of this study, which combines a historical and economic analysis of global trends with a 
critical examination of the literature on Islamism, socio-political theories of Islam, studies 
of ethnic identity in situations of conflict and the practical outcome of interventionist 
paradigms, such as the institution of international protectorates. My analysis is intended to 
contribute towards a better understanding of the Bosniaks by examining past and present 
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ways, in which Islam has been internalised in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such an 
understanding could aid a more comprehensive appreciation of the nature of the Bosnian 
war and the internationally supervised settlement. In this respect, my claim to originality 
rests on a critique of the existing literature of the 1990s conflict; it presents an alternative 
account of the war. My aim is also to demystify contemporary Islamic ‘revivalism’ on the 
global level by explaining its symbiosis with neoliberalism. This is the reason I have 
chosen to use the term ‘neo-Islamism’. I turn to an introduction of neoliberalism and neo-
Islamism below. 
 
1.5 The research context: neo-Islamism and neoliberalism in the New World Order 
Neo-Islam rose to greater prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of the New World Order, when globalisation and a host of other destabilising 
elements in the international arena came to the fore. Kagan (1996: 23-27) argues in the 
influential journal Foreign Affairs that one result of this was the re-emergence of the 
traditional fault line between Islamic fundamentalism, representing ‘global absolutism’, and 
the West, portrayed as the embodiment of liberal freedom of thought. This thesis argues, 
however, that the New World Order is not a novel constellation of power relations but a 
project that has re-emerged from a broader map of historical networks, in which Islam 
played an indispensable role. This claim contrasts with contemporary scholarly and 
political discourses that often cite the New World Order as an incumbent framework, 
adjacent to the process dubbed ‘globalisation’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Castells 2000; 
Rosemond 2000; McMichael 2000; Hay 2002).  
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This thesis endorses the definition of globalisation as a historical process that was 
crystallised in the nineteenth century in mercantile capitalism and the nascent nation-state, 
both of which have proved extremely tenacious. In relation to the subject of this work, 
therefore, globalisation and the New World Order together comprise a significant feature in 
the geostrategic rearrangement of the political relationship between Islam and the West, 
which I termed neo-Islam. The process commenced in the nineteenth century and regained 
focus with the end of the Cold War, as I argue in chapter two. It was out of the ashes of the 
Cold War that the two most prominent ideological paradigms in the international arena, 
neo-Islamism and neoliberalism, emerged. Both of these phenomena are discussed in more 
detail in chapters two and five respectively. The international response to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to be observed and understood in the context of neo-Islamised 
global politics and the neoliberal political economy of globalisation.  
I define neoliberalism as a capitalist ideology that has been adopted globally and 
whose main agenda is the promotion of trade liberalisation and a market economy. This is 
achieved through sweeping privatisations, cuts in public spending and the rise of privately 
owned conglomerates, creating an elite of ultra-rich individuals. The reduction of the 
welfare state, loss of social justice and rise of market monopolies comprise its defining 
characteristics. Chapter five provides an extensive review of the literature on the topic. 
Above all, these sources point to an economy that can only function on the basis of debt.  
I define neo-Islamism as an ideology that uses the pretext of Islamic dogma, albeit 
distorted and misinterpreted, to advance, promote and implement neoliberal economic 
policies. In other words, these are neoliberal Islamist movements. Led by Saudi Arabia, 
neo-Islamists have ensured that there is a sufficient flow of money available to be 
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borrowed, facilitating the continuation of a debt economy and the incorporation of national 
ruling classes into the wealthy global elite of the New World Order. An examination of the 
political and economic data used in this work demonstrates that neo-Islamism and 
neoliberalism are not only compatible, but that neo-Islamism is the incarnation of 
neoliberalism. Had it not been for the financial procurements of neo-Islamists, the global 
prominence of neoliberalism would not have been possible.  
The politicisation of Islam has been utilised in various ways since the protracted 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 2001) and the rise of the nation-state. In the post-
Cold War period, neo-Islamism witnessed, and took part in, the global proliferation of 
ethnic conflicts; the involvement of neo-Islamists in the ethnically coloured, belligerent 
global situation led to a tendency to ‘Islamise’ the discourse and conduct of international 
relations. This thesis attempts to determine whether the international organisations and 
nation-states that jointly refer to themselves as the ‘international community’ are able to 
prevent the instrumentalisation of Islam in the conduct of international affairs, in order to 
aid more peaceable conflict resolutions. To facilitate such a study, the 1992-95 war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is taken as a case in point because the conflict became most 
violent when waged against the Bosniaks.
1
 The discussion below highlights a selection of 
the existing literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks.  
 
                                                 
1
 The percentage of Bosniaks killed is about 66, compared with 26 percent of Serbs and 8 percent of Croats 
(cf. Appendices I and II for figures and charts). The website of the Sarajevo Research and Documentation 
Centre gives more detailed information on the numbers killed or missing during the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It is important to stress that the numbers of persons killed are not final as there are many who 
are labelled ‘missing’, and not all the mass graves have been identified. The numbers, therefore, are still 
contested.   
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1.6 Literature review  
Comprehensive analyses of the Bosniaks and the phenomenon of Islam in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are limited. A vast quantity of literature appeared following the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, but this dealt only marginally with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tendency has 
been to focus on human rights, minority issues, economic causes and legal concepts, 
concentrating on the two dominant republics of Serbia and Croatia (Geoff 1994; Boyle 
1996; Woodward 1995; Turković 1996; Ramet 2006). Literature that sets out to deal with 
the role of religion in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is rare, and usually does not 
deal with Islam per se but incorporates all the religions within Bosnia and Herzegovina (for 
example, Goodwin 2006). Such analyses are most commonly published in the form of 
collections of wide-ranging essays that present very interesting bodies of reading (Scott 
1996; Reza 1996; Mojzes 1998; Mousavizadeh 1996; Shatzmiller 2002). The authors who 
concentrate on one particular religion generally analyse disputes in a local context (Bax 
1995) or perceive them as ideological conflicts between communism/socialism and the 
‘free world’, which is represented by the adoption of a market economy (Cancar and Karić 
1990; Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman 1993; Sonyel 1994; Djulabić 1995).   
The literary works that deal with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be placed 
in four broad categories. The first group is autobiographical literature, which necessarily 
includes a rather subjective twist as it incorporates a wide array of memoirs (Owen 1996; 
Maass 1996; Hoolbrook 1998; Dietrich 1998; Rose 1998; Major 1999; Hadzišehović 2003; 
Izetbegović 2003; Ashdown 2007). It is important to point out that this literature is mostly 
written by diplomats who were directly involved in affairs concerning the war, and 
although it is at times revealing, it falls short of providing a comprehensive account. The 
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full story remains unavailable to the general public – and this may always be the case. 
However, some excellent studies have been conducted on the role of intelligence in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Halilović 2005; Wiebes 
2006; Alibabić 2010; Glaurdić 2011).    
The second group of literature focuses on the Western response to the Yugoslav 
crisis and serves more as a study of how foreign policy is formulated in conflict scenarios 
(Sharp 1993; Burg and Shoup 1999; Radha 1998; Cushman 1997; Williams and Waller 
2003; Hansen 2006; Caplan 2005). Some are specifically focused on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, either exposing the West’s double standards when dealing with the Bosnian 
crisis (Hoffman 1996; Reiff 1995; O’Shea 2005; Vulliamy 1998) or documenting direct 
high-level diplomatic involvement to foil any attempt to stop the carnage and save lives 
(Hodge 2006; Hartmann 2007). Within this group of literature, I am compelled to single out 
Simms (2001), who has produced an admirable and well-documented study excavating the 
leading role the British government took in shaping appeasement policies during the 
Bosnian war, and its adoption of a parochial approach to the settlement, a mode that was 
followed by the international community.  
Group three comprises literature that attempts to explain the Bosniaks. It offers a 
wide-ranging survey, which serves as a valuable general introduction to the study of 
Bosniak historical origins (Malcolm 1994; Donia and Fine 1994; Bringa 1995; Friedman 
1996; Pinson 1996; Bieber 2000; Velikonja 2003). Within this literature, the inescapable 
thematic component appears to be the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
generally leads the discussion towards the question of Bosniak identity. This strand is 
particularly prominent in the works of Bosniak authors, who rather than challenging 
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Western orthodoxy provide new insights on the origin of Islam and the Muslim identity 
formation of Bosniaks (Cerić 1968; Hadžijahić 1974; 1990, Smajlović 1990; Balić 1995; 
Sućeska 1995; Filandra 1998, 2006; Imamović 1998; Handžić 1999). I shall deal with the 
spread of Islam in Bosnia and Muslim identity of Bosniaks in chapter four. 
Finally, the fourth group contains the recent literature and various reports on Islam 
and Islamism that have emerged as a response to the so-called ‘war on terror’ and the 
perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism. This type of literature tries to place Bosnian 
Muslims within the context of the global proliferation of militant Islamic networks 
(Kohlmann 2004; Napoleoni 2005; Johnstone 2003; International Crisis Group Reports 
2001; Schindler 2007; Hudson 2003; Deliso 2007). However, it is generally undone by the 
way its authors invariably try to force Bosnian reality to fit their muddled Islamophobic 
arguments. Some have gone so far as to step into the territory of the Yugoslav war 
revisionists by diminishing  the atrocities or denying the presence of the ‘Bosnian gulag’2 
altogether (Parenti 2002; Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; Shay 2006; Clark 2007; Deliso 
2007; Flounders 2007; Herman and Peterson 2010).
3
 This apologist view has, in turn, been 
challenged and ubiquitously criticised by scholars who see the Bosnian war as an act of 
aggression and the site of the worst genocide in Europe since the Second World War (Cigar 
1995; Campbell 1998; Shaw 1999; Riedlmayer 2002; Walls 2002; Vulliamy 1998, 2012). 
The most vociferous critic is perhaps Hoare (2004), who sought to establish that 1992-95 
Bosnian war was genuinely multi-national and pluralistic at its inception but, under the 
                                                 
2
 The term ‘gulag’ was used by Vulliamy (2012) to describe the Bosnian predicament. I endorse the term.  
3
 It is necessary to add to this list Chomsky, Chandler and Chossudovsky, who have all made various verbal 
comments and written contributions in the media regarding the denial of the Bosnian concentration camps, the 
genocide and atrocities. For the full extent of articles and other sources, refer to the website, balkanwitness, 
that keeps excellent records: http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/articles-deniers.htm#clark-n (accessed on 12 
May 2012).  
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impact of external aggression, internal treason and international betrayal it turned into 
essentially Bosnian Muslim struggle for survival. Hoare has also dedicated a significant 
portion of his political commentary to an analysis of the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, paying specific attention to the refutation of the revisionist portrayal of the 
1992-95 war.
4
 
These competing views essentially epitomise the entire debate over the nature of the 
Bosnian war, which is contained in two opposing schools of thoughts, each calling for 
mutually exclusive policy approaches. Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) critically analyse 
and usefully compartmentalise these two schools of thought: one, taking an ‘aggressor-
victim’ stance, portrays the conflict as an act of aggression against a UN member state by 
ultranationalist forces using genocide as a means of territorial contest; the other views the 
conflict as a civil war, with no aggressors or victims but simply warring factions, and 
spreads the blame evenly. According to this reading, the conflict emerged as an inevitable 
result of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’. The international community generally supported the 
latter view,
5
 leading to the approach that Williams and Waller (2003) term ‘policies of 
coercive appeasement’. The views of the international community are encapsulated in the 
work of two particular authors, both of whom use the ‘ancient hatred’ thesis, supported by 
religious arguments: Robert Kaplan (1994), whose work allegedly caused US President 
Clinton to retreat from the ‘aggressor-victim’ approach and endorse the idea that the 
conflict was a civil war, and Rebecca West, whose account (originally published in 1936) 
                                                 
4
 See Hoare’s blog for his online analysis and full list of publications: http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com.  
See also Bosnia Report online for a number articles written as a critique of the apologists and revisionists: 
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=1041&reportid=162 (accessed on 11 May 
2012). 
5
 This school of thought was supported by former US presidents Bush and (sometimes) Clinton, the Great 
Powers on the UN Security Council (especially Russia), UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and the 
European Union member states, especially Britain and France (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 518). 
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was distributed to UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, presumably to offer a historical context 
that would reinforce established prejudices (Simms 2001: 179) and provide a justification 
for the atrocities the soldiers witnessed. Because of the diplomatic and military significance 
of these works, as well as the influence they reportedly exercised over the international 
community’s choice of policy approach, both are discussed in more detail below. 
 
1.6.1 Literature review: travelogues of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’  
‘Violence was, indeed, all I knew about the Balkans: all I knew of the South Slavs,’ muses 
West in 1936 (21-22) whilst preparing for an exotically dangerous journey to Yugoslavia 
‘to give some lectures in different towns before universities and English clubs’. Her 
knowledge of the Balkans was non-existent and she ‘quite simply and flatly knew nothing 
of the south-eastern corner of Europe’ (West 1936: 21), apart from a few scattered youthful 
memories from Paris and Nice, where the word ‘Balkan’ was applied in blanket fashion as 
‘a term of abuse, meaning a rastaquouere [sic] type of barbarian’.6 She apparently soon 
came to realise the truth of those claims as her four-year long adventure turned out to be ‘a 
great source of danger’, threatening her safety and depriving her ‘forever of many benefits’ 
(West 1936: 21).  
More than a half century later, Wheatcroft (2004), writing about the ‘Balkan ghosts’ 
entangled in the history of the conflict between Christendom and Islam, revived this violent 
image of the Balkans and its people. Dwelling on his childhood memories, Wheatcroft 
(2004: 221) offers a vivid description of the collection of his grandfather’s ‘worldly books’. 
                                                 
6
 West takes pains to offer two examples of French prejudice against the Balkans and its peoples, in an 
attempt to assure her readership that such bias comes from outside her cultural realm and is alien to her. She 
wants her readers to believe that, like them, she just happens to be exposed to this prejudice and is not 
partaking in its image-building process.     
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Amid ‘all the battles and gore’ in these books, he singles out one thing that most terrified 
him: the description of the Balkan adventures of a young officer in the 1860s, who, after his 
‘trusty revolver’ had saved him from many ‘sticky situations’, nearly met his death in Corfu 
in Greece, where he was attacked by a ‘huge Albanian dog’.7 Immediately after he killed 
the dog, the protagonist was attacked by ‘the dog’s avenger: the Albanian with his long 
yathagan’ (Wheatcroft 2004: 222), whose sharp blade injured him badly. All ended well, 
however, as the protagonist was saved by his friends. This passage was engraved forever in 
Wheatcroft’s memory: 
Simskin’s engraved illustration of this event terrified me at the age of nine, 
and still has the power to frighten. The Albanian rushing from the woods, 
with dark cruel eyes, tight limbs and bristling beard, was the stuff of 
nightmares. To this day, it remains my first instinctive and childish 
understanding of the Balkans. (Wheatcroft 2004: 222) 
This feeling of dread on the part of the author was ominously commemorated when, 
years later, he read Kaplan’s (1994) book about the Balkans and its people, Balkan Ghosts: 
A Journey through History. This compelling narrative brought back fearful memories of 
‘the garlic-scented Albania’ (Kaplan 1994: 223) of his childhood. The old juvenile 
nightmares were resuscitated in his present adult consciousness. In this way, mythology 
and literature inhabit and function within the same imaginative world, one that is ‘governed 
by conventions, by its own modes, symbols, myths and genres’ (Hart 1994: 23).   
However, Kaplan claims, as did West before him and a plethora of other foreign 
travellers to the Balkans, to know little about the region; it is apparently only during their 
travels that these authors discover the region to be a nest of animosities. The reason lies, 
                                                 
7
 It is perhaps worth noting that the curious reader is not informed how the protagonist was able to tell an 
Albanian dog from a Greek one. 
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Kaplan discovers, in its long, dark history. He reportedly claimed that his aim was ‘to 
provide the experience of a backpacker, with the disciplined analysis of a good journalist or 
a policy specialist’ (Rozen [online] 2001). Yet, in his self-proclaimed ‘entertaining 
journalistic travel book’, Kaplan’s method rests more on a description the re-emergence of 
a ‘wasteland’ than the production of a simple explorer’s manual would warrant. He depicts 
a dark landscape, haunted by atrocities arising from ancient grudges that have been 
perpetuated in present hatreds. All the horrors of the collective past have been carried into 
the savage present – ‘in modern times, it all begun here’:  
Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been 
isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics 
has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history 
has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe. Nazism, for instance, can 
claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground 
of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned to 
hate. (Kaplan 1994: 227)    
 
Everything that is murderous and savage is endemic in the Balkans: ‘The rocky 
landscape of political crisis and conflict suddenly yields patterns, trends and meaning’ 
(Rozen [online] 2001). The most recent bloodshed is explained through the prism of the 
Balkans’ sanguinary past, which Kaplan believes to be pathologically inherent in the region 
and its inhabitants. It was precisely this caricature of ancient hatreds that made its way onto 
Clinton’s bedside table. After reading the book, the president abandoned his ‘aggressor-
victim’ conviction about the Bosnian war and joined the adherents of the ‘civil war’ school 
of thought, adopting a neutral stance (Drew 1994: 157-158).
8
  
                                                 
8
 As a presidential candidate, Clinton was a vociferous supporter of the ‘aggressor-victim’ approach, calling 
for the ‘international community’ to play a more decisive role in preventing crimes against civilians. His 
views were influenced by reports in Newsday in August 1992, in which Gutman revealed the existence of 
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This dichotomous policy approach dominated the entire Bosnian war. Hoffman 
(1994) explains succinctly:  
[T]he international community made the mistake of simultaneously pursuing 
two incompatible policies – collective security against aggression, and a 
negotiated compromise between parties that were treated as morally 
equivalent. (Hoffman 1994: 96) 
However, in answer to accusations that his clichés of ancient Balkan grudges had an impact 
on the policy decisions of the US president, Kaplan pleaded:  
When I was reporting ‘Balkan Ghosts’ in the 1980s, the Balkans were like 
Ethiopia, an obscure country. The idea any policymaker would read it, I 
didn’t even consider. I saw it purely as an entertaining journalistic travel 
book about my experiences in the 1980s. (Kaplan, cited in Rozen 2001 
[online]). 
 This over-stated modesty deserves a number of observations as it seems there is a bit 
more truth in it than Kaplan would perhaps like to admit to. Firstly, it is interesting that he 
uses Ethiopia as an example. Since its post-imperial conception, Ethiopia has never been an 
‘obscure country’, as any ‘good journalist or policy specialist’ would undoubtedly know. It 
was nested at the heart of the Cold War conflict in the ‘Arc of Crisis’, to borrow Zbigniew 
Brezinski’s phrase. The country was the largest recipient of American aid to Africa and had 
the greatest number of Peace Corps Volunteers, until it switched sides in 1977 and became, 
in turn, the largest recipient of Soviet military and financial supplies and host to 16,000 
                                                                                                                                                    
concentration camps in northern Bosnia, creating a media snowball that generated the ‘aggressor-victim’ 
approach amongst Western policymakers. For details of the influence of Gutman’s reports on Clinton, see 
Hansen (2004: 7). It is also worth mentioning that Senator Robert Dole, a bipartisan majority in the US 
Congress, the majority of the UN General Assembly and the Islamic Conference were all supporters of the 
‘aggressor-victim’ school of thought. The U-turn in policy is perhaps best described by Clinton’s statement 
(cited in Woodward 1995: 285), following the February 1994 Markale marketplace massacre in Sarajevo that 
killed over a hundred people and wounded many more. Clinton declared: ‘[U]ntil those people get tired of 
killing each other, bad things will continue to happen.’ Woodward notes: ‘Using arguments … that the 
hostilities were the result of ancient ethnic and religious hatreds … the West was again able to justify not 
deploying troops.’ 
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Cuban troops (Ottaway 1982: 53-56, 116).
9
 Secondly, Balkan Ghosts ‘explores’ the 
situation of Yugoslavia immediately after Tito’s death and offers a long-winded account of 
the rise of post-socialist nationalism that allegedly brought the country to the point of 
disintegration. Yugoslavia’s position during the Cold War, however, was similar to that of 
Ethiopia.  
Thirdly, this catalogue of ‘ancient Balkan horrors’ was reworked into an image of 
contemporary ethnic strife, and published in a timely fashion in the wake of the 1990s war, 
following media reports of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. 
Anthropologists refer to these types of ethnographies as written in the ‘anthropological 
present’. Wallerstein (1996: 1) terms this ‘TimeSpace’: time and space are locked together 
in a frozen, one-dimensional concept, which is used to portray the lives of so-called 
‘primitive’ peoples, where apparently no room for change or alteration could possibly 
exist. The anthropological present is of paramount importance in building a national myth-
history, in which narratives from the past morph into narratives of the present and 
timespan becomes an abstraction, relative to the individual culture (Bloch 1989: 1-18).  
Lastly, and most importantly, it is Kaplan’s (1994: 4) conscious choice of 
informant on the region, a Serbian nun called Mother Tatiana, that betrays his lack of 
analysis. Her ‘fiery maternal eyes’ expose all the nakedness of anti-Muslim feelings in the 
region, through either an anti-Albanian or an anti-Turkish mythological narrative, selected 
according to the particular story, as shown in the following two examples: 
                                                 
9
 Its strategic position and sheer size, in comparison to its neighbours, rendered Ethiopia a potential chief ally 
to either superpower during the Cold War, into which the countries of the Horn of Africa were dragged as 
proxies: ‘Given the huge difference in population size (Ethiopia has a population of 32 million and Somalia 
only 4 million) and the long history of Ethiopian geopolitical importance in the Horn-Arabian Peninsula 
region, it is not surprising that both superpowers should consider Ethiopia the greater prize’ (O’Loughlin 
1989: 316).  
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We [Serbs] would have been even greater than Italians, were it not for 
the Turks. 
I am a good Christian, but I will not turn the other cheek if some 
Albanian plucks out the eyes of a fellow Serb or rapes a little girl or 
castrates a twelve-year old Serbian boy. (Mother Tatiana, cited in 
Kaplan 1994: 32, 33) 
In fact, the book is so openly chiselled with pro-Serbian motifs that Kaplan is compelled to 
justify himself in the preface of one of its later editions: ‘Nothing I write should be taken as 
justification, however mild, for the war crimes committed by ethnic Serb troops in Bosnia, 
which I heartily condemn’ (Kaplan 1993 [online]).10 Nevertheless, by linking his own 
dossier of the crimes of Islam with West’s anti-Turkish statements, written half a century 
earlier,
11
 Kaplan creates an uninterrupted historical flow: 
That was a refrain you heard throughout the Balkans, in Dame Rebecca’s 
day and in mine. Dame Rebecca writes, ‘The Turks ruined the Balkans, with 
a ruin so great that has not yet been repaired.’ (Kaplan 1994: 32)12  
Frye (1971: 25) terms this creation of a potentially unified imaginative experience a 
‘new poetics’. In essence, this refers to a centrifugal allegory that moves away from textual 
structure and literary aesthetics to fulfil a social purpose, stressing the thematic connection 
of stories and characters to the social function of literature. In the (approximately) last two 
hundred years, almost all international and local literature on the Balkans has been written 
in this fashion, ‘nesting Balkanisms’ (Todorova 1997). It is only through the lens of 
                                                 
10
 See Kaplan (1993) ‘Balkan Ghosts – response to book by Noel Malcolm – Letter to the Editor’ in The 
National Interest. Available online at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_n33/ai_14538728/pg_1 
(Accessed on 10.10. 2007). 
11
 The interchangeability of the terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Muslim’ was introduced by foreign travelogues of the 
Balkans in the nineteenth century to uphold the thesis that, as far as Islam was concerned, it could be only 
confined to the newly formed Turkish nation and no other. The usage in this context, and perhaps for this 
purpose, persisted throughout linguistic tradition, and remained preserved in the majority of domestic and 
almost all international works until the present day.  
12
 For this particular critique, see Simmons (2000: 109-124). 
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‘archetypal criticism’ that the social function of such narratives can be recognised and its 
readers awakened to ‘successive levels of awareness of the mythology that lies behind the 
ideology in which their society indoctrinates them’ (Stingle 2005: 25). Literature turns into 
a ‘displaced mythology’ of ‘myths to live by’ and ‘metaphors to live in’, which… 
…not only work for us but constantly expand our horizons, [so that] we may 
enter the world of kerygma or transformative power and pass on to others 
what we have found to be true for ourselves. (Bates 1971: 18, italics in 
original)  
West (1936) resorts to the ‘transformative power’ of the allegorical fable to create a 
meaning and enliven the myth of the perennial presence of the Turks and the imprint of 
their legacy throughout the Balkans, which she describes as a source of ‘ultimate sadness’ 
to her during her visit to Sarajevo: 
I woke up only once from my sleep, and heard the muezzins crying out to 
the darkness from the hundred minarets of the city that there is but one God 
and Mohammed is His prophet. It is a cry that holds an ultimate sadness, 
like the hooting of owls and the barking of foxes in night-time. (West 1936: 
315) 
This story is a good example of the way the artefacts of the author’s imagination are 
capable of transforming the mythological mobilisation of individual feeling into collective 
experience (Stingle 2005: 2). To attain this, West (1936) conflates past and present through 
her purposefully selected informants. Amongst these, the one who is portrayed as the most 
reliable is a certain ‘Constantine from Belgrade’. Speaking about the visit of Turkish 
officials to the Muslim Bosniaks, in pursuit of a possible military alliance between the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Turkey in the event of a further world war, 
Constantine evokes past stories of great suffering under Turkish malevolence in order to 
show his disapproval of such an arrangement:  
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[F]or the Turks were our oppressors and we drove them out, so that we 
Christians should be free. Now the heads of the Turkish state are coming by 
the consent of our Christian state to see the Moslems who upheld the 
oppressors. (cited in West 1936: 312)  
By mobilising events from the past, the present is didactically recreated and 
becomes part of a collective psychosis, imbued with the idea of a cosmological struggle 
between good and evil. Bosnian Muslims are portrayed as the malign epicentre of this 
battle. The following example illustrates the aim to internalise the Bosniaks’ 
disenfranchisement from a wider Christian Slav identity, and keep alive the story of their 
opportunistic support of the loathed enemies, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs: 
The Turkish Empire went from here in 1878, but the Slav Moslems [sic] 
remained, and when Austria took control it was still their holiday. For they 
were favourites of the Austrians, far above the Christians, far above the 
Serbs, or the Croats … they [the Austrians] raised up the Moslems, who 
were a third of the population, to be their allies against the Christians and the 
Jews. (cited in West 1936: 312) 
13
              
‘Their faces darkening with the particular sullenness of rebels,’ comments West 
(1936: 312) on the narratives of her informants, ‘shadowed by the double tyranny of 
Austria and the Moslems’. This commentary underpins a ‘reverse-image projection’, for 
there is a whole history nested in this short sentence that projects a mirror image of the self. 
What lies at heart of this type of discursive construction is not only a perception of the 
‘other’, but also, as post-colonial literary theorists have postulated, a re-creation of self-
definition and self-formation.
14
 Moreover, by re-telling the stories again they are made yet 
                                                 
13
 This is a classic example of misrepresenting history in order to lead a presumably uninformed readership 
towards one’s own beliefs. It is a well-established historical fact that the Austrian reign in Bosnia was 
anything but benevolent towards the Muslim population. This is dealt with more fully in chapter four. For an 
illustration of this, refer to the excerpt of an account written in 1878 regarding the Austrian reforms of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: ‘Austria is, at this moment, under the [Berlin] treaty, occupying militarily two provinces of 
Turkey [Bosnia and Herzegovina] in order to reform them, and is reducing the numbers [of Muslims] 
hereafter to be reformed by a preliminary process of extermination’ (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 395).  
14
 For a concise overview of post-colonial literary theories of ‘otherness’, see Lye (1997). 
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more bitter, and as the embellished stories are kept alive in the popular imagination every 
time they are retold, they are further immortalised in public consciousness. As Schick 
(1999: 12) suggests, ‘the other plays a determining role as the antithesis and embodiment of 
characteristics disavowed by the self that thereby paradoxically mirrors the self’. Thus, 
through using the anguish of her characters as a mirror, West (1936) commiserates with her 
readership on Europe’s, or more precisely the Anglo-Saxon world’s, own greatest malaise – 
Muslims and Austrians. In fact, her account is said to have installed a pro-Serbian attitude 
in two generations of readers, policymakers and diplomats (Holbrooke 1998: 22), and is 
reflected in the ‘civil war’ foreign policy approach towards the 1990s war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This is due to an almost traditional European fear of Islam, and in the case of 
Bosnia, a two-centuries-old bias against Muslims, stemming from previous travelogues and 
reports from the Balkans. The following passage is a good example of the Islamophobic 
expressions so readily utilised by West (1936), in which she portrays the self-sacrificing, 
martyr-like figures of the Balkan Christians, who firmly preserve an ecclesiastical bastion 
for the entire European region:   
[T]he last ducat was extracted to pay tribute to the Turks. These people gave 
the bread [out] of their mouth to save us of Western Europe from Islam; … I 
had only to shut my eyes to smell the dust, the lethargy, the rage, and 
hopelessness of a Macedonian town, once a glory to Europe, that had too 
long been Turkish. The West has done much that is ill, it is vulgar and 
superficial and economically sadist; but it has not known the death in life 
which was suffered by the Christian provinces under the Ottoman Empire. 
(West 1936: 137)  
It was through travel writing that the world was discovered and the ‘foreign’, 
particularly Muslims, was communicated to European and American audiences. As 
emissaries and diplomats crossed the globe, their contributions became a significant part of 
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the genre (Pratt 1992). People generally believed in their veracity. The bias remains today, 
perpetuated through a process that Goldsworthy (1998) terms ‘narrative colonisation’. This 
prejudiced view, however, was temporarily abolished with the ‘brotherhood and unity’ 
approach promoted by the socialist Yugoslav republic, which I turn to below.  
 
1.7 The break-up of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a multicultural federation comprising six 
republics and two autonomous provinces. In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the province of Kosovo, Muslims made up the majority of the population.
15
 To manage the 
different nations and nationalities, the Yugoslav state apparatus relied on three main policy 
pillars: economic self-management embedded in a specific type of socialist market 
economy,
16
 political non-alignment
17
 and societal norms of ‘brotherhood and unity’ (Ramet 
1991: 91). Bosnia and Herzegovina held a specific symbolic position, and Bosnian 
Muslims a special role, in the promotion of a policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’. The reason 
is twofold. First, in the early years of Yugoslav formation following the end of the Second 
World War, the country was still repelled by the consequences of the onslaught, when 
                                                 
15
 According to the data obtained from the 1991 census and published in October 1993 by the Institute of 
Statistics of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were about two million Muslims in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, out of a total population of 4,377,033. Kosovo Albanian Muslims boycotted the 1991 Yugoslav 
census. For this reason, the data from the 1981 census is used to illustrate the number of Kosovo Albanians 
who, at the time, were calculated to number 1.7 million (Golubović 1997: 219). Taking these figures into 
account, it is considered that Muslims accounted for about four million of the approximately 23.5 million 
Yugoslav population. Nearly 2.5 million were Bosniaks, who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Muslims 
from the Sandžak province of southern Serbia, eastern Montenegro and parts of Kosovo and Macedonia, thus 
forming the largest compact Muslim territory in Europe. For more on this subject, see Balić (1994: 195-259).  
16
 Yugoslav enterprises were organised on the socialist principle of workers owning the assets through self-
managed guilds.  
17
 For a detailed explanation of the Non-Aligned Movement, see footnote 213.  
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many different warring factions had turned to exterminating each other.
18
 The war left scars 
so deep that at times they threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the unified Yugoslav 
state. To address this problem, the state apparatus constructed a common history of a 
national liberation struggle by means of ideologically inspired tales of partisan hardship and 
communist triumph.
19
 As almost all of the major battles during the national liberation 
struggle took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republic’s place in generating this 
sentiment of ‘brotherhood and unity’ was most significant (Mlinarević, cited in Spahić-
Šiljak 2012: 80).  
Secondly, Yugoslavia’s federal principles organised the republics around the most 
dominant nation, awarding the largest ethnic group a considerable measure of self-
governance within ‘its’ republic (Mlinarević, cited in Spahić-Šiljak 2012: 80). Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, however, was the exception to this rule. Even though Bosniaks formed the 
largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
20
 they were still unable to exercise 
‘ownership’ over the Bosnian republic because they were not recognised as one of its 
‘constituent nations’. The persistent line of argument was that Bosniaks were Islamised 
Serbs and/or Croats who had reneged on the Christian faith of their ancestors and needed a 
nationalist structural environment if they were to comprehend their historic mistake and 
return to their perceived primordial origins. In the event, they refused. They continued to 
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 The Second World War in Yugoslavia was not only a war against the Nazis, but also a civil war and a 
socialist revolution. During the war, some supported the Nazis, whilst others fought with the partisans against 
them. There were situations in which close family members were on opposing sides.  
19
 Second World War novels were mandatory reading in schools, and ideologically inspired movies featuring 
the joint struggle for Yugoslav liberation and communist victory were frequently broadcast. 
20
 Even though Bosniaks were the largest ethnic group, there was no absolute majority. According to the data 
obtained in the 1991 census and published in October 1993 by the Institute of Statistics of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the republic comprised 44 percent Muslims, 32 percent Serbs, 18 percent Croats and 
6 percent ‘Others’. No other census took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the war, and these 
numbers are thought to have changed considerably due to the exodus of people, predominantly Bosniaks.  
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describe themselves as Muslims, adherents of Islam, a religion considered not only 
nationally unacceptable to both Serbs and Croats, but also portrayed as a ‘late-comer’ to the 
region, rendering its adherents vulnerable to ‘export back’ when the time was ripe. Material 
evidence, however, does not support such claims, confirming instead that the arrival of 
Islam in the Balkans occurred no later than that of Christianity, as argued in more detail in 
chapter four.   
Until 1968, the prerogative of ‘constituent nationhood’ within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina belonged exclusively to Serbs and Croats, while Bosniaks were left to either 
classify themselves as nationally undeclared Yugoslavs or to express allegiance to the Serb 
or Croat nations by declaring that they were one or other nationality. Although this view 
ran counter to the Yugoslav Communist Party platform, which since 1937 had considered 
‘Bosniak’ a separate ethnic entity (Hadzijahić 1974),21 it was not until the 1971 census that 
Bosnian Muslims gained national recognition. However, the communist cadres did not 
allow them to resume their historic name of ‘Bosniak’; instead, they bestowed on them a 
new term, ‘Muslim’, which was supposed to symbolise ethnic and cultural belonging but 
without religious connotations. The discussion on the lack of Bosniak national recognition 
is developed in more detail in chapter four, but, for now, it is important to mention that 
while this political gesture might have reinforced the policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’ by 
lessening Serbian and Croatian territorial and cultural pretentions over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Biserko 2006: 12), it did not completely remove them. By classifying 
Bosniaks as Muslims rather than allowing them to re-embrace their historic name of 
                                                 
21
 Many Bosnian Muslims joined the Communist Party and fought alongside partisans, either in mixed units 
or in separate Muslim units, such as the 16
th
 Muslim Partisan Brigade. The reason for Muslim loyalty to the 
Communist Party was the fact that it did not challenge Bosnian Muslims’ separate ethnicity.  
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Bošnjaci (Bosniaks), the communist leadership left room for disputes to arise over the 
legitimacy of the Bosniaks’ nationhood and claims of ownership over the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that continue to this day. This argument informs the whole thesis. 
The adoption of Yugoslav ‘brotherhood and unity’ policies continued until the end 
of the Cold War and the ‘declaration’ of a New World Order in 1991, when the process of 
Yugoslav disintegration and the formation of new states began. At the time, Yugoslavia 
was one of the last remaining multicultural federations in the region. More importantly, it 
was the only regional economy run by self-managed guilds of workers, which owned their 
companies’ assets, rather than by privately operated multinational conglomerates. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet state-run economy, the New World Order was founded 
according to capitalist parameters, as described in greater detail in chapter two. As such, it 
did not tolerate economic deviations in any shape or form. Yugoslavia was no exception. 
The international community followed developments in Yugoslavia when the skirmish 
there started eroding the federation;
22
 however, it was not until the war began in the former 
Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that it paid special attention to the conflict, 
issuing explicit instructions to its countries’ respective intelligence operatives to follow the 
rapidly developing events closely, and to physically move from their various stations 
clustered around Eastern Europe to the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo (Wiebes 2006). In this 
respect, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationalised from the outset, and 
international involvement proved a decisive element in its outcome. However, the 
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 According to some scholars, the international community even resorted to covert operations to destabilise 
the country (Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman 1993; Chossudovsky 1996; Chomsky 1997; Hudson 2003; 
Johnstone 2003; Parenti 2002). They churned out innumerable versions of the conspiracy theory that the 
break-up of Yugoslavia was engineered by Germany, the Vatican and/or the IMF. These theories were later 
used by nationalists of all kinds as a popular way of displacing responsibility for the war onto the Great 
Powers. 
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international community has not only had an overbearing presence in this conflict, but in 
every other dispute involving Bosnia and Herzegovina since the nineteenth century. 
 
1.7.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 1992-95 war  
The break-up of Yugoslavia revived the primary question haunting Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: whose is it?
23
 Any claim to ownership was supposed to be settled by 
consensus, a practice the republic began to incorporate from the nineteenth century 
onwards.
24
 However, the unravelling of Bosnia was hastened by the rise of nationalisms. 
As the former Yugoslav republics started seceding one by one in the early 1990s, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina became a ‘Yugoslav time bomb’, ready to explode if handled unwisely 
(Hall 1994: 117). Serb and Croat nationalists used the situation to re-commence denial of 
the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks, a practice that had built up a 
repetitive momentum from the nineteenth century onwards. The lack of a systematic 
approach on the part of the Yugoslav authorities towards the study of the historiography of 
Bosniaks in either the school curricula or in public debates, and the failure to satisfactorily 
tackle sensitive questions, such as the absence of a recognised Bosnian language or nation 
within Yugoslavia, perpetuated this widely accepted stance. The following statement of a 
Serbian returnee from Canada in the wake of the 1990s war serves to illustrate the point:  
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 Ever since rise of nineteenth-century nationalism in the Balkans, Bosnian state and nationhood was 
questioned. Bosniaks were not regarded as the ‘rightful owners’ of the land, and their neighbours, Serbs and 
Croats, often expressed pretensions to ownership of both land and people. This is further explored in the 
sections of the thesis dealing with the historical background.  
24
 Prior to this, the ‘eyelet of Bosnia’ was governed by a council of Bosniak ayâns (elders), who were directly 
answerable to the Ottoman sultan. These elders were Muslim, but Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks also had 
some influence, even though they did not sit in the Council. It was only in the nineteenth century that Catholic 
and Orthodox Bosniaks began to be taught, initially by the clergy, to stop referring to themselves as Bosniaks 
and to embrace the new names of ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’. This is discussed in more detail in chapter four. In 
addition, this period marked the rise of new nation-states that caused the mass migration of Muslims to 
Turkey, escaping persecution and death. The decreased numbers of Muslims, coupled with government 
reorganisation, led to the introduction of rule by consensus amongst those who stayed in what remained of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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The Muslims have a question of identity to answer… Serbs, whether they 
are Orthodox Christians or atheists, are always Serbs: Croats are always 
Roman Catholics. But what are Muslims? They are something left over from 
the Ottoman era. (cited in Burns [online] 1993) 
Cigar (1995: 68) similarly cites the Belgrade patriarch, Pavle, who justified the 
Serbian nationalist claim to Bosnia and Herzegovina by explaining that Bosnian Muslims 
were interlopers from the East and not indigenous to the region. Again, Plavšić, a genetic 
biologist and former director of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Sarajevo, later charged 
at The Hague with war crimes, maintained that Bosnian Muslims were the descendants of 
genetically damaged Serb converts to Islam:
25
 
It was genetically deformed material that embraced Islam. And now, of 
course, with each successive generation it simply becomes concentrated. It 
gets worse and worse. It simply expresses itself and dictates their style of 
thinking, which is rooted in their genes. And through the centuries the genes 
degraded even further. (Plavšić, cited in Stazmiller 2002: 58)  
Croatian nationalist claims were no more subtle. Franjo Tudjman, the first president 
of independent Croatia, had a problem with the Muslim presence in Bosnia; he spoke of it 
in terms of ‘contamination by the Orient’ (cited in Sells 2002: 58). The environment had to 
be purified, and a rampage against Bosniaks and their relics commenced. For example, a 
Croat militiaman, who belonged to the unit which destroyed the Old Bridge in Mostar, 
when asked why he participated in the destruction of this architectural monument, replied: 
‘It is not enough to clean Mostar of the Turks, their relics must also be removed’ 
(Riedlmayer, cited in Shatzmiller 2002: 121). Similarly, when the Hague fugitive, General 
Ratko Mladić, entered Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, he made an address, broadcast on 
                                                 
25
 This is the line of argument used by almost all Serb nationalists. A case in point is Šešelj, a hard-core 
nationalist and former leader of the ultra-right Serb Radical Party, who is currently on trial in The Hague for 
war crimes. 
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Bosnian Serb television, during which he warned that the time had come to take revenge on 
the ‘Turks’: 
Here we are, on July 11, 1995, in Serbian Srebrenica. On the eve of another 
great Serbian holy day, I make a present of this town to the Serbian nation. 
Finally the time has come that after the last Serbian uprising we take 
revenge against the Turks in this area.
26
 (Mladić 1995, my italics) 
However, Alija Izetbegović, the leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)27 
and the first president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, played directly into the 
hands of his opponents. In July 1991, he visited Turkey to request that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina be admitted to the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Tanasković 
1992: 145-150). At the subsequent OIC meeting in Istanbul in June 1992, Izetbegović, 
along with members of his close circle, issued a plea to the Turkish government for 
protection in the event of an attack on the Bosnian Muslims (Silber and Little 1997: 213).
28
 
The more he was accused of adopting an intransigent Islamic colouring, the more he 
maintained the image of an ‘Islamic’ leader who wished to return to the ‘sources of 
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 Taken from A Cry from the Grave – Muslim Genocide in Bosnia, a BBC documentary, available online at 
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=E2BoheCrHfI (accessed on 2 March 2012). The above citation is my 
translation. This is the BBC’s translation: ‘Here we are, on July 11, 1995 … in Serbian Srebrenica … just 
before a great Serb holy day. We give this town to the Serb nation. Remembering the uprising against the 
Turks, the time has come to take revenge on Muslims.’ Mladić was probably referring to the 1875 uprising, 
which is discussed in chapter three. It is interesting to observe the BBC adaptation of the last part of the 
translation. The phrase ‘revenge against the Turks’ became ‘revenge on Muslims’ because the Western 
audience might have rightly asked what the reference to Turks has to do with 1995 Srebrenica. In the absence 
of historical knowledge of the complexities surrounding the identity of the Bosniaks, it becomes increasingly 
complicated, and at times meaningless, to mention the identification of Bosnian Muslims as ‘Turks’. This is a 
further reason why it is important to investigate fully the pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, as well as to conduct 
objective studies on the process of Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to de-mythologise the 
history of the region.  
27
 The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was considered to be a Muslim political party – that is, a 
representative of the Bosniaks. It was formed in 1989, and won the majority of Bosniak votes and 
parliamentary seats in the first multiparty elections in November and December 1990.  
28
 The authors state that this plea occurred in February 1992, but the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference) meeting did not occur until June 1992, when Izetbegović did indeed attend the conference 
session and ask for membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which gained observer status at the OIC (not 
full membership) in 1994.  
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Islam’.29 Burg and Shoup (1997: 67) note that when addressing Muslim audiences abroad, 
Izetbegović liked to stress ‘the need for the Muslim nation in Bosnia to have its own state’, 
even though at home he often spoke of creating a multicultural civil society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
30
 
The secession of Croatia in 1991 signalled that the Bosnian Croats were no longer 
interested in staying in a federal Yugoslavia. Under Tudjman’s patronage, Bosnian Croats 
started to ardently lobby for Bosnia and Herzegovina to also leave Yugoslavia. On the other 
hand, Bosnian Serbs were against Bosnia’s leaving Yugoslavia and campaigned against 
independence. Radovan Karadžić,31 in one of his last speeches in the Bosnian parliament, 
warned that if Bosnian Muslims decided to leave Yugoslavia they might vanish as a people. 
Bosnian Muslims, as many times before in their history, were caught between Serb and 
Croat centrifugal forces, which threatened to tear them apart. In a last attempt to save 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from plunging into war, Adil Zulfirkarpašić and Muhamed 
Filipović, Bosnian Muslim politicians and co-founders of the SDA, gained Izetbegović’s 
consent to approach Slobodan Milošević, the last president of the socialist federal 
Yugoslavia, who was subsequently tried in the International Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and died in detention. They wanted to draw up an ‘agreement’ in which 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain within Yugoslavia, on the condition that it was 
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 ‘I have been attacked as a fundamentalist,’ he says, ‘and in a certain sense I was – demanding a return to the 
sources’ (Izetbegović 2001: 35).  
30
 This was perhaps to satisfy the rhetoric of the international community, which on the surface appeared to be 
pushing for a multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet at the first opportunity divided the country along 
ethnic lines.  
31
 Karadžić was a co-founder of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which won the 
majority of Bosnian-Serb votes in the first multiparty elections. He was also the first president of the 
Republika Srpska, the region occupied by Bosnian Serbs, which proclaimed independence from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992. Karadžić was indicted for war crimes and genocide committed during the 1992-95 
Bosnian war, and is currently detained in the United Nations Detention Unit at The Hague.  
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guaranteed autonomy.
32
 Izetbegović, however, reneged on this strategy and decided to hold 
a referendum on independence.
33
 Following his decision, the citizens of Sarajevo – myself 
included – witnessed huge convoys of military trucks from the Yugoslav People’s Army 
heading towards the hills surrounding Sarajevo. It was only later that we found out they 
were there to control water and gas supplies, in preparation for the siege of Sarajevo, and to 
entrench the heavy artillery that was later used to bombard the city.  
The referendum took place between 29 February and 1 March 1992. The majority of 
nationalistically disposed Serbs boycotted the vote, believing it to be illegal as the Serb 
members of parliament did not approve it. The Bosnian Serbs withdrew to the autonomous 
regions they had already formed out of the ‘Serb municipalities’ – that is, the territories that 
fell under the control of the Serb Democratic Party following elections in November and 
December 1990. There were Serbs, however, who stayed and participated in the 
referendum, but the referendum itself turned out to be an affair where the teenagers and 
pensioners manning the polling stations were bamboozled: the poorly secured ballot boxes 
meant it was extremely easy to extract any ballot paper that disagreed with the intended 
result. It seems that Bosnia’s destiny had been sealed once again and the referendum was 
just a formality.
34
  
                                                 
32
 For a detailed account on the ‘historic agreement’, see Djilas and Gaće (1994: 213-222).  
33
 See the interview with Muhamed Filipović in Vele (2009: 1-8). Milošević claimed at The Hague Tribunal 
that Izetbegović acted under pressure from the US and Britain.  
34
 As a teenager, I worked for three days manning the polling station in my neighbourhood. I did not hold the 
right to vote as I was still a minor, but I could have stuck as many voting cards as I wanted in the box. In fact, 
supervision was virtually non-existent: anybody could place as many ballots as they liked, since it appeared as 
if no one had any intention to count them anyway. It seemed it did not matter, since the outcome looked like a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. For the most part, Serbs did not vote. The majority had already left for the 
surrounding mountains, from which the shelling of the city started soon afterwards. However, there were 
Serbs who refused to leave Sarajevo. They stayed because they believed in a multiethnic Bosnia. Throughout 
the war, they endured the same hardship as their Bosniak and Croatian compatriots.     
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On 5 April 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence, and on 6 April, 
following its international recognition by the Great Powers (a definition of which is 
provided later in the chapter), the war formally began. In Orwellian fashion, the war in 
Afghanistan ended on the same day, and rather than leaving the Islamic veterans of the war 
idle, a great number were shipped to Bosnia and Herzegovina under dubious circumstances 
and in a highly covert manner to fight in the name of Almighty.
35
 Since the combative 
power of the mujahideen (the name under which these fighters became known) and their 
contribution to military operations were insignificant, they received more publicity than 
they deserved.
36
 All the available evidence suggests that their presence was used more for 
ideological and propaganda purposes than for genuine military ones. At the start, however, 
the Bosnian war hardly presented a viable opportunity to wage jihad,
37
 but as it ran its 
course the leadership representing multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina – the only multi-
religious ‘side’ at the onset of skirmishes – evolved into increasingly ethnically 
homogenised units. Hence, the Islamic development of the Bosniak ‘side’ in the war was 
determined rather than predestined (Hoare 2004: 87-90).  
At this juncture it is useful to point out that this thesis rejects the common misuse of 
the terms ‘sides’ or ‘factions’ in reference to the ‘Bosnian gulag’. These terms were 
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 The fact that Muslim ‘freedom fighters’ or mujahideen could leave or come back at any time, despite the 
strict military curfew and travel blockades that affected ordinary Bosnians, points to a highly confused 
situation that contains far more than meets the eye. These imported ‘freedom fighters’ originated from 
obscure backgrounds and were run by a great variety of dubious militant and criminal organisations. A great 
number were controlled by state-sponsored intelligence services (Wiebes 2006: 207-208). It still remains to be 
explained how exactly and upon whose initiative the mujahideen appeared during the war.  
36
 For an account of the mujahideen’s lack of military expertise, which resulted in a great number of them 
being killed or wounded, see Kohlmann (2004: 53-66).  
37
 Jihad means ‘struggle’ or ‘striving effort’ in Islamic teaching. It can reflect the pursuit of ideals on an 
individual or collective level, or the struggle to achieve freedom. Nowadays, its meaning is politicised and 
assigned the apocalyptic definition of a ‘holy war’ against ‘infidels’.    
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introduced and liberally used by members of the international community,
38
 perhaps to 
justify their partitionist-secessionist rhetoric and parochial approach.
39
 The overt aggression 
met with opposition from all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina who wished to defend 
their country.
40
 It was only later that the multicultural Bosnian army was subject to the 
‘Muslim purges’, which introduced and incorporated Islamic elements, such as a pledge to 
God to defend the land of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regular prayers and the provision of 
imams. At the same time, imams were also introduced in the schools and other public 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
41
 ‘Islamic patriotism’ or ‘religious patriotism’ 
became equated with the ‘Bosniak liberation struggle’ (Alibabić 1996). Moreover, 
consistent financial sponsorship from Muslim countries and logistical support from the 
West,
42
 as well as the subsequent incorporation of the muhajideen into the Army of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, served to justify the claim that the war was indeed a religious one. Serbs 
and Croats – who from the outset cemented their military and national ordeals in religious 
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 The Bosnian vice president, Ejup Ganić, in summer 1992, described the ‘peace’ talks with Lord Carrington, 
an EU ‘peace’ envoy at the time, as follows: ‘Talks with Lord Carrington is glamour ... it’s like Dynasty. He 
introduced the concept of three communities ... the concept that is killing us...’ For more on this, see Hodge 
(2006: 35-55).  
39
 Through a critical reading of international diplomacy, Campbell (1998, 1999) argues that both the Bosnian 
war and the diplomacy designed to address it was made worse by the identity politics of both paramilitaries 
and peacemakers. He perceptively observes that the international community intervened in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina not to save the ideal of multiculturalism abroad, but rather to shore up the nationalist imaginary 
in order to contain the ideal of multiculturalism at home.  
40
 See the online videos of pre-war demonstrations in Sarajevo. People spontaneously poured onto the streets 
in a futile attempt to resist the war, only to be forcefully dispersed at gunpoint: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBbXRFzn1mo&feature=related (accessed on 11 May 2008).  
41
 Even then, there were still Serbs and Croats fighting in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; many of my 
Serb and Croat neighbours remained in the army despite its increasingly Islamic rhetoric. 
42
 In December 1992, Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia made a donation of $150,000 to Clement Rodney 
Hampton-el, an American Muslim convert, for ‘Project Bosnia’, which aimed to mobilise and train 
mujahideen as mercenaries. What is interesting is that mujahideen were trained in well-equipped camps 
across the US by former marines or retired military officers. After an intensive course in ‘insurgency 
warfare’, the mujahideen and their American instructors departed for Bosnia and Herzegovina together on a 
‘mission’ as ‘armed humanitarians’ to protect Bosnians against the ‘infidels’ – only to mysteriously vanish 
from the combat zone after a few days. For more on this, see Kohlemann (2004: 3-75). 
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narrative and symbolism, without receiving any public admonishment for doing so
43
 – 
capitalised on the increasing Muslim element within the Bosnian army to justify their claim 
that they were protecting Europe from Islamic penetration.  
The international community, for its part, gained a further alibi with which to 
defend its policy of calculated neutrality towards the so-called ‘warring factions’. In fact, 
the more it insisted on promoting a ‘level playing field amongst warring factions’ (Owen 
1996) – a rhetorical approach led by Britain that ensured that no other country took a 
different position (Simms 2001) – the more ethnically inflamed the war became. Insisting 
on neutrality in the face of criminal actions, the international community encouraged 
policies of appeasement
44
 (Hoffman 1994; Sharp 1994; Williams and Weller 2004) that 
gave the green light to the commencement and continuation of the carnage  perpetrated 
against Bosnian civilians, predominantly Bosniaks (Vulliamy 2012). Bosnian Serbs, who 
were militarily much more advanced and equipped, thanks to support from Serbia, rapidly 
succeeded in occupying two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnically cleansing most of 
the non-Serb population from the occupied territories, and even committing genocide 
against Muslims in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Croats in Herzegovina, who 
were generously supported and guided by Tudjman, occupied a region they proclaimed as 
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 For a well-documented study into religious symbolism and anthropology preceding the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Žanić (2007). See also Sells (2002).  
44
 This is how Vuillamy (1998: 75-76) defended the use of the term ‘appeasement policies’: “‘Appeasement” 
is a pejorative and historically tendentious term but it seems a good enough word to describe the three years 
of diplomat-to-diplomat barter between the leaders of the democratic West and Radovan Karadzic – now a 
fugitive wanted for genocide – beneath the chandeliers of London, Geneva and New York; or the matey 
soldier-to-soldier dinners of lamb and suckling pig shared by successive United National generals with their 
opposite number, General Ratko Mladić – likewise now fugitive and wanted – whose death squads 
perpetrated the Srebrenica massacre, on his personal orders and in his presence … If the term “appeasement” 
offends, then “toleration” and even “reward” can hardly be contested.’ 
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Herzeg-Bosna (Herzegovinian Bosnia), expelling or murdering Serbs and then Bosniaks 
following the escalation of the conflict between Croats and Bosniaks in 1993 (Sells 1998). 
The Bosnian war developed into a human catastrophe on a horrendous scale (World 
Bank 1999, 2000).
45
 Thousands of people were killed, maimed or massacred; it is often 
cited as the worst carnage in Europe since the Second World War (Reiff 1995; Silber and 
Little 1997; Halilović 1998; Borogovac 1995). The war is also significant in that it 
influenced the International Criminal Court to change its stance on the definition of rape 
during conflict. Some of those subjected to systematic mass rape – mainly Bosniak women 
and children – described how, during their ordeal, they were kept imprisoned until 
impregnated and then released when it was too late to abort. These poignant testimonies 
compelled international jurisprudence to define rape as a tool of war and crime against 
humanity. The statute was ratified in 1998, and since 2003 it has been applied to all 
international conflicts where systematic rape has occurred (Shelton 2005).  
The best indicator of the human tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the 
approximate estimate of over one million people who left the country, fleeing persecution 
and torture.
46
 The great majority of those killed or persecuted were Bosniaks, who became 
the principal victims of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Their neighbours, Bosnian 
Serbs and Croats, violently turned against them, expelling them from their homes or driving 
them into detention camps, where they were subjected to torture, physical and 
                                                 
45
 I am aware that other conflicts were simultaneously taking place around the world, but that does not make 
the Bosnian misery any less, even though there are ‘scholarly’ attempts to diminish it and introduce a degree 
of relativism to the scale of the Bosnian tragedy. These works are discussed in the literature review section.  
46 The exact number of people who were forced to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war is unknown. The 
UNHCR rough estimate is 1.2 million, but it is widely admitted that the number is far higher.   
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psychological abuse, rape and sexual assault.
47
 Numerous ‘peace resolutions’48 and the 
British-led policies of the international community allowed the pogroms against Bosniaks 
to continue unremittingly, in the belief that they comprised ‘a perpetratorless crime, in 
which all were victims and all more or less equally guilty’ (Simms 2001: 32). Innumerable, 
fruitless ‘peace’ conferences were convened and re-convened at various summer and winter 
holiday destinations. In the absolute belief of the moral equivalence of all the ‘combatants’, 
the world’s leading diplomats claimed they were indeed dealing with ‘ancient ethnic 
hatreds’,49 fought out along the traditional fault line of Islam versus the West. Without any 
ethical quandary, ‘peace’ negotiations were initiated and conducted with local warlords, 
who were simultaneously engaged in issuing orders to kill. Meanwhile, the international 
mediators pretended not to see their crimes.
50
 In this way, once again, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became hostage to the competing geostrategic interests of the world powers 
                                                 
47
 Bosnian Report, which used to be a biannual publication of the Bosnian Institute in London but which 
ceased operations due to lack of funding, published a variety of testimonies from a great number of captured 
and subsequently released survivors of the war. See its website for a selection of the publications available 
online at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/default.cfm. At the end of the war, a number of books emerged, written by 
survivors of the concentrations camps and some foreign correspondents who met them afterwards or 
witnessed atrocities themselves. Non-exhaustive examples include testimonies from various parts of Bosnia 
where genocide took place (Rieff 1995; Mašić 1996; Pervanić 1999; Cigelj 2002; Krzić et al. 2003; Suljagić 
2005; Sućeska 2008; Kozlica 2009; Vulliamy 2012; Demick 2012).  
48
 There are too many to cite here. Their details are also beyond the scope of this work, but there is a good 
chronological collection of the various peace resolutions contained in analyses of Western intervention by 
Burg (2001) and Campbell (1999).  
49
 The ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ argument is discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the literature 
review.  
50
 Vulliamy (2012), who excavated the testimonies of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), 
reported the early existence of concentration camps and their locations, and the torture, rape and killing that 
took place in them. His source was an ICRC official who admitted passing on information about the camps to 
Geneva, and from there to concerned diplomats in Britain and France, at least two months before Vulliamy 
and his colleagues officially ‘discovered’ them. Six American diplomats resigned from the state department 
over the concealment of the torture camps in Bosnia when it came to light that the ICRC reports were hidden 
from the US house foreign affairs committee in 1992. According to Vulliamy, even the CIA admitted having 
timely intelligence about the presence of the camps. Simms (2001: 42) reports that Douglas Hurd, British 
foreign secretary at the time, was very much aware of the atrocities committed against Bosniak civilians, but 
rather than trying to prevent it, he closed Britain’s borders to Bosnian refugees, using their misery to ‘put 
pressure on the warring factions to treat for peace’. When Cohen (cited in Vulliamy 2012: xxxiii) wrote a 
review of Hurd’s book in the Observer, he put it in the right perspective: ‘You have to read this disgraceful 
passage several times before you realise that Hurd was denying sanctuary to the victims of the Serbs (and his 
diplomacy) so he could use their misery to force Bosnia to cut a deal with the ethnic cleansers.’  
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(Hodge 2006), as well victim to the anti-Muslim racism of the West,
51
 a stance that has 
repeated itself from the nineteenth century onwards, as discussed later in greater detail.  
 
1.8 The peace settlement 
The war came to a halt with the General Framework Agreement for Peace negotiated in 
Dayton, Ohio. It was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by the Bosniak president Alija 
Izetbegović, the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian president Franjo 
Tudjman in the presence of officials from the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, 
along with a representative of the OIC. Under the auspices of these international players, 
the Dayton Agreement, as it is best known, created a Bosnian state with weak central 
institutions. Dayton was ‘an eccentric construct, a long-winded ceasefire agreement rather 
than a blueprint for a functioning state’ (Steele 2005). It dismantled the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and established two very different entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which was populated overwhelmingly by Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats in a 
ghettoised manner,
52
 and the Serb Republic, which was populated almost exclusively by 
Serbs, the non-Serbs having already been purged through killings or expulsions. These 
entities, apart from representing a novelty in international law, possessed all the 
characteristics of independent states, such as police forces, courts and parliaments. 
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 See: Hoffmann (in Ullman (ed.) 1996) for a concise review of early European political efforts to resolve the 
crisis. See also: Sharp (in Freedman (ed.) 1994) for a critique of the response of the European Union to the 
Yugoslav crisis.  
52
 There is very little co-existence of Bosniaks and Croats outside Sarajevo and Tuzla, and there are almost 
exclusively separate Croat and Bosniak areas all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The segregation is especially 
evident in the Herzegovina region. A prime example of the apartheid that is still very much present is Mostar. 
Čapljina, a town situated 30km south of Mostar and about a fifteen-minute drive from the Croatian border, is 
another example of a stronghold of ultra-radical Croat nationalists, where Bosniaks have returned but are 
extremely unwelcome. In this town, Croatian money is in circulation, Croatian flags and symbols are 
recurrent features, and a bridge even carries the name of Franjo Tudjman. Any symbolism even remotely 
reminiscent of Bosnia or Muslims has been erased. Christian crosses of various sizes have been erected 
throughout the town and its surroundings, even in front of those villages with majority Muslim populations.  
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Furthermore, both bore the names of categories that are well established in international 
constitutional law: ‘republic’ and ‘federation’. However, neither the Serb Republic nor the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were constituent parts of a state, nor did they refer to 
or identify themselves as a federation of republics, states, territories, cantons, provinces or 
any other such bodies. The Dayton Agreement, therefore, threw the entire statehood of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina into question by bestowing state-like powers on these entities and 
leaving the central state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in limbo.   
Another characteristic of Dayton was the massive international involvement in the 
establishment of a single state apparatus. In fact, to this day, the international community 
continues to take the upper hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entire decision-making 
process. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), as the international community jointly 
refers to itself, consists of fifty-five countries and agencies, as well as a fluctuating number 
of observers.
53
 Its executive authority rests in a ‘steering board’, comprising Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, the president of the European 
Union, the European Commission and the OIC, represented by Turkey. As a result of 
negotiations in September and October 1995 between the European members of the Contact 
Group
54 
and the US, the Office of High Representative (OHR) was created to oversee the 
implementation of the civilian peace process, with ‘final authority in theatre’ (ICG 2001: 
2),
55 
under the political guidance of the steering group. The OHR chairs weekly meetings of 
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 The PIC has met five times since its founding conference, held in London in December 1995, with the last 
ministerial-level meeting taking place in May 2000 in Brussels. For a full list of PIC countries and observers, 
refer to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) website:  
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38563 (accessed on 1 November 2009). 
54
 The five- and later six-member Contact Group (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, plus Italy) 
succeeded the Geneva-based International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in 1994, following 
the failures of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans. 
55
 From the Conclusions of the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, December 1997. 
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the steering board members’ ambassadors to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Bosnian 
capital, Sarajevo. In addition, the steering board meets at the level of political directors 
every three months.  
Alongside the PIC and OHR, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have a 
significant input into the running of state affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an 
outstanding empirical study, Fagan (2010: 77) identifies the European Union as the main 
provider of development assistance and the driving force behind Bosnia’s post-Dayton 
reconstruction. Although these organisations have massive administrative powers and 
devour a great deal of revenue for the salaries and expenses of their international 
workforces, they have neither succeeded in building good governance nor managed to 
engage NGOs in the policy process (Fagan 2008). The IMF has total control of the 
economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and directly appoints the governor of its central bank; 
the Bosnian constitution stipulates, however, that the governor can be neither a Bosnian 
national nor a national from the two neighbouring states of Serbia and Croatia.
56
   
The Dayton Agreement itself comprises a total of eleven annexes, which include 
provisions for demilitarisation, arms control, elections and human rights. Annex IV is the 
constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to one report, the constitution is 
‘unwieldy, clumsy, unworkable, and bears no relation to the reality of Bosnian political 
life’ (ICG 1999: 3). The institutions of central government exist largely on paper and are 
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 The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article VII, paragraph II, explicitly states the rules on the 
Central Bank and the selection of the governor, who is vested with the power to cast the tie-breaking vote on 
the governing board. 
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only as powerful as the entities
57
 allow them to be. The concept of the ‘constitutionality of 
nationalities’ permits legalised discrimination on the basis of ethnic background (ICG 
1999: 21) – indeed, the entire constitution condones ethnic discrimination by converting it 
into a principle of law. This is most evident in the categorisation of the peoples of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: the Dayton constitution proclaims three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats, with two additional groups, ‘others’ and ‘citizens’,58 and three official 
languages that are essentially linguistic and semantic variations of the same language. 
Dayton has thus perpetuated the deep ethnic division in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was 
achieved through pogroms against civilians – predominantly Bosniaks – during the war. In 
the process, it has created a dysfunctional international protectorate.  
Historical analysis, however, demonstrates that this situation is not unprecedented: 
the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans in the nineteenth century left the way open for 
the rise of nation-states, which was accompanied by the wholesale persecution and 
slaughter of Muslims under the watchful eye of the Great Powers. When the Ottomans 
finally decamped, all their provinces became independent nation-states except Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which was the only former Ottoman province to end up as a protectorate. It is 
for this reason, this thesis argues, that the 1992-95 Bosnian war and subsequent peace 
settlement represent a continuation of the inverted principle of nation building adopted in 
relation to the Bosniaks in the nineteenth century, the consequences of which continue to 
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 The two entities that were formed by the Dayton Agreement were the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the 
Serb Republic.  
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 It transpires that Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and ‘Others’ are not categorised jointly as citizens – ‘citizens’ are 
an additional, fifth group of people in the state. It is evident, therefore, that Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be 
hijacked from its citizens and confined to the three ethnically coloured groups of inhabitants.  
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have both a regional and international impact upon contemporary political developments in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
1.9 The historical background to Bosniak nation and state building 
In the nineteenth century, Bosnia and Herzegovina became the principal battleground for 
the clash between absolute Ottoman centralisation and local Bosnian autonomy, a status 
Bosnia maintained throughout Ottoman rule and which it fought to preserve in the face of 
the Ottoman reforms. These reforms, conceived in 1826, abolished the janissary guilds and 
attempted to centralise the Ottoman army. They culminated in the Tanzimat period that 
commenced in 1839 with the proclamation of an imperial edict, Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun.59 
The Tanzimat period lasted until 1876 and is discussed in more detail – particularly as 
regards its implications for Bosnia – in chapters three and four. For now, it suffices to 
mention that the controversial Tanzimat reforms were an indispensable tool for the creation 
of a loan economy, a manifestation of the globalised capitalist economic system. The 
reforms simultaneously weakened the multicultural Ottoman Empire and pursued the aim 
of creating a Turkish nation-state that would homogenise all the Muslims expelled from the 
former Ottoman provinces in Europe and Central Asia. The Bosniaks were among those 
Muslims from the former ‘Turkey in Europe’, as it became fashionable to refer to the 
Ottomans’ European lands, envisaged as integral to the new Turkish nation.  
However, this presented a problem: the Bosniaks were the Muslim millet with the 
most developed sense of identity in the entire Ottoman Empire. The millet system (millah 
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 This had its roots in the earlier reforms of the Lale Devri (Tulip Period) 1718-30. The Tanzimat lasted until 
the first Ottoman parliament in 1876. 
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in Arabic) was the form of administrative governance employed by the Ottomans that was 
based on the Islamic principle of self-administered religious communities. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was never a colony of the Ottoman Empire in the classic sense; it was 
governed by a council of âyans (local representatives) rather than by the direct decree of 
the Porte (the Ottoman central government). The Ottomans recognised the Bosniak’s 
unique ethnic fabric and they referred to all Slav-speaking Muslims as ‘Bosniaks’ rather 
than simply ‘Muslims’, as was the case with other Muslims in the empire. This dated from 
the time when the Bosnian Bogumils voluntarily accepted Islam en masse. The Bogumils 
were adherents of a medieval Bosnian religion called Bogumilism; it possessed 
fundamental features in common with Islam (Asboth 1896; Jalimam 2002; Arnold 2005), 
making the two religions symbiotic, as explained in more detail in chapter four. In response 
to the Bogomils’ conversion, the sultan granted the Bosniaks autonomy, because their 
adoption of the Muslim faith helped him fulfil his worldly duty to spread and preserve 
Islam in the provinces he conquered.  
Thus, it was not surprising that Bosniaks evinced a lively zeal for their ethnic and 
territorial autonomy when the reforms began to rein in their autonomy and prerogatives of 
self-determination. The Janissery Decree, a written promise of special treatment (Bašagić-
Redžepašić 1900: 19; Handžić 1997), represented a thing of the past for the Tanzimatçılar 
(the reformist ministers), and they used all available means to implement the reforms. This 
triggered the longest political battle to emerge in the region; no province could match the 
bitterness of the resistance displayed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, with the help 
of external interference, Bosniak autonomy was crushed and their self-determination 
extinguished in blood. Although the struggle lasted over a century and a half and had a 
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profound impact on the Bosniaks’ future national development, it remains a little studied 
historical event. This neglect is due to the absence of comprehensive, in-depth studies in 
Bosniak historiography, partly caused by the lack of availability of original documents and 
partly by the lack of translations of Bosnian primary sources into those languages most 
commonly used in academia. This thesis, therefore, offers a fresh analysis of the impact of 
the reforms on the Bosniaks’ future political development – or lack of development.  
While the development of the principle of nation building was arrested or inverted 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the decline of the Ottoman Empire simultaneously gave rise to 
various ethno-nationalisms in the Balkans, emerging predominantly from the Christian 
millets. The Great Powers of Britain, France and Russia encouraged the Christian millets to 
embrace the concept of a single ethno-national unit carved out of the post-Ottoman 
territory, using an array of secret societies dedicated to raising national awareness first 
amongst the intelligentsia and then amongst the masses (Glenny 1999; Velikonja 2003). 
The Bosniaks, however, did not receive Great Power support; they were considered to be of 
Ottoman-Islamic heritage and hence outside the cordon of international aid, which was 
dispatched exclusively to the Christian millets. Bosniaks were fighting for the rights of 
Muslims, who had been excluded from the European Enlightenment, and their allegiance to 
Islam accounted for the fact that they were never promoted as a separate nation. The 
development of a Bosniak nationality and nation-state was thwarted and forcefully curtailed 
by two external factors: the ‘reformed’ Ottoman-Turkish Empire and the Great Powers. 
Both maintained totalitarian and autocratic attitudes in their approach towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The inability of Turkish rule to act as a substitute for the former Ottoman 
supremacy over Bosnia was finally settled by the Europeans – not by giving independence 
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to Bosnia, but by drafting an agreement that placed it under Austro-Hungarian supervision. 
Although this was not the best solution for Bosnia, the geostrategic interests of the Great 
Powers did save it from extinction, as analysed in greater detail in chapters three and four.  
As for the post-Ottoman territory in the Balkans, the Great Powers of Britain, 
France, Russia and Prussia carved it up according to their whims and interests. They 
granted independence and nationhood (albeit under Great Power suzerainty) to all the 
newly emerged Slav states except one – Bosnia and Herzegovina. They agreed with the 
Turkish Tanzimat ministers that Bosnia and Herzegovina would lose almost half of its 
territory and its major port. This was followed by massive pogroms of Muslims in the lost 
Bosnian territories; those who survived were prevented from finding refuge in what 
remained of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mušović 2002; Bandžović 2006) and systematically 
shipped to Turkey, where they were ‘resettled’ and forbidden to return. The Bosniak forced 
migrations to Turkey are analysed in chapter four.  
In political terms, international mediation left Bosnia and Herzegovina with an 
undefined status, placing it under Austro-Hungarian administration. Austro-Hungarian rule 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted until the outbreak of the First World War, after which 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918, which subsequently 
became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. This period was especially hard for the 
Bosniaks; they endured agrarian reforms, during which their land and possessions were 
confiscated in exchange for government bonds that became worthless overnight. Many 
started to leave the country, initiating a second wave of emigration to Turkey whose 
policies on Bosniak resettlement had remained unchanged in anticipation of just such 
another large influx of Muslims. In addition, the Bosniaks’ political and national 
  
45 
development was limited by their need to constantly juggle the approaches of the Serbs and 
Croats, both of whom assiduously courted Bosnian Muslims, trying to persuade them to 
declare themselves as one or other nationality since their addition to either population 
would ensure supremacy in the South Slav state. Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the 
constant threat of partition between the Serbs and Croats, rendering Bosnian Muslims a 
permanent and ineffectual minority. A partition agreement finally occurred in 1939, which 
was known as the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. Its destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is discussed in chapter four. 
However, Bosnia and Herzegovina was once again unintentionally saved from 
extinction by international factors and the raison d’etat of the Great Powers (also discussed 
in chapter four). Since that time, a complex web of international realpolitik has always been 
the decisive factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fight for national recognition. It only 
managed to achieve recognition with the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1943, when it was awarded the status of republic and became constitutionally 
equal to the other five republics of Yugoslavia. However, this resolution was only 
temporary. The war of the 1990s threw the Bosnian nation-state into question again, 
placing Bosnia once more at the centre of international political interests. The 
internationally brokered Dayton Agreement produced a similar settlement to that of the 
Berlin Treaty of 1878. The status of ‘international protectorate’ reopened the question of 
Bosnian Muslim identity and their place in Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina remained an 
unresolved national issue for the Europeans; the Turks were allowed to retain their 
Ottoman-Turkish heritage, but the Bosniaks were forced to continue their fight for national 
recognition.  
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Bosnia and Herzegovina was not recognised as a separate nation-state during the 
nation-building bonanza of the nineteenth century, nor was it endorsed as a sovereign 
nation-state following the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Islam played a pivotal role 
in both periods: in the nineteenth century it prevented the formation of a fully fledged 
Bosnian nationhood, while in the twentieth the Bosniaks finally found their place in Europe 
but only through the transformation of Islam into a national identity based on the European 
principle of ‘nation equals state’ – a myopic concept that ignores the universal, 
international principles of Islam. Nineteenth-century developments are analysed in chapters 
three and four, and the twentieth century in chapters five and six.  
 
1.10 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured around seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the context, scope 
and methodology of the research, as well as defining the main terms, including, ‘neo-
Islamism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ and the contextualisation for the concepts of ‘New World 
Order’ and ‘globalisation’. Chapter two provides the theoretical background to the research, 
analysing the literature on neo-Islam and globalisation explaining the reason for adopting 
the particular view of the phenomenon endorsed by the thesis. It also illustrates the chain of 
events that had a bearing on the attitude of the Great Powers in their conduct of 
international relations in the nineteenth century. This is important for the analysis that 
follows in the subsequent chapters as it addresses the question whether the particular 
legacies of the Ottoman rule and neo-Islamism construction shaped the events during the 
1992-95 Bosnian war, given the changing world order. It also sets the tone for the main 
trends in international relations in the twentieth century during the 1992-95 Bosnian War, 
and juxtaposes them with the nineteenth
-
century ethno-liberal boom.  
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Chapter three then turns to an investigation of the historical dimension, analysing 
the extent of international influence during the ‘Eastern Question’ on the Bosniaks’ lack of 
national recognition. It also explains the European decision, following the Ottoman retreat 
from the Balkans, to establish the Bosnian province as an international protectorate, 
addressing the question of why Bosnia was not fully incorporated into the European system 
of nation-states. Chapter four analyses the continuation of the Bosniaks’ struggle for 
national recognition and describes their efforts to achieve a nation-state by opposing the 
Austrian occupation. It also follows their subsequent national development, culminating in 
an analysis of Communist Yugoslavia’s decision to acknowledge Bosniak national identity, 
although not under their historic name; the Bosniaks were placed in a novel category, that 
of a ‘Muslim nation’, which only added to the confusion and encouraged the Serbs and 
Croats to make further claims to Bosnian territory. Chapter five provides an analysis of the 
developments in international relations that impacted the break-up of Yugoslavia and 
subsequent 1992-95 Bosnian war, specifically examining the international aspect of the 
symbiosis of neo-Islam and neoliberlism. It illustrates how neo-Islam, as an ideology, 
gained such prominence in the conduct of international relations. This chapter also provides 
reasons for the neo-Islamists’ renowned interest in the plight of the Bosniaks. Chapter six 
examines the Islamic revivalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in three decades preceeding the 
1992-95 Bosnian war as well as international efforts to settle the crisis. The discussion pays 
special attention to the infiltration of the neo-Islamist group in the 1980s and analyses the 
impact of the events on the construction of neo-Islamism during the 1992-95 Bosnian war 
and its aftermath. It elaborates on the international element in the conflict in an effort to 
find an answer to the question of whether the peace settlement signed for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which ended the conflict but did not finish the war, was inevitable. Finally, 
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chapter seven summarises the research and attempts to draw out some of the trends that 
display the internationalised character of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ‘unfinished business’ – 
to borrow the phrase of Bassuener and Lyon (2009). It indicates that the Bosnian saga is, at 
present, without any resolution that could help ascertain what course Bosnia and 
Herzegovina might follow in the near future.  
The following chapter offers an analysis of the international events that formed the 
context in which the 1992-95 Bosnian war story began to unfold. An explanation of how 
the Great Powers have dealt with Bosnia and Herzegovina, both historically and in present 
times, is essential not only to understanding the course of the conflict, the subsequent 
settlement and the construction of neo-Islamism in the war, but also to an elucidation of the 
complexities that surround the recognition of a Bosnian Muslim nation.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
NEO-ISLAM AND GLOBALISATION  
Introducing the question of neo-Islam into the globalisation debate is a delicate matter and a 
challenging task. At the onset, it is important to highlight the fact that definitions on 
globalisation tend to come from predominantly Western sources and, although they claim a 
global reach, they are very much concentrated on the Western experience. Apart from 
scattered statistical references, the rest of the world, especially Muslim one, is largely 
missing from the allegedly ‘global’ analysis. Garret (1998: 1-74) asserts that even the most 
extensive contributions, fortified by a solid body of empirical evidence, refer by and large 
to the experience of the advanced industrial economies of the West. As such, they do not 
address the meaning and significance of globalisation for Islam, nor do they define the 
place of Muslims within the globalisation process. 
The main argument of this chapter is that globalisation, when observed from a 
Muslim perspective, is a continuation of Western-induced modernity, which began in the 
early nineteenth century. It accelerated with the development of capitalism based on a loan 
economy and the birth of the nation-state, both of which are concepts alien to Islam. I have 
adopted this particular approach because it was during this period that neo-Islam for the 
first time ushered the campaign to establish ethno-nationalism and the usurious practices 
the West used to gain definitive political and economic hegemony on a global scale. Hence, 
the purpose of this chapter is to give a theoretical underpinning to the thesis and to form a 
historical framework for the research question presented in the introductory chapter, as well 
as the arguments that follow during the course of the thesis. 
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In the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals started to engage with Western 
political philosophy in a conscious attempt to mitigate the effects of modernity on Islamic 
practices. However, the nation-state – accompanied by its ideological tool of nationalism – 
and the usurious economic practices of neoliberalism continue to remain as discursive, if 
not defining features of contemporary globalisation and, as such, they continue to present a 
serious challenge to Islam. Despite this, neo-Islam still makes painstaking efforts to 
reconcile the effects of globalisation with ‘classic’ Islamic norms.  
Analysis of the available evidence demonstrates that Muslims view globalisation as 
an unfolding process aimed at furthering Western interests and maintaining Western 
influence over the Muslim world; it is regarded as a Western invention and viewed with 
suspicion. In order to ascertain the extent of the links between neo-Islam and globalisation, 
the concept of ‘neo-Islam’, which definition was already provided in chapter one, now must 
first be further contextualised. This is the task of the chapter’s initial section, which consists 
of a critique of the literature on Islamism. Section two presents globalisation as the 
advancement and consolidation of the neoliberal capitalist economy. It is followed by 
analysis of Muslim chronology of globalisation. Section three analyses the globalisation 
debates, identifying two main points of controversy for neo-Islam: the state-globalisation 
debate and the disputed beginnings of globalisation. The literature review reveals that 
globalisation is an integral part of the process of modernity and therefore began a few 
centuries ago. This being the case, it is necessary to briefly historicise global Islam in terms 
of the reach, effect and eventual decline of the last Muslim empire. Section four concludes 
the chapter. It transpires that the main reason behind Western intolerance of Islam was the 
power and influence Muslims enjoyed at their imperial height, and the decline of this power 
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was ultimately the result of globalisation. As far as analysis of the links with globalisation 
are concerned, the central premise of this thesis – that neo-Islam is a force that was 
conceived during the rise of mercantile capitalism in the early nineteenth century and 
ideologically underpinned by the proliferation of nation-states and the spread of a loan 
economy – remains intact throughout the discussion. 
 
2.1 Review of the relevant literature on ‘neo-Islam’ 
Comprehensive review of the relevant literature on ‘neo-Islam’ comprises of critique of the 
current sholarship on Islamism. I first used the term neo-Islam at the conference in 
Maastricht in July 2006, presenting a paper on neo-Islamism and neoliberalism.  At that 
time this seemed a novel term, at least in the languages accessible to me: English, Turkish 
and Bosnian. Neo-Islam did not have an established literature body and was only 
sporadically used in the couple of translated articles dealing with issues of women in Islam 
(Roded 1999; Bora and Çalışkan 2007). Last year, the term appeared in one article 
(Chamkhil, October 2014), two books (Al-Da’ami 2014; Lapidus 2014) and a couple of 
newspaper columns mainly in the United States written by an Iranian journalist (Taher 
2014). Nonetheless, even the recent usage defines neo-Islam as a proliferation of radical 
Islamist networks that manifest a variety of organisational, social and political challenges to 
the Western ideology. My definition is contrary to this claim and defines neo-Islam as an 
ideology that uses the pretext of Islamic dogma, albeit distorted and misinterpreted, to 
advance, promote and implement Western orthodoxies, mainly neoliberal economic 
policies. In other words, these are neoliberal Islamist movements. Led by Saudi Arabia, 
neo-Islamists have ensured that there is a sufficient flow of money available to be borrowed 
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in order to facilitate continuation of debt economy and the incorporation of national ruling 
classes into the wealthy neoliberal global elite. Critical analysis of the available scholarship 
purports to the claim that neo-Islam is the ally of the West and not an opponent as further 
explained below. 
 
  Discourse on Islam has been a focal point of heated analysis and discussions not 
only among academic circles but it came to dominate passionate debates in broadcasting 
studios and newspaper columns, introducing controversial topic closer to general public 
into offices and homes. The trend of ‘Islamised discussions’ originated with the US-Soviet 
war in Afghanistan in the1980s, after which victorious Islamic ‘freedom fighters’, who 
fought on the side of USA, were proclaimed as grave threat to Western civilisation as 
Communism itself (Niva, 1998: 29). Niva (1998: 29) bases the rationale on the Universalist 
claims of both Islam and Communism irrespective of race, culture and territory that appeal 
globally to the less privileged segments of capitalistic societies. This line of discourse 
continued through the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s with the allegation that the same 
Mujahedins who fought Jihad in Afghanistan moved to former Yugoslavia to fulfil their 
martyrdom mission (Deliso 2007, Napoleoni 2005). The literature tried to place Bosnian 
Muslims within the context of the global proliferation of militant Islamic networks 
(Schindler 2007; Kohlmann 2004; Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; International Crisis 
Group Reports 2001). However, the arguments are generally undone by the way its authors 
invariably try to force Bosnian reality to fit their muddled Islamophobic contentions as 
already explained in the literature review at section six in chapter one.  
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The legitimate public outcry in the wake of 9/11 attacks was followed by policies 
that encouraged Muslim witch-hunt and street back-clash heightening debates on Islam. By 
now, they contained more pronounced anti-Islamic tune and eventually served as 
justification for the subsequent Western invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The themes 
encompassing Islam showed no signs of abating, and generally continued to burden Islam 
with negative images and often misconceived concepts. Bias was aided by certain academia 
circles, which provided scholarly veneer for hegemonic neoliberal political platform for 
leading Western regimes. Prime example is a British-born and American-adopted scholar, 
Bernard Lewis, who in the essay ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ written in 1990 coined the 
term ‘clash of civilizations’ claiming that the conflict between Islam and the West was 
always present but it reached its final stages with the end of the Cold War. Using 
credentials of an historian and a former intelligence officer, the subsequent, well-timed 
works demonized Islam as an imminent threat to Western capitalistic economies (Lewis, 
1996; 1998; 2002). Even though he was criticised for the lack of the objective approach and 
analytical omission in his modern analysis (Alam 2002; Miles 2004; Gresh 2005), he was 
nonetheless proclaimed by the mainstream media reviewers as a ‘doyen of Middle Eastern 
Studies’ (The New Your Sun, Wall Street Journal 2006) and ‘a pillar of wisdom in the great 
Islamic debate’ (The Times, 2006).  Lewis was a recipient of a lavish birthday party thrown 
in his honour by Dick Cheney, the former US Vice-President, an occasion which served as 
a round-table gathering of like-minded intellectuals discussing the relationship between 
Islam and the West in the 21
st
 century. Present at the event were also Samuel Huntington, a 
scholar with political career who adopted and famed the Lewis’s terminology of 
civilizational clash, and his fellow-colleague Frances Fukuyama, who advanced the thesis 
of Western Liberal Ideology over the rest, and especially Islam. Both of these authors will 
  
54 
be further discussed in chapter five due to their relevance in hailing neoliberal structure as 
well as derogatory neo-imperial sentiments they intellectually grounded on differential 
position of Islam vis-a-vis West. Writing in the influential Foreign Affairs, Robert Kagan 
(1996: 23-27), similarly observed that the tantalising grip of the new world order witnessed 
the re-emergence of traditional faultline between Islamic fundamentalism, representing the 
world’s absolutism, and West, as an embodiment of free liberal thought, for which reason 
he called for a greater vigilance of Western democratic institutions.     
 
This symbiosis of policy formulation anchored in partisan scientific evidence 
greatly contributed to politicising discourse on Islam at the global level. Not only partial 
policies were implemented, but also some previously marginalized parties and personalities 
inserted themselves into the very mainstream Western politics, often using Muslims as their 
scapegoats (Zemni and Parker 2002: 235). In a political rehearsal the topics on Islam were 
deployed in many forms: Fundamentalist, Political, Moderate, Secular, Cultural, Militant, 
but essentially the Other. Even those scholars who relied on significant intellectual powers 
and available empirical evidence to incorporate Islam in the complex constellations of 
contemporary world, generally became susceptible to offering recommendations how to re-
educate Muslims, and thus, albeit inadvertently, reinforced the point of incommensurable 
system value of Muslims to the Western space of socio-political affiliation.  The impressive 
collection of articles on a wide-ranging selection of topics on Islam - from Diaspora studies 
and Muslim education to participation, assimilation as well as studies dealing with reach of 
anti-Muslim xenophobic sentiments – was usefully compiled and edited by Swayd (ed. 
2007). 
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Whilst one current of thought invested a significant intellectual energy in defending 
Islam (Halliday 1994, Humphrey 1998, Eickelman, 1999, Kalim 2002, Cesari 2003, 
Esposito and Haddad 2003, Keppel 2004), the other one contextualised Islam as a post-
Cold War ideology belonging to a family of ‘anti-systemic movements’ (Arrighi, Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, 1989). Postmodernist interpretations conform to explaining politicising 
Islam as the defeat of the Enlightenment (Turner, 1994), or ultra-religious political 
expressions which activism is placed within time and place abstracted from modern social 
context (Sivan 1985, Voll 1994, Mary and Appleby, 1994, Baker, 2003). To protect the 
West from politically awakened but egregious Muslim masses, Daniel Pipes (2006) 
suggested creating internment camps for the US-based Muslims, such as those built for the 
Japanese during the World War Two.   
 
Public, media, intellectual and political discourses generally stereotype Muslims as 
commendably well presented in illustrious study of Morey and Yaqin (2010). In their view, 
Muslims are bifurcated into one of two categories: Backwards or Terrorists. In this respect, 
two streams of scholarly approach beg to differ. The first one focuses research on historical 
evidence emphasizing medieval Islamic contribution to the scientific and technological 
development of the West. Goody (2004: 8) belongs to this group and he argues that 
whatever the problems with Islam, it was not only to be seen as attached to the ‘backward 
other’ but is in fact essentially intrinsic to the Western norms of Christianity and Judaism 
Rather than being an alien socio-cultural tradition and foreign religion, Islam ‘has long 
been established within Europe and has had a great influence not only on its politics but on 
its culture more generally’ (Goody 2004: 16). Since its first conquest of Europe, Islam had 
penetrated almost all areas of Western life from science, technology, agriculture, classical 
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mathematics, philosophy, trade, architecture and literature. Much of the Enlightenment and 
Renaissance periods are owed to the Muslim translators of classical resources. The Arabic 
inscriptions have been found on the Isle of Man and date as early as the eleventh century or 
the well documented English trade with the Saracens can be traced way back to the 
medieval period (Melitziki 1997: 127). These and other are discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Second group of scholars endeavour to present Islam as a proximate political 
phenomenon, consequential to the emergence of economic neo-liberalisation programmes. 
Since the conditions attached to the finance received generally resulted in a decline in state 
provision of social welfare and increased poverty and inequality (El-Said and Harrrigan 
2003), this trend analysed Islam as either a force behind provincial protest movements 
against the penetration of neo-liberal regimes in the Arab world in the 1980s (Fandy 1994; 
Buşra 1998; Ismail 2000), or a powerful unifying factor in mobilizing social movements to 
fill in the gap for support networks (Denoux 1993, Wickham 2002, Wiktorowitz 2004). 
Joel Benin (2005) went one step further in asserting that Islam – based on Turkish and 
Egyptian experiences he explored - does not represent the recrudescence of backwardness 
and rejection of modernity, but is the integral part of modernity. They endeavour to present 
Islamism as a proximate political phenomenon, a consequence of the emergence of 
economic programmes of neoliberalisation in contemporary international relations.  
The research in this thesis builds on this strand of scholarship but attempts to take a 
more original approach. I base my arguments on interpretations that claim that neither 
Islamic norms in general nor the socio-political blueprint Islam itself has adopted lie 
outside the parameters of modern power relations. Since its inception, Islam has claimed a 
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full participatory role in the establishment of society and state, occasionally in quite 
revolutionary ways.
60
 Islamic participation in the formation of international political 
dialogue has never ceased. If a modern Islamic contribution has taken place in a more 
negative way than witnessed in previous history, this is because of the synergy of Islamism 
with neoliberalism. This thesis, therefore, seeks to establish the claim that not only is 
Islamism compatible with neoliberal doctrines, but it is neoliberalism’s perfect adherent, 
and for this reason it can be aptly termed ‘neo-Islamism’. Neoliberalism emerged as a key 
conceptual reflection and empirical political agency that replaced economic processes 
previously dubbed globalization (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Castells 2000; Rosemond 
2000; McMichael 2000; Hay 2002). The next section explains the paradigm shift from 
globalisation to neoliberlism. 
2.2 The paradigm shift to neoliberalism 
Following the initial enchantment with globalisation,
61
 the scholars gradually became 
sceptical about the so-called ‘benefits’ of globalisation, recognising the retrograde 
tendencies it contained. This is perhaps due to the fact that by the late twentieth century 
globalisation had mutated into neoliberalism, shifting the discussion towards a new 
paradigm. The following quote from Hirst and Thompson (1996: 6) is representative of the 
general mood of scholarship: ‘Globalization is a myth suitable for a world without 
                                                 
60
 This pertains, for example, to matters such as the equal position of women and the conduct of state affairs. 
Women had full participatory electoral rights, and could even stand as candidates for the position of caliph 
(the head of the Islamic state). Also, the first four leaders of the Muslim community (‘rightly guided’ caliphs) 
ran state affairs on the principle of mutual consultation (shura). Policies had to be publicly approved and 
accepted through sworn allegiance (bai’ah). This was sometimes expressed by means of a referendum (the 
second caliph, Umar, was elected in this way).  
61
 cf. Appendices III and IV. This contains an indication of the literature on globalisation from 1980 to 1998, 
which seems to have developed at a faster pace than the phenomenon itself. The literature originates from a 
remarkable diversity of authors, ranging from postmodernist scholars, social theorists, pedantic empiricists, 
economists and geographers to politicians, businessmen and management consultants.  
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illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope.’ This group of scholars considers the 
process of globalisation as generally unfettered by ethical and moral considerations (Ritchie 
1996), for which reason they challenge the whole concept of globalisation, both its theory 
and its practice. They see it as a euphemism for capitalism and neoliberalism, as it has been 
commonly pronounced that globalisation faces ‘no threat from any viable contrary political 
project, for it is held that Western social democracy and socialisms of the Soviet bloc are 
both finished’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 6; Fukuyama 2000). In this vein, Harvey (1996, 
cited in Kelly 1999: 385) summarises globalisation as a ‘spatial fix for capitalism and an 
ideological tool with which to attack socialists’. In the same fashion, Steingard and 
Fitzgibbons (1995, cited in Kelly 1999) describe the entire process of conceptualising 
globalisation as a strategic tool exogenous to the capitalistic forces of globalisation, 
creating … 
… an ideological construct devised to satisfy capitalism’s need for new 
markets and labour sources and propelled by the uncritical ‘sycophancy’ of 
the international academic business community. (Steingard and Fitzgibbons, 
cited in Kelly 1999: 383) 
 
Walck and Bilimoria (cited in Kelly 1999) further argue that the discourse of globalisation 
has been utilised as cover for a different ideological agenda:  
[G]lobalisation is not an output of the ‘real’ forces of markets and 
technologies, but is rather an input in the form of rhetorical and discursive 
constructs, practices and ideologies which some groups are imposing on 
others for political and economic gain. (Walck and Bilimoria, cited in Kelly 
1999, 1995: 383) 
This group of scholars generally protest against the attribution of too powerful a 
role to globalisation, since the logic of ‘there is no alternative’ is used to pursue a neoliberal 
policy agenda (Thompson 1997: 151). However, since globalisation has been promoted by 
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international organisations and spurred on by the actions of governments (Castells 2000), it 
is not surprising that the globalisation discourse remains overwhelmingly powerful. As 
Reed (2002) explains:  
The message of globalization is so thoroughly integrated into public 
discourse by mass media owned by the globalizers themselves, a 
phenomenon known as convergence. The result is resignation and 
demobilization. That is precisely its design: to demonstrate that no other 
form of discourse is possible. (Reed 2002 [online]) 
 
Gill (1997) argues that the ‘globalising elites’, whom he defines as transitional ‘fractions’ 
of the world’s capitalistic classes, promote powerful globalisation discourses in a form he 
terms ‘a new disciplinary constitutionalism’, in order to create regulatory frameworks 
suitable for the advancement of their interests. In the same vein, Boos (2003) states that 
globalisation, as envisaged by political and corporate elites, turns out to be a socio-political 
movement based on its own oligarchic doctrine: 
Globalisation is a philosophy, an ideology like socialism, Marxism, 
communism, which means domination of the economic, political, social and 
cultural world [by] one or a few powers. It is nothing else than the [return] 
through the backdoor of the decried … monopolies and oligopolies [of ill 
repute]. (Boos 2003: 3) 
 
McMichael (2000: 348) further outlines globalisation as ‘an emerging vision of the world 
and its resources as a globally organized and managed free trade/free enterprise economy 
pursued by a largely unaccountable political and economic elite’. Meanwhile, Rosamond 
(2000: 10) poses the question of whether globalisation’s actors ‘knowingly and strategically 
seek to construct the world in ways consistent with their interests’. His suggestion of a 
‘strategic pathway’ comes in useful when evaluating the material conditions created by the 
process of globalisation (2000: 9-10).  
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In this sense, a paraphrased synopsis of Castells’ (2000: 162) three-volume work 
serves as a conclusive summary of this group’s theories. He describes the entire process 
‘perceived under the label of globalisation’ as a consciously induced and politically 
constituted amplifying force that connects only the dominant segments of national 
economies, and the elites within them, by dramatically expanding markets and tapping into 
new sources of capital and skilled labour. This process has resulted in the formation of the 
‘new economy’. This is still the capitalist economy, but, facilitated by the revolution in 
information technology, it has spread on a global scale: ‘[F]or the first time in history, the 
whole planet is capitalist or dependent on its connection to global capitalist networks’ 
(Castells 2000: 160). This achievement, Castells insists, shows that globalisation was not 
built in a vacuum. He argues that it was ‘a conscious product of the decisive and tentative 
capitalistic agenda’ that evolved and replicated itself through governmental policies that 
created a ‘new global economy’: 
Yet, neither technology nor business could have developed the global 
economy on its own. The decisive agents in setting up a new, global 
economy were governments, and particularly the governments of the 
wealthiest countries, the G-7, and their ancillary international institutions, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation. Three interrelated policies created the foundations for 
globalization: deregulation of domestic economic activity (starting with 
financial markets); liberalization of international trade and investment; and 
privatization of publicly controlled companies (often sold to foreign 
investors). (Castells 2000: 137) 
 
The institutions named above were essential to advancing the process of globalisation, 
which later consolidated itself as a neoliberal ideology, which economic implications upon 
countries and Neo-Islamic response are discussed in more detail in chapter five. With the 
help of governmental intervention, globalisation obtained its final features as a capitalist 
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network that created a cleavage in global development, due to the fact that its sole goal was 
profit.  
In contrast to the previous globalisation research bonanaza, this wave of scholars 
included Muslim voices for the first time. The general flavour of the Muslim works 
published in English is highly critical of the entire process of globalisation, believing it to 
bear neo-colonial connotations. This is not surprising as neoliberalism’s urge for profit and 
exploitation encouraged Western imperialist expansion, which eventually conquered and 
colonised most of the Muslim world. When reading these works, it becomes apparent that 
Muslim scholars were wary of the entire process even before it became fashionable to 
criticise globalisation, but their studies were simply not available in the lingua franca of 
contemporary scholarship. The uneven development of globalisation has meant that 
scholars who wish to expound their views on the impact of globalisation on their societies 
are constrained by the need to publish in English. Mittelman (2002: 22) emphasises the 
need to de-centre the focus of globalisation and widen the origins of participating 
researchers, pointing to the number of scholars from all parts of the world whose works are 
unavailable in English.  
 
2.2.1 A Muslim chronology of globalisation  
Muslim scholarship sees globalisation as two extremes: either as an unavoidable and 
beneficial reality or as a neo-colonial force, sweeping all before it. For example, a Bosnian 
compilation, published as a series in Forum Bosnae,
62
 projects an image of globalisation 
imported from the West, while Neeraj (2001: 7), on the other hand, proclaims it to be 
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nothing less than ‘recolonisation in a new garb’. An exemplary English publication on the 
Muslim Arab view of globalisation comes from Najjar, who helpfully summarises the huge 
volume of Arabic literature on globalisation. In his study, Najjar (2005: 91-103) divides 
Arab intelligentsia into three groups: those who reject globalisation altogether as the 
highest stage of imperialism; those who are secularist by nature and call for efforts to 
‘benefit from the positive opportunities of globalisation’; and those whom he considers as 
naively trying to accommodate globalisation with the cultural and economic interests of the 
Arab and Muslim peoples. 
Among the Muslim studies on globalisation, Malaysia has by and large been the 
most vociferous interlocutor. In 2000 the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding 
published a large volume on issues concerning Islam and globalisation. This highly 
acclaimed work observes the impact of globalisation on Islam from various economic and 
financial perspectives, touching upon issues of culture, politics, the economy and Islamic 
banking. The driving force behind this active Malaysian scholarship appears to have been 
the country’s phenomenal economic success. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, 
Malaysia, alongside other East Asian countries, fell victim to currency speculation and the 
volatile inflow and outflow of foreign funds. However, while all the other newly enriched 
East Asian economies – also known as the ‘Asian Tigers’ – crumbled after foreign currency 
traders decided to abruptly withdraw their money,
63
 Malaysia was the only country to 
emerge from the crisis without having succumbed to the lure of incremental loans issued by 
the IMF or World Bank. This fortunate outcome was mainly due to the wit and intelligence 
of its prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Following his successful resurrection of the 
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country out of the ashes of bankruptcy, he became a zealous, uninhibited critic of 
globalisation, speaking his mind on what he termed as the ‘conquering euphemism known 
as globalization’ (Mahathir 2002). In 2002 he published a work that provides compelling 
reading for researchers interested in the impact of globalisation on Muslims. It comprises a 
compilation of Mahathir’s selected speeches on globalisation, delivered at various 
occasions in many different countries, and provides an incisive critique of the phenomenon 
from a Muslim perspective. The following quote serves as the best summary of the book, 
and offers a potentially conclusive challenge to the entire Muslim scholarship on 
globalisation studies: 
Muslim countries and Muslim governments have a duty to ensure that 
globalisation will not result in the marginalisation of their countries as 
happened with the Industrial Revolution and Industrial Age. We cannot 
afford this at this time. If once again we miss the opportunity to keep pace 
with the radical and rapid advances now being made with technology and 
the sciences, and the changes they cause to the world’s perception of things, 
the new ideas and concepts in human and international relations; if we miss 
all these and fail to handle them, then we will not only be marginalised, but 
be dominated and hegemon[ised] permanently. (Mahathir 2002: 53) 
Thus, critical examination of the available evidence demonstrates that while the 
West has seen globalisation as representing a sea of opportunities – no matter how selective 
and shallow - Muslims have generally regarded it as a threat to their culture, economy and 
existence. The analysis also suggests that globalisation is not considered to be the first 
phenomenon of this kind; the advent of capitalism, accelerated by modernisation and 
Westernisation, provided precedents (Mahathir 2002). This suspicion harks back to the 
Crusades and to the colonisation and Western imperial domination of the Muslim world 
(Najjar 2005), commencing with the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries via the medium of mercantile capitalism, whose expansion was advanced by a 
rising bourgeois class.  
In the Ottoman state, the representative Muslim state of the time, it was regarded as 
obligatory for all sources of wealth to be dedicated to the preservation of the stability of 
society and the power of the ruler, the main protector of the ‘community of the faithful’, 
rather than the empowerment of the individual. In accordance with Islamic tradition, the 
primary concern of the empire was always the fiscal interest of the state and the protection 
of the domestic consumer as opposed to the capitalist economy, which was driven by profit 
and the interests of an absolutist monarch or ruling elite. Hence, all economic activities 
were regulated by the state in order to achieve this goal (Guida 2007: 14). The government 
strictly regulated the supply of raw materials, the delivery of surpluses to the palace 
(preventing agents from seizing them for themselves), and the prices at which produce was 
sold (Inalcik 1994). However, the main point of divergence with European capitalism was 
the esnaf (guilds), which were specifically established to ensure the subsistence and 
harmony of society through the creation of a web of mutual assistance and solidarity. This 
system discouraged overproduction: wealth accumulation through uncontrolled profit was 
managed by the strict supervision of production, which did not permit any change in the 
style and quality of the produce. If a member of a guild became too rich, his fellows would 
expel him, considering his greed to be immoral (Guida 2007: 15). Through such tight 
supervision, the state ensured that the surplus was directed towards the government, rather 
than ending up as profit in an agent’s hands. The state also controlled sales on the market 
by fixing prices, in consultation with the guilds, and by buying produce at a specially 
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allocated place at a fixed profit of ten percent, or in exceptional circumstances, twenty 
percent (Faroqhi 1994: 589-598).  
While these measures curtailed profiteering, fraud and, most importantly, 
speculation, which was strictly forbidden in Islam, they also obstructed the development of 
capitalism, which relies on competition, cheap labour and the competitive production of 
goods for the world markets (Inalcik 1994: 49). Above all, it prevented the formation of the 
sort of oligarchic elite crucial for the formation and advancement of capitalism. The idea of 
profit for its own sake, without social considerations, had no precedent in Islamic tradition, 
and Muslim jurists rejected it as un-Islamic. This all changed with the process of 
modernisation and reform, as will be discussed in the next chapter. The reforms heralded 
early Neo-Islamic practices that in the nineteenth century expedited the series of treaties 
known as the ‘capitulations’64. These granted Europeans access to the vast Muslim markets 
across the Ottoman Empire, which they flooded with cheap exports, leaving Muslim 
products lagging even further behind. The effect is still evident today, while the 
relationship with Neo-Islamist continues to flourish as purpoted by intra-Muslim conflicts 
around the globe.  
The hereditary right to land ownership was also prohibited by Islam. The classical 
model of the Ottoman state had tight monitoring and regulatory mechanisms, which 
supervised relations between peasant and master. The landowners were ruthlessly and 
efficiently regulated by the state; they were were unable to use the land as private 
investment and were prevented from passing it on to their heirs, thus disabling the 
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formation of an aristocratic elite that could establish and preserve such a system. Equally, 
they did not have ultimate power over the peasants: they owned neither the peasants nor the 
land, but simply possessed customary rights to their produce (Mazower 2001: 32). In the 
words of an Ottoman document that refers to these Islamic principles: 
The land, which was in the [hands] of [the] reaya (peasantry) at the time of 
the conquest, was settled upon them once more with ownership held in trust 
for the Muslim community. (cited in McGowan 1981: 54-55) 
Mazower (2001: 33) observes that the result of this arrangement was that ‘the 
peasants themselves enjoyed more control over their lives than their counterparts in most of 
Europe’. Ultimately, state intervention obstructed the formation of a landowning class, and 
thus another of the main requirements for the successful establishment of capitalism was 
left unfulfilled. By jettisoning the main features of the new economic system, the Ottomans 
stalemated the penetration of capitalism. However, these conditions were to change 
permanently with the reform of land ownership, which heralded the demise of the old 
Ottoman land regime and its replacement by new privately owned estates. The new owners 
comprised not only newly enriched Muslim notables, but also local and European 
Christians. The rise of what are known as chiflik estates is among the most bitterly 
contested of issues in Ottoman historiography (Stoianovich 1992: 15-39).
 
It is unclear 
whether they were caused by the opportunities afforded by the international economy and 
the emergence of mercantile capitalism, or were procured through the corruption of 
oppressive tax-farming landlords. In either case, the outcome was a deterioration of living 
standards among the peasantry, as well as the erosion of the Ottoman state’s centralised 
control over the rich, unruly and disloyal class of local notables (Mardin 1989).  
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This brief historical overview is crucial to an understanding of the impact of 
economic globalisation upon Muslims. The debate on the link between globalisation and 
Neo-Islam, is discussed in the following section. This explains in more detail why it is 
important to consider globalisation, in its historical dimension, as an imperialistically 
driven capitalist force, with the nation-state system as its ideological underpinning. By 
implication, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, which was precipated by the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, needs to be placed in this context. This is for two reasons: first, it 
was the last stronghold of socialism in Europe and, perhaps, the world; secondly, it was a 
compound multinational state that prospered because of its diversity of cultures and 
viewpoints. The following section on the state-versus-globalisation debate, followed by a 
discussion on the existence of an Islamic precedent to the process of globalisation, provides 
more detail.  
 
2.3 The state-globalisation relationship 
In discussing the relationship between the state and globalisation, the most vexed question 
is that which revolves around theories of the state and state sovereignty. The main question 
this debate raises is whether the state is in retreat (Reich 1991; Strange 1996; Camilleri and 
Falk 1992; Held et al. 1999; Beck 2000), has become an agent of globalisation (Cox 1997; 
Hoogvelt 1997; Gordon 1988; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Waltz 1999), or has acquired an 
even more active role as the author of globalisation (Panitch 1996; Wallerstein 2000). In 
addition, there is a totally opposing view, which sees globalisation as a redundant concept 
(Zysman 1996). In relation to the state-globalisation issue, Hobson and Ramesh (2002: 6) 
advance the debate by organising their research around a diametrically opposed discourse. 
On the one hand, they identify a ‘structuralist’ approach that rests on ‘the assumption that 
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the capitalist world economy forms global structures which require states to adapt to its 
constraining logic’. On the other hand, they group opposing views into an ‘agent-centric’ 
approach, which maintains that ‘globalisation remains weak to the extent that the national 
sovereign states remain strong’ (Hobson and Ramesh 2002: 7). Their findings conclude that 
the debate over the relationship between the state and globalisation ‘tends to promote a 
zero-sum conception of power in which there is a trade-off between global structures and 
states-as-agents’ (2002: 7). However, rather than adopting such an approach, they suggest a 
‘collective-sum’ approach, due to the fact that ‘states enhance their power “through” or 
“with” global (and domestic) forces’ (2002: 10). In other words, states are ‘spatially 
promiscuous’,65 so that ‘globalisation makes of states what states make of it’ (2002: 22). 
The nation-state and globalisation are entangled in a mutually reinforcing relationship; the 
tenacity of the nations-state has not been diminished vis-à-vis the forces of globalisation 
(Clark 1999; Mann 1988; Weiss 1998; Wade 1996; Kennedy 1993; Strange 1988).  
Koehane and Nye (2000) assert that the state-centred paradigm is the approach best 
suited to the globalisation debate because the nation-state still possesses a dominant and 
resilient structure. Hardt and Negri (2000: 10-11) argue that globalisation consists of the 
history of imperialism and nation-states, which have created a ‘fluid, infinitely expanding 
and highly organised system that encompasses the world’s entire population’. Luke (2008) 
considers nation-states to be the main building blocks of globalisation, and their 
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government apparatus as the only driving force that can endorse and legitimise the process. 
Nationalism serves as a mandatory tool in the institutionalisation and perseverance of the 
nation-state mechanism as a global system. A glimpse of contemporary nationalist practices 
around the world confirms that the idea of the nation-state is still present; it does not seem 
to have been weakened by globalisation. Irrespective of a shrinking world, divisions along 
the lines of national identity still persist (Geertz 1998; Ignatieff 1997). As a consequence, 
the fact that physical barriers between countries are proliferating around the globalised 
world does not come as a surprise.  
The main progenitors of these new barriers seem to be national governments, with 
their divisive policies. Israel’s new wall in the occupied West Bank, and the mined fences it 
has built around the Gaza Strip and those separating the country from Lebanon, Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria, are well known. However, many other walls have either been completed 
or are in the process of being built around the world: for example, India has recently 
finished a 4,100km-long wall with Bangladesh; Thailand has walled off its border with 
Malaysia; China is intent on physically keeping North Korea at a distance from its booming 
economy; and Iran is similarly constructing a concrete wall along the Baluchistan border 
with Pakistan. Perhaps the most assiduous barrier-builder, however, is Saudi Arabia. 
Alongside its $8.5 billion fence along its Yemeni border, the Saudis have constructed ‘a 
state-of-the-art wall guarding their frontier with Iraq, which includes face-recognition 
software and even automated weapons’ (Prospect 2007: 8). This is an important factor to 
remember when Saudi Arabia’s role as the leading neo-Islamist regime, which endeavours 
to subordinate other Muslims to its neoliberal doctrine, is discussed in chapter five. 
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It is interesting to note that walls are mainly being erected in areas with a Muslim- 
majority population. At first glance, this seems extraordinarily surprising, because the 
concepts of division and alienation essentially contradict Islamic fundamentals.
66
 However, 
closer investigation reveals that these physical, concrete borders are not an entirely novel 
phenomenon but are, in fact, a fortified continuation of the national borders drawn up 
during the imperial expansion of the European Great Powers. While for Europe, the 
emergence of ethno-nationalism offered its peoples the opportunity to define themselves 
under the flag of the Enlightenment, for Muslims it was a completely new socio-political 
structure, leading to their eventual enslavement.
67
 These borders, which were built with the 
endorsement and often at the instigation of the governments of the Muslim states in 
question, are an important factor in the understanding of the significance of the nation-state 
concept in the study of Islam and globalisation, as well as serving to contextualise the 
recent Bosnian war and the atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims. This is because 
the nation-state, and by implication nationalism, in a Western ethno-liberal sense, are alien 
and relatively novel to Islam. Kedourie (1993: 68), who has written several influential 
works on the development of nationalism both in Europe and in regions outside the 
European-Christian cultural arena, confirms that nationalism is not a universal phenomenon 
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but ‘a product of European thought in the last 150 years’. Thus, it transpires that 
nationalism is a recent phenomenon for Europe too.  
Nevertheless, Europe is still considered the ‘home’ of nationalism, and although its 
progress was painstakingly slow at times, it has developed evenly in every direction within 
the region.
68
 In European nations, it was considered a tool of liberation from the chains of 
religion and a medium of cooperation and coexistence for peoples sharing common beliefs 
and values. Aside from historic conflicts such as the First World War, which the following 
chapters demonstrate was more a product of the imperialist greed of the elites rather than 
the animosity of Europe’s peoples, European nations generally benefited from the 
emergence of the nation-state on both a domestic and international level. In modern times, 
these beneficial effects have become even more prominent. A case in point is the European 
Union, a project which – although often disputed, criticised and generally considered as 
unfinished
69
 – has, nonetheless, brought great cultural, commercial and financial betterment 
to its member states, primarily due to the funds it makes available to them. 
By contrast, the Muslim world was from the outset at odds with ethno-nationalism. 
The underlying reason was not lack of recognition of diversity in Islam. Based upon 
Qur’anic revelations, Islam acknowledges and, in a way, cherishes cultural pluralism. 
Moreover, Islam orders people to cooperate, to help one another according to its precepts of 
goodness and piety, and not to harbour evil or malice (Qur’an 5: 2). This principle was fully 
endorsed by the Prophet Muhammad on the local level, regardless of the religion of one’s 
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neighbour. Ramadan (2001: 198), for example, describes Muhammad asking Ibn Thabit, 
one of his companions, to learn Hebrew for the sake of understanding and communication. 
This principle was extended to the international level in cases where neighbouring countries 
developed mutually beneficial economic and political relations with the Islamic world. 
However, based upon historical analysis and contemporary evidence, it can be seen that the 
principle of modern ethno-nationalism was not devised to serve as a tool of cooperation for 
Muslim countries. It was, rather, a European export in the form of an ideological and 
strategic weapon bestowed upon the Muslim elites to ensure European colonial supremacy 
following the end of the Ottoman Empire.  
The ruling Muslim elite was trained and encouraged to govern in a colonial style, a 
tried-and-tested recipe with a proven track record across many continents. Armstrong 
(2001: 141) sees in this a process of modernisation in which ‘Islamdom [sic] was quickly 
and permanently reduced to a dependent bloc by European powers’. As a result, an 
increasing resentment of Western ideas, and the ultimate rejection of westernised segments 
of the Muslim population, became the most common feature of almost every Muslim 
society. It was the rise of the nation-state, in a liberal European sense, that created the 
cleavage in Muslim societies, giving birth to a battle between modernists, who embraced 
the ideology of nationalism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries, and hardliners – a battle that continues to this day. The rancour of the hardliners 
grew to the point where they considered modernists to be apostates, who deserved to be 
subjected to the most severe penal code. For example, Lazzerini (1988: 156) quotes the 
Russian Muslim religious leader, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, as denouncing the modernists’ 
secular beliefs in the following terms: ‘Whoever believes in God and Muhammad must be 
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an enemy of the modernists. For them the Shari’a demands the death penalty.’ Davutoğlu 
(1994) sums up the challenges faced by Muslims in the wake of the conceptualisation of the 
liberal nation-state system: 
Perhaps the most radical changes in the institutionalisation of the state in 
Islamic history came with the end of caliphate. This turning point and the 
following stage of the imposition of the nation-state system in Muslim lands 
created an imaginative and structural confusion among the masses. The 
demarcation and internal consistency between umma, Dar-al-Islam and dawlah 
(the Islamic State) was lost while new political structures as nation-states 
populated by Muslims faced a comprehensive problem of political legitimacy. 
(Davutoğlu 1994: 193) 
The nation-state’s lack of political legitimacy among Muslims stemmed from its 
lack of historical precedence and the absence of Qur’anic textual reference. Traditionally, 
Muslim scholars and leaders have always looked to the Qur’an and the Sunnah (a living 
commentary on the Qur’an through the Prophet’s deeds and utterances) for guidance over 
the permissibility of certain actions and adoption of new concepts. The Qur’an does not 
refer to the concept of the nation-state in any shape or form but contains instead a great 
number of references to ‘society’. Hence, the concept of the nation-state has never been 
truly developed in the Muslim tradition. There was only a rudimentary form of a city-nation 
in Madinah (or Medina), which was under the constant threat of attack by Muhammad’s 
opponents. For this reason, Muhammad established a society on the basis of a partnership 
between Jews, pagan idol-worshippers and Muslims, which was legitmated by a treaty 
commonly known as the Sahifat al-Madinah (the Medina Constitution). Medina was a 
pluralist nation-city, comprising Muslims and non-Muslims, united in the common goal of 
defending the city under the name of Ummah Wahadah or the ‘One Ummah’. Whether the 
concept of the ‘ummah’ in early Muslim history refers only to Muslims or whether it 
includes Jews and others is a point of divergence among scholars. Nevertheless, the all-
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embracing essence of Islam, regardless of race or culture, is a commonplace. Examples 
from Islamic history testify to the overall inclusion of non-Muslims, commonly referred to 
as dhimmies (‘People of the Book’), with whom successful economic and cultural 
cooperation was an essential part of life under any form of Muslim rule.  
In sharp contrast, when Europeans developed the concept of the nation-state, 
inclusiveness and acceptance of diversity became obsolete. A multiplicity of cultures, races 
and religions in one state was not tolerated, and demands to ensure the exlusion, and often 
extinction, of the ‘other’ led to bitter and destructive warfare (Toynbee 1957; Hayes 1960; 
Carr 1983). This intolerance was primarily channelled towards Muslim minorities 
(Ekmečić 1996). Muslims in the nation-states that emerged in the Balkans following the 
Ottoman withdrawal from the region were either expelled or killed, as related in chapter 
three. To form a European nation-state with a majority Muslim population was beyond 
feasibility in such a system. This is the reason why Bosnian Muslims never succeeded in 
forming a nation-state after the Ottomans abandoned them, while their neighbours – the 
Serbs and Croats – successfully established their own nation-states, as explained in more 
detail in chapter four. With the formation of nation-states, other Muslims fell prey to an 
expansive European imperialism, arising from the desire of each newly defined 
independent polity in Europe to demonstrate its might (Kohn 1948: 16). 
For this reason, those Muslim scholars who first came into contact with the 
concepts of the nation-state and nationalism were highly suspicious of these ideas. Since 
their very first contact with nationalistic ideology, Muslim scholars and thinkers pondered 
over its compatibility with Islam. Pioneers of Muslim modernism generally rejected any 
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analogy between Islam and the modern European nation-state;
70
 the exceptions to this rule 
were those Muslim intellectuals who occupied high ranks in the colonial service or were 
promoted by the Europeans (mainly British imperialists), who reiterated the imperialist 
view that nationalism was a European product it was necessary to inflict upon the Muslim 
world in order to reinforce colonial rule.
71
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 Particularly famous Muslim thinkers and philosophers opposed to the ethno-liberal nation-state were 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-1897), his disciple and colleague Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and 
Abduh’s student and aide Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1936). They rejected the idea of Islam as a tool to 
establish nationalism or imperialism, instead of a community of all peoples, a ‘league of nations’, in which 
recognition of artificial boundaries and racial distinction are only intended for the sake of convenience, an 
identifying reference rather than restrictive social borders for the members of the thus-defined community 
(Amin 1988, 1991). For more on the writings of al-Afghani, see Keddie (1983). Muhammad Iqbal (1877-
1938) was another pioneering modernist who rejected the idea of Western nationalism and its temporal and 
spatial attributes. He insisted that neither unity of language and country nor identity of economic interests 
binds Muslims together, but advocated the idea of the spiritual unity of the society founded by the Prophet of 
Islam (for more on the thought of Muhammad Iqbal, see Vahid 1964). Nevertheless, at the All India Muslim 
League meeting held in 1930, Iqbal was the first to advocate a separate national state for the Muslims of 
India, following which he was knighted by the British. This event placed him in the group that was viewed 
with suspicion by their contemporaries, as explained in the following footnote below.  
71
 Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) is perhaps the most immediate example. He was a member of the judicial 
service in British India. He was knighted by the British and reached the highest rank then open to Indians. 
Khan cooperated with British in many fields, for example by founding the Anglo-Oriental Muhammedan 
College, where he lectured on Islamic issues, even though he held no formal Islamic training. His British 
contacts and frequent visits to the UK meant he was often seen as an agent of the West and frequently 
denounced for introducing innovative Islamic practices that were deemed illegitimate (for more on this 
subject, see al-Mahdi 1983: 231; Ahmad 1983). Innovation or bi’da is equated with heresy in Islam. This 
classification occurred in the ninth century, when all four fiqh (Sunni schools of jurisprudence) closed the 
gates of ijtihad (the rational extension of Islamic law) and basically ‘froze’ a great majority of Qur’anic and 
Sunnah interpretations. Another example is the above-cited Muhammad Iqbal. Although he was at first an 
opponent of the ethno-liberal nation-state, Iqbal was later in favour of territorial and national identification 
and very much an apostle of British imperialism, which he saw as ‘a civilizing factor’ in the Islamic world 
(Kurzman 2002: 7). Perhaps this is why the modernist interpretations of Iqbal are rejected as ‘imported 
solutions’ by other Muslim thinkers, such as renowned Yusuf al-Qaradawi (2003, revised edition). 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) was another example of this group. As the founder Pakistan, he 
developed the ‘two nations theory’ and regarded Islam as merely a cultural denomination (Zakaria 1998: 
228). Jinnah was severely criticised by two of his country fellowmen, Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, who 
replied by writing Composite Nationalism and Islam (1938), and Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979), 
amongst others. The latter changed his views on the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, after which he 
proclaimed himself an amir (a political leader with religious overtones), and formed a political party, Jamaat-
i Islam, which although opposed to the secular views of Jinnah and his followers, nonetheless advocated a 
separate Muslim state.  
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To give a flavour of the debates, it suffices to turn to Beduizzaman Said Nursi 
(1932), a Turkish/Kurdish theologian and scholar, who founded the spiritual movement Nur 
(Light):
72
 
The idea of nationalism has greatly advanced this century. The cunning 
European tyrants in particular awaken this among Muslims in a negative 
fashion, so that they may divide them and devour them. Furthermore, in 
nationalism is a thrill of the soul, a heedless pleasure, an inauspicious power. 
For this reason, those occupied with social life at this time cannot be told to 
give up the idea of nationalism. (Nursi 1932: 383)  
Nursi (1932: 385) perceived nationalism as a source of manipulation and ‘a variety of 
European disease’ that the imperialists spread to cause division so that ‘Islam would break 
up and be easily swallowed’. A few decades later, Sayyid Qutb (1964) – a Muslim thinker 
who at times has been misunderstood – adopted a not-dissimilar position. He also rejected 
the idea of a state-imposed nationalism: 
The homeland of the Muslim, in which he lives and which he defends, is not a 
piece of land; the nationality of the Muslim, by which he is identified, is not 
the nationality defined by a government; the family of the Muslim, in which 
he finds solace and which he defends, is not a blood relationship; the flag of 
the Muslim, which he honours and under which he is martyred, is not the flag 
of a country; and the victory of the Muslim, which he celebrates and for which 
he is thankful to God, is not a military victory.
73
 (Qutb 1964: 135)      
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 The movement was founded about seventy years ago. Although a relatively recent phenomena, it represents 
one of the most popular of global movements, with the fastest growing membership. 
73 
It is important to emphasise that both Beduizzaman Said Nursi and Sayyed Qutb were writing in reaction to 
the great changes caused by modernity, and the forms of opposition and interplay it provoked. Nursi created 
the Letters Collection in the light of the emerging nationalist movement in Turkey, personified by the Young 
Turks, who were bitterly opposed to any religious idea – the Young Turks were ultra-secularist and 
wholeheartedly supported by Europe. Because of his allegedly reactionary opposition to the nationalist regime 
and foreign intervention, Nursi was harassed by the police and the military, prosecuted by the courts and 
proclaimed a heretic by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) in Turkey. The actions 
taken against him were sanctioned by the legal authorities, which took him to court for violation of the 
constitution and the penal code, and the organisation of religious opposition. Similarly, Qutb was highly 
disillusioned with Nasser’s secular Arab nationalism following the overthrow of Egypt’s crony monarchist 
government. Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, he rose against Nasser, but was soon prosecuted, 
imprisoned, tortured and eventually executed. His works, the Resale-i Nur Collection and Milestones, are 
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In more recent times, however, Muslim scholars have remained divided on this 
issue. There is a faction that is still antagonistic to the idea of the nation-state and 
nationalism, perceiving it to be ‘a creed, a school and a pseudo-religion which the West 
created to fill an ideological vacuum’ that existed in Europe; it was offered to the local 
populations as ‘a new religion and a new god, which was welcomed by thirsty devotees’ 
(Naqaweh 1984: 17-18).
74
 Secular nationalism continues to be seen as a neo-colonial ploy, 
part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Islam through Westernised agents who stress 
national rather than Islamic unity (Tibi 1998: 100; Tamimi 2000: 26). For example, 
Sudanese Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi (1983: 242) rejects the term ‘Islamic state’ for the 
reason that the ‘state’ is a deceptive notion, which as far as Islam is concerned is ‘a 
misnomer, since Islam does not stop at any frontier’. In their Khilafah publication (1996), 
Hizb-ut-tahrir, a transnational Islamist organisation, rejects any notion of the nation-state, 
condemning it as a Westernising concept imposed upon Muslims through globalisation and 
interfaith dialogue.  
Opposing these exclusionist views stands the integrationist model that is advocated 
by more moderate scholars. A good example of this group is Doi (1987: 56-57). He 
advocates that Muslims who have moved from the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) to the 
West adopt the common concerns of the country they live in so that they can fully 
participate in public life. Basing themselves on this idea, a group of prominent Muslim 
scholars in the West have issued a fatwa (religious ruling) for Muslims serving in the US 
                                                                                                                                                    
perhaps as relevant today as they were when they were written in the last century, but it is in the context of the 
attempts of Muslims to come to terms with modernity that his contribution must be assessed. 
74
 In this sense, it is important to mention some Western writers who also saw nationalism as a form of 
religion and a product of modernity. Kohn (1948) and Hayes (1960), both very prolific writers on the topic of 
nationalism, agree that nationalism is primarily an ideology which possesses both simplicity and a natural 
sentiment, for which reason it appears the perfect substitute for religion. 
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and British armies, which proclaims that they have a duty to fight for their adopted 
countries even if it means combating other Muslims (Murphy 2002). This model stresses 
the importance of citizenship and allegiance to nationhood, echoing the aforementioned 
Medina Constitution, which sought the allegiance of non-Muslims to the Prophet in the 
event of an external attack. In the same fashion, Ramadan (1999) reminds the growing 
Muslim population of Europe of the fundamental Islamic teaching that urges Muslims to 
engage with and participate in society as a whole, not only in order to bring about the 
general betterment of both Muslims and the host society, but also to pave the way for the 
emergence of a European Islam, in the same way as an African or Asian Islam has 
developed. From some perspectives, however, a truly European Islam seems a long way 
off, due to the diversity of the migrant Muslim communities in Europe and the fact that 
indigenous Muslim populations, such as the Bosnian or Albanian Muslims, lack a structure 
of coherent European leadership. More fundamentally, the migrant Muslim communities 
come from a variety of political backgrounds and are often influenced by political views 
from ‘back home’. Due to this, the construction of their places of worship are funded by 
individual Muslim governments in a way that defines the entire atmosphere of a given 
community; it may seem a paradox but it is quite common in Europe to speak of a Bengali, 
Pakistani or Turkish mosque. However, the inevitability of the current system of nation-
states, which Muslims are party to, prompted the most prominent contemporary Muslim 
scholar and activist, the late Shaikh Zaki Badawi, to pioneer the idea of a ‘British Islam’ 
and ‘British Muslims’.  
As the debates above show, this topic continues to be a source of heated academic 
and public argument amongst Muslims, particularly in the current globalised climate. In 
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October 2006, for example, the International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (IFID) held a 
well-attended and fiercely debated seminar entitled ‘Islam and State: Rethinking Muslim 
Politics?’ The major bone of contention was whether Muslims should embrace the concept 
of the nation-state, and if they do, what type of state it should be. In other words, 
contemporary Muslim scholars were once again encountering the challenge of justifying 
scriptural interpretations of the concept of an Islamic state as opposed to that of a nation-
state. The debate, as usual, was waged between Neo-Islamists and Islamists, or to borrow 
Esposito’s (1991) categorisation of modern Islamic movements, progressives/neo-
traditionalists versus traditionalists/radical revisionists. Another contemporary example of 
this debate comes in a selection of modern Muslim thought on Islam, the state and 
democracy in a postmodern globalised context compiled by Bennett (2005). As well as 
being extremely well documented, it also offers a wide-ranging overview of Muslim 
governing practices and the national challenges provoked by modernity and ethno-
nationalism since the early nineteenth century. The recurrent issue of the conceptualisation 
of Islam in relation to the ideas of state and nation surfaces again in a work jointly 
compiled by Ahmed and Donnan (1994). Its thematically and geographically wide-ranging 
essays endeavour to explain the challenges of governance that Muslims faced within their 
separate national boundaries following the colonial retreat.  
Based on the available evidence, therefore, it can be concluded that nationalism and 
the concept of the nation-state in general are a direct consequence of globalisation. 
Observed from an Islamic perspective, globalisation is a continuation of the process of 
modernity that engulfed Muslims at the start of the nineteenth century, following the 
Ottoman retreat and ensuing European expansion. Hourani (1983) writes in an exemplary 
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fashion on the impact of the growing European influence over Muslims, examining the 
reasons for the Muslim retreat in the face of European liberalism. This engagingly written 
work has turned into an indispensable classic on the problems modernity poses for Islam. 
Since modernity has metamorphosed into the process of globalisation, this book represents 
an essential contribution to an understanding of the place of Muslims in the contemporary 
socio-political arena. The nation-state was, in this sense, one of the first manifestations of 
modernity that Muslims came into contact and tried to come to terms with, and the 
challenges and efforts persist to this day. Observed from the point of relationship with Neo-
Islam, nineteenth-century modernity can be regarded as the starting point of contemporary 
globalisation.  
The best illustration of this claim is to be found in Kurzman’s (1998, 2002) 
anthology of works on Islam and modernity. The essays are organised chronologically in 
two sourcebooks: the first (1998) hosts contributions from a wide range of Muslim scholars 
who deal with the challenging topics facing Muslims from the 1940s onwards; the other, 
organised in the same way and published a few years later (2002), deals with matters not 
dissimilar to its antecedent but concentrates on the way these issues surfaced a century 
earlier, from 1840 to 1940. The latter serves as a useful contextual and historical 
background to the first publication. It can be immediately observed that military, political, 
economic and cultural themes were as much recurrent features for nineteenth-century 
Muslim scholars as for their contemporary counterparts. For this reason, it is important at 
this stage to analyse the question of ‘Islamic globalisation’ as a historical precedent for the 
contemporary process, in order to facilitate comprehension of the relationship of 
globalisation to neo-Islam. 
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2.3.1 Islam: the antecedent to globalisation  
The question of the exact starting point of globalisation is as vexed as the question of what 
the term stands for. From an analysis of the literature, it appears that globalisation is 
generally taken to be a novel phenomenon. However, there are those who beg to differ. Al-
Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006: 7) acknowledge globalisation as a current that has existed 
throughout human history. Their work contains a timetable of major events from the time 
human history began, and bears the indicative title, Historical Milestones of Globalization. 
Dividing the process of globalisation into six sub-realms of economic, political, socio-
cultural, security, military and environmental sectors, they examine the impact each 
historical trajectory has had on the development of the respective human epochs. Noting the 
important contribution of historical events, such as the advent of Christianity and 
subsequent advent of Islam, Columbus’s discovery of America and the French Revolution 
to the development of modern globalisation, they conclude that globalisation is an evolving 
phenomena that has grown over the past centuries in various forms and thus ‘cannot be 
hailed as a new concept developed only in the latter part of the 20
th
 century’ (Al-Rodhan 
and Stoudmann 2006: 7).   
One of the most cited scholars, who pioneered the analysis of modern 
globalisation’s historical precedents, is Wallerstein (1984, 2000). He has traced 
globalisation back over the years to the spread of the global exchange of goods and money 
and the emergence of the spirit of capitalism. For Wallerstein (1974: 11), globalisation 
represents ‘the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of 
labour’. This capitalist world system has been locked in conflict with a socialist world 
system ever since. Other scholars share the opinion that globalisation equates with the 
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growth of the global spread of capitalism, and place its origins either in the expansion of 
European capitalism in the sixteenth century (Waters 1995: 2-4) or in the nineteenth-
century market capitalism of the industrial revolution (Lamy 2006). Hirst and Thompson 
(2003: 17) point to the unprecedented internationalisation of contemporary economic 
activities, concluding that – in contrast to previous proto-globalisations – current policies 
are less open to the free exchange of goods, people and services than they were between 
1870 and 1914.  
The turn of the twentieth century represented the commencement of an era of proto-
globalisation of international trade and investment that has important parallels with the 
contemporary era (Gilpin 2000; Zeiler 2001; Williamson 1996). The most evident analogue 
to today’s globalisation is the quintessential role the Great Powers played in harmonising 
global policy (Hirst and Thompson 2003: 17). The information revolution has empowered 
globalisation, adding a further historical dimension; it has endowed globalisation with a 
‘new form of sovereignty’, giving it the potential to encompass the entire world and placing 
it under the unremitting authority of neo-imperialism and its system of nation-states (Hardt 
and Negri 2000: 10-11; LaFeber 1999). The political attitude of the most powerful states 
since the nineteenth century is extremely important to bear in mind when discussing the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the crucial role they 
played in the internationalisation of the conflict (analysed in chapter six). The suppression 
of a potential Bosnian nation-state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as well as the 
creation of an international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992-95 war, 
were the results of the joint policies of the Great Powers that predetermined the political 
development of the Bosnian Muslims, as is further explained in chapters three and four.       
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Many other scholars have attempted to pinpoint the timeline that marks the 
beginning of the globalisation process. They have located the origins of globalisation in the 
rise of the European imperialist powers. For instance, Rennen and Martins (2003: 138-139) 
consider the invention of steamship in 1807, the steam locomotive in 1825 and the 
electronic telegraph, introduced gradually between 1830 and 1850, to be the starting point 
of an increasingly global interconnectedness and, by implication, the origin of 
globalisation. Holton (1998: 48) maintains that the creation of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross in 1863 as one of the first global NGOs represents the beginning of 
globalisation. Similarly, Scholte (1999: 17) argues that the establishment of the first global 
regulatory agency, the International Telegraph Union, in 1865 provided the foundation for 
contemporary globalisation. Meanwhile, Robertson (1992) makes an interesting claim – he 
asserts that globalisation ‘took off’ between 1875 and 1925, according to the following 
benchmarks: 
… the time-zoning of the world and establishment of the international 
dateline, the near-global adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the 
adjustable seven-day week; and the establishment of international 
telegraphic and signalling codes. (Robertson 1992: 179) 
As far as the research on Islam and globalisation is concerned there are two points 
that merit special attention. Firstly, all the available evidence shows that, in an effort to pin 
down the exact period in which globalisation emerged, scholars have based their research 
within Western parameters. It has already been pointed out that a great majority of 
globalisation studies are indeed exclusively based on the Western experience and follow a 
Western blueprint. Robertson (1992) even uses the prevalence in the world of social 
features with Christian connotations to determine the driving force behind the process of 
globalisation. Similarly, Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006) cite the success of the West in 
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halting the advance of Islam in Europe by breaking the siege of Vienna in 1683. In this 
regard, Waters (2001) summarises succinctly the wider implications of this apparent 
European monopoly over the history of globalisation: 
Globalization is the direct consequence of the expansion of European culture 
across the planet via settlement, colonization and cultural replication. It is 
also bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it 
has ramified through political and cultural arenas. However, it does not 
imply that every corner of the planet must become Westernized and 
capitalist but rather that every set of social arrangements must establish its 
position in relation to the capitalist West – to use Robertson’s term, it must 
relativize itself. (Waters 2001: 6) 
Secondly, it transpires that the periods stated above are as relevant for Muslims as 
they are for the West. However, they need be observed through a reverse perspective. For 
instance, by 1850 a great majority of Muslims had suffered either persecution or been killed 
or expelled from the Ottoman territories by the European powers; in 1856 the Ottoman 
Empire, the last site of Muslim political and cultural dominance, took out its first 
international loan; by 1875 it was completely bankrupted and placed at the mercy of newly 
emerged European capitalist creditors; and by 1925 the last Muslim caliph was informed by 
means of the modern telegraph system that he had been overthrown, leaving almost the 
whole Muslim population of the planet as colonised peoples
75
 and economically enslaved 
by debt. Thus, the idea of globalisation – according to a Western blueprint – as the free 
exchange of people, goods and information, contributing to greater convergence and 
cooperation, is a paradoxically partial picture: for Muslims, the opposite was the case. The 
story of Muslims in the Western-defined ideological and chronological framework of 
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 The only exception was modern Turkey, but its founders remained only nominally Muslim, and Islamic 
dogma had no place in their approach to governance. Critical examination of the historical events testifies that 
they only retained references to Islam when it became apparent that Islamic practices and faith could not be 
eradicated amongst the general population. The evidence also points to the fact that their references to Islam 
remained essentially rhetorical.     
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globalisation is one of expulsion, exclusion, limitation and subordination to the colonial 
and neo-colonial mode of rule. Examination of the available evidence demonstrates that, 
with the development of globalisation, Muslims were penned into newly created national 
enclaves and, for the most part, deprived of the freedom to travel – the colonial structure 
imposed a strict visa system as opposed to the free movement of people that existed during 
the time of the Ottoman Empire.  
A good illustration of the situation comes from Sir Adolphus Slade (cited in Yalman 
2001), who served in the Ottoman navy during the 1820s and who admired the Ottoman 
legacy and its sense of justice. Placing it in implicit contrast to the West, he wrote:  
The Osmanley [sic] has enjoyed by custom some of the dearest privileges of 
free man, for which Christian nations have so long struggled. He paid a very 
limited land tax, no tithes, needed no passport, encountered no customs or 
police. From the lowest origins he might aspire without presumption to the 
rank of pasha. (Slade, cited in Yalman 2001: 270) 
 
Indeed, it seems that so far as Muslims were concerned, globalisation, defined as the 
exchange of people, goods and services, started far earlier, perhaps even with the advent of 
Islam in the seventh century. The message of the Qur’an and a deep belief in God seems to 
have inspired early Muslims to pursue expansion in all fields.
76
 For instance, it was a 
Muslim who made the first attempt to fly – Abbas Ibn Firnas was witnessed experimenting 
with his flying machine over Cordoba in the ninth century. Ibn Idris, who was the chief 
consultant of King Roger II, designed one of the first maps in the twelfth century, and at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century Mimar Sinan (‘Architect Sinan’) was building 
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  The Qur’an starts with the command: ‘Ikra!’ (Read!). Muslim jurists and scholars take this as an order 
from God to pursue knowledge and intellectual expansion. This revelation is further emphasised and placed as 
an imperative upon Muslims because it was revealed to Muhammad who was illiterate.  
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earthquake-resistant mosques using lead sheets to absorb shock waves (Al-Hassani 2007). 
For many researchers, the famous map of Piri Reis is proof of a Muslim presence in 
America long before the endeavours of Columbus: it comprises a map of America, as well 
as extremely accurate measurements of the distance between America and Africa. Fell 
(1980) claims that the preponderance of the voyages embarked upon by Columbus and 
other Spanish and Portuguese explorers towards the other side of the Atlantic were 
undertaken in light of Muslim geographical and navigational knowledge.
77
 Similarly, when 
Vasco da Gama rounded Africa in 1498, his navigator was his Arabic chief aide, Ahmed 
Ibn Majid. Rourke and Williamson (2002: 24) believe that 1498 marked the beginning of 
globalisation, since it ended the Arab and Venetian monopoly on the spice trade. Travel and 
exploration seem to have been commonplace among Muslims, and trade seems to have 
been an important driving force behind their voyages. Long before Muslims became an 
indispensable labour force for the West, they were transforming the agriculture of Sicily 
and Andalusia, introducing a great variety of new crops, dried fruits and pasta, as well as 
novelties such as forks, soap, paper, compasses and the clepsydra or water-clock, which 
paved the way for the invention of the mechanical clock (Goody 2004: 29, 56, 64).   
Globalisation is considered to be an important medium for the exchange of ideas 
and flow of information. Studies in philosophy, mathematics and the sciences were made 
possible in the West through translations from the Greek, partly by way of earlier Arabic 
translations (Lopez-Baralt 1994: 509). The European Renaissance and its classical revival 
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 Al-Masudi’s (871-957) work, Muruj al-Dhahab, for instance, was written with data compiled by Muslim 
traders from across Africa and Asia. Rocks found in archaeological surveys in Nevada bear the Arabic 
inscriptions ‘In the Name of God’ and ‘Muhammad is the God’s Prophet’, and are believed to date back to the 
seventh century. For more on this subject, see Fell (1980: xiv, 190, 400, 403). 
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were, therefore, much indebted to Muslim scholarship. Islamic architecture also proved a 
significant influence on the Gothic architecture of Europe, while the influence of Arabic 
literature had a far-reaching impact on Europe, not least as a source for European 
masterpieces such as Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, Marlow’s Tamburlaine and Racine’s 
Bajazet. Furthermore, Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire 
looked for inspiration to the East in order to voice their disapproval of absolutism at home 
(Goody 2004). 
Militarily speaking, Muslims were also highly sought-after as allies. It was this 
military supremacy, as well as their values of freedom and justice, that prompted Greek 
peasants from the Peloponnese to welcome and support Turkish troops when they re-
conquered it from the Venetians in 1715 (Stavrianos 1965: 181). Throughout the sixteenth 
century, it was often reported to the Ottoman capital that Christians in the Balkans ‘do not 
want any other domination in preference to the Turks’ (Stavrianos 1965: 181). As Mazower 
(2001: 60) observes, ‘the Ottoman rule was bringing Balkan Christians not only religious 
autonomy but increasing prosperity as well’. In effect, the scattered Balkan peoples were 
unified through Ottoman power for the first time in centuries. The Christian Orthodox 
Church, far from being crushed, was able to recover from its chaotic and fragmented phase 
under Byzantine rule and expand its power through the Balkans and into Anatolia 
(Runciman 1968: 180). The Catholics too sought an alliance with the Ottoman dynasty, 
which resulted in ‘the sacrilegious union of the Lily and the Crescent’, when the French 
king, Francis I, signed a treaty with Suleiman the Great (Mazower 2001: 8). This alarmed 
Britain’s Elizabeth I. Threatened by ‘Catholic’ corsairs in the Mediterranean ‘Islamic 
Lake’, she sought an alliance with the Ottomans, using the argument that ‘Protestants and 
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Muslims were alike haters of the “idolatries” practiced by the Spanish king’ (Goody 2004: 
41-42). The Venetian ambassador of the time, Marco Minio, observed that the Gran 
Signore, as the Ottoman sultan was commonly known, ‘seems to have in his grasp the keys 
to all Christendom’ (Valensi 1989: 44).  
Referring to Muslim global expansionism, Mazower (2001: 8) points out that it was 
precisely this universal reach, efficiency and power
78
 that attracted as well as repelled, 
tormented and frightened ‘its squabbling neighbours in Christendom’. ‘Seeing how many 
go from us to them’, commented Sir Henry Blount on the subject of Christian converts to 
Islam, ‘and how few of theirs come to us, it appears of what consequence the prosperity of 
a cause is to draw men unto it’ (cited in Mazower 2001: 22). While the pious Catholics in 
Italy were told to ‘pray for the undoing of Islam’, the historians busied themselves in 
depicting the Muslim bonanza as ‘the latest incarnation of the Islamic peril and the present 
terror of the world’ (Matar, cited in Mazower 2001: 21). Armour (2006: 78, 215) likewise 
observes that ‘the Ottoman rule has for too long been seen through the prism of Christian 
prejudice against a Muslim-dominated state’, creating a sense of hostility towards Islamic 
pretensions to universal dominion. Setton (1992: 4) asserts that the ‘Muslim threat’ at 
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 The terms ‘Muslim’, ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turk’ are used interchangeably, and this is especially evident in the 
Balkan region where this practice has continued until the present day; Muslims from the Balkans are referred 
to as ‘Turks’, albeit in a derogatory way. To instigate the persecution of Bosnian Muslims during the 1990s 
war, they were rhetorically described as a remnant of the extended Turkish/Ottoman Empire that had been 
expelled from the Balkan territories almost a century previously. The remaining Muslims were considered an 
alien body that had to be either exterminated or permanently returned to their place of their origin – Turkey. 
That is why, during the war, and even in its aftermath, the Serbian media celebrated the extermination of the 
‘last Turks’ in the Balkans. For their part, the Bosnian Muslims, under the leadership of late president 
Izetbegović, ironically lived up to Serb and Croat expectations; they re-adopted Ottoman imagery and Islamic 
vocabulary. Armour (2006: 78) comments on the unambiguous ‘Muslim connotations’ found in the terms 
‘Turk’ and ‘Ottoman’. He states that ‘[s]ince the expansion of Islam was the raison d’être of the Empire, the 
… Ottoman Empire must be seen as a Muslim empire rather than a Turkish one’. For further discussion on the 
idea of ‘Muslims’ and ‘Turks’ as synonymous, see Lewis (1982: 32).        
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Europe’s door had to be either expelled from the ‘Christian’ states or strictly controlled, in 
the same way as were the small settlements of Jews.  
A critical examination of the evidence suggests that Muslim advances were often 
downplayed, with the result that the global reach of Muslims in almost every field is little 
known. In many ways, the Islamic globalisation of the past resembles modern Western-led 
globalisation, but the most striking difference lies in the modern pace of dissemination of 
information, thanks to the development and global reach of contemporary information 
technologies. However, the main reason why Muslim global activities are so little known is 
the fact that the West could not tolerate Islamic advances in any sphere of activity, and 
mobilised to prevent them. The evidence shows that this was undertaken by means of the 
Ottoman reforms, which became an essential part of the process of modernity. The impact 
of modernity on Islam, and the failure of Muslims to adapt to its parameters, has already 
been alluded to. In this regard, Armour (2006: 215) concludes that the Ottoman Empire was 
besieged by a range of internal and external foes, the by-product of direct external assault. 
He further states that the consequence was a kind of ‘arm-wrestling’ amongst the opposing 
factions and a number of futile attempts at a pretence of ‘modernisation’: 
The Ottoman Empire offers a conspicuous example of failure to modernise, 
despite fitful attempts in that direction and despite having every incentive to 
reform in the threat of partition. (Armour 2006: 77) 
 
This observation requires elaboration. The more the empire met the essential preconditions 
for modernisation, the deeper it sank into irreversible decay. This twofold impact was 
mutually reinforcing: it created a highly unfavourable situation for the general population, 
who grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Porte’s position, while, simultaneously, the 
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image of the all-potent ‘Sublime Protector’ began to die. Todorova (1997: 91-94) maintains 
that the shift in both popular sentiment and the balance of power caused respect for the 
Ottoman Empire to diminish in Western cultural and diplomatic circles. The old tone of 
awe was replaced by degrading observations. The quest for theories and hypotheses behind 
the Ottoman capitulation became the latest literary infatuation, offering perfect cover for an 
anti-Muslim discourse. It was time to reassert the religious and racial vigour of 
Christendom after centuries of Islamic domination over the ‘Old World’. Any Muslim 
legacy had to be denied and disassociated from Western civilisation. In the words of 
Halecki (1962): 
From the European point of view, it must be observed that the Ottoman 
Empire, completely alien to its European subjects in origin, tradition and 
religion, far from integrating them in a new type of culture, brought them 
nothing but a degrading foreign dominance which interrupted for 
approximately four hundred years their participation in European history. 
(Halecki 1962: 77-78) 
 
History was reinvented, and the reason for the Muslims’ impotency was ascribed to 
‘Oriental inefficiency’, an inherent incapacity or ‘organic degeneracy’, since ‘the Turk is a 
Moslem, and the soul of the true Moslem is indifferent to progress’ (Moor 1913: 226).79 
These self-fulfilling
80
 prophecies appeared to conspicuously correspond to the realities of 
the day: the Ottoman reforms, rather than facilitating healthy recovery, sent the ‘sick man 
of Europe’ into terminal decline. To the great joy of Christian Europe, he eventually gave 
up the struggle and collapsed entirely: 
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 The topic of Orientalism will be discussed further in the following chapter.  
80
 Chapter three demonstrates that Ottoman decay was the result of a series of attacks, generated from within, 
in order to meet the desired goal of the destruction of the empire.  
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The Asiatic Turks had blighted their European subjects by imposing Islamic 
rule upon them. They had tried to invigorate their own racial stock through 
conversion, but had ultimately been unable to prevail over the biologically 
superior European breed they ruled. Now the Turk will make his way back 
to Asia as he came, centuries ago, little changed by his association with the 
peoples of Europe – whom he has kept as he found them, in a medieval 
condition, with all the barbarity of medieval Europe … and unthinking faith 
(Moor 1913: 199-226). 
 
However, Armour (2006: 215) claims that the empire was ‘not so much sick as mugged’. 
McCarthy (2001: 3) also argues that the Great Powers deliberately imposed unfair trading 
terms on the empire, with the aim of weakening it both economically and militarily. 
Consequently, due to lack of adequate funds, it was soon forced to yield in the face of a 
host of internal and external foes. An analysis of the historical evidence reveals three 
immediate results of the aggressive intervention of the Great Powers: a waning of the 
Islamic faith and its religious institutions, a dwindling economy and the proliferation of a 
European Romantic nationalist discourse. The tactics combined a religious strategy, since 
many Ottoman subjects were Christians ‘for whom the governments of the European 
powers, if not their citizens, professed sympathy’, with an expansionist strategy as the 
Great Powers sought opportunities for economic profit (Armour 2006: 215, 154). Similarly, 
Goodwin (1999: 303-304) states that the reforms of Selim III, Mahmut II and their 
successors, with the exception of Abdülhamid II (as discussed in chapters three and four), 
effectively ‘forged the link between domestic policy and Great Power approval which was 
to dog their sultanates’. This acted as the trigger for the advent of modernity from which 
globalisation flowed. From its origin, globalisation was characterised by the fundamental a-
symmetry between the Muslim world and the West, in terms of level of integration, 
competitive potential and share in the benefits of economic growth. Thus, when 
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determining the starting point of globalisation, there is consensus between Western and 
Islamic views, although they initially seem at odds. This is because the results of the 
globalisation process are located at the extreme ends of a sliding scale. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed globalisation from the Muslim angle, and explained the links with 
neo-Islam. With the regard to the research question, this chaper laid foundations for 
understanding the construction of neo-Islamism as well as provided historical framework 
for the changing political and economic interplays on a global level encompassing 
Muslims. This process - dubbed ‘globalisation’- was described as fragmented, incomplete, 
discontinuous, contingent and, in many ways, contradictory and puzzling. (Held et al. 1999: 
431; Giddens 1999: 5; Findlay 2000: 169). In essence, however, it was a neoliberal 
capitalistic economy aiming at global reach. Due to the discrepancy in levels of 
technological development, diffusion and integration have been applied selectively. While 
it is true that some areas have experienced unprecedented prosperity, parts of the world 
have been excluded from growth, with the result that economic progress has been a mixed 
blessing (Castells 2000).  
The available evidence supports the conclusion that globalisation policies are 
grounded in a set of homogenous rules, creating a self-replicating logic that has influenced 
people’s life throughout the world, albeit disproportionately. Globalisation does affect 
everywhere and everybody, but it is inclusive and exclusionary at the same time, with some 
countries, regions, economic sectors and local societies disconnected from the global 
processes of accumulation and consumption; the benefits of globalisation affect only 
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certain units of the world’s economy and certain participating forces. Competition in the 
global arena takes place between companies, but national governments create the 
conditions in which they operate, according to the remit laid down by global trade and 
financial institutions. As Kobrin (1997: 147-148) observes, the heterogeneous spread of 
globalisation is not meant to encompass the entire earth; rather, it comprises only certain 
segments of economic activity in both developed and developing countries.  
An analysis of the research on the topic demonstrates that the Muslim world was 
denied a place in the profitable global network, although, as Ernst shows (2003: 3), it may 
no longer be possible to speak of a ‘Muslim world’ in a meaningful way as if it were an 
entity somehow separate from Europe and America (that is, the West) – at least outside of 
neo-colonial contexts. It was Islam’s universally inclusive message and its ability to adapt 
to local settings that made it such a successful global religion (Leaman 2002). The advent 
of Islam introduced the concept of the ‘ummah’ or global community, which managed to 
transcend man-made borders. Hence, it is astonishing to note that the Muslim world, 
responsible for a golden Islamic civilisation that in a relatively short period of time spread 
to the four corners of the earth, transforming it into a truly global phenomenon (an Islamic 
globalisation), is absent in the modern process of globalisation. While it contributed to the 
Western Renaissance and Enlightenment, and to the development of science and literature, 
laying the foundations for the industrial and scientific revolutions in the West, it remains a 
seemingly distant and inaudible entity following the spread of modern-day globalisation.  
Yet the sweeping process of globalisation intimately concerns Muslims East and 
West, often in a detrimental fashion. It seems hard to grasp such a contrast between past 
efficiency and present-day economic apathy and stagnation without seeing it in terms of 
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power, inequality and conflict. This is why it is essential to historicise globalisation, in the 
context of the expansion of capitalism and institutionalisation of the nation-state, from a 
Muslim perspective. These features never truly developed in the Muslim world because of 
the lack of Islamic reference points and precedents. Moreover, the nature of this new 
system was such that it could not be accommodated in the Muslim empire without causing 
its dismemberment. A critical examination of the available literature and historical analysis 
points to the combination and interplay of global strategies, which brought about two 
simultaneous and diametrically opposing results. On the one hand, Christian Europe grew 
stronger, thanks to the emergence of mercantile capitalism, colonial trade and, more 
importantly, nationalism and the development of new nation-states after the Thirty Years 
War (Mazower 2001: 9). The advances of the Great Powers began the process known as 
‘modernity’, which, as it kept unfolding, began to be hailed as ‘globalisation’. On the other 
hand, when the modernising recipes were exported to the Muslim world, they brought 
about its fatal institutional degeneration and eventual collapse. The last place of Muslim 
dominion was the Ottoman Empire, which disintegrated in the wake of modernity spurred 
by the Neo-Islamic reforms that will be further detailed in the next chapter.  
The success of globalisation depended on essential preconditions in the Ottoman 
Empire. These were premised on the participation of neo-Islamists in the so-called ‘New 
World Order’, a concept that is often regarded as the framework for the emergence of 
globalisation and therefore seen as an equally ‘novel’ phenomenon. However, when 
analysed from an Islamic perspective, it appears that this idea had its genesis in the 
Ottoman military reforms of the eighteenth century, which were promulgated under the 
name ‘Nizami Cedid’ (‘new order’). Its detrimental impact upon the empire’s Muslims is 
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common knowledge, and continues to have far-reaching consequences today. What exactly 
this term stands for and how it impacted Bosnian Muslims, however, is – literally – 
unknown. The attitude of the Great Powers towards Bosnian Muslims, as well as the 
Bosniak’s relationship with the emergent Turkish nationalism and the newly acquired 
ethnic identities of their Serb and Croat neighbours needs to be contextualised within the 
emergence of the New World Order. The 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
constituted a mere continuation of this process. In order to grasp its impact and reach, and 
the significance it had on shaping responses and developments in the Bosnian conflict, the 
following chapter critically examines the relationship between neo-Islam and the New 
World Order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
96 
CHAPTER THREE 
NEO-ISLAM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
‘EASTERN QUESTION’ FOR BOSNIAN MUSLIMS 
This chapter presents a selective analysis of the historical accounts concerning the 
introduction of the New World Order that was underwritten by the nineteenth-century 
Ottoman reforms. It examines the hypothesis, of particular relevance to the overall 
argument of this thesis, that Bosniak national development was jointly thwarted by the 
Tanzimat reforms and Western determination to prevent the formation of an independent 
Islamic polity in Europe, denying Bosnian Muslims a separate nation-state. By analysing 
the impact of the reforms on the Bosniaks, this chapter introduces the historical context in 
which the most violent manifestation of the break-up of Yugoslavia – the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – took place. With the regard to the research question, it demonstrates that the 
Dayton Agreement, which lies at the heart of the current political stalemate in which 
Bosnia-Herzegovina finds itself trapped, was a hangover from these reforms.  
Section one sets out the historical context of the chapter, while the second section 
briefly outlines the relevant scholarship on the New World Order, historicising the concept 
by placing it within its nineteenth-century setting. The third section juxtaposes the 
privileged position of the Bosniaks in the Ottoman Empire with their subsequent treatment 
by the proponents of the Ottoman reforms, the Tanzimatçılar, and the Great Powers. 
Section four gives an account of the reforms and their impact on local Bosniak autonomy, 
and section five explores their bitter results. The sixth section describes the promulgation of 
the edict that launched the reforms, the Tanzimat Fermani or Güllhane Hatt-ı Humayun, 
which eventually led to Ottoman bankruptcy and the ultimate triumph of absolutist 
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Tanzimat centralisation. Section seven analyses the persecution suffered by Muslims in the 
newly formed nation-states, and the eighth section concludes this analysis of the ‘Eastern 
Question’ with an investigation into the overall impact on Bosnian Muslims and their place, 
or lack of one, in the New World Order.  
 
3.1 The historical context 
The concept of the ‘New World Order’ is frequently paired with that of globalisation and 
associated with the post-Cold War world. Just as many scholars claim that globalisation is a 
contemporary manifestation, so they also assert that the New World Order is its incumbent 
framework, and thus arose alongside it. However, this chapter argues that the New World 
Order is not a novel Western project, but evolved out of a broader map of historical 
networks, in which neo-Islam played an indispensable role. From a diplomatic perspective, 
the New World Order represented a re-arrangement of the political relationship between 
Islam and the West, and, as such, appeared to offer a long-deferred solution to the ‘Eastern 
Question’. The ‘Eastern Question’ had emerged as a by-product of the nineteenth-century 
process of capitalist globalisation that gave birth to the concept of the nation-state (as 
elaborated in the previous chapter). This chapter builds on the preceding discussion by 
examining the impact of the mutating world order on the development of Bosniak ethno-
national consciousness.    
Perhaps the most concise definition of the ‘Eastern Question’ was offered by 
Guernsey (1877: 364). He claimed that it consisted of a riddle: how to manage the bounty 
of the dying ‘sick man of Europe’, as the Ottoman Empire was described, around whose 
bedside ‘all the other Powers were watching, each determined that none of the others 
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should gain the greater share in his estates when he died’. The existence of a vast number of 
Muslim subjects in the dwindling empire continued to pose a major problem that threatened 
to derail the establishment of the new order; Islam was perceived to be a barrier to its 
successful implementation. An article printed in 1858 in Littell’s Living Age, under the title 
‘Turkey’, concluded that any reorganisation of the Ottoman state ‘logically and inevitably 
involves the destruction of Mussulman [sic] power’. The slow and painful annihilation of 
the empire’s Islamic foundations commenced with the military reforms introduced in the 
Lale Deviri (Tulip Period).
81
 Aside from being impractical, however, the reforms were both 
expensive and destructive, with far-reaching consequences for the peasantry and a 
disastrous impact upon the empire’s Muslim subjects in general.82 The first direct attempt 
by Neo-Islam to participate in the establishment of the New World Order was initiated in 
the Tanzimat period that ran from 1839 to 1878.
83
 These years were particularly significant 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina: by 1839 all the countries in the Balkans had gained some form 
of autonomy, if not outright independence, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by 1878 all 
the Balkan countries were incorporated in the European system of nations-states as fully 
fledged independent polities, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became a protectorate 
under Austro-Hungarian administration. 
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 The Tulip period ran from 1817-30, and was expedited by the military reforms that followed.  
82
 The manuscript Ahval-i Bosna (Conditions in Bosnia), written by Muhamed Emin Isević in the early 
nineteenth century, illustrates the deteriorating economic and social situation precipitated by the reforms. 
Although the author’s main concern was Bosnia and Herzegovina, his detailed account is, nevertheless, 
descriptive of the situation in the entire Ottoman Empire. Isević was a Bosnian intellectual from a judicial 
family. His unique manuscript, which is housed in the library of the University of Istanbul, was authenticated 
by Ahmed Aličić, who translated and annotated the document, and wrote an introduction to it. This work is an 
exemplary analysis, and represents crucial reading for those who want to gain a better appreciation of the 
impact of the reforms on the Bosnian population, especially regarding its repercussions on Bosnian Muslims. 
See: Aličić’s (1984) Ahvali-i Bosna Manuscript from the Early Nineteenth Century.  
83
 ‘Tanzimat’ literally means ‘ordering’ or ‘setting in order’, and refers to the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 which 
decreed the first Ottoman parliament of 1878. 
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Elements within the Ottoman Empire who wished to see the establishment of the 
New World Order started to undermine the empire’s foundations. A considerable number 
of historians have noted the internal process of decay but failed to observe that it was 
brought about by deliberate manipulation, ensuring the succession to the caliphate of weak 
and incompetent sultans. This was achieved through the hidden workings of gender power. 
From the seventeenth century onwards there was a widespread practice of confining the 
young princes to the harem (the private areas of the palace), with the result that they 
gradually lost direct control of the affairs of state (Guida 2007). Successive generations of 
Ottoman princes were deprived of adequate education and worldly experience; they lacked 
any exposure to the realities of the political world and were prevented from assuming an 
active military or administrative position (Inalcik 1993). The political vacuum was 
frequently filled by by their mothers, who proceeded to play a powerful role in the affairs 
of state.  
These women were often of European descent and seldom exhibited any discernible 
loyalty to the Muslim empire.
84
 Writing about the characteristics of the young princes from 
the seventeenth century onwards, De Leon (1871: 609-10) argued that it was through the 
harems that ‘the influence of Christian civilisation and intimate intercourse with Europeans 
[created that] full-blooded Turk of today [who] looks more like an Englishmen than any 
other nationality’. Being more inclined towards their ancestral roots, the mothers of the 
sultans became influential players, exercising official authority to the benefit of the ‘new 
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 Pierce (1993), in her valuable study on the role of women in the Ottoman state, asserts that – contrary to the 
Orientalist fantasy of sexual licentiousness – the imperial harem was not only a regulated institution with a 
carefully structured environment, but at the same time both the centre of Ottoman power and, more 
significantly, of female power. She also points to the origins of these women: they were mainly freed 
European slaves who maintained ties to their places of origin in various ways.  
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order’. A case in point is Nakshidil Sultan, a cousin of Napoleon’s wife Josephine, a 
confidante and stepmother of Selim III and mother of Mahmut II. Both these sultans 
initiated the ‘new order’ or ‘Nizami Cedid’. Nakshidil Sultan is recorded in the historical 
literature as being the main contact through which the reforms were channelled and was 
considered to be the mastermind behind the reorganisation and murderous competition that 
dominated the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II. Although nominally a Muslim, she died a 
devoted Catholic; a Catholic priest was allowed to cross through the ‘Felicity Door’ of the 
harem for the first time in its history to attend to her on her deathbed. However influential, 
these women could not have acted without a network of supporters, otherwise known as the 
Tanzimatçılar (literally, the ‘bearers of the reforms’). These were high officials, committed 
to the reform process, who replaced the weak sultans by gradually assuming the 
prerogatives of state (Mumcu 2007). This is important to remember when discussing the 
introduction of the reforms, which, although proclaimed by the sultan, were actually 
implemented by powerful ministers, who were themselves often pawns in the hands of the 
Great Powers, as discussed in the forthcoming sections. Although nominally Muslim, the 
Tanzimatçılar ‘with eyeshades, Morse, perfect French and an unusually deep knowledge of 
the empire’s affairs … were thoroughly disloyal’ to the Ottomans (Goodwin 1999: 313) 
and the greater Islamic cause the empire embodied. They were early neo-Islamists. 
At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that this thesis makes a clear 
demarcation between the terms ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turk’, and rejects their use as synonyms. 
Although committed to the Islamic ethos, the Ottomans promoted a multicultural and pluri-
religious state, in which each group was able to maintain their own identity within the 
empire’s ethnic tapestry. In other words, the description of ‘Ottoman’ served to indicate a 
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citizen’s allegiance and was not used as an ethnic substitute. The Turkish Tanzimatçılar, on 
the other hand, were campaigners with a narrow nationalistic approach, who rejected the 
idea of diversity – especially if ethno-religious. They insisted on building a Muslim-
Turkish nation, comprising local Muslims and those Muslims expelled from the lands the 
Ottomans lost in Central Asia and Europe through reforms or disadvantageous truces, as 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Since the project of the New World Order was 
intolerant of the idea of a multicultural state, the erosion of the Ottoman Empire was an 
essential prerequisite for the mushrooming of a whole array of mono-ethnic polities. In its 
inability to preserve multiculturalism, the Ottoman Empire is reminiscent of Yugoslavia. 
The effect of neo-Islam on theYugoslav break-up and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
can only be explained by setting it in this historical context, bearing in mind the 
international dimension of competing strategic interests. Yugoslavia broke apart amidst the 
re-invention of the New World Order in the 1990s,
85
 which witnessed the intensification of 
ethnic conflicts and rejection of multicultural states. Thus, the ‘new’ New World Order 
turned out to be simply a continuation of the old.  
 
3.2 Islam and the old concept of the ‘New World Order’ 
Studies of the New World Order often portray it from an essentially Western angle, either 
omitting any correlation with Islam or placing its dogma in direct opposition to Islamic 
doctrine (Hill 2010; Lewis 2003; Huntington 1996; Barber 1995). As enthusiasm over the 
end of the nuclear arms race waned (Rivage-Seul 1995) and financial ‘low-intensity 
conflicts’ started to brew across the less-developed world, the New World Order became 
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 George Bush Jrs’s vision for the future as embodied in his well-known 1991 speech was generally taken as 
a signal for the commencement of a New World Order ‘where diverse nations are drawn together in common 
cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law’. 
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synonymous with the interventionist paradigms of Western political elites (George 2006; 
Kaldor 2007), either as a platform for organised transnational networks (Slaughter 2004) or 
as a tool for formulating policy and maintaining the balance of power (Keen 2007). The 
contextualisation of the debates concerning the New World Order is important, as the 
dilemma of Western intervention dominated the entire policy discourse during the 1992-95 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Simms (2001: 309-311) considers the controversial 
response of many left-wing intellectuals towards intervention in Bosnia as ‘a postmodern 
malaise’, which served as ‘an invincibly sceptic critique of the New World Order. If the US 
was about to intervene, this was symptomatic of western hubris; if she did not, this proved 
that war on Iraq [in 1991] had been waged solely for oil’.86  
The New World Order became a euphemism in certain intellectual circles for 
illicitly pursuing a Western neoliberal agenda – waging, supporting and intervening in wars 
for the sake of profit (Grupp 2009; Duffield 2007; Engdahl 2004; Chossudovsky 2002; 
Rivage-Seul 1995). Chomsky (1997: 25) asserts that the New World Order implied an 
explicit continuity, being ‘new’ only in so far as it entailed ‘adapting traditional policies of 
domination and exploitation to somewhat changed contingences’. He claims that, with the 
end of the Cold War, there were several attempts to call for a New World Order, but these 
simply reflected the old power relations between rich and poor and the widening gap 
between North/West and South/East. Basing his view on an examination of the political 
actions of Churchill, Nixon and Reagan, Chomsky (1997) claims that their policies held 
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 One of the striking features of the debates on the New World Order was the rise of criticisms of the position 
of left-wing scholars and intellectuals. It was often argued that they took a hypocritical or relativistic stance, 
enjoying a self-adulatory image as inheritors of the legacy of the Enlightenment, alongside a tacit feeling of 
superiority when compared with their less fortunate counterparts from the Third World. For more on this 
subject, see Žižek (2002: 60).  
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far-reaching implications; they prepared an international platform for a neoliberal system 
guided by a free-market oligopolistic elite. The importance of the formation of this elite for 
the promulgation of the doctrine of neoliberalism is discussed in more detail in chapter five.  
At this point, it is important to point out that throughout the centuries such groups 
have established common patterns of governance, capable of maintaining the world system. 
Hill (2010) has produced an incisive analysis of the continuity of the international system 
based on a procedural world order. In a recent work, he uses his insider knowledge of 
statecraft at the highest level
87
 to give a sophisticated account of the cumulative processes 
that led to the systematic establishment of the New World Order. He sees its embryonic 
form in the formation of the nation-state at the end of the Thirty Years War and the Peace 
of Westphalia. He is not the first high-ranking official to place the New World Order in the 
historical context of the creation of the nation-state: a leading British foreign office 
diplomat, Robert Cooper (1997), has interrogated the concept in an article with the 
suggestive title, ‘Is There a New World Order?’ He proceeded to answer this question in 
the conclusion of his paper: ‘This essay is intended to say many things, but especially to 
say one big thing. That there is no New World Order is a commonplace’ (Cooper 1997: 
324). In the enviably superior tone of someone privileged enough to be privy to classified 
information, Cooper asserts that there were never any actual political attempts to create a 
global order that would supersede the one already created by the system of nation-states. 
When there was a perceived ambition to do so on the part of Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 
1990, Cooper (1997: 322) states that the West decided to defend its own interests: ‘[T]he 
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 Charles Hill is a diplomat-turned-academic. He was a senior adviser to George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, 
Ronald Reagan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.  
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Gulf war was a war of interests, not a clash of ideologies.’ Cooper’s statement is important 
as it illustrates how Western intervention has been conducted in the same fashion ever since 
the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. By maintaining within its 
sphere of influence a multiplicity of states containing oil supplies, and hindering their 
ability to purchase advanced technology, it thwarted any possibility of ecomomic  
advancement in the region. Cooper (1997) is clear on this point: 
The reason for fighting this war was not that Iraq had violated the norms of 
international behaviour. Some mistook the Gulf War for a war for principles 
or a collective security action – and indeed the political rhetoric at the time 
fostered this impression. In fact, it was a collective defence of shared 
interests by the West. The Gulf War was fought to protect an old order, not 
to create a new one. (Cooper 1997: 322, my italics) 
 
Cooper’s account (1997: 315-317) also upholds the idea that the Cold War was a delusion 
based on an ‘absurdity in strategic logic’ and the presumption of East-West enmity, which 
helped create a simplification of the balance of power. The ultimate ideal was to achieve 
order through the hegemony of a single state power, as witnessed ‘in dreams of the 
restoration of Christendom or in proposals for world government’ (1997: 313).  
Cooper’s claim, as a high-ranking policy practitioner, is highly significant because 
he refers to the New World Order as a platform for unified global governance, in 
concurrence with the scholarly analysis mentioned above. His analysis becomes even more 
illuminating when his choice of terminology is dissected: while ‘dreaming’ refers to a 
disabling illusion, the term ‘proposal’ indicates legitimate claims. That is mainly due to the 
fact that when the imperial world system was dismembered, the idea of a united 
Christendom was replaced by the actuality of a system of nation-states. With the empires 
gone, there was a need for an institution that would safeguard the multiplicity of nation-
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states as the final step towards the ultimate hegemony of the New World Order. Cooper 
(1997: 319) believes that the most suitable organisation to fill this role was the United 
Nations, which was ‘thus conceived to stabilize the order of states and not to create a 
fundamentally new order’. In order to prevent any challenge to the interests of the Great 
Powers, the UN was equipped with a special power of veto, illustrating the fact that its 
specific duty lay in the maintenance of the status quo in the international balance of power. 
Supplied with the machinery to operate a system of nation-states defined and guided by the 
interests of the Western powers, the UN became the main gatekeeper of the ‘new’ New 
World Order.
88
  
This thesis argues that this conceptualisation of the New World Order is significant 
for the research question, especially in regards to the analysis of particular legacies of the 
Ottoman rule and the construction of neo-Islamist influences in the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in two ways. Firstly, it was the Islamic component in the country’s 
composition that provoked the Great Powers into denying the Bosniaks the right to form 
their own nation-state in nineteenth-century Europe. This begged the question, if the world 
system is based on the web of nation-states, but the Bosniaks are without one, what then is 
their place within it? The nineteenth-century solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina was to 
impose a protectorate, as detailed below. Consequently, if the new order is but a 
continuation of the old, it is within this context that the search for explanations of the 
controversial peace solution that concluded the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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 The UN system is supervised by agents of the Great Powers in the form of military/peacekeeping forces or 
various international organisations, nowadays popularly called INGOs (international non-governmental 
organisations). The contemporary terminology for all forms of UN and UN-related institutions is the 
‘international community’.   
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must begin. In both instances, Islam was the crucial component that defined the place of 
Bosnian Muslims in the New World Order: in the nineteenth century it served to de-
nationalise Bosnian Muslims and distance them from Europe, whilst in modern times it has 
served to elucidate their national place in the contemporary European setting, albeit under 
the pretext of neo-Islam, as discussed in more detail in chapter six. Secondly, the 
predominant tendency in the international political system is to maintain the status quo. The 
UN peacekeeping operations serve as a good illustration. Since 1948, the UN has launched 
sixty peacekeeping operations, out of which fifteen are still active today.
89
 Out of these 
active operations, thirteen are on territory with majority Muslim populations
90
; the only one 
in Europe took place during and after the break-up of Yugoslavia, which ended with the 
genocide of the Bosnian Muslims. Taking the case of Bosnia as ‘tangible proof’, 
Ramadan’s (2001: 277) view is representative of the position of most Muslim scholars: 
‘[A] clash is going on, and … the West is clearly at war against Islam.’91  
However, this thesis takes a slightly different view. While the European-biased 
rejection of Islam is unquestionable, the West’s calculated neutrality during the 1992-95 
Bosnian crisis must be situated within the context of the maintenance of the New World 
Order. A Muslim nation-state on European soil was not envisaged as part of the scheme. 
Islam, however, contrary to the claims of many scholars, participated in the project. One 
way to understand the participating neo-Islamic elements, and to begin to unravel the 
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 For more information, consult the official UN website: https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/  
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 See the official UN website:  https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ 
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 Ramadan (2001: 277) explains: ‘One may speak of simplification, a thousand analyses and theories can be 
referred to, one can explain and explain again, but one will not be able to convince them. Nothing in light of 
the objective data surrounding the conflict – ethnic cleansing, arms embargo, unprotected “safe havens”, the 
Russian position, strategic interests and the conniving passivity of Europe and the USA – fundamentally 
contradicts the thesis.’ 
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continuing conundrum of the Bosnian Muslims, is to fully appreciate the far-reaching 
impact of the Ottoman reforms and the way they formed an essential part of the creation of 
the New World Order. Their repercussions were so profound that they still affect 
contemporary Turkish political and military affairs, perpetuating conflicts between Muslim 
modernists and traditionalists (Johnson 2007). The same is true for their impact on Bosnian 
Muslims and their fight for a nation-state that has lasted to this day. In order to comprehend 
the severity of the reforms and their damaging impact, it is essential to outline the 
privileged position Bosniaks held in the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent degradation 
they suffered at the hands of the Tanzimatçılar and Europeans during the autocratic rule of 
ethno-liberal modernisation.  
 
3.3 The Bosniaks: between the Ottomans and the Europeans 
Bosna Vilayeti (the Ottoman Bosnian province) was never a classical colony of the 
Ottoman Empire (Smajlović 1991: 29). When the Ottomans eventually conquered Bosnia 
in 1463 (some parts did not succumb until 1528), Sultan Fatih Mehmed II granted Bosnia 
and Herzegovina unprecedented autonomy because of the en masse voluntary acceptance of 
Islam on the part of Bosnian Bogumils (see chapter one). The sultan’s grace stemmed from 
the fact that they had enabled him to fulfil his worldly duty of spreading and preserving 
Islam, a mission he could only successfully accomplish by establishing a deeply rooted 
faith in the conquered provinces. The Bosniaks replied to the gesture with loyalty, 
equipping the empire with its most able military and political men. In turn, they were 
allowed to enjoy a de-facto autonomy (Glenny 2000: 74).  
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Bosnia had a very particular administration that differed from any other region 
within the Ottoman Empire: it was ruled by a council of âyans (local representatives). Its 
peculiar position even persuaded the imperial court to adapt its laws and regulations in 
relation to the governance of provinces so as to fully incorporate the Bosnian reality into 
the laws of the empire (Zulfirkarapašić 1994). For example, local leaders of Bosna Vilayeti 
were the only provincial leaders in the region who were not answerable to the grand vizier 
of Rumelia (the Balkans) but reported directly to the sultan. When Bosniaks boycotted or 
challenged some decree from the Porte, their representatives were invited by the sultan 
himself to attend negotiations. The sultan would be present at the talks, whereas in other 
rebellious parts of the empire, such as Albania, the negotiations were conducted through the 
grand vizier, or rather his large army would be sent to extinguish the rebellion.  
This is not to say that the relationship between the Bosniaks and the Ottomans was 
entirely without its problems. Cerić (1968) has found that between 1621 and 1824 there 
were twenty-seven open conflicts between the Bosniaks and the sultan’s armies – the so-
called ‘anti-vizier’ rebellions. Nevertheless, each time, a delegation would be sent to the 
Porte and the sultan would usually grant the Bosniaks’ requests, the major one being the 
preservation of Bosnian autonomy and Bosniak prerogatives. The rationale for maintaining 
this relationship was the fact that both entities were united through Islam, a fact that 
compelled them to preserve their mutual interests.
92
 However, there were differences in the 
perception of these interests: while the Ottomans’ interests lay in safeguarding the borders 
of the empire by maintaining the balance of power in its westernmost province, the 
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 Albanians shared Islamic interests with the Ottomans, but they never enjoyed autonomy similar to that of 
Bosnia. 
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fundamental necessity for Bosniaks was to sustain a livelihood for their community. In 
other words, if Bosnia and Herzegovina were attacked, they would defend it, not in order to 
preserve the empire and the Islamic faith but to protect their lives and their families.  
This is especially important to remember when considering the impact of the 
Tanzimat reforms. These reforms were aimed at the centralisation of the Ottoman state 
apparatus, which up to that time was composed of a widespread network of decentralised, 
self-managed deputies such as millets, wakfs (charitable endowments) and guilds. One of 
the measures essential to achieving stronger central government and tighter state control 
was the creation of a centralised army, which ultimately led to the abolition of the janissary 
guilds in 1826 under Mahmud II, the son of the aforementioned Nakshidil Sultan. The 
impact on Bosnia was such that it not only caused the dismemberment of its army and 
shattered the livelihoods of Bosnian soldiers,
93
 but it effectively curtailed its autonomy. The 
Bosniaks, therefore, bitterly opposed the reforms; the ‘anti-vizier’ rebellions from 1826 
onwards were transformed into fully fledged wars, and became the longest political and 
military battle the empire ever waged against its subjects. Glenny (2000) describes the 
extent of the bitterness of the dispute: 
Men of the Tanzimat attempted to reconcile economic change with the 
reform of the millet. The experiment was doomed to heroic failure. Nowhere 
was the problem they addressed more acute than in the vilayets of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. By the early nineteenth century, chronic poverty, strained 
social relations, arbitrary official cruelty and bitter resentment towards 
Istanbul flowed through the Ottoman Empire like poisoned blood, but no 
other province could match Bosnia and Herzegovina for the severity of its 
symptoms. (Glenny 2000: 73) 
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 The economic importance and implication of these guilds is discussed in chapter two. 
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The Bosnian âyans were determined to reject the reforms because they viewed them 
as a foreign imposition that would lead to an erosion of their rights over the land that had 
belonged to their ancestors for centuries. Sućeska (1995: 33) explains that the Bosniaks 
considered the reforms to be ‘directed not only against their own privileges but against the 
fundamental principles of the Islamic faith …, especially against the interests of Bosnia’. 
They represented an attack on the autonomy that had been granted to Bosnian Muslims at 
the time of their initial contact with the Ottomans. The Tanzimat reforms not only 
threatened the âyans’ prerogatives, but also considerably weakened Bosnia’s military 
position from within. Bosnia Vilayeti was a remote western province, and its vulnerable 
position at the outskirts of the Ottoman Empire meant that it was forced to endure constant 
attacks from external foes. Experience had taught the Bosniaks that a weak Bosnia meant 
they had little chance of survival. Their vehement resistance, however, compelled the Porte 
to take sterner measures against the rebels. In 1827 a special decree from the imperial court 
ordered Abdurahman Pasha to leave his seat in Belgrade and go to Sarajevo to aid the war 
effort. Abdurahman was successful in crushing the local janissaries, killing seven of their 
leaders and cruelly punishing the others in an attempt to instigate fear and obedience 
(Karatay 2006: 374; Djurdjev 1960: 1261-1275). This is very significant because, until that 
time, Ottomans had generally dispatched Bosniaks to deal with Serbian revolts. Taking a 
wider perspective, however, it can be seen that these reforms spelled the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire’s military might, and with it, its economy.  
The Europeans, for their part, misunderstood the Bosniaks’ struggle to protect their 
lives, faith and land as signifying unconditional devotion to their Ottoman masters. For 
Europeans, the Bogumils’ voluntary embrace of Islam and subsequent piety was a 
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consequence of ‘very particular circumstances that seem to have been frequently 
overlooked [which meant] that the whole of Bosnia became Mahommedan [sic], and is still 
in the hands of Moselmin [sic]’ (Fraser’s Magazine 1876: 226). The author was referring to 
the Bogumils’ voluntary, collective embrace of Islam,94 which had been puzzling European 
scholars and travellers ever since it was discovered that Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
populated by an indigenous Muslim population. The Islamisation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became a recurring topic, generating a number of hypotheses that continue to 
have a tenacious hold. Owing to the Islamic presence, Bosnia was regarded as ‘the most 
barbarous of the provinces of Turkey in Europe, standing savage and oriental in between 
the Adriatic shores and the more advanced cultures of Serbia and Croatia’ (Irby 1875: 643). 
Geographically speaking, Bosnia was in Europe, but it was its ‘cultural Orientalism’ that 
distanced it from a wider European consciousness (Said 1988). In European cultural 
memory, Bosnian Muslims had a reputation of being ‘Mohammedan fanatics’, and were 
regarded as perpetuating an unjust Islamic rule in the Balkans.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore, was imprinted in the European collective 
memory as the westernmost border of ‘Turkey in Europe’;  at the slightest sign of Ottoman 
weakness, this was the first province that had to be attacked, ravaged and ‘redeemed’ from 
perceived ‘Mohammedan’ oppression (Freeman 1876; Guernsey 1877). According to 
European sources at the time, it was in Bosnia and Herzegovina proper, more than four 
centuries ago, that Christian subjects ‘were first drowned in the flood of Mahometanism 
[sic]’, and greedy Bosnian renegades were seen to …  
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 Islamisation is discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
 
  
112 
… cling with furious determination to every privilege and power conferred 
on them in former times by a religion which treats all but Mahometans [sic] 
as the enemies of God and man, fit only for slavery and abuse. (The Living 
Age 1876: 389) 
 
Greed and a concern for safeguarding their privileges were commonly presented as the 
main reasons why the Bosniaks had accepted Islam en masse. The argument most 
frequently used was that the bulk of Bosnian landowners became apostates in order to 
retain their wealth, whilst the great majority of the population remained ‘faithful’. This 
explanation became a common part of historical accounts and still persists today; most 
contemporary historians maintain this socio-economic hypothesis as a bona fide cause for 
the mass conversion of the Bosnian population. That fact that it fails to account for the 
spiritual reasons for embracing Islam and to explain why Islam has continued to flourish in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, even during the time when Muslims became subject to 
persecution and death, has frequently been overlooked. The following chapter deals with 
the Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in more detail as part of its analysis of the lack 
of national development of Bosniaks in a political sense. At this juncture, it suffices to 
point out that none of the original European reports on Bosnian Muslims mention the 
significant pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, or the symbiosis between Bogumilism (the 
unofficial medieval religion of the Bosnians) and Islam, as the main rationale behind their 
unconditional acceptance of Islam at the time of Ottoman conquest.  
Beneath this derogatory discourse lay the insatiable European demand for the 
resources indispensable for its industrial development, such as high-quality timber and iron, 
both of which were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina in large quantities (Glenny 2000: 
74). The reforms instigated by the Tanzimatçılar were warmly welcomed by the Great 
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Powers because they granted concessions to foreign companies, allowing them to extract 
minerals and cut timber, at the same time as forbidding domestic business activity in this 
area. English companies started working the mines, extracting copper and iron ‘not only in 
large quantities but also of excellent quality’, with the best Bosnian iron being equal to that 
of Sweden; meanwhile, felling Bosnian timber proved ‘a source of wealth to many 
Austrians and Frenchmen who have embarked in it’ (JRJ 1876: 640).  
As a consequence of the entrepreneurial prerogatives conferred upon them, the 
Europeans adjusted their discourse. The Ottomans were now frequently referred to as 
‘Turks’ and represented as a separate group within the Muslim world: 
Unlike the Saracens or Arabs the Turks, from the beginning, were the most 
tolerant of human beings. They never practised that fanaticism which 
compelled conquered Christians to adopt their creed or perish by the sword, 
as is popularly stated. On the contrary, they allowed the largest liberty and 
treated non-conformity in religion with an indifference worthy of [a] French 
philosopher or an American citizen. (De Leon 1872: 606)  
 
The revised tone of the travelogues and correspondence is important to note for two 
reasons. First, differentiating Turks from other Muslims accomplished the task of rescuing 
nascent Turkish nationalism from the image of the Ottoman ‘sick man of Europe’ and 
distanced it from other nascent Muslim-Arab nationalisms. Secondly, it helped secure 
acceptance of the nascent Turkish nation as a legitimate part of the emerging ethno-liberal 
geopolitical structure of a new enlightened Europe, devoid of multicultural empires and 
comprising a system of homogenised nation-states. This strategy of favourable reportage 
was particularly important because a renewed Turkish nation was intended as a homeland 
for the many Muslims expelled from the European and Central Asian lands the Ottomans 
  
114 
lost to the Great Powers during the attempted resolution of the ‘Eastern Question’. A 
legitimate Muslim-Turkish nation would host and subsequently assimilate the incoming 
Muslim population. The Europeans, in effect, rewarded the Tanzimatçılar for their 
willingness to administer reforms under whatever terms the Great Powers decreed and to 
supervise the expedited Ottoman withdrawal from the territories to be occupied by the 
Great Powers or their newly created client states.
95
  
This discourse also operated on the geostrategic level of imperial rivalry, creating 
various spheres of influence among the European powers, helping ensure the supremacy of 
one over another. Analysing the tone of the discursive strategies deployed in literary works 
produced in the English language, Hopkirk (1992: 361) suggests it was ‘Russophobe-
Turcophile’ – that is, it elevated the Turks and demonised the Russians in accord with 
Britain’s foreign-policy agenda of curtailing Russian expansionism during the ‘Eastern 
Crisis’.96 A vast number of explorers, writers, essayists and members of the Western 
intelligentsia followed the progress of European foreign policy closely. When diplomatic 
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 A useful example that can serve as an illustration of the symbiosis between the Great Powers and the 
Tanzimatçılar comes from a ‘sympathetic writer’ reporting on the Turkish withdrawal from the battlefield 
through Bulgarian territory. The author asks his readers to regard him as an ‘accurate witness’ because he 
believes that he has the ‘faculty of keen observation’ and no ‘conscious prejudice, except in a favour of a 
good fighting man’, so his account of astonishing Turkish tolerance can be fully trusted. ‘I have said that the 
Turks are barbarians and that they are ruthless savages when their fighting blood is up; but there is no 
inconsistency between this attribute and the attribute of the contemptuous good-natured humanity, or rather 
perhaps tolerant ingressiveness, when nothing has occurred to stir the pulse of the savage spirit’ (Forbes 1877: 
643, 650).  
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 The following quotation is a good example of the way the narrative was adjusted. It still retained an 
Islamophobic continuity, but transmitted this through a more measured intonation, offering an altered view of 
the Turks: ‘I feel thankfully indebted to the Porte. And I do not, like many other people, consider gratitude to 
be a burden, but to be a dear obligation. I learned to esteem highly the noble personalities of the Turkish 
national character … It is true that Turkish people remain far behind in what we call civilisation … These are 
my personal views, my individual sympathies. Sympathies, however, are no centre for attraction of the 
politics of the world: but self-interest is. And though for a long time the conservation of the Turkish Empire 
was a dogma of the politics of European equilibrium, and it is still so in foro consientia, it does not follow that 
Europe is in love with the Turks, but only that it abhors the increase of the Russian preponderance’ (Kossuth 
1878: 94, italics in the original). 
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efforts took a different course, the language of their reports and travelogues adjusted itself 
accordingly. In this respect, these literary works represented a political statement reflecting 
the ‘new imperialism’ driving Europe’s aggressive territorial aggrandisement during the 
period of the ‘Eastern Question’.97 Moreover, these accounts of adventure and travel found 
great popularity throughout Europe from the 1860s onwards, with a readership that was fast 
developing into a mass reading public, which found this genre highly congenial.
98
 In effect, 
this vein of travel writing functioned as a channel of propaganda for pro-imperialist 
political views (Akilli 2009).  
In relation to the influence of foreign policy on public opinion, the shift in 
sentiments towards the Turks on the part of Europeans was also significant for Bosnian 
Muslims. Encouraged by the pro-European reforms, the European powers embarked on a 
crusade to reclaim Bosnia from Islam. Although Oriental in appearance and customs, 
Arabic and Persian were unknown languages to Bosnian Muslims as ‘the Bosnian oligarchy 
speaks nothing but Slave [sic], and [they] are not remarkable for any deep knowledge of the 
Koran [sic]’ (Freeman 1876: 75). Arthur Evans, a British missionary-explorer who reported 
directly to the British Imperial Office, was particularly influential in this regard. He 
popularised the theory that the Bogumils were early Protestants, noting that ‘Slavonic 
Mohammedans’ were not opposed to re-converting to the faith of their forefathers.99 
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 The ‘new imperialism’ refers to the period of aggressive territorial acquisition by European imperial 
powers, roughly between the early 1870s and the First World War. For detailed accounts of the new 
imperialism, see Cohen (1973) and Smith (1982).  
98
 This was specifically true of trends in Britain, whose authors generated the largest numbers of travelogues. 
For full-length accounts of the emergence and growth of a mass reading public in Britain from the 1870s 
onwards as a result of concurrent technological, social, economic and political developments, see Altick 
(1957) and Blake (1989).  
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 Evans, assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a fact-finding mission in 1877-78, wrote in his Illyrian 
Letters: ‘An active leader among the Begs answered as follows the question whether he would imitate some 
of his associates, who were already receiving baptism from Bishop Strossmeyer and his priests: “Not yet, but 
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Referring to the papal persecutions of the Bogumils, Evans underpinned his Islamophobic 
views with a critique of Europe’s malaise:  
Europe has mainly to thank the Church of Rome that an alien civilisation 
and religion has been thrust in their midst, and that Bosnia at the present 
remains Mahometan [sic]. (Evans 1877: iv) 
The subject of re-Christianisation was dealt with anachronistically, creating a historicised 
image of opportunistic Bosniaks who had notoriously accepted Islam to preserve their 
property. Irby (1875: 646) claimed to speak from personal experience after residing a 
number of years among ‘Slavonic Mussulmans’, ‘who are not indisposed to embrac[ing] 
the Christianity professed by their forefathers, and … preserve with care patents of nobility 
of their Christian ancestors”.100 It is important to point out that these reports were generated 
at a time of national awakening in the Balkans, when borders were being drawn up for the 
emerging nation-states. In this respect, their task was to blend historical, anthropological, 
military and political perspectives, establishing a framework in which to explore the 
question of whether, in the event of revolution or nationalist revolts (for which the 
                                                                                                                                                    
when the time comes and the hour of fate strikes, I will do so in another style. I will call together my kinsmen, 
and we will return to the faith of our ancestors as one man. We would choose to be Protestants, as are you 
English; but if need be, we will join the Serbian Church. Latin we will never be. If we go into a Roman 
church, what do we understand? My family has never forgotten that they were once of your faith and were 
made Moslems by force. In my castle there is a secret vault in which there are kept the ancient Christian 
books and vessels that they had before the Turks took Bosnia. My father once looked into it, then closed it up, 
and said, ‘Let them be; they may serve their turn yet.’”  How many of these secret vaults in Bosnia may yet be 
opened and their Christian books brought out?’  
100
 Adelina Paulina Irby was a Norfolk-born schoolmistress who spent most of her adult life in Sarajevo, with 
the aim of ‘enlightening’ the local Christian population through the foundation of a school for Orthodox girls 
in 1869. She first travelled to the Balkan region in 1867 with her friend Georgina Mackenzie. Their visit was 
recounted in a book, subsequently published in two volumes under the title, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces 
of Turkey-in-Europe (Irby 1877). This travelogue is a detailed report of their journey, during which they 
recorded the habits of the peoples of the Balkans. The most striking feature of the work is its extremely 
Islamophobic tone, Muslims being described as savage illiterates; by contrast, Christian schools were run by a 
‘remarkable Serb, Mother Katerina, as the subject of education, indeed, actively concerns all the Christian 
Slavs’ – but not of course Muslims. Another time, the travellers met with scary ‘Muhamedan [sic] tax-
gatherers’, and the travelogue further offers detailed descriptions of the ruins of a church converted into a 
mosque, whose ‘stones still bear the sign of the cross’, and of the way Slav Muslims ‘tolerate accumulated 
filth of one sort or another, under windows, under divans, in short everywhere’ (1877: 303, 305, 306).  
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Christian population was carefully being psychologically prepared and militarily equipped), 
‘such men [Bosniaks] may turn back again as easily as their forefathers turned in the first 
instance’ (Irby 1875: 75).  
Irby’s missionary work in Bosnia in 1875 and 1877 is noteworthy in that it 
culminated in a particularly Islamophobic book, endorsed by the British prime minster, 
William Gladstone, who wrote a foreword to it. This formal authorisation serves as a 
cogent example of the symbiosis of such travel writing with the official political views it 
reiterated. It lent further support to the claims of anti-Muslim propaganda, with its aim of 
purging Europe of the Islamic presence through the establishment of a New World Order, 
in which the expelled Muslims would find a homeland in a redeemed Turkish nation-state. 
Irby is also significant in a contemporary way: a street in the centre of Sarajevo still bears 
her name. Even when neo-Islamists, who will be further discussed in chapter six, gained 
control of the city government, they kept this street name, even though they renamed 
almost all the others, especially those from communist times. Logically, discarding Irby’s 
name should have been a natural course of action for neo-Islamists, given her notoriously 
Islamophobic views. This seemingly small, overlooked lapse is important on two counts: it 
supports the argument of this thesis that the Muslim identity of Bosniaks is not a 
satisfactory explanation in itself for the cause of the 1992-5 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the subsequent violent repercussions against Bosniaks; more immediately, it serves as 
convincing evidence of the participation of neo-Islam in the establishment of the New 
World Order in the nineteenth century, which is manifest today in the synthesis of 
neoliberalism and neo-Islamism (analysed in chapters two and five).        
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When it became apparent that the re-Christianisation of Bosniaks was for the most 
part impossible, Europeans assigned them the image of unruly and disobedient Muslims. 
They were described as a disruptive and rebellious ‘large Muslim element [that] represents 
a great difficulty’ (Irby 1875: 647), despite the fact that it was also ‘very fanatical, very 
hostile to the Stmboul [sic] government’ (Godkin 1877: 124). This was an admonition 
directed at the Bosniaks for their resistance to the reforms propagated by the Tanzimatçılar, 
which incorporated conditions agreeable to the European powers. More importantly, it 
clearly demarcated the insubordinate Bosnian Muslims from the cooperative Turks. Due to 
their demonstrable disobedience, Bosniaks were proclaimed as ‘immediate oppressors’ over 
people of their own race; their image of savage brutality separated them from the Turks, as 
Bosniaks were not ‘Turk by blood but artificially turned Turk’ (Freeman 1876: 75), a sad 
peculiarity that apparently made matters even worse.101 The Bosniaks were not integrated 
into the European system of nation-states but remained confined to the sidelines as 
demonised figures of ‘fanatic Mussulmans [sic]’, who were still venerating Christian patron 
saints but who ‘nourish blind and savage hatred against their Christian fellow-countryman’ 
(Irby 1875: 646).  
To summarise, Bosniaks represented the ‘Oriental other’ – a euphemism for Islam 
and Muslims – and were to be mistrusted on all levels. Islam, therefore, influenced both the 
way the Bosniaks saw themselves and the way their immediate neighbours perceived them. 
It was the internalisation of Islam in this remote European province of the Ottoman Empire 
that meant that Bosniaks had ‘the most developed sense of their own national identity in 
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 Freeman (1876: 75) reported: ‘A foreign conqueror may command a certain kind of respect which a native 
renegade certainly cannot. In some cases, it is a certain softening of tyranny when one’s tyrants are one’s 
countrymen; but that rule can hardly apply to the dominion of such a caste as this’ (my italics).  
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the entire Empire’ (Glenny 2000: 77). This highly developed sense of identity was unusual 
among the inhabitants of Europe at the time: the Bosniaks shared a religion with the 
Ottomans but were separated from them by their language, which they shared with their 
Christian brethren, along with their culture and, to some extent, traditions. However, the 
Bosniaks did not consider themselves as partners of their Euro-Christian fellow 
countrymen, but as the sole European ally of the ‘Commander of the Faithful’, in the 
person of the sultan, who represented the unifying power of Islam. Europeans perceived the 
Bosniaks through an Islamic prism too; however, they did not see them as part of a unique 
European diversity but as a reminder of the Muslim stronghold on Europe’s doorstep, and 
ultimately as a foe. This dichotomy in perceptions is important to bear in mind when 
discussing the unsuccessful attempts of the Bosniaks to build a nation-state of their own, 
the lack of support from the Great Powers, and the efforts of the Turkish Tanzimatçılar to 
erode their autonomous prerogatives by expediting the reorganisation of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman military reforms signalled the commencement of these trends.  
 
3.4 The Tulip Reforms and the beginning of the ‘Eastern Question’ 
The Tulip Reforms or Lale Deviri refer to the reorganisation of the Ottoman military in the 
period from 1718 to 1730. Based on the historical record, this thesis argues that the military 
reforms were conceived in Bosnia with the arrival of a French officer, the Comte de 
Bonneval. De Bonneval was a controversial yet relatively obscure figure who crossed the 
frontier into Bosnia in 1727, accepted Islam and went on to Constantinople where he 
became a high-ranking official known as Humbaraci Ahmet Pasha (Fullarton 1857: 126; 
Berkes 1964: 47; Bowen 1971: 291-192). Prior to this, he was engaged in numerous battles 
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against the Ottomans, fighting alongside their opponents
102
 at the Bosnian borders, and 
appeared well acquainted with the empire’s internal upheavals and martial ability. What 
prompted de Bonneval to switch sides and embrace Islam or the sultan to welcome him into 
his adminstration is not known, and curiously there are very few documents available that 
would shed light on this important figure who initiated the Ottoman reforms.
103 
What is 
known is that as soon as he was accepted by the Porte, de Bonneval, or Ahmet Pasha, 
opened the first military academy, the Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun.  
Aside some initial military victories over Russia, however, the new military training 
produced little in the way of immediate results. The Persians defeated the Ottomans and 
Ahmed Pasha personally signed a dubious truce with Nadir Shah of Iran in 1732. The treaty 
satisfied neither the Turks nor the Persians, and the fighting continued for another fourteen 
years (Seyrek 2006: 136-137). In other words, rather than ending the war, the inauspicious 
truce brokered by Ahmed Pasha prolonged it. The extended engagement at the Persian 
frontier had a negative impact on the Bosniaks. Of the 5,200 Bosnians who answered the 
sultan’s call to arms, only five hundred returned (Pelidija 1994: 123). A critical 
examination of the historical events, and the lack of an easy explanation for the reasons 
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 For example, de Bonneval was a good friend and military companion of Eugene de Savoy, a Hapsburg 
prince, who fought the Bosnians for a number of years. When de Savoy finally managed to enter Sarajevo in 
October 1697, he butchered a great many of the population and set the city and all its mosques on fire. His 
prime targets were Muslims. For more on this subject, see Ademović (1997).  
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 There are very few resources on this subject. There are two books published in French that belong to rare 
book collections and cannot easily be obtained. Moreover, their authenticity is questionable, and it appears 
that works originating from the pasha himself are no longer extant. The titles of the aforementioned books are 
Mémoires du Comte de Bonneval, cidevant Général au service de Sa Majesté Impériale et Catholique 
(Londres, 1737, 3 vol. in 8; réimprimés en 1738, 1755 et 1806) and Anecdotes Vénitiennes et Turques, ou 
Nouveaux Mémoires du Comte de Bonneval by M. de Mirone (Utrecht, 1740, 2 vol. in 8). There is an English 
translation by John Sparrow (1734) entitled A Complete History of the Wars in Italy. Recent years have seen a 
renewed interest in de Bonneval, especially in relation to his eccentric character and the opulent lifestyle he 
followed as an Islamic convert. For short articles about him, see Irimia (2009) and Fabre (2008). Apparently, 
there is one more publication, a Swedish translation, but this is currently unobtainable.   
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behind the reorganisation of an already successful military force, lead to the conclusion that 
Ahmed Pasha’s actions represented a deliberate attempt to weaken the Ottoman military, 
which up until that time had been the key to the empire’s martial and economic strength. 
Following this military disaster, the Ottoman Empire’s lack of manpower provided 
an opportunity for Russia and Austria to attack its weakest point – its most remote 
province, Bosnia. In the 1736-39 war with the Russians, ten thousand Bosniak men were 
mobilised, out of whom only one fifth, or more precisely 1,340 officers and soldiers, 
returned home (Pelidija 2006: 11). At the same time, Bosnia was ravaged by plague and 
host to a huge influx of refugees from those territories the Ottomans had lost through 
disadvantageous agreements. The Austrians, who did not appear uninformed about this 
situation, violated the Treaty of Passarowitz
104
 and invaded Bosnia. The well-known 
Austrian friend of Ahmed Pasha-Bonneval, Eugen de Savoy, launched a renewed attack on 
Banja Luka in 1737, hoping it would quickly surrender due to its reduced manpower and 
the ravages of the plague. He did not anticipate that Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha would mobilise 
the youth and organise the city’s defence with great vigour, skill and determination 
(Pelidija 2006: 152-163) – although it was the women who contributed the most to winning 
this battle (Novljanin and Hadžinesimović 1994). Writing about the conflict, Pelidija (2003: 
49) asserts that this was not a fight for to preserve the power of a remote Porte, but rather a 
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 The Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac in Serbia) of 1718 was a result of the war of 1714, which the 
Ottomans lost to the Austrians and Venetians. The Austrian prince Eugene de Savoy teamed up with the 
Venetians and attacked the Ottoman Empire via Bosnia. His chief aide was the Comte de Bonneval, with 
whose help the prince managed to inflict huge losses on the Ottomans at Peterwaradin. However, the Bosnian 
defence further west firmly held its ground. Nevertheless, Bosnia was to pay the price for the Ottoman losses, 
and the strip of land it had successfully defended, part of its traditional territory around the river Sava in the 
north, was confiscated as part of the terms of the treaty and lost to Bosnia permanently. On its southern 
border, Venetians managed to get further inland, and occupied the Dalmatian coast, which now forms 
Croatia’s south-western border with Bosnia. 
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patriotic act by the people of Bosnia, ‘representing one of the first pages written about 
Bosniaks’ self-determination, courage and patriotism. With this victory, the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remained intact until the present day.’  
The fatal battle at Banja Luka was the first important military move in a series of 
strategic actions planned by the Great Powers and the Turkish reformers in a bid to stifle 
the Bosniaks’ drive for national existence and the preservation of their homeland. There 
were two complementary reasons behind the decision to choose Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
the site for the initiation of the reforms. It was the most densely populated Muslim province 
in Europe and, as such, served as a firm boundary within which to test the mechanism by 
which the Great Powers intended to establish a New World Order of homogenised nation-
states, where Muslims would either be given a new national identity and absorbed into one 
of the newly emerged nations or ‘Turkified’ and expelled to what remained of the Ottoman 
Empire. Even if this strategy did not succeed completely, it did not fail either, since careful 
manoeuvring by the reformers and the Great Powers reduced Islamic influence and sowed 
the seeds of Islam’s future withdrawal from Europe. From this time on, the reformed 
Ottoman Empire began its steep military decline, suffering an increasing number of defeats, 
and was forced to surrender provinces into the hands of Great Powers.  
The first serious Ottoman defeat was sealed by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on 21 
July 1774. For this reason, the treaty is considered to be the starting point of the ‘Eastern 
Question’ (Anderson 1991). It had two major consequences that were relevant to the 
building a New World Order based on a loan economy and devoid of an independent 
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European Muslim polity.
105
 Firstly, the Crimea – an eyelet populated by indigenous 
Muslims who had accepted Islam in the twelfth century – was lost at the cost of millions of 
lives. This is significant because the Crimea was in many ways similar to Bosnia: the local 
population had voluntarily converted en masse and, as with Bosnia, Islam was internalised 
with a certain ease due to a pre-Ottoman Islamic presence, a topic that is developed more 
fully in the next chapter on Bosnian Islamisation. The Ottoman withdrawal precipitated the 
killing and expulsion of Crimean Muslims, even though they were part of the local 
population and their Islamic roots predated the Ottoman conquest. This treaty was also 
pertinent for the Bosniaks: after the defeat, violence against Muslim populations became 
the norm rather than the exception, and Bosnian Muslims would have suffered a similar 
fate to that of the Crimean Muslims had it not been for the interference of international 
forces that inadvertently saved them from extinction. Secondly, for the first time in their 
history, the Ottomans were ordered to pay compensation. This added to their indebtedness, 
which rapidly gained momentum, as illustrated in the next section. The Turkish reformers’ 
only response was to usher in further changes (Shaw 1971: 4-8), eventually destroying the 
empire. For Bosniaks, this meant that the struggle for independence would suffer further 
defeats as Islam, albeit in its Bosnian character, was perceived to be part of the problem. 
 
3.5 Crushing the Bosnian independence movement 
The 1831-32 Bosnian independence movement ended in fiasco. However, it triggered the 
longest political struggle ever to emerge in the Ottoman Empire. A Bosnian officer, 
Husein-kapetan Gradaščević, the ‘Dragon of Bosnia’, refused to accept the reforms, 
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 For more on the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca’s text, see Anderson (1970) and Hurewitz (1956). 
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mobilised about four thousand supporters and marched on Travnik, the seat of the 
appointed Turkish vizier, where he defeated the guards and occupied the city (Malcolm 
1994: 119-122; Imamović 1998: 333-337; Karatay 2006: 374-375). Aličić (1982: 174-189, 
1996) narrates how, on the imprisonment of the grand vizier, the Bosnian âyans elected 
Gradaščević as governor and proclaimed Bosnia an autonomous province. The vizier, 
however, managed to escape and find refuge in Austria, which gladly offered a helping 
hand, setting a future precedent for Austro-Turkish cooperation on the northern borders of 
Bosnia, including joint raids against the Bosnian leaders (Rothenberg 1966: 130).  
In the meantime, a serious revolt broke out in Albania, around the border with 
Kosovo. Gradaščević went to Kosovo, but it remains unclear whether he assisted the 
Ottoman army or the rebels. What history does record, however, is that the Turkish vizier 
betrayed his promise to appoint him governor of Bosnia. Moreover, the vizier succeeded in 
pitting the Bosnian âyans against each other, most notably persuading Ali-aga 
Rizvanbegović and Smail-aga Čengić to turn their backs on the idea of Bosnian autonomy. 
The Turks were determined to annihilate Bosniak resistance and sent an army of thirty 
thousand men to Bosnia to fight alongside the troops of the two renegades. Gradaščević 
was finally defeated and exiled to Turkey, and Rizvanbegović was awarded with the newly 
detached province of Herzegovina, which was separated from its sister Bosnia for the first 
time. This would set an ominous precedent for future attempts to partition Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with the help of suborned clients in government positions. Having said that, 
Serbia received few of the Bosnian nahiyas (districts), leading to the birth of the dream of a 
‘Greater Serbia’ that has loomed over Bosnia and Herzegovina to the present day 
(Imamović 1998).  
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This was the first time that a Bosniak uprising was wiped out and their requests 
rejected by the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, however, the Turkish reformers 
remained reticent about the increased autonomy of the Christian millets, which, with the aid 
of the Great Powers, had developed ethno-national programmes and were marching 
towards full independence. An array of secret societies had been set up to operate 
clandestinely across the region. The Greek secret society, Philiki Etaria (Friendly Society), 
was formed with Russian and French support in 1814 in Odessa, with a view to laying the 
ground for insurrection. According to Glenny (2000: 27), the Greek War of Independence 
was the result of ‘a conscious plan to destabilise the Ottoman Empire’. Greek independence 
was finally achieved in 1829, following a revolt sponsored and orchestrated by the British 
agent and poet Lord Byron (Blind 1869). The influence of this society also persuaded Ali 
Pasha of Janina, a disobedient Albanian governor, to convert to the religion of his Orthodox 
wife and initiate an Albanian revolt (Mazower 2001: 90-91). Once he had denounced Islam, 
he qualified for Western support and was aided by the Habsburgs. Meanwhile, Napoleon III 
supported the Romanians’ maximalist programme – ‘the unification of the two 
principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) under a foreign prince’ (Glenny 2000: 65) – and in 
1830 a member of the British royal family was enthroned in Romania. Ćubrilović (1930) 
details the host of secret societies operating in Bulgaria and Romania, agitating for Serbian 
independence. Added to which, Lord Derby, the British prime minister, was a personal 
friend of the Montenegrin Prince Nikola, and offered to help him in his bid for 
independence for Montenegro by securing a strategic port that up till then had been under 
Bosnian rule (Bliss 1896).   
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When the Bosniaks sought independence, however, the Great Powers remained 
silent. A few of the Bosniak historians who deal with this issue assert that denying the 
Bosniaks their own nation-state while granting it to others was a paradoxical but 
coincidental process that was not motivated by conscious policy but emerged as a result of 
Bosniak political immaturity (Maglajlić 2002: 6; Imamović 1998: 336). This view seems 
apologetic and misinformed; the earlier discussion demonstrates that all the nationalist 
movements in the Balkans were dependent on Great Power support and the tacit approval 
of the Turkish Tanzimat ministers. Suppressing the national autonomy of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina whilst granting it to others is convincing evidence of the symbiosis between 
the Great Powers and the Tanzimat reformers and their determination to establish a New 
World Order in Europe, devoid of an independent Muslim nation-state.
106
 Bosnian Muslims 
did not qualify for Great Power support as they were considered to possess an Ottoman-
Muslim heritage and, therefore, did not belong in Europe. The withdrawal of the Islamic 
presence from European soil served as a prerequisite for the establishment of a ‘new 
Enlightenment’ in Europe.  
The emergence of a nascent Turkish nation was supposed to signal the end of the 
multinational Ottoman Empire and, by encompassing and territorialising Europe’s Islamic 
component, solve the ‘Muslim problem’ of ‘Turkey in Europe’. In other words, rather than 
being given the tools and opportunity to build a nation of their own, Bosnian Muslims were 
to be removed to, and assimilated in, the nascent Muslim-Turkish nation. The reform that 
was next in line was the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun (Noble Reform Edict), also known as 
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 Albania is included in this claim as it was never officially a Muslim state because Albanian allegiance to 
Islam was considered to be doubtful – they denounced Islam twice in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The Albanian case is explained in more detail in chapter four, which develops an analysis of the inverted 
principle of Muslim nation building in Europe. 
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Tanzimat-ı Hayriye. The next section analyses the way in which this reform instigated 
permanent changes in the fabric of the empire. 
 
3.6 The reform edicts: en route to bankruptcy 
Sultan Abdülmecit I was only seventeen years old when Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Paşa, 
the Ottoman ambassador to Britain and a confirmed Europhile, decided that the sultan 
should endorse reforms essential for the reorganisation of the empire. As discussed earlier, 
the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire followed a pattern whereby incompetent sultans 
were the nominal rulers but the real executive power lay with Tanzimat ministers such as 
Reşit Paşa, the leading reformer behind the Tanzimat ideology. Together with his two 
protégés, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, Reşit Paşa was determined to rein in the Bosniaks’ 
autonomy. The Tanzimat-ı Hayriye was announced at the Gülhane Gardens of the Topkapi 
Palace in November 1839 before a large gathering of foreign ambassadors and government 
officials. The Europeans present were pleased to witness ‘a sole intent to regenerate 
religion, government and the nation’ through the guarantee of equal treatment before the 
law for all Ottoman subjects (Seyrek 2006: 168). It is important to emphasise that the 
reform edict was initiated in the midst of the Middle East crisis; the British and French 
were making and breaking local governors in the region, vying for control of the strategic 
benefits offered by the Straits of Tiran. British ships had been patrolling the Persian Gulf 
for some time, while the French had annexed Algeria in 1830. In 1833 Mehmet Ali of 
Egypt and his son Ibrahim of Syria fought off the Ottomans with British and French 
assistance, and were eventually left in control of the Middle East. Both countries effectively 
became eminently exploitable client states of France and Britain: 
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[They were] sufficiently small to be easily influenced, sufficiently 
multifarious to preserve easy checks and balances in the region, and 
sufficiently westernised to offer both markets and supplies to European 
commerce and manufacture. (Goodwin 1999: 299-300) 
 
The Tanzimat-ı Hayriye did not deal with the problem of a shrinking empire, nor 
did it tackle any of the root causes of the dissatisfaction with the imperial court that was 
provoking rebellions across the empire. Instead, it concentrated on the Ottoman economic 
system, introducing the right to own and inherit land, and a regular system of assessing and 
levying taxes. Mazower (2001: 43) states that the Porte was specifically compelled by the 
British to relax the laws on land ownership – up until then the private possession of land 
was forbidden (as detailed in chapter two). Most importantly, the Noble Edict jettisoned the 
sultan’s power, installing ‘the rule of law above any other rule within the Empire’ 
(Goodwin 1999: 169). A body called the ‘Council of Justice’, comprising ministers 
appointed to deal with all the legal aspects of the empire, was placed above the caliphate 
itself. The council was portrayed as an independent entity, but ministers were generally 
only appointed to the council if they were committed to Tanzimat ideology. By accepting 
the conditions of the edict, the sultan essentially agreed to acknowledge that the ‘rule of 
law’ took precedence over his own authority, and ultimately over God’s, even though he 
officially remained the head of the caliphate. Consequently, the direct viceregency, and 
with it the accountability of the ruler to divine power (Qur’an 6: 156), was suspended, and 
divine law was transferred from the public domain to the private sphere. In this way, the 
Tanzimat-ı Hayriye marks the turning point in the separation between state and religion in 
the Ottoman state. This fundamental change opened the way for the replacement of the 
other Islamic principles upon which the empire was established with the creation of nation-
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states and the reformation of land ownership, trade and the exploitation of natural 
resources. All these changes were the necessary prerequisites of a New World Order based 
on capitalism and a secular nationalist ideology.
107
  
It was only after the successful adoption of the Tanzimat-ı Hayriye that the Ottoman 
Empire was regarded as a part of Europe and European legal scholars accepted it into ‘the 
Christian family of nations’ (Freeman 1877: 1). The Tanzimat-ı Hayriye gave generous 
legal rights to the empire’s Christian subjects, who were placed under the protection of the 
Great Powers, mainly through the offices of missionary activists (Cilacı 1990). The reforms 
were presented by the Turkish reformers as a way of preventing further interference by the 
Great Powers, notably Russia, Britain and France, in the internal affairs of the ‘Sublime 
Porte’. However, a major part of the reform edict was the agreement to allow the Great 
Powers to monitor the treatment of minorities to ensure that the empire’s non-Muslim 
subjects enjoyed full equality under the law, and this served them as an excuse to gain an 
even more aggressive grip on the empire (Sousa 1933: 162; Seyrek 2000: 169).  
Bosnian Muslims, however, refused to adopt the Noble Edict, provoking Reşit Paşa 
into a great rage. He instructed Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha to crush the remaining Bosniak 
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 The historical evidence shows that the Christian states were never secularised, in the sense in which it was 
imposed upon the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Islam, the separation of the divine and civil orders are the very 
essence of Christianity, based on Christ’s command to ‘Render unto Caesar what are Caesar’s, and to God the 
things that are God’s’ (Mark 12:17). Nevertheless, the secularisation process among Christian countries was 
gradual, and remained a mostly incomplete process. Generally, the secularisation programmes were 
accomplished through nationalistic rhetoric and doctrine, which were carefully prepared for the consumption 
of the masses. The awakened sense of national character was fed with various nationalistic propaganda 
materials, and subsequently moulded by the clergy and intelligentsia. By contrast, however, the newly 
enriched capitalist merchant class was growing more international and becoming more interconnected through 
socialising at international events and private social clubs. It was this international elite who, maintaining 
their supremacy above the peasantry, remained immune to the nationalist epidemic that swept the lower 
classes. They became the gatekeepers of the new system. The Western Christian  secularisation process was 
officially installed in 1878 – the same year the Ottoman Empire was basically dismembered.  
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resistance, and his two protégés chose a close acquaintance, Omer Pasha Latas, to launch a 
massive assault on the rebels (Glenny 2000). Omer Pasha was a Serb convert from the Lika 
region on the northwest border of Bosnia and Croatia, then under Austrian occupation. In a 
trajectory similar to that of de Bonevall, he had left the Austrian army under mysterious 
circumstances, switched sides and attained high rank in the service of the sultan. His story 
of conversion, followed by swift professional advancement and the aggressive 
implementation of the Ottoman reforms, is indicative of a historical pattern, whereby both 
domestic and international forces sought to undermine the Ottoman Empire and remake 
Europe into a region devoid of any potent Islamic influence. More immediately, Omer 
Pasha impacted Bosnian relations with Serbia, which became strained during the nineteenth 
century due to constant Serb rebellions. Serbian dissatisfaction with the decaying Ottoman 
Empire was reflected in vitriolic retaliations on the local Muslim population, as detailed in 
the following section.  
Omer Pasha entered Sarajevo in 1850 and ruled with the utmost cruelty for seven 
consecutive years, during which time he succeeded in systematically crushing the entire 
Bosnian aristocracy, driving its most influential members from state office and awarding all 
the positions of authority to non-Bosniaks (Šišić 1939: 17). In order to exact ferocious 
retribution against the Bosniaks, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha dispatched a special murtad 
(traitors’) unit to Bosnia, which was made up exclusively of ‘hard-drinking desperados 
from Poland and Hungary, most of whom could speak neither Turkish nor Bosnian and 
whose attachment to Islam was questionable’ (Glenny 2000: 82), alongside a large regular 
army and two thousand Albanian irregulars. The lack of discipline and brutish behaviour of 
the army and the irregulars, who embarked on a spree of plunder and pillage, turned the 
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whole of Bosnia into ‘one enormous prison, [where] every rank of mullahs, kadis, begs are 
wandering around the streets in chains or dragging around materials to repair roads’ (Šišić 
1938: 17).  
Omer Pasha’s rule in Bosnia left deep scars and, in a broader sense, the Bosniaks 
never truly recovered. They had little chance to, as the Tanzimatçılar were eager to abolish 
the autonomous prerogative the Bosnian Muslims had been granted by the Ottomans. Fra 
Ivan Jukić recorded that the damage inflicted was such that the Bosnian Muslims would not 
recover for another hundred years (cited in Cerić 1968: 108), while Irby (1875) 
triumphantly told her receptive European audience: 
The Bosnian beg, par excellence, is a chained monster with drawn teeth and 
cut claws. He was decidedly too big a megatherion of our age. Omer Pasha, 
the Croat [sic], a renegade, did a good deed for humanity in the Turkish 
service, when he thrust him back among the fossil curiosities of history. The 
brute force of the savage is broken, and he has acquired no other. (Irby 1875: 
646) 
108
      
 
Crushing the remaining resistance in Bosnia left ‘Turkey in Europe’ a weak and tottering 
power. The last obstacle to the reforms was removed and the implantation of the New 
World Order could begin. Von Ranke (1853) summarised the fragile predicament of the 
Ottoman Empire, left at the mercy of the Great Powers and the Ottoman reformers: 
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 Despite her long experience of living in the Balkans, Irby mistakenly referred to Omer Paşa Latas as a 
Croat. He was originally from the region of what is now called Croatia, but ethnically he was a Serb because 
he was an Orthodox Christian. No Orthodox Christian would take on Croatian nationality, nor would any 
Catholic become a Serb. The demarcation between Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism was a sharp and 
non-interchangeable ethnic delineation between the emerging Croatian and Serbian nationalisms, as discussed 
in more detail in chapter four. This quotation is useful as a classic example of the difficulties in differentiating 
between the various Balkan peoples using the absolutist terminology of modern European nationalism, which, 
even for their most ardent supporters, proved too much of a challenge and ultimately resulted in confusion.   
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If we enquire into the causes of the internal decline of the Turkish Empire, 
and regard them under their most general manifestation, we must affirm that 
it is owing to the fact that the empire is opposed to another section of the 
world immeasurably superior to itself in power. That other section could 
crush it in atoms in a moment; and while suffering it to exist for reason of its 
own, yet by a secret necessity, it exerts upon it an indirect and invisible 
influence. (Von Ranke 1853: 365) 
The existence of a passive, manageable Ottoman power ensured, in effect, ‘English 
supremacy in the East’ (Godkin 1877: 111) by creating an obstacle to Russian ambitions. 
The Russians’ return to the Balkans and the Black Sea, which had been ensured by the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, coupled with the Austrian Dag Nah Austen (‘Eastern 
Advancement’) policy, was anathema to Britain. It tried to obstruct potential Austro-
Russian cooperation that would enable Russia to take over the most precious part of the 
Ottoman heritage, Constantinople. Russia had already satisfied some of its imperial appetite 
by conquering the Ottoman Central Asian provinces of Bokhara and Khokan, with the 
fertile cities of Tashkent and Samarqand, which were rich in silk, cotton and woven fabrics, 
among other commodities.
109
 However, the most attractive reward Russia fixed its eyes 
upon was India:  
Besides the conquest of Central Asia, Russia seeks to establish a port on the 
Indian Ocean; she already has a project for a railway to India and the subject 
of navigating the Oxus and Jaxartes has long been under consideration. 
(Knox 1873: 224) 
110
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 Samarqand was once the favourite city of Tamerlane, and is nostalgically represented: ‘The shadow of the 
Black Eagle is over the land of Mohammed, and all the prayers of the faithful cannot dispel it … for the first 
time in twelve hundred years the chant of the muezzin was broken by the sound of the Russian bells.’ For 
more on this subject, see Knox (1873: 223).  
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The Oxus and Jaxartes are the two major rivers of Central Asia that flow around the borders of what is 
now Uzbekistan. The Oxus (Amu Darya) runs along the southern border of Uzbekistan, separating it from 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan; the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) roughly follows the border between Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. At the time when the excerpt above was written, the water from some parts of the river would 
sometimes evaporate for a few months, making navigation impossible. This, however, was the period of the 
newly discovered steam engine, for which water was a sine qua non. For an interesting account of Russian 
imperial ambitions and her diplomatic and military activities in the East, which caused tensions with Britain 
  
133 
This was the reason for British engagement, as India was known as the ‘jewel in the 
British crown’, and was to remain so for as long as it served British imperial purposes. 
Britain was more than aware that the Russian way to India led through Constantinople, and 
that it could easily gain influence in the city through calling on the Balkans to swear 
allegiance to the Orthodox Church. Indeed, to preserve its predominant position in the 
Balkans, Russia proclaimed itself as the ‘Protector of all Slavonic Christian brethren’ and 
cultivated the image by encouraging a ‘pan-Slavist’ movement in Europe through the 
consolidation of a ‘seventy-five million [strong] Slavonic race in one great united Slavonic 
Church’ (Von Kanitz 1872: 221). Russia’s public pretext was to ‘subjugate Mohammedan 
nations and destroy Islamism’ (Putnam 1854: 548). Writing about Russian imperial 
pretensions, however, Mazower (2000: 87) observes that far from supporting the Balkans 
and its Orthodox Christians, Russia’s ‘enlightened despots envisaged substituting Christian 
imperial rule for Muslim – the replacement of Sultan by autocratic dynasties ruling over 
ever vaster polyglot realms of their own’.  
The immediate result of British engagement was further Ottoman wars with Russia, 
with the Ottomans wholly dependent on British support. The most important of these 
engagements was the Crimean War of 1855 and the Siege of Sevastopol, in which the 
British, aided by the French, fought alongside the Ottomans and defeated Russia decisively. 
The scale of the victory was such that the Crimea, the only region that guaranteed Russia an 
exit to the warm Mediterranean waters, was returned to the Ottoman Empire, ‘because all 
alike dreaded the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean’ (Bliss 1896: 473). 
Coming to the empire’s aid gave the Christian powers the excuse they needed to compel the 
                                                                                                                                                    
over India, see Knox (1873: 224). See also: An Old Diplomatist (1878: 397-401), and Appendix V, which 
contains excerpts of letters to Emperor Alexander warning of the threat Napoleon posed to Russia.           
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Ottomans to issue another Tanzimat Fermani (reform edict) ‘necessary for a modern 
civilised state’ (Mowat 1918: 177). In Paris, in 1856, under cover of the argument for the 
need for more religious justice, the Western Powers forced the Ottomans to initiate two 
very important reforms. Despite their detrimental effects on the empire, the Ottomans 
abolished the poll tax and farm tax, and gave foreigners the right to obtain private property 
(Seyrek 2006: 171). In return, ‘the Sublime Porte was admitted to participate in the 
advantages of the Public Law and System of Europe’ (Mowat 1918: 177). These were 
extremely important measures as they sowed the seeds of bankruptcy in the empire.  
In light of the reduced tax revenues and growing fiscal demands associated with the 
implementation of the often-costly reforms, the only way the Porte could obtain fiscal 
revenue was through currency devaluation. Even though this had been a tool intermittently 
employed by the Ottomans from the sixteenth century onwards, the devaluations associated 
with the reforms, beginning with Sultan Mahmud II, were especially severe. Imperial mints 
struck ten series of coins and steadily decreased the silver content from 5.9 grams to less 
than a gram (Pamuk 1997: 970). The weak currency, coupled with the internal political rifts 
between Ottoman and Tanzimat forces, shook public confidence; local merchants took to 
using the imperial mint as a token currency for low-value purchases, while foreign 
currencies with a more reliable silver content prevailed for larger purchases and foreign 
trade (Gerber and Gross 1980: 351-358). The measures ordering the currency devaluation 
formed the essential preconditions for the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the 
wide use of foreign currency spread foreign influence in the empire and created a shift in 
allegiance among the local merchants, especially those from non-Muslim millets. It was 
through such contacts that the British and French channelled their geostrategic interests, 
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granting European citizenship to those merchants who proved loyal to their cause (Owen 
and Giráldez 1997: 90-99). The fiscal burden created by the ill-devised devaluation policies 
was aggravated by the exigencies of the Crimean War, and the Porte was compelled to take 
its first overseas loan in 1853. An examination of the sources and critical analysis of the 
chain of historical events reveal this decision to be of the utmost importance: the loss of 
fiscal sovereignty was the first step towards the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into 
the new capitalist order of Europe, leading to its territorial incision and eventual extinction 
and replacement with a Turkish nation-state.
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A further examination of the available documents leads to the conclusion that the 
loans offered to the Porte were distinctly disadvantageous. The onerous conditions were 
such that, in some instances, the interest rates were as much as sixty percent of the 
borrowed equity (Shaw 1971: 94). By 1860, the government was paying a fifth of its 
meagre revenue on interest alone, a figure that had climbed to fifty percent by 1875 
(Jelavich 1983: 285). Britain was by far the most active supplier of loans to the Ottoman 
Empire. Between the years 1853 and 1876, the brokers Dent and Palmer of London 
arranged more loans to the imperial court than any other company, and Palmer’s influence 
was such that he could organise the removal of any grand vizier who refused to contract a 
further loan (Glenny 2000: 88). These financial steps were backed by the deliberate policies 
of the British government, which subsidised Ottoman bonds by offering a high return of 
                                                 
111 Even though the Porte often found ways to fund the costly reforms, it just as frequently could not pay for 
them, neither could it produce enough trained bureaucrats (Armour 2006: 173). More importantly, it was 
starved of cash due in part to its weak currency and the abolition of the internal tax system, and in part to the 
fact that the Tanzimat government spent its funds liberally. Whilst struggling to pay for basic expenditure, it 
continued to build modern infrastructure, such as railways and telegraph systems, as well as lavish palaces. 
The funds for these grand designs came from loans obtained from banks in London, which they freely 
supplied at top rates of interest. In this way, the Tanzimatcilar greatly aided the Great Powers’ destruction of 
the Ottoman Empire, further testifying to their symbiosis and common objectives.  
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nine-to-ten percent, compared with the half-price returns on unsubsidised investments in 
domestic industry and public utilities (Glenny 2000: 86).  
In addition to the British efforts, the most obvious concerted policy intervention on 
the part of Great Powers concerned the tariff system that forbad the Porte to raise the 
uniform import duty on goods from Western Europe. The ‘capitulations’ or trade 
agreements the Great Powers forced on the Porte forbad it to derive any revenue from 
foreign imports larger than five percent, simultaneously forcing it to increase export tariffs 
on its own products to the ‘punitive rate of twelve percent, on top of the various internal 
taxes levied for the transportation and sale of goods within the Empire’ (Glenny 2000: 86-
87). Starved of cash, the Porte continued borrowing, throwing itself further into debt. With 
the quadrupled interest rates, the bubble eventually had to burst, and the imperial court was 
forced to accept the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. This international body, made up 
of a consortium of European powers, earmarked the revenue from government monopolies 
and taxes for the Porte’s foreign creditors. Thus, the Ottoman Empire immediately lost 
twenty-nine percent of its real income (Armour 2006: 219).  
In the years that followed, the vicious cycle of debt and borrowing, weak currency 
and foreign influences disabled the Porte, and in 1875 it was pronounced bankrupt. Critical 
examination of the available evidence suggests that the only reason it continued to exist 
was that the so-called ‘Muslim Question of Europe’ still persisted. A British diplomat of 
the time, who wrote under the pseudonym of ‘An Old Diplomatist’ (1878), offered an 
insider’s perspective on the conditionality of the modernisation of ‘Turkey in Europe’: 
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[T[he Mussulman [sic] element is determined to resist, the only consequence 
of concessions at Constantinople will be to produce a revolution there, 
which will overturn the Sultan and his Government, and inaugurate a 
religious war, which must make the task of reform [easier than] ever. (An 
Old Diplomatist 1878: 398)   
To ensure continuation of the reform process, Abdülhamid II promised to instate the 
first Ottoman constitution of Meşrutiyet I (a constitutional monarchy). In return for being 
created sultan, he announced the Kanun-i Esasi (Ottoman Constitution) on the 23 
December 1876. At the same time, he pronounced himself ‘Caliph of the Muslim world’ in 
the hope of countering nationalist aspirations amongst his Christian subjects and to 
inculcate a sense a loyalty in his Muslims ones. He departed from the Tanzimat ideology 
and thus diverged from the political practice of his three predecessors and his Tanzimat 
ministers, as exemplified by his immigration policies for the Bosniaks (discussed in chapter 
four). His Islamist move, however, was ‘disquieting [for the] British in India, French in 
North Africa, and Russians on the Black Sea; and disquieting to his own domestic 
opposition, secular, westernised and progressive’ (Goodwin 1994: 315). The Great Powers 
responded by orchestrating Christian revolts in the Balkans during its war with Russia. This 
broke down the central control of the Porte and encouraged the demand for independent 
nation-states. In the nationalist revolts that sprang up across the Balkans, Muslim 
populations – Turkish or indigenous – were the first to be attacked. The attempt to eradicate 
the remaining Muslim obstacle to a Christian Europe inevitably led to the establishment of 
the New World Order. The next section concludes with an analysis of this process.  
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3.7 Eliminating the ‘Muslim Question’ in Europe 
‘The rearguard of Mohammedanism [sic ] in Europe maintains its last stronghold in the 
Turkish vilayet of Bosnia,’ concluded Irby (1875: 643, 651). Irby developed into the most 
famous (Islamophobic) European champion of the poor Christian rayah (Ottoman 
subjects), dedicated to publicising their ‘true tale of bitter wrong and suffering … in this 
almost unknown country’. Although Bosnia was, in fact, well known to Europeans, Irby 
was correct to observe that by 1875 Bosnian Muslims, albeit considerably weakened, were 
still in control of their affairs of state. It was for this reason alone that Bosnia was seen as 
‘the last Muslim refuge in Europe’ (Gölen 2006: 376), and perhaps it is why an obscure 
person called Wesselitzky Bogidarović was sent on a mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Bogidarović first appears in the historical record as a Russian secret agent, and then as a 
leader of the Bosnian rebels (Treitschke 1915: 30), beginning a series of revolts that lasted 
from 1875 to 1878.
112
  
As well as Bogidarović and Irby, the year 1875 also brought the aforementioned 
Arthur Evans to Bosnia, as well as a plethora of international secret agents who appear to 
have been intimately engaged in Bosnian political developments. The concentration of 
foreign agents preceding the revolt, which developed into a massacre of the Muslim 
population, is significant: it set the precedent for all future conflicts that occurred across 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1992-95 war can be seen as a continuation of the 
international involvement that began in the nineteenth century; the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina similarly followed hard on the heels of an influx of agents of foreign 
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 Even to this day, historians are debating the cause behind the 1875-78 Bosnian revolt, whether it was just a 
rebellion of Christian subjects or an uprising of all the dissatisfied peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
regardless of religious affinity. Critical examination of the available evidence supports the conclusion that the 
uprising was an operation that was carefully planned by the Great Powers in conjuction with local leaders.        
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intelligence services, which began to pay attention to Yugoslavia once the crisis in Bosnia 
escalated (as detailed in chapter six). 
By the spring of 1875, Bosnia and Herzegovina was encircled on all sides by the 
different parties in the conflict. From the east, volunteers from Serbia entered Bosnia under 
the command of Prince Milan; Prince-Bishop Nicholas of Montenegro led the rebels to 
Herzegovina; and members of the Bulgarian secret society, the Bulgarian Revolutionary 
Central Committee, which was sponsored by Russia and based in Bucharest, crossed the 
border to the north (McCarthy 2001; Millman 1980). The Austrian emperor, Francis 
Joseph, also travelled to Bosnia in 1875, with the purpose of stirring up unrest. During his 
journey he allegedly received many petitions from Bosnian Christians complaining of 
Ottoman oppression and asking for protection. He gladly obliged by issuing orders to the 
imperial forces in Dalmatia to prepare to march across the Bosnian frontier (Stavrainos 
1963). Guersney (1877) recounted that spies were sent to incite the local population to 
insurrection and spread the rebellion further to the east, towards Bulgaria and Serbia, 
forcing the local Muslim population to leave: 
The plan was to set fires at Adrianople [Edirne] and Phillipopolis [Plevna], 
each in scores of places, to burn other towns mainly inhabited by 
Mussulmans [sic], and force all Bulgarians rayahs to join the uprising. 
(Guersney 1877: 368) 
 
Nevertheless, the 1875 revolt in Bosnia was unsuccessful. According to Bishop 
Strossmayer, leader of the Bosnian Catholics, whose name is still engraved on a main street 
in Sarajevo’s city centre, Serbia and Montenegro went to war prematurely, contrary to the 
advice of the Russian prince Gortschakoff: 
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[Gortschakoff] informed Prince Milan [of Serbia] that Russia was 
unprepared; that … she counted on taking Constantinople [in three years’ 
time]; and that only then would she call on the Sclaves [sic] of the South to 
plant the Greek cross on the Dome of St Sophia. (Strossmayer, cited in 
Ćubrilović 1930: 84)113 
 
Moreover, the rebels who came to instigate insurrection among the local people met with 
little success. Even the actions of the Tanzimat government in Istanbul, raising more taxes 
to help the revolt, which alienated the empire’s Christian subjects still further, did not 
help.114 McCarthy (cited in Karpat, 2004) argues that the rebellion was forced, and the 
majority of peasants wanted to carry on living their lives peacefully on their farms: ‘[T]hey 
did not want to rebel, nor [mount a] defence against [the] rebels. They did not want to fight, 
but they were forced to do so’ (McCarthy 2004: 142). Travelling to Bosnia on the eve of 
the revolt, a British colonel, James Baker (1877: 628), recorded that the Muslims were 
living in harmony with their Christian neighbours, except where religious passions were 
stirred up by outsiders, and noted that he ‘never saw a country which looked less like a seat 
of rebellion; the people were peaceful, prosperous and contented’. This observation is 
important to remember as it bears a remarkable similarity to an observation made by 
another British officer on the eve of 1992-95 conflict (see chapter six).  
Baker (1877: 628) further stated that foreign agents were sent in to specifically 
manufacture rebellion and compel the otherwise peaceful Christian peasantry to join the 
ranks of the rebellion, ‘and in abject terror some few unfortunate Bulgarians did join the 
                                                 
113
 St Sophia is now the famous Blue Mosque in Istanbul. According to legend, Mohammed the Second, the 
victorious conqueror of Constantinople, refused to remove the cross from St Sophia’s interior but had it 
walled in and the crescent placed over it. It is believed that the cross remains concealed to this day, waiting 
for the Christians to re-conquer Istanbul and uncover it.  
114
 Guersney (1877: 365) claimed that ‘in the summer of 1875, the pecuniary needs of the Sublime Porte were 
more than usually urgent, and the tax-gatherers were more than usually exacting’.  
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ranks of the many ruffians that gathered in the hope of plunder, and we know the sad 
result’. The ‘sad result’ the colonel refers to were the series of insurrections that 
subsequently emerged across Serbia and Bulgaria. These were violently crushed by the 
Ottoman vizier, Ahmet Pasha, in 1876, triggering a public outcry in Europe against the 
‘Bulgarian Horrors’. This event was significant in that those leaders who managed to stay 
alive retreated to Vienna and Bucharest, the respective seats of their operations. They 
quickly spread the news across Europe as proof of Muslim barbarity. This situation 
presented itself as another opportunity for the Great Powers to intervene, with the excuse of 
the alleged protection of the empire’s Christian subjects. The fact that the rebellions had 
been sponsored and engineered by the same Great Powers – who had done nothing to 
prevent Ottoman retaliation despite having the power to do so –- was completely ignored 
by all the reports.  
This event irretrievably destroyed the previously peaceful environment of the 
Balkans, and had three major impacts on the future political development of the ‘Eastern 
Question’. Firstly, it reversed the attitude of the Christian population, who became more 
receptive to implanted ideas of insurrection, and secondly, it provided a way of legitimating 
the open involvement of Russia and the other Great Powers in the Balkans, as they could 
now offer immediate protection to the empire’s Christian subjects. These two powers 
subsequently joined Bulgaria and Serbia in issuing a declaration of war on the Ottoman 
Empire. Finally, the pogroms of Muslims that followed every rebellion were transformed 
into justified retaliations for the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’, and became the norm amongst local 
rebel leaders and foreign agents. In this way, the rebellions in the Balkans graduated from 
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political statements into attacks on the Muslim populace, causing a mass exodus of local 
Muslims.  
McCarthy (2004) suggests that a pattern developed that occurred in all subsequent 
rebellions: 
First, Ottoman Government officials were attacked, then government 
buildings were sacked and destroyed, and finally, but sometimes almost 
immediately afterwards, [the] Muslim population [was] attacked as well. As 
I said, every single one of these revolutions worked the same way. 
(McCarthy 2004: 142) 
 
As a consequence, studies of the Muslim population in Bosnia between 1875 and 
1878 indicate a significant population loss, most notably a steep decline in the number of 
young adult males. McCarthy (2004: 141) contends that the 1875-78 Bosnian rebellion was 
‘such a trauma, it cut off a significant part of the body of the Bosnian Muslims, [and] 
disorientated and disabled society’. He argues that the rebellion also had regional 
implications that spread throughout the Balkans, causing the deaths of more than thirty 
thousand Muslims and the displacement of more than a million, uprooted from their homes 
and forced to take refuge in Turkey (McCarthy 1995: 109-134).
115
 According to the list 
compiled by the Ottoman consul-general, in the Serbian province of Niš alone, more than 
four thousand Muslims were killed and members of the landowning âyans – very few of 
whom remained alive – were expelled and dispossessed, losing more than 800,000 donums 
                                                 
115 The Bosnian Muslims did not leave in large numbers. Although many were internally displaced under very 
harsh conditions, relatively few indigenous Bosnian Muslims migrated to Turkey. This is discussed further in 
chapter four. Those who left were mainly Ottoman officials and Muslim refugees from other parts of the 
Balkans. For more on this subject, see Pinson (1993: 54-83). 
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of their landed property.
116
 Similarly, in Bulgaria, out of a population of a million and a 
half Muslims, 800,000 were either killed or starved to death, and thousands were massacred 
by Russian troops during 1877-78. In Bosnia, the Muslim population had been reduced to 
about a third of its original size by 1879 (Jelavich 1983: 340-341). Those Muslims in the 
Balkans and Central Asia who remained alive were expelled, and Ottoman Turkey received 
a steady stream of Muslim refugees: five million from the Balkans, nearly 1,400,000 
Crimean Tartars, and a further 600,000 Circassians from the Caucasus (Jelavich 1983: 
286). The Tanzimat ministers prepared for the large influx of Muslim refugees by 
establishing the Muhacirin-i Islamiyye Komisyonu Alisi (the High Commission of Muslim 
Immigrants), whose role was to permanently resettle the new arrivals.
117
 
Scholars have generally noted that ‘whenever Christians rose against Ottoman rule, 
the first to die were usually the local Muslims’ (Armour 2006: 55). McCarthy (2004) 
attempts to explain the reasons behind attacks on Muslims: 
Muslims were attacked partly out of hatred, partly out of desire to seize 
Muslim property, partly out of desire to force the expulsions of Muslims, 
leaving regions populated by only the rebels’ people. (McCarthy 2004: 142) 
 
Karčić (2001) has pioneered the study of the exodus of European Muslims from a regional 
perspective, within the context of the ‘Eastern Question’. He offers the first regional 
examination in the Bosnian language of the common history of the majority of Balkan 
Muslims, pointing to the lack of awareness of the collective aspect of their disadvantageous 
                                                 
116
 A copy of the full list of those who were killed or who lost their property, originally preserved by the 
British diplomatic representative in Belgrade, appears in Karpat (cited in Arbid and Kancal 2003). 
117
 The Muhacirin Commission was set up to resettle the Muslim immigrants, who started pouring into the 
Ottoman Empire from the 1870s onwards. Muslim emigration was encouraged by the governments of the new 
nation-states, who established harsh religious laws banning Muslims from practising their religion. For more 
on the forced migration of Muslims from the Balkans, see Karpat (2004: 122-146).    
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treatment. In his exemplary work, he contextualises the twentieth-century massacres 
committed against Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims as a continuation of those that occurred 
during the ‘Eastern Crisis’, and attributes dislike for Muslims to the general Islamophobic 
attitude prevalent in Europe during the nineteenth century, claiming that this attitude has 
been sustained up to the present day. His arguments concur with those of other scholars 
who claim that the project of the Enlightenment ‘reserved no place for Islam’ amongst its 
huge repertoire of signs, symbols and methodological prescriptions ‘for the fledgling 
national identities in the former “Turkey in Europe’” (Canefe 1983: 107), nor were 
indigenous European Muslims allowed to form a separate nation (McCarthy, cited in 
Karčić 2001: 49).  
This thesis builds on these arguments, adding the proposition that the active role 
neo-Islam played in building the New World Order in Europe – albeit through its adoption 
by the Turkish Tanzimat officials – has to be acknowledged. The Tanzimatçılar formed an 
alliance with the Great Powers, expediting Muslim eviction from the lost Ottoman lands 
and preparing to accept these Muslim refugees, who would be taught to substitute 
Turkishness for Islam, as the following chapter elaborates. At this point, however, it 
suffices to state that at the same time as the Tanzimatcilar were promoting pan-
Turkishness, the Great Powers were boosting anti-Turkish independence movements across 
the Balkans. The removal and subsequent attempt to ‘Turkify’ Bosnian Muslims, as well as 
other indigenous Muslim population in the Balkans, was not primarily a result of blatant 
savagery, but a conscious attempt to establish a new European order, in which the 
imperialist conflict with the Ottomans was presented as a form of sacred battle between 
Christianity and Islam, so that all Christians could join in the fight against the common 
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Muslim enemy (Obradović 2002: 98; Đorđević 1968: 309-326). Once Europe was purged 
of Islamic influences, and its Muslims transferred to Turkey, there would be no obstacle to 
establishing a New World Order devoid of a Muslim nation-state on European soil. 
Consequently, the local Christian intelligentsia and clergy, the main propagators of modern 
ethnic liberalism, encouraged the development of an attitude of intolerance towards Islam 
amongst the peasantry (as detailed in chapter four). 
With this in mind, the Turkish Tanzimat ministers attempted to destroy Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, following their defeat in the 1877-78 war against the Russians. When the 
Russian army arrived at Yeşil Köy, a district on the outskirts of Istanbul, the Ottoman army 
surrendered and signed the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. The agreement, which sealed the 
Russian victory, stipulated – among other demands – the formation of a separate Bulgarian 
state and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Montenegro occupying 
Herzegovina and Serbia appropriating Bosnia. However, this treaty conflicted with 
Britain’s interests; anxious to protect its Indian possessions and remain involved in the 
‘Eastern Question’, it sent its warships to the Dardanelles to support the Ottoman fleet. 
Lord Derby, the British premier, solicited public support: 
We have in that part of the world great interests which we must protect. … It 
is said that we sent the fleet to the Dardanelles to maintain the Turkish 
Empire. I entirely [deny] it. We sent [the] fleet to maintain the interests of 
the British Empire... (Lord Derby 1879: 362) 
 
He was telling the truth; it was not concern for the predicament of the Ottoman Empire that 
prompted Britain to offer a helping hand to the ‘sick man of Europe’, who was by now on 
his deathbed. An enlarged and strategically well-positioned Bulgarian kingdom 
presupposed the penetration of Russian influence into the Balkans, and it was for this 
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reason that Britain refused to acknowledge the Treaty of San Stefano
118
. Moreover, in 
February 1878, Sultan Abdülhamid II abolished the Ottoman parliament, reinforcing the 
adoption of his role as caliph. Both of these developments alarmed the British, who 
annulled the Treaty of San Stefano, and thus inadvertently preserved Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In July 1878, declining to invite the sultan to participate (Goodwin 1994: 
312), the Great Powers, led by the British, signed a new agreement that became known as 
the Treaty of Berlin. The secular, westernised and progressive Tanzimat ministers endorsed 
the treaty, by which the Ottoman Empire lost literally almost all of its territory in Europe 
and the Black Sea region. The treaty also proved costly, as the empire was ordered to pay 
sixty million roubles in war compensation to Russia (Seyrek 2000: 184).  
The treaty coincided with British and French invasions of the Arabian Peninsula 
and North Africa. To celebrate the occasion, the British prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield, 
purchased shares in the Suez Canal and proclaimed Queen Victoria Empress of India (An 
Old Diplomatist 1878: 392). In the territory the Ottomans lost in the Balkans, all the newly 
emerged Slav states were classed as separate nations and awarded independence, except 
one – Bosnia. Bosnia’s status remained undefined, and in accordance with Article 25 of the 
1878 Berlin Congress, it was placed under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian 
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 The Treaty of San Stefano virtually annihilated the Ottoman Empire, and thus its signatories were able to 
boast that they had removed the‘sick man’ from Europe. However, the diplomatic agreement was undermined 
by imperialist rivalry and was bound to arouse opposition from all quarters. Austria complained that the new 
Bulgarian principality violated the stipulation in the Budapest Treaty that no large Balkan state was to be 
established; Bulgaria would become a Russian outpost, giving Russia access to the Aegean Sea and control 
over Constantinople. This would eventually enable it to form a base on the Gulf of Alexandretta, making it 
easy for it to reach India. The British were alarmed. The Greeks, too, were opposed to San Stefano. They had 
attempted to enter the war, as they were vulnerable to attack from the sea, but were forced to remain neutral 
by the threat of a British blockade. Naturally, they were bitter when the war ended and Bulgaria was 
rewarded, while they received nothing.  
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Empire. Although this was presented as a temporary measure, the fate of being an 
international protectorate has dogged Bosnia and Herzegovina to the present day. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
Bosniaks occupied a privileged position in the Ottoman state and enjoyed unprecedented 
local autonomy, due to their unconditional collective submission to Islam. Although the 
Ottomans cherished their relationship with the Bosnians because of their belief in Islamic 
unity, they treated them as linguistically and culturally distinct fellow-subjects. The 
Ottomans therefore recognised the Bosniaks’ ethnic distinction, and consequently referred 
to all other non-Turkish speaking Muslims from the Balkans as ‘Bosniaks’.119 This was the 
case until the Tanzimat reforms, which triggered the most acrimonious opposition ever on 
the part of Bosniaks to the embrace of the Ottoman state. This was due to the fact that the 
reforms represented an open attack on local Bosnian autonomy: ‘the ancient regime found 
its temporary defender in nationalism and its enemy in a modernising absolutism’ (Glenny 
2000: 78).   
The task of the Tanzimat reforms was to establish a New World Order based on a 
web of nation-states and maintained by an elite system of mercantile capitalism. The 
Islamic system of self-administered religious communities (millets) employed by the 
Ottomans was perceived to be an obstacle to building a New World Order, which conjured 
up a completely different arrangement, introducing secular ideas and initiating the 
                                                 
119
 During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, the term Bošnjaci (Bosniak) encompassed all Slav Muslims 
living in the following regions: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Lika, Krbava, Slavonija, Sandžak, some of the border 
regions around Smederevo Sandžak (Užice in Serbia), including the western part of Kosovo (up to the town 
of Mitrovica), as well as regions in what is now Monetnegro such as Plav and Gusinje, and Podgorica. For a 
more detailed discussion on this topic, see Mušović (1992).   
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separation of church and state. For Islam, this idea proved almost impenetrable; the ruler 
was not only head of state but also the ‘protector of the faithful’ – both caliph and chief 
imam. Moreover, Qur’anic revelations and the tradition of the Sunnah do not only preach 
religious dogma, but also lay down social, political and economic norms, offering an entire 
blueprint of how to manage both the state and personal life. In this respect, Islamic values 
were considered incompatible with the traditions of Christian Europe, and the two could no 
longer be envisaged in the same territory (Bandžović 2006a). Those officials promoting 
modern ethnic politics aimed at reorganising the Ottoman Empire in line with the European 
system of nation-states by provoking national movements, exclusively among the Christian 
millets, in order to remove the ‘sick man’ from Europe.  
The Bosniaks were primarily seen by modern ethno-liberals as part of the legacy of 
an Ottoman Muslim millet system and, as such, considered to be simply debris around the 
Ottoman ‘deathbed’. While all the other ethnicities from the Balkans were encouraged to 
conform to the liberal concept of separate national units and to participate in the nation-
building process, the development of Bosniak nationality was forcibly curtailed by the 
‘reformed’ Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. In their approach towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, both maintained a totalitarian and autocratic attitude – the Bosnian Muslims 
were expected to decamp ‘back’ to Turkey, the geographic national unit to which the 
Ottoman Empire was eventually reduced. To further repudiate the continuous presence of 
the Bosniaks on European soil, a whole set of biases and stereotypes were reproduced in 
foreign reports. These were upheld by the Tanzimatçılar, with a view to demonising the 
Bosniaks as fanatical and disobedient Muslim subjects and so expedite their ‘repatriation’ 
to Turkey.  
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When the Berlin Congress was convened in July 1878, the treaty’s signatories – the 
Great Powers and the Tanzimatçılar – unanimously concluded that Bosniaks were not to 
become a nation and Bosnia was not to become a nation-state but a protectorate under 
Austrian administration. Abandoned in no man’s land, Bosnia constituted the greatest part 
of the ‘Eastern Question’, and up to the present day has suffered the adverse effects of these 
decisions. The implications for the formation of a Bosniak ethno-national identity, and their 
place in the so-called New World Order, are discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TANZIMAT ‘TURKIFICATION’ AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
BOSNIAN MUSLIM IDENTITY 
 
The analysis in the previous chapter demonstrates that nation-building projects in the 
Balkans were dependent on the international climate and Great Power support. Nation 
building in this region consisted of the creation of a number of nation-states, each 
exclusively identified with a single religion, and each harbouring territorial aspirations and 
dedicated to the assimilation and persecution of Muslims (Bandžović 2006). This chapter 
builds on this analysis by revisiting historical circumstances, as well as the situation in the 
more recent past, and explores the turbulent phases of the attempt to build a Bosnian state 
and sense of national identity. As such, it represents a contribution towards finding an 
answer to the research questions of why debates on the Muslim identity formation of 
Bosniaks continue taking place with undiminished vigour. Closely related to this, it will 
explain why Bosnia is the only one of the six former Yugoslav republics to exist as a 
protectorate and not a nation-state.  
This thesis posits that the reason behind the lack of international recognition for 
Bosnian Muslim national legitimacy lies in the lack of systematic research into the 
complexities of the phenomenon of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a 
widespread claim that the Ottomans brought Islam to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the 
Bosniaks then wholeheartedly embraced (Malcolm 1994: 51-69). By default, Islam became 
a rationale for the identification of Bosniaks with Turks (the defeated and dismembered 
Ottoman empire metamorphosed into a Turkish nation-state). Bosnian Muslims came to be 
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regarded as the standard-bearers of an ‘imported religion’, ripe for ‘export back’ to Turkey 
when the conditions were right – as, for example, during the nineteenth-century uprising of 
the Christian millets. However, this account is incorrect: there is historical evidence 
collected by Bosnian scholars that testifies that not only did Islam appear no later than 
Christianity among the Bosniaks (Hadžijahić, cited in Smajlović 1990: 20), but it was, in 
fact, established in the Balkan region centuries before its first contact with the Ottomans 
(Hadžijahić at al. 1977; Balić 1995; Ibrahimi 2008). This has resulted in the peculiar 
position the Bosniaks occupy, both historically and in the present day. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section sets the theoretical framework for 
the investigation into the ‘inverted principle’ of Bosniak nation building. This term refers to 
historians’ failure to recognise the effort the international powers put into building nations 
out of the Balkan’s Christian millets, while simultaneously thwarting the national 
development of the Bosniaks. Scholars have misconstrued the adoption of Islamic values, 
representing it as the culprit for the delay of Bosniak national development. Section two 
analyses the Islamisation of Bosnia, arguing that it was the pre-Ottoman introduction of 
Islam into the region, as well as its symbiosis with the Bosnian Bogumil religion, that aided 
the development of a specific Bosniak ethnic fabric. The Bosniaks could have developed 
into a viable nation had it not been for the Great Power-approved ‘Turkification’ approach 
of the Ottoman Tanzimat leaders. An example of the suppression of a potential Bosniak 
nation is seen in the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, which is examined in section three. 
Section four describes the attempts to squeeze Bosniaks into either Serbian or Croatian 
nationalities during the period between the two world wars, and depicts their struggle to 
balance the competing claims of their neighbours. Section five deals with Bosniak success 
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in gaining some sort of national recognition by discussing the emergence of a ‘Muslim 
nation’ in socialist Yugoslavia, and section six summarises the international endeavours to 
thwart the national development of the Bosniaks.      
 
4.1 Towards a theoretical rationale for the inverted principle of Bosniak identity 
The Balkan Muslims did not have an appropriate system in place to facilitate their 
transformation from millets into national entities in the nineteenth century. The lack of 
political legitimacy was reflected in their undefined, fragile national awareness. Hence, 
where ‘Turkification’ failed, Balkan Muslims were nationalised as separate ethno-religious 
minorities within the newly emerged larger nations, as happened with the Pomaks in 
Bulgaria
120
 and Torbeši in Macedonia; others, such as the Bosniaks, who resisted both 
assimilation and ‘Turkification’, were either converted to Christianity or ethnically 
cleansed – hundreds of thousands were slaughtered or expelled during the nineteenth-
century outburst of ethno-nationalism (Mušović 1992: 104; Memić 1996: 165-166). The 
persecution of, and pogroms against, Muslims from the former Ottoman provinces reflected 
common European practice. Ekmečić (2004: 654) asserts that until the Berlin Congress, 
Christian states did not tolerate the existence of a Muslim minority within their borders, nor 
were there specific laws ensuring Muslim safety once a new nation-state was formed out of 
former Ottoman lands.
121
 After Turkey, Muslim Albania was the last nation to emerge from 
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 Even today the Bulgarian Pomaks are a repressed community. Even if institutional discrimination against 
Pomaks is now rare, the Bulgarian state continues to refuse to recognise them as an ethnic minority. State 
officials seek to identify them as Bulgarians who happen to practice Islam, rather than a separate ethnic group. 
For a detailed discussion on this subject, as well on the post-cold war situation in Bulgaria, see Ramous 
(2005). For more general information on the Pomaks, see Radushev (2005) and Brunnbauer (1998). 
121
 This is in stark contrast to the ‘reform edicts’ – the Tanzimat Fermani of 1839 and Islahat Fermani of 
1856 – that not only granted legal equality to Christians but facilitated the preferential treatments of non-
Muslims, who were placed under the protection of the European powers (Karpat 2004: 77-126). When the 
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the Balkan region. The Turks succeeded because of unflagging British support for the 
Tanzimatçılar, stemming from a fear of Russian penetration into the Mediterranean 
(Schevill 1995: 340). Albania, meanwhile, was awarded nationhood due to its defence of 
Italian interests in the Mediterranean, and more critically because of the ‘light way the 
religion hung over an Albanian’ (Mazower 2001: 17).122 
In dealing with the question of Muslim nationhood in Europe, many scholars note 
the absence of national awareness amongst the Muslim peoples. Bieber (2000: 13) observes 
a ‘delay’ in the development of Muslim national identity in Europe, claiming that it was 
only the declining Ottoman Empire’s loss of its power to protect the interests and identity 
of Muslims that led to ‘the development of ethnic and national identity among the 
Muslims’. In other words, Ottoman Muslims were unaware of their own ethnicity and 
linguistic origin until the Ottoman state began to crumble. This argument seems to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Ottomans signed these agreements, why did they not ask for the same assurances of protection for Muslims in 
the lands they lost?  
122
 Official Albanian allegiance to Islam was always doubtful. Islam was first denounced in Albania in the 
fifteenth century by Scanderbeg, an Orthodox devşirme (convert), who was called the ‘Champion of 
Christendom’ (Destani 2001: 97). The second time was during the nation-building process in 1827-29, when 
Ali Pasha of Janina, a disobedient Albanian governor, converted to the religion of his Orthodox wife and 
initiated a revolt (Mazower 2001: 90-91). It was only after he abandoned Islam that Albania qualified for 
Great Power support. During the nation-building process in Albania, the Bektashi Sufi order was especially 
popular. It was widely believed that the Bektashi deviated greatly from normative Islamic practices and 
beliefs. Its adherents were totally opposed to the creation of an Ottoman national identity in the last days of 
the empire, and formed anti-Turkification movements. In fact, some Bektashi sympathisers of prominent 
public standing worked diligently to create a modern Albanian nation-state by separating religion from 
national identity. They further popularised the slogan, ‘We are not Turks, nor Giaurs [infidels], but 
Albanians’. Albanians were famous for saying that the only religion of an Albanian is Albanian. They were 
often connected in historical analysis to esoteric freemasonry. For example, in 1879 Shemsedin Sami wrote a 
book entitled, Albania: How It Was, Is and Will Become, in which the following quotation can be found: 
‘[T]rue and good Albanians and those who want to save Albania have to always put the nation before the 
faith; his brother is not his co-believer, but his co-national. The real Albanians are true brothers with each 
other; their brotherhood should be [so] strong [that] nothing can … divide or penetrate them. True Albanians 
must be like the frankmasons [sic] and Bektashis that are true brothers to each other’ (cited in Jazexhi 2007). 
See also: Birge (1994).   
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contradict evidence that testifies to an awareness among Ottoman Muslims, specifically 
among Bosniaks, of belonging to a separate ethnic group.   
Discussing the ‘arrested national development’ of Bosniaks, to borrow Burg and 
Shoup’s (1999: 18) phrase, the arguments can be succinctly grouped into those made by 
Bosnian scholars and those by international ones. Bosniak authors offer different reasons 
for the failure of Bosniak nationhood, although they all argue for the distinct cultural and 
ethnic identity of Bosnian Muslims. They generally assert that Bosniaks maintained a high 
level of consciousness of their own ethnicity but lacked an innovative intellectual and 
political plan as to how to achieve an independent Bosnian state or adapt to modern 
conditions (Filandra 1998: 51; Cerić 1968: 123; Sućeska 1995: 34-44). Bosniak authors 
generally burden the Bosnian Muslim national conscience with an alleged insufficiency of 
political maturity as the bona fide reason for their failure to attain an independent state, 
without ever asking why it was possible to achieve this in neighbouring states with very 
similar conditions. Nor do they appear to objectively analyse the political realities of the 
time in the Ottoman Empire (as outlined in chapter three).  
International scholars, on the other hand, pinpoint the Bosniaks’ historical links 
with the Ottoman Empire and their attachment to Islam as the reasons for their lack of 
national identity (Irwin 1984; Velikonja 2003; Zacharay 1999; Donia 1994). Pinson (1996: 
90) believes that the lack of development of a Bosniak nationhood can also be explained by 
other factors, such as not having a pre-Ottoman Islamic history, institutions or historical 
period in their collective memory that they could identify with. This claim contradicts the 
historical evidence analysed in the forthcoming section.  
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The above theories tend to generate an uncritical scholarly response, which stems 
not from insufficient knowledge but rather from an inadequate and perhaps distorted 
comprehension of the inverted principle of Bosnian-Muslim national identity. This 
scholarship can be categorised in three main demographic groups. The great majority of 
contemporary Bosniak scholars appear unable to emotionally detach themselves from the 
fetish of the Ottoman-Turkish legacy to critically examine the crucial role the 
Tanzimatçilar played in the failure of the Bosniaks to build a nation-state. The second 
group comprises Turkish scholarship on Bosnian Muslims, which seems, astonishingly, 
sporadic and almost non-existent when it comes to a critical examination of the Bosnian 
phenomenon. This is most probably due to a Turkish academic adherence to ‘political 
correctness’ over the interpretation of the Tanzimat ideology. The best-known 
contemporary work to deal with the Bosnian Muslims is Babuna’s (2000), but even this 
skips the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman period and mainly concentrates on their history from 
the Austrian occupation onwards. The other significant account is that of Yorulmaz (2007), 
which talks about post-conflict Bosnia as seen through the lens of a visiting Turkish 
academic. Karpat (2004: 124) also notes the lack of comprehensive studies on Bosniaks in 
the Turkish language, calling it ‘puzzling, given the keen and sympathetic interest of 
contemporary Turks in Bosnia’ and the presence of the many millions of descendants of 
Bosnian refugees who migrated to Turkey in the last two centuries. More objective and 
revealing information may be found in the archival sources, but it appears that for the large 
part these have not been systematically organised or sufficiently explored.  
There is a trend in international scholarship towards selectively applying a 
theoretical framework concerning the ‘a-national’ nature of Islam to some regions but not 
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others. The widespread misconception, even prejudice, that Islam thwarted the national 
development of the Bosnian Muslims, underlies the lack of originality, comprehensiveness 
and objectivity that afflicts much of the research on Bosnia. These theorists take the 
consequences for the starting point of their analyses; they explain the symptoms rather than 
the causes that emerged from the wider context of international realpolitik. For example, if 
Ottoman credentials and Islamic association are presented as the main obstacles in the 
transition from millet to modern ethno-national community, why it was that Turkish 
nationalism or the various Arab nationalisms were not hampered by their Islamic and 
Ottoman pasts? Chapter two demonstrated that embryonic Turkish and Arab nationalisms 
actually blossomed as a result of the reforms, as part of a national awakening on a global 
level.
123
  
Having said that, while Islam might be an ‘a-national’ religion only in the Western 
liberal sense, it certainly recognises human diversity as a motif of harmony and cooperation 
amongst people of all faiths, rather than a force for division, exclusion and intolerance 
(Qur’an 5: 48, 49: 13). In the case of the Bosniaks, it was the embrace of Islam that helped 
them preserve the unique ethnic features they developed during the Middle Ages. However, 
explicit investigation of the social and cultural implications of Bosnian Islamisation is non-
existent, and this part of Bosniak history remains largely inaccessible and under-explored 
(Stoyanov 2000: 258). This is mainly because research into the early embrace and 
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 The simple reason for the blossoming of these nationalist movements was that they served the geostrategic 
interests of the Great Powers and enjoyed their undivided support. The words of Beduizzaman Said Nursi, 
who accompanied Sultan Mehmed Reşad on his ‘Rumelia Journey’ in June 1911, serve as an illustration. This 
was the last visit to the Balkan provinces by the Ottoman sultan, and a last attempt by the Ottomans to secure 
social peace in the face of the upsurge of various Balkan nationalisms. When two Balkan Muslim scholars of 
modern science asked Nursi whether religious zeal or national zeal should be the stronger, he replied: ‘With 
us Muslims, religion and nationality are united, although there is a theoretical, apparent and incidental 
difference between them. Religious zeal and Islamic nationhood have completely fused in Turk and Arab and 
may not now be separated.’ For more on the ‘Rumelia Journey’, see Vahide (1992: chapter 6). 
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establishment of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been conceptually problematic for 
many Balkan historians (Bringa 1995: 15). Studies on the spread of Islam, or the lack of 
such analyses, lay at the heart of recent tragedy in Bosnia (Handžić 1999: 18). Discussion 
on Bosnian Islamisation is extremely important for an understanding of Muslim identity 
formation as it explains the way Islam was established in Bosnian society. The next section 
aims to close this gap in the study of Islam in Bosnia, arguing it was the process of earlier 
Islamisation that upheld the specific pre-Ottoman ethnic features of the Bosniaks.  
 
4.2 The origins of Islam in Bosnia  
As far as the process of Islamisation is concerned, the most important event is the 
appearance of Sari Saltuk, who is thought to have arrived in the Balkans, with about forty 
Turkmen tribes, and to have settled in Dobrudja in 1261. Sari Saltuk is portrayed as a 
tireless missionary, spreading Islam across the Balkans, and a cult emerged around his 
legendary character (Kiele 1995). Çelebi (1896: 133-137, 659), in his well-known Seyahat-
nâme (travelogue), wrote in great detail about Sari Saltuk being secretly visited by crypto-
Muslims from all over the central-eastern parts of Christian Europe. During the month of 
Ramadan, they would break the fast, perform communal prayers and celebrate Eid together, 
after which they would return to their countries. Çelebi (1896: 137) further observed that he 
was also well known amongst the Christians under the name of Sveti Nikola (St 
Nicholas).
124
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 On the northern shore of Lake Ohrid in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia lies the Sveti Naum 
monastry, where Christian pilgrims worship at the tombs of the Orthodox saint Sveti Naum. Interestingly, 
however, during the Ottoman Empire, this was a place ceremonially visited by Muslims, who were convinced 
that it was the tomb of Sari Saltuk (Ocak 1984: 12). 
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When Sari Saltuk died, he was venerated as a saint, and there is thought to be a total 
of twelve different places claiming to be his türbe and tekke (tomb and shrine), spreading 
from Eastern Anatolia right across the Balkans.
125
 One of those places believed to be Sari 
Saltuk’s shrine is Blagaj Tekke on the River Buna near Mostar in Herzegovina (Hafiz 1995: 
212-220) – this was also a meeting place for the Bogumils, a medieval Bosnian Christian 
religion, which was symbiotically related to Islam.
126
 Akalın (1998: 229), who researched 
the cult of Sari Saltuk for his doctoral thesis, asserts that there were in total twelve 
medieval kings who asked for his tabut (coffin), the Bosnian king being one. This was 
almost two hundred years before Bosnia would officially become a Muslim entity as part of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1463. Moreover, a hagiography from the collection of Sokolović 
(1972), confirms the request of the early medieval Bosnian king to be sent the tabut with 
Sari Saltuk’s remains. 
Islam was introduced and established in the Balkans a few centuries before the first 
arrival of the Ottomans (Hadžijahić et al. 1977; Balić 1995; Ibrahimi 2008). Hadžijahić 
(cited in Smajlović 1990: 20) cites material evidence demonstrating that amongst the great 
majority of Southern Slavs the appearance of Christianity was no older than that of Islam, 
especially in Bulgaria, which ‘already had Muslim inhabitants even before the 
Christianisation of the Bulgarians’. Pope Nicolas I (858-867) made unambiguous reference 
to Islam and the availability of the copies of Qur’an:  
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 For more details on Sari Saltuk, see Babinger (1966: 220-221), Yüce (1987: 20-100), Akalın (1994: 360).  
126
 For more on this topic, see Bušatlić (2006: 13-15), Handžić (1999: 7-46), Bašagić-Redžepašić (1900) – see 
particularly page19 for a description of the Janissery Decree, which testifies to the mass conversion of the 
Bogumils to Islam.
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You are asking what to do with the blasphemous books, which – as far as 
you are concerned – are disseminated in your area, and you have got them 
from Saracens. Of course, they are not to be kept anywhere, because as the 
sacred scripture says ‘evil talk spoils sound spirit’ … therefore turn those 
harmful and blasphemous books into ashes (Nicolas I, cited in Smajlović 
1990: 22).  
 
Another important document testifying to the pre-Ottoman presence of Islam was left by 
Abu Hamid al-Andalusi, who stayed in Hungary between the years 1150 and 1153 (the 
Royal Historical Library in Madrid holds his original manuscript). The grand mufti of 
Zagreb obtained a copy, and Omerbašić (1988) subsequently translated and published it in 
the bimonthly magazine Behar. It transpires from the text that Abu Hamid visited a country 
situated at a distance of ‘forty days on foot from Hungary’, which Hadzijahić (1974) finds 
corresponds to present-day Mačva in eastern Croatia and Srijem in north-eastern Bosnia. In 
these scripts, Abu Hamid wrote about his encounter with two large groups of Muslims, who 
were living under the protection of the Tsar of Hungary: the ‘Muslims from Horaz’127 and 
the ‘Sakalib Muslims’ or Slav Muslims.128 Both of those groups were in the service of the 
Tsar; while one group were soldiers enjoying full confessional rights as a reward for 
fighting the Byzantine army, the other was exclusively engaged in minting coins.
129
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 Horaz is now eastern Uzbekistan.  
128
 The term is thought to represent an Arabic name for the Slav slaves who later embraced Islam. 
129
 It is known that the Saracens were running successful coin-minting workshops up until the fourteenth 
century. The black Saracen head on Hungarian coins originates from a certain Jakobus Saracenus, who in 
1371 bought a number of forges, and perhaps to reinforce his Saracen ancestry, engraved a Saracen’s head on 
his mint (Smajlović 1990: 28). Some of the Hungarian coins bore an Arabic inscription. Coins with Arabic 
inscriptions were also discovered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hadžijahić (1990) points out that silver coins 
dating from the time of Caliph Mervan II el Himara (circa 744-50) were found in the villages of Potoci and 
Bijelo Polje near the city of Mostar. For a detailed description of the discovery in 1938, see Dizdar (1938) and 
Appendix VI. There were other discoveries of coins that date back to the expansion of the Arab and early 
Turkish empires towards the Balkan Peninsula. These were minted in gold or silver and were engraved with 
different verses of the Qur’an in Islamic calligraphy, with the motif of the ‘standing caliph’ (Spink and Sons 
Numismatics 1986: 15, 16, 30 31, 42, 46).  
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Klaić (1971: 25-37) was the first Yugoslav historian to analyse Abu Hamid’s 
manuscripts and validate their provenance by comparing them with Byzantine sources, such 
as the manuscripts of Kinam and Honijat. She confirmed that the information offered by 
Abu Hamid corresponds to the records of Kinam and Honijat, which speak extensively 
about the lengthy wars waged between Hungary and Byzantium, during which time the 
king of Hungary kept a Muslim army. The Byzantine emperor even approached the king 
with a view to brokering a peace agreement in return for a considerable number of 
imprisoned Muslim soldiers (Omerbašić 1988: 12). Klaić (1971: 37) concludes that these 
soldiers could only be Muslims from the Srijem region and northern Bosnia who had been 
seized and imprisoned during the war. These Muslims were known under the name of 
Kalisija or Halisija; the etymology of the village called Kalesija near Zvornik in north-east 
Bosnia testifies to the fact that Kalisija Muslims were present there.  
Near the same town of Zvornik are two other towns whose names indicate that they 
were named after Muslim Saracens: the Bosnian villages of Saraci (which later became 
Sarači) near Zvornik, and Saracica (later Saračica) near Mali Zvornik. Another town whose 
etymology bears evidence of an early Muslim presence is Pečenegovci near Prnjavor, 
named after the Pečenez Muslims who migrated from Asia Minor towards the Balkans in 
the ninth century.
130
 In the twelfth century, the Knez (ruler), Melek-Dok Damald, held the 
Neretva River valley (Herzegovina). Both his father and grandfather were of Arabic origin. 
Damald’s grandfather, Dhu’l-ayn, was also known to inhabitants of the southern Balkans 
(Balić 1995: 38). The Islamic presence is clearly documented through the three generations 
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 The Pečenezi were also known as the Patzinak, Pacinacae or Pezengi. For a more detailed discussion on 
these early Muslim migrants to the Balkans, see Yücel (in Karatay et al. 2006: 185-214). 
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of Damald, and Melek-Dok Damald may be one of the first known Muslim rulers in this 
region. In fact, Bosnian and Slav inhabitants of the Neretva River valley were in 
communication with the Arab world; according to Balić (1995) and Hadžijahić (1974), 
these contacts occurred in the second half of the ninth century, and continued to intensify 
into the Middle Ages. They had links as far afield as North Africa, Sicily and Syria, where 
the Fatimids ruled (Balić 1995: 38). Obolensky (1971: 37, 77) suggests that Muslim 
expansion from the Arabian Peninsula towards the Adriatic Sea occurred in 876, with the 
siege of Dubrovnik, and from thence they spread to the lower Danube. Following this 
conquest, the Arab Muslims decided to enter the Balkan interior, moving towards the 
Bosnian region through the valley of the Neretva River in Herzegovina, where it seems 
they settled permanently. This explains the origins of the Damald dynasty in the 
Herzegovina region.  
The son of Abu Hamid-al Garnati (1080-1169) was the mufti (religious leader) in 
the Hungarian kingdom, particularly in the valley of the lower Danube River, which at that 
time was densely populated by Saqalibs (Slav Muslims) (Obolensky 1971: 39). In the city 
of Aleppo in Syria, Yakut al Hamawi (1179-1229)
131
 met Muslim students from Bosnia. 
This shows that the relationship between Muslim Slavs and Arabic Islamic culture 
continued into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Hamawi further records that Srijem (the 
north-west border of today’s Bosnia) hosted thirty large Muslim villages in the valley of the 
lower Danube River (Obolenksy 1971: 39). In addition, old European chronicles refer to 
Muslim residents from these regions as Saracens or Bezermeni (Balić 1962: 62). Norris 
(2001: 6) argues that Hungary, as one of the three chief centres of early Islam in Europe, 
                                                 
131
 Yakut al Hamawi was the author of the great geographical dictionary, Mu’gam al-buldan. 
  
162 
represented an important geographical starting point for the spread of Islam in the Balkans, 
especially in the Bosnian region.
132
  
It seems that the Bosniaks were not only on the receiving end of migrations but 
were migrants themselves. For example, in early medieval times, there was a village called 
Bosna (Bosnia) with about eight hundred residents (Balić 1965: 91) in Tunisia. A similar 
Bosnian settlement also existed in Syria, and from the early period in Turkey, there was a 
village also called Bosna.
133
 This is perhaps the provenance of the two black Saracen heads 
on the medieval Bosnian coat-of-arms.
134
 Kovačević (2007) reports that Solovjev (1956), in 
his study of Bosnian coats-of-arms, claimed that the same symbol is engraved on the tomb 
of Queen Katarina (the last medieval Bosnian ruler) in Rome, symbolising that her country 
had become Islamic. Although Katarina spent the rest of her life in Venice, her children and 
her brother, Stjepan Hercegović, who became known as Ahmed Pasha, accepted Islam even 
before the Ottomans spread through the whole region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jahić 
1979: 229-230). In fact, most of the petty nobility and city administrators willingly 
surrendered their possessions to the Ottomans and converted to Islam (Bašagić-Redžepašić 
1900; Filipović 1970; Handžić 1997; Handžić, M. 1999; Moačanin 1999). The reason 
behind their conversion was their Bogumil faith. 
                                                 
132 Handžić, M. (1999: 18), on the other hand, states that Islam disappeared from Hungary in the thirteenth 
century, after the introduction of laws that required the Christianisation of all Muslims, so there is no 
continuity between the first period of Islamisation and the time when a more consistent Islamisation took 
place from 1453 onwards. The academic debate on this issue remains inconclusive. 
133
 Nowadays, there is also a part of Istanbul called Yeni Bosna (New Bosnia). The Bosnian migration to 
Turkey intensified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and there are large settlements around Izmir, 
Adana, the town of Ayvalik, and of course Istanbul, in quite a few of the large suburbs in both parts of the city 
(Halilović 1991: 29). 
134
 Cf. Appendix VII. They are arranged at the top end of two keys that are placed in a criss-cross position. 
The appearance of Saracen heads on the medieval Bosnian coat-of-arms is a mysterious historical fact of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that has not been explained to the present day. Anđelić (1973: 214) was the 
medievalist who succeeded in advancing this study the most. He discovered an identical Saracen’s head to the 
one on the coat-of-arms on a medallion in the Gothic biforium of a palace near the city of Travnik. 
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4.2.1 The symbiosis between the Bogumils and Islam 
The open, official Islamisation of Bosnia – as opposed to concealed Islamisation – started 
in 1463 when Bosnia first fell under Ottoman rule, continued through to 1528 when the last 
part of Bosnia became officially Ottoman, and lasted with similar intensity until about the 
eighteenth century. It was a relatively smooth, voluntary, collective process that seems to 
have occurred due to the symbiosis between Bogumil beliefs and rituals and Islamic 
traditions. The term ‘Bogumil’ means ‘Beloved by God’, but could equally well be 
translated as ‘awliya of God’, as in the words of Ayoub (2004: 154), ‘the Qur’an also uses 
the term to refer to the righteous who are the intimate friends of God’.  
Bogumils, also known as the ‘Bosnian Heretics’ or ‘Good Bosniaks’, are the most 
contested phenomenon in the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were 
continuously persecuted by the Orthodox Church, which was established in neighbouring 
Serbia, while Bosnia was raked by papal crusades operating from Hungary during the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Non-allegiance to either the Eastern or Western form of 
Christianity made Bosnia the only-known confessionally independent medieval kingdom in 
Europe that openly rejected the prevalent religious hierarchy. In the thirteenth century, 
Bosnia developed as the most prestigious heretical centre in Europe, a place where all 
known heretics of the time would come, either to find refugee or to further their education. 
The Bogumils had close ties with their ideological brothers, the Cathars in France and 
Lollards in England, but this area remains under-investigated.
135
 However, the attacks on 
                                                 
135
 The nature and type of this ‘heresy’ also remain unknown. It is useful to remember at this juncture that 
Islam was also referred to as a ‘heresy’ in the Christian vocabulary of the time. The available sources on the 
Bogumils mainly derive from their enemies – that is, from the papal archives and ‘heretic manuals’ published 
at the time. Bogumils were the main protagonists of these manuals of torture issued to the papal delegations, 
mainly Dominicans and Franciscans, who were sent on a mission to exterminate ‘heresy’. They succeeded in 
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the Bogumils did not destroy them, but only reinforced their distinctive sense of identity, 
and this developed into an urge to not only protect their religion but also their national 
independence. They thus demonstrated pre-nationalistic features well ahead of their time 
(Ćorović 1925).136  
There are no extant documents describing the Bogumil heresy, and since they 
generally lived as crypto-Christians (Klaić 1971; Vilar 2007), the scholarship has tended to 
consider them as a deviation or particular form of Christianity. For this reason, they are 
often called the ‘Bosnian Church’.137 Some scholars have argued in favour of the 
Manichaean and Paulician nature of the Bosnian Church,
138
 whilst others have taken them 
to represent early Protestants, especially during the nineteenth century when the Ottoman 
withdrawal from the Balkans spurred futile attempts to re-Christianise the Bosniaks 
(Brockett 1870; Evans 1877), as analysed in chapter three. However, Imamović (2001) 
asserts that the Bogumils had been associated with Islam since the second caliph, Umar Ibn 
Khattab (586-644), when a delegation of Balkan Bogumil elders pledged alliance to 
him.Thus, when the Ottomans entered Bosnia in 1463, Ayvaz Dedo, the Bogumil djed 
                                                                                                                                                    
southern France and England, but Bogumilism persisted in Bosnia until it converged with Islam, when the 
Bogomils openly professed Islam as their religion.  
136
 Writing about the medieval Bosnian state and the Bosniaks as devoted Bogumils, Ćorović (1925) argues 
that they developed certain nationalist features way ahead of their time: ‘The Bogumils have significantly 
developed national characteristics. Persecuted by papal inquisitions and the Hungarians, they were feeling that 
the Hungarian belligerence, together with Catholicism, not only threatened their religion but their national 
independence too. That is why they selflessly defended both, and called their Holy house [the] ‘peoples’ 
[house]’ or ‘Bosnian’, and … exclusively referred [to themselves] as ‘Good Bosniaks’ (Dobri Bošnjaci).’ 
137
 The following scholars consider Bogumils a form of Christianity, making special reference to the 
Orthodox Church: Leon Petrović (1953), Jaroslav Šidak (1969), Vaso Glušac (1992), Dragoljub Dragojlović 
(1987), John Fine (2007), Noel Malcolm (1994), Dubravko Lovrenović (2006).  
138
 The following scholars argue in favour of the Manichaean and Paulician nature of the Bosnian Bogumils: 
Franjo Rački (2003), Ivo Pilar (1927), Dominik Mandić (1973), Sima Ćirković (1964), Vladimir Ćorović 
(1930), Aleksandar Solovjev (1948), Miroslav Brandt (1989), Ćiro Truhelka (1942), Franjo Šanjek (1975). 
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(elder), along with his followers, openly submitted to Islam at Mount Ayvatovica, which 
still retains a special place in Bosniak spiritual life.  
There were many similarities between the Bogumils and the Muslims: they rejected 
icons, church hierarchy and every form of priesthood, the worship of the Virgin Mary and 
the institution of baptism, as well as the belief in purgatory and transubstantiation (Arnold 
1896). They further discarded the belief that Christ was crucified (Jalimam 2002: 170-
180).
139
 They fasted for at least a full month (Arnold 1896: 199), and prayed five times a 
day and five times at night, with frequent kneeling (Arnold 1896: 36). They also used the 
symbol of a crescent and a star, which resembles the iconography of the Turkish flag (Vilar 
2007),
140
 and refused to venerate the symbol of the cross, calling it ‘a tree of shame’ (Pilar 
1927). Solovjev (1948) examined the primary sources of the Bogumil medieval elders and 
postulated that Bogumils generally repudiated the symbol of the cross. Commenting on the 
fact that cross was occasionally engraved on medieval Bosnian tombstones, Solovjev 
(1948: 95-99) states that these did not belong to Bogumils, but were erected during the 
Ottoman period to stress adherence to the Orthodox Christian faith.  
These medieval tombstones are the most distinctive of all the surviving cultural 
features of medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina testifying to the early Islamic presence. They 
are called ‘stećci’, and about sixty thousand still remain.141 Donia and Fine (1994: 23-24) 
assert that all three local denominations erected these tombstones. Truhelka (1942) and 
Čurćić (cited in Solovjev 1948: 90) disagree; they both note that stećci are found almost 
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 On Christ’s crucifixion, the Qur’an (4: 157) reveals: ‘That they said (in boast), “We killed Christ Jesus the 
son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah”; but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear 
to them.’ For an extremely well-analysed and fascinating discussion on the crucifixion from a Muslim 
perspective, see Ayoub (1992). 
140
 Cf. Appendix VIII  
141
 Cf. Appendix IX 
  
166 
exclusively in the geographic areas that belonged to the Bogumils, and are far less 
prevalent in other areas, especially those areas under the explicit control of a Catholic 
bishop or the Orthodox Church. Moreover, medieval Serbia meted out especially harsh 
treatment to the Bogumils (Vaknin 2007), contributing to the separation of Bulgarian and 
Bosnian co-religionists.
142
 Many medieval tombstones in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
engraved with ornaments and motifs in Islamic style. Imamović (1998: 41) mentions motifs 
such as a crescent and star; these symbols can be seen at the Mount of Bukovik, one of the 
hills surrounding Sarajevo, engraved on tombstones clustered around each other near a 
spring on one of the highest peaks. Such remote locations were usual for Bogomil burials, 
as well as for their ancient places of worship, the dovišta (Djedović 2006; Pašić 2005; 
Suljkić 1997).143  
In their mysticism, the Bogomils resembled the Islamic Sufi orders, where 
worshippers seek out secluded, remote places to practice dhikr (recitation of the names of 
God) and meditation; they worshipped on the remote mountainous peaks with their pir 
(also shaikh or saint) – this was a title given to Sufi masters, although Markotić (1964: 52) 
mistakenly translates it as referring to the ‘thunder-god’. Thus, when the Sufi sheikh of the 
Mevlevi tariqat (order) arrived with Mehmet Fatih’s army at the foot of Mount Igman near 
Hodidjed, today’s Sarajevo, the last Bogumil djed (elder) presented him with his holy stick 
(Imamović 1998), providing yet more evidence of the symbiosis between Bogumilism and 
Islam. Malkić (2009: 220) states that this holy stick was preserved for over five centuries in 
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 According to Pilar (1927), the Bulgarian Bogumils later converted to Christianity, whereas the Bosnian 
Bogumils embraced Islam, and the reason for these asymmetrical conversions was the geographical rift and 
loss of connection between the two, which was spurred on by Serbian persecution of the Bulgarian Bogumils.  
143 For more on Islamic pre-Ottoman features in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak, which was previously 
part of the Bosnian Ottoman province and later became part of southern Serbia, see Džogović (2006: 7-20).  
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the Mevlevi Tekke in Sarajevo, but vanished when it was demolished in 1958. In addition 
to Islamic symbols, the tombstones sometimes include interesting texts. In this, they 
resemble Islamic tradition and bear certain similarities with Islamic tombstones (Malkić 
2009: 217-223). Studying Bosnian tombstones and comparing them with Turkish ones, 
Boşdurmaz (2011) emphasises that Bosnian tombstones differ, having some unique 
characteristics in terms of their shape and the text engraved on them, which they preserved 
from their medieval ancestors. Vego (1962: 160, 199) asserts that two Bogumil tombstones 
from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries mention the word ‘Sracin’, which he believes to 
be a literary corruption of ‘Saracen’.  
Dizdar,
144
 in his most notable collection of poetry, Kameni Spavač (Stone 
Sleeper)
145
 (1973), created a powerful mythopoeic meditation on Bosnian culture in all its 
historical manifestations. Its main theme is a quest to trace and decipher the roots of 
Bosnian Muslims. The medieval stećci and the Islamic messages engraved on them are the 
muse that inspires the poet. Buturović (2002: 35-53) observes: ‘The Stone Sleeper is 
especially germane for Bosnian Muslims, insofar as it “authenticates” their identity in a 
space-time that predates – and thus challenges – the one at the root of their official ethno-
national identity.’ The Stone Sleeper alludes to the Islamic inscriptions on the stećak as 
showing that the Bosniaks may well have been Muslims even before the Ottoman arrival. 
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 Mak Dizdar (1917-1971) is commonly hailed as the most eminent poet of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
145
 His most notable collection of poetry, Stone Sleeper [Kameni spavač] (Mostar: Prva Književna Komuna), 
republished in 1973, is a powerful mytho-poetic meditation on Bosnian culture in its historical manifestations. 
Its main theme is epistemological, representing a quest to trace and decipher the roots of Bosnians, and 
especially Bosnian Muslims. The poet was inspired by medieval tombstones (stećci) and the scripts engraved 
on them. They are considered to be the heritage of the Bosnian Bogumils. Buturović (2002) observes: ‘Stone 
Sleeper is especially germane for Bosnian Muslims, insofar as it “authenticates” their identity in a space-time 
that predates, and thus challenges, the one at the root of their official ethno-national identity.’ For detailed 
discussion for the parabolas and symbolism of the poems, see Buturović (2002: 35-54).  
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Jones (2004: 717) describes this as an ‘act of constructing a Bosnian identity through the 
country’s medieval past – an identity of the heretic faithful, persecuted but impossible to 
exterminate’. The challenge it represents for Bosnian Muslim identity is best illustrated by 
a poem in the collection called ‘A text about a text’, in which the meaning of a medieval 
text written in the Arabic style, from right to left, is debated by the five people who 
discover it: 
Those who insist on reading from right to left 
Are wrong all along –  
A third one says half crazed 
And half amazed 
Look it’s a secret from the darkest days of old  
Rising it seems from the depths of our murkiest dreams 
Its signs are like writing 
Seen in mirror –  
Mutters a mouth calm and cold 
The fifth with clenched fists and trembling fingers tries to hold  
This mirror of clear redeeming grace 
But it slips to the floor  
For in it that instant he recognises 
His own ancient 
Forgotten face.
146
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 The poem is adapted from Buturović (2002: 41-42). For the purposes of space, the poem is abbreviated, 
but it can be read in its entirety in Buturović’s article. 
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This overview relates the significance of the pre-Ottoman Islamic presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fact that bears particular significance for the question of the 
identity of Bosnian Muslims; they consider themselves to be the heirs of the Bosnian 
Bogumils, and thus indigenous inhabitants of Bosnia. This is especially important to 
remember when discussing the rise of modern ethno-nationalism in the Balkans, which 
thwarted the national development of Bosniaks by casting them in the role of remants of the 
Ottoman-Turkish Empire. During the nineteenth century, with the exponential rise of 
ethno-liberalism, Bosnia became the chief battleground for the clash between centralisation 
and the preservation of local autonomy, which the Bosniaks saw as the only way to protect 
their culture, language and identity (Karpat 2001: 75-126). As Bosnia failed to be 
incorporated into the European system of modern nation-states, Bosniaks were represented 
as Turkish converts occupying Christian land; the ultimate expectation was that they would 
either decamp back to Turkey or ‘revert’ to the faith of their alleged Christian ancestors. 
The fact that the Bosniaks preserved a regional identity that differentiated them from 
Muslims elsewhere in the Balkans was disregarded, and their further national development 
was forcefully suppressed. On the other hand, the Christian millets were guided into a 
previously unawakened national awareness by the diligent efforts of the Catholic and 
Orthodox clergy (Velikonja 2003; Perica 2003: 203-225), under the auspices of the Great 
Powers (Mazower 2012).  
Although the development of national consciousness amongst the Christian 
population was a painstakingly slow process,
147
 the Orthodox and Catholic population were 
                                                 
147
 Zulfikarpašić (1994: 109) relates an anecdote about the Yugoslav writer of Croatian origin, Tugomir 
Alupović. When instructing his mother to adopt the term ‘Croat’ to describe her identity, she replied: ‘Please, 
son, do not change the religion! What Croats are you talking about? We are no Croats, we are Catholics!’  
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gradually persuaded to abandon the usage of the term ‘Bosniak’, which they had previously 
adopted to describe their identity (Cerić 1968: 124).148 In this way, the category of 
‘Bosniak’ only remained in usage among the local Muslim population (Cerić 1968: 124). 
However, following the Berlin Congress in 1878, they too stopped identifying themselves 
as Bosniaks, ‘because it was not a sufficiently descriptive term to identify the Muslim 
ethnic component’ (Hadžijahić 1974: 92).149 This was because all other Muslim minorities 
were nationalised into their host countries, while Bosnia was not accepted as a recognised 
nation-state. To fill this gap, a Turkish profile was applied to Bosnian Muslims, and Balkan 
Muslims in general, through the joint efforts of the Great Powers and the local Christian 
populations. The term ‘Turk’ became a synonym for Muslims – any Muslim community in 
the Balkans was, by implication, of Turkish nationality.  
The Turkish Tanzimatçilar ignored the fact that the Bosniaks were not a part of the 
Turkish ethnic tapestry and deliberately emphasised the ambiguity between the terms 
‘Muslim’ and ‘Turkish’. The Tanzimatçilar maintained their persistant intention to 
‘Turkify’ the Bosniaks, both in the aftermath of the Berlin Congress and during the 
subsequent Austrian occupation in 1878, when they called for a peaceful transfer of power, 
urging the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meekly accept their new ruler (Filandra 
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 All the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina were referred to as ‘Bosniaks’ of varying religious affiliation. It 
was only in the nineteenth century that nationalism added an additional dimension to religious identity. As 
late as 1925, high-school textbooks for year four in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes described the 
inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina as follows: ‘Bosniaks too belong to the population [inhabiting the 
area] around Mount Dinara within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. By Bosniaks, we refer to the inhabitants of 
northern Bosnia. They are a hardworking, brisk, dogged and somewhat strongheaded people. There are 
Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic Bosniaks; the former are the largest group and the latter are the smallest. The 
Muslims are the [ancestors] of [the] Bogumils, who in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries accepted Islam.’ 
(Our Kingdom and the Balkan Peninsula 1925: 69).  
149
 For more on this issue, see the ‘Study Analysis’ from the Centre for Social Studies (1970: 167, 178, 251).  
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1998: 29).
150
 The events surrounding the Austrian occupation and subsequent annexation 
relate to this thesis in four major ways. First, building on the analysis of the previous 
chapter, they demonstrate the contribution of the Tanzimatçilar to the carve-up begun by 
the establishment of the New World Order, which caused the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the formation of new nation-states. Secondly, they offer an insight 
into the nationalist policies of the Tanzimatçilar concerning the Bosnian Muslims, and 
serve as a cogent example of the rifts between the modernists and Islamists that were such a 
recognisable feature of Muslim attempts to come to terms with modernity, as argued in 
chapter two. The dichotomy in the international political approach to Bosnia in the 
nineteenth century was a feature that resurfaced in the recent conflicts of the 1990s. 
Thirdly, the Austrian occupation provides a good picture of the political immaturity, 
perhaps even naivety, of the Bosnian Muslim political leadership, which stemmed from the 
fact that their thwarted national development impeded the possibility of Bosniaks playing 
any future political role within region. Lastly, with the regard to the research question the 
Austrian occupation points to the way future conflicts involving Bosnian Muslims would 
be concluded. The following section offers more a detailed discussion of the implications of 
Austrian involvement in the suppression of the Bosnian Muslims’ national development. 
 
4.3 The Austro-Hungarian annexation and occupation of Bosnia 
Article 25 of the Berlin Congress of 1878 ceded Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austro-
Hungarian rule, despite the fact that Austria was not eager to formally occupy the region. 
The main reason for this reluctance was the high level of instability in Bosnia and 
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 It is thought that the Austrians paid two million Turkish pounds in return for the right to occupy and 
administer Bosnia and Herzegovina (Rizvić 2000). 
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Herzegovina caused by the insurrections of local Christians and their hostility towards the 
Muslim population. Austria had already satisfied some of its imperialistic appetites and did 
not want to lose the advantage it had gained vis-á-vis the other Great Powers; it conducted a 
considerable amount of trade with the Balkans, monopolised commerce on the Danube and 
controlled the postal and telegraph systems, which were crucial for the rapid transmission 
of information: 
Austrian steamers, directed from Trieste, took possession of both the 
coast[al] and foreign trade of Turkey. The Danube traffic was monopolised 
by a company subsidised from Vienna. The foreign and internal postal 
system, except at Constantinople, was almost completely in the hands of the 
Austrian Lloyd’s and controlled by Austrian officials. (Littell’s Living Age 
188: 771) 
     
Furthermore, Austria had built uninterrupted rail networks connecting northern Germany 
with Tbilisi, Salonica and Mitrovitza in southern Serbia, and had almost finished 
construction of the Bosnian line, running all the way to Vienna. It also had ambitious plans 
for connecting Constantinople with Salonica, which, being only 670 nautical miles from 
Alexandria, would make it the quickest route between East and West.
151
 A secure railway 
network, connected to strategic ports, would ensure Austria’s imperialist dominance. 
Moreover, before the unification of Germany, Prussia’s Prince Otto von Bismarck 
supported Austria’s extension to the east through the policy of ‘Drang Nach Osten’ (the 
extension of its Eastern policy). Skilfully encompassing German imperial pretensions, 
Bismark openly declared that Austria must become the Oester Reich or ‘Eastern front’ (An 
Eastern Diplomat 1897: 570-578).  
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 The only other quick route was the Italian one from Brindisi, which was only 150 nautical miles further 
from Alexandria than Salonica. However, the Italian route was at the time too dependant on France to be 
completely safe for use by the other Great Powers (‘Servia’ 1878: 223). 
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Mazower (2001: 106) points out that the Austrians began to fear that once the 
‘Eastern Question’ was resolved, Europe would inevitably turn its attention to the ‘Austro-
Hungarian question’. This thesis argues that this would have been the expected course for 
the European Enlightenment forces to take, as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire left the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire as the only multicultural domain in Europe – a situation the new 
international arrangement could not tolerate. Britain was the most sensitive to Austrian 
dominance, due to Austria’s potential to establish good relations with Russia, which was 
seeking to seize India (see chapter three). Indeed, a great number of English-speaking 
literary ‘explorers’ embarked upon a writing crusade – this time turning their vitriol on 
Austria, using their favourite tried-and-tested trope, religion. The ruling Hapsburgs were 
portrayed as the mercenaries of Roman Catholicism, whose greed had led to the Islamic 
penetration of Europe.
152
 Citing the persecutions of the Bogumils, these writers often used 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of how ‘the abhorrent supremacy of the Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Tongue’ (‘Servia’ 1878: 223) led to the success of Islam.The 
British were also apprehensive of emerging German imperial pretentions: ‘[Bismarck] did 
all in his power to encourage Austria to enter the Slav trap prepared for her in Bosnia’ (An 
Old Diplomatist 1878: 403).  
When the Treaty of San Stefano was dashed aside in favour of the Berlin Treaty, it 
was seen as the result of Bismarck’s adroit diplomacy, whereby the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire was to be coaxed into occupying Bosnia – an agreement that, two years earlier, it 
had refused to sign on moral grounds (An Old Diplomatist 1878: 403). Austro-Hungary, in 
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 The persecution of the Bogumils by the Catholic Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was often 
cited as the main reason why the Ottomans were successful in spreading Islam in Eastern Europe. ‘[T]he 
papal pretensions to supreme authority over all Christian churches, which the Crusaders of the West imposed 
with such violence and cruelty, paved the way for the triumph of the Ottoman invaders’ (‘Servia’ 1878: 223). 
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fact, had made good use of the valuable intelligence pouring through the cables and postal 
routes it administered across the Balkans, and under a calculated diplomatic pretext, it 
attempted to avoid plunging into the midst of the Russian-sponsored, hostile pan-Slavism it 
knew it would encounter once it was pronounced official governor of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, it eventually succumbed to Bismark’s diplomatic influence, and 
agreed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, on condition that formal suzerainty remained in 
the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Even a nominal Bosnian connection to the decaying 
empire was a guarantee that Austrian existence would not be threatened by any of the Great 
Powers as long as the Ottoman Empire remained intact. The Germans were content, as the 
Austrian buffer in the Balkans enabled their further imperial expansion towards the east. 
While the Turkish Tanzimatçılar may have welcomed this move, the Bosniaks were 
living in ‘anxiety because they felt that events of deep importance for their future and their 
survival were occurring’ (Rizvić 1990: 11). Kreševljaković (1937: 18) recounts that the 
Bosniaks’ response to Austrian occupation was twofold: one group was complaisant, 
justifying the Turkish action as a last-resort response to pressure from the Great Powers; the 
other group, however, displayed bitterness, pledging that ‘the Sultan can give away Istanbul 
if he wants but not Bosnia, and even if he orders us to surrender to the Austrians, we will 
not do it’. This is an important point, because an almost identical divergence of opinion 
occurred over the signing of the Dayton Agreement: one group was supportive because it 
was said that the Americans had threatened to bomb the Bosnian army if they did not 
withdraw from positions claimed by the Serbs; the other group portrayed this ultimatum as 
a hoax, and maintained that the war should be fought to the end, when it would be clear 
which ‘side’ was victorious.    
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With regards to the Berlin Treaty, it seemed that the Bosniaks were neither properly 
informed nor, apparently, aware of the schism within the Porte. It was not the sultan 
himself who signed the treaty but the Tanzimatçilar, who appeared to be his representatives 
but were, in reality, representatives of the ‘Enlightenment project’, according to which, 
Islam was to be confined within the borders of a future Turkish state. The Great Powers did 
not consider Sultan Abdülhamid II a viable enough ally to participate in the new carve-up; 
he was accused of pan-Islamic tendencies and of attempting to revive the Ottoman Empire 
by mobilising the Muslims within his tottering domain. For this reason, he was not even 
invited to the congress. In vain, the Bosniaks attempted, for the last time during the nation-
building process, to defend Bosnian autonomy, but Bosnia’s destiny had already been 
decided by others, and the agreement proceeded with a seemingly unstoppable momentum 
that anticipated the course of all future settlements. The signatories to the treaty 
unanimously concluded that the Bosniaks were not to become a nation, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was not to become a state but a protectorate, a pattern that would be 
reproduced a century or so later.  
Bosnians of all confessions turned to armed resistance against Austria.
153
 However, 
Donia (2006) argues that despite the claims of unity, the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was already divided on this issue: while Catholics were not motivated to rise 
up against their co-religionists, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, encouraged by charismatic 
religious leaders, declared their brotherhood and took up arms, albeit for different reasons. 
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 Donia (2006: 103) found evidence of this appeal for armed resistance in the personal collection of a 
colleague: ‘You fellow Bosnians, Christians and Latins [Orthodox and Catholic], for the honour of the 
homeland in which you have experienced centuries of tranquillity, go with your Islamic countryman into 
battle and expel the enemy. Defending the homeland is the duty of all people who live in it.’ 
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Meanwhile, Bosnian Jews, although paying a ‘war tax’, were completely disenchanted.154 
Nevertheless, the uprising turned into the outbreak of war proper. A timely report from the 
region (Editorial Section 1878: 795) recorded that attempts by the Austrian troops to enter 
Bosnia ‘provoked strenuous resistance, and severe engagements have occurred between the 
troops and the insurgent Bosnians, the latter numbering over one hundred thousand men’. 
To help the Austrian troops suppress Bosnian resistance, the Porte dispatched 
reinforcements of four battalions under the command of Hafiz Pasha. This act is convincing 
evidence of the determination of the Tanzimatçilar to reorganise ‘European Turkey’. The 
Bosnians’ fierce resistance delayed the entry of the Austrians for an entire three months. 
They also caught and imprisoned the Turkish commander, and even proclaimed a ‘people’s 
government’, electing the imprisoned commander Hafiz Pasha as its leader. Still unaware 
of the real intentions of the Tanzimatçilar, they hoped through this act to gain the support 
of the Porte – a further indication that the Bosniaks were out of touch with the realities of 
the day, a pattern that has continued throughout the history of their political struggles.  
The main reason for this political naivety was that a mature political understanding 
of the tenor of the times required the development of a national awareness; in all the other 
Balkan regions, this was diligently encouraged by external forces, but the Great Powers 
took pains to ensure that such an awareness was absent from the Bosniak political stage. In 
other words, the Bosniaks did not lack awareness of their separate ethno-national identity, 
but they were neither presented with the opportunity nor given the appropriate tools to build 
a modern nation. Most critically, they lacked the Great Power support needed to achieve 
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 Serbs, by that time, had developed a sense of Serbian nationalism, and were disappointed that Serbia was 
not given any role in Bosnia. This was different from the Bosniaks’ patriotism – they were defending the only 
country they had, as articulated by the appeal from their leaders. See: Donia (2006: 44-55). 
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national recognition, because unlike those who were fighting for the ‘rights’ of Christians, 
Bosniaks were fighting for the ‘rights’ of Muslims. Consequently, the Bosniaks were 
outnumbered and defeated by the joint Austrian-Tanzimat forces, with the tacit approval of 
the Great Powers. The subsequent Austrian retribution affected the entire country. Austria’s 
vindictiveness intensified Bosniak emigration to the Ottoman lands, which had already 
begun with the persecution of Muslims that followed the rebellions of the Christian millets, 
as detailed in chapter three.
155
 The Tanzimatçilar welcomed these migrations because it 
corresponded to their targets of Turkification of Bosniaks as explained further below.    
4.3.1 Tanzimat ‘Turkification’ 
The Ottoman approach to Bosniak migration reflected the fundamental rift in its state 
apparatus. Whilst the Tanzimat faction favoured migration as an extended tool of 
‘Turkification’, offering to transport the Bosniaks by boat from Salonika, the Islamist side 
was against mass migration because the Bosniaks’ presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ensured the survival of the Muslim ummah in Europe, affording a glimpse of hope for the 
future return of a revitalised Ottoman Empire.
156
 This ambiguity in Ottoman migration 
policy lasted until 1882, although it would continue to linger in various forms until the full 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. However, in 1881 the French occupied 
Tunisia, and in 1882 the British colonised Egypt. In response, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
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 Some migrations were encouraged by an array of Austrian-sponsored spies and agents, until the fear of 
Serbian predominance in Bosnia, and by implication Russian penetration, forced the Austrian government to 
change its policy and actively discourage Bosniaks from migrating. Rizvić (2000) cites Osman Nuri Hadžić as 
reporting, in the early days of the Austrian occupation, that Austrian agents visited unsophisticated Muslim 
villagers and spread rumours that that sultan would give land and a sum of money to all those who ran away 
from the Kafirs (infidels) and moved permanently to Turkey. For more on this issue, see Rizvić (2000: 14). 
See also: Hauptman (1967).  
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 There are two relatively long documents signed by fourteen ministers in the Ottoman cabinet: Yıldız 
Sadaret Resmı Maruzat No 3/7, 27 April 1879 and Yıldız Sadaret Hususı Maruzat No. 163/29, 6 January 1880 
(Başvekalet Arşivi [Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office]). The second document cites four reasons against 
the Bosnian Muslim migrations, mainly based on the prevention of Austrian consolidation of power in the 
region.   
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initiated the ideology of pan-Islamism, based on the idea of a political ummah, united 
through the caliphate, with a view to encouraging Muslim cultural resistance to European 
(including Russian) imperialism (Karpat 2001: 3, 14). In addition, in 1882 Baron von 
Kallay, the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s minister of finance, who was in effect the governor 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903, created the office of re’is ul-ulema, the 
supreme religious head of the Bosnian Muslims (the re’is ul-ulema still continues to play 
an important political role in Bosnia). This action empowered the Bosnian Muslims; they 
were given a representative and a political voice, and as a consequence the mass migration 
temporarily abated.  
Both of these events urged the sultan to liberalise his migration policies and take 
expedient measures to encourage all the Muslims of the empire’s old domains to migrate to 
the Ottoman state, in order to increase the number of Muslims who could be rapidly 
mobilised and politicised. The sultan was further prompted to encourage Bosniak migration 
by the anti-migration measures imposed by Kallay, who, fearful that the Serbs might 
become the dominant group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, introduced a series of preventative 
measures, as well as incentives for those Bosniaks who had already emigrated to return.
157
 
To counteract these, Abdülhamid II ordered his aide and cabinet member, Ibrahim Dervish 
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 Many Bosniaks who emigrated to what was left of the Ottoman state wanted to return, mainly because 
their economic situation led to hunger and a high mortality rate, but also because of the language barriers they 
encountered in Turkey. The migrants were looking for ways and means to return, but were discouraged by the 
Ottomans and the Austrians. Austria had placed harsh conditions on return, and generally did not allow it. For 
example, anyone who spent more than five years outside Bosnia, or who became a foreign national, or who 
left Bosnia without obtaining special permission was considered an ‘illegal alien’ and not allowed to return. 
The Porte also prohibited the return of refugees and migrants to Bosnia by issuing only a limited number of 
passports and asking for repayment of the money distributed to the refugees as a precondition to return. 
Moreover, it was looking for ways to resettle the Bosnian refugees at the borders of newly emerged Christian 
states, as Bosnian Muslims had proved to be good and reliable soldiers, able to guard the shrunken Ottoman 
borders, which, from the Berlin Congress to the end of the First World War, served as a target for 
neighbouring client-states of the Great Powers. For more on the forced migration from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, see Šehić (1980), Kraljačić (1990), Juzbašić (1990), Laveleye (1885: 124-127). 
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Pasha (who, according to my interpretation of the documents, was a Tanzimatçı) to prepare 
a memorandum with recommendations for measures to induce migration. Dervish Pasha, 
focusing on the oppressive policies of the newly independent neighbouring countries rather 
than on Bosnia itself, concluded that immigration was the only solution and it was a 
religious and humanitarian duty to help Bosnian Muslims to emigrate (Archives of the 
Prime Minister’s Office, 19 May 1894). He was appalled by the Islamic interpretations 
used by the Bosnian ulema (religious scholars), who were advising against emigration by 
citing a hadith (a sacred saying attributed to the Prophet): ‘hubb al-watan, min al-iman’ 
(‘love of the homeland is love of the faith’). He recommended that the Islamic scholars of 
the Porte transcribe the ‘real’ meanings of the Sunnah and hadith and distribute them 
throughout Bosnia.  
In the battle between the Bosniaks, Ottoman Islamists and the Tanzimatçılar over 
the accurate Islamic interpretations of verses in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, the real conflict 
was nested within the protection of narrow ‘national’ interests. Evidence of this is found in 
a widely quoted memorandum from the şehbender (consul) in Ragusa (Dubrovnik), which 
helped the Ottoman cabinet formulate its final views on migration from Bosnia. The 
document suggested that intensified migrations of Bosniaks could be used as a tool to 
increase the Muslim population and counterbalance the ratio of Armenian and Greek 
inhabitants in the Ottoman lands (Bosna-Hersek Belgeleri [Archival Bosnian Documents], 
Doc. 39, 17 March 1901: 168-181). It also reminded the Porte of its long-term interests in 
keeping the Bosnian Muslims in Europe in readiness for the empire’s recovery, and 
recommended that rather than encouraging mass migration, the Porte should use diplomatic 
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channels to provide them with economic and cultural assistance (Bosna-Hersek Belgeleri 
[Archival Bosnian Documents], Doc. 39, 17 March 1901: 169). 
However, all hopes for the revitalisation of the empire were dashed in July 1908 
when Sultan Abdülhamid II received a telegram from the Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
(Committee of Union and Progress), an obscure political movement of exiles operating out 
of Macedonia, Paris and Geneva, and the only Muslim political society who enjoyed Great 
Power support. The telegram threatened the sultan with dethronement if he did not reinstate 
the constitution and cease his alleged dictatorship. Abdülhamid II placed great emphasis on 
his status as a Muslim ruler, and in this respect he departed from the practice of his 
Tanzimat ministers and his Tanzimat-oriented predecessors, who sought to play down 
Muslim exclusiveness in favour of the new doctrine of ‘Turkish-Ottomanism’, which soon 
became simply ‘Turkishness’.158 As seen earlier, to substitute ‘Turkishness’ for Islam was, 
indeed, the ultimate aim of the Enlightenment project for ‘Turkey in Europe’. Hence, it was 
the sultan’s emphasis on Islam, and the support he received from traditionalists and 
Islamists, that alienated Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti members, who subsequently 
metamorphosed into the ‘Young Turks’.  
In addition, the sultan’s call generated a plausible echo among Muslims living in the 
colonised lands of the former empire that was equally alarming for the Great Powers. The 
Great Powers sponsored a military coup by the Young Turks and their Hareket Ordusu 
                                                 
158
 As soon as the Young Turks came to power, they confounded civic and ethnic definitions of the Turkish 
nation: every citizen of the empire, irrespective of his or her ethnic background, was declared to be a Turk. 
Then, in the aftermath of the formation of the Turkish republic, they became the descendants of Turkish 
tribesmen from Central Asia (Bruinessen 2008). For a succinct overview, see Glenny (2000: 216-219). 
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(Army of Action), and Abdülhamid II was rapidly replaced by Mehmed Reşat.159 The 
Young Turks seized the parliament building and this gesture finalised the 1908 
revolution.
160
 In response to the Young Turks’ coup, and out of fear that they would 
encourage Bosniak emigration even more aggressively, leaving Bosnia vulnerable to 
Russian penetration via Serbian influence, Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and further tightened the conditions for emigration and return.
161
  
The Bosniaks replied to the annexation with the ‘Memorandum of Muslims from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which they submitted to the Ottoman parliament in February 
1909 (Bandžović 2010: 115). In the memorandum, they emphasised their centuries-old 
loyalty to the Ottoman state and Islamic values. They further expressed their astonishment 
that the Porte could consider accepting the shameful sum of £2.5 million in return for 
turning more than a million and a half of its Bosnian subjects into ‘Austrian slaves’. 
Finally, they affirmed their belief that the sultan would not allow such a humiliation of ‘the 
most loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire’ (Imamović 2000: 430). The delegation even 
went to Istanbul to discuss the repercussions of the annexation, but the Tanzimat ministers 
advised them to meekly submit to their lot. This is another convincing example of the 
symbiosis between the Tanzimat officials and the Great Powers in their quest to rid the new 
Europe of any influential Muslim presence. The Bosniaks’ memorandum, as well as their 
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 Sultan Mehmed Reşad was a brother of Sultan Abdulhamid II. He spent much of his life in seclusion, until 
his brother’s forced abdication. After his dethronement, Abdülhamid II was placed under house arrest. Reşad 
was a gentle man, with an interest in Persian literature, and unfamiliar with geopolitics. Thus, he was little 
more than a puppet. Unable to govern on his own accord, he accepted direction from the leadership of the 
Young Turks, mainly from the grand vizier. 
160
 For a well-conceived and articulate account of the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, see Deringil (1998). For 
an adventurous account of the events during the revolution, wrapped in a novel, see the narrative of Buchan 
(1999), a British intelligence officer.  
161
 For an interesting account of Austrian visa policies regarding migration to and from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, see chapter thirteen of Durham’s (2007) work. Bandžović (2010) also presents an extremely 
rich and well-documented review of the difficulties encountered by Bosniaks during the forced migrations.  
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hopeful visit to the Porte, once again testified to their political immaturity and lack of 
awareness of the geopolitical situation, a behaviour that was to be repeated in 1992-95, with 
the Bosniaks’ futile pleas for help to neo-Islamist governments during the massacres and 
persecution.  
This politically immature reaction to Austrian annexation was mainly due to the fact 
that Bosnian Muslims were too deeply immersed in their everyday struggle for survival to 
be able to devote much time to studying the international diplomatic arena. More critically, 
there was a lack of viable and trustworthy information. The links between the Bosniaks 
who stayed and those who emigrated were, for the most part, broken; the only channels of 
information open to them were Austrian or Tanzimat in origin, and these sources were 
generally biased, coloured by their respective national interests. However, the result of their 
official visit to Istanbul alerted the Bosniaks to the geopolitical reality of the day. Upon 
return, the delegation authorised its representatives to bow to the inevitable and accept 
Austria’s suzerainty over Bosnia and proclaim allegiance to the Austrian emperor. This was 
the first time they had admitted the political reality, in which the Bosniak leaders had to 
maintain a careful balance between the Austrian ruler and rising Serb and Croat nationalism 
in a political arena where they had neither allies nor supporters. This would, henceforth, be 
the sort of diplomatic tactic they would deploy throughout most of the twentieth century, as 
analysed in more detail later in the thesis. 
4.4 Extended ‘Turkification’ in the international environment 1878-1914   
Following the occupation of Bosnia, and over the coming years, Austro-Hungary evolved 
into a considerable imperial power and adopted an expansionist policy. It was able to 
expand towards the east, thanks to German efforts. Germany too became stronger following 
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unification, and further cemented its membership of the club of powerful states. Its position 
was mainly due to the invention of diesel-, gasoline- and electricity-driven engines by 
Diesel, Otto and Siemens, which enabled German ships to travel more rapidly. Deutsche 
Bank and Georg von Siemens also built the Baghdad railway, running from Berlin through 
Vienna, Bosnia and the Ottoman Empire to the oil fields in Kirkuk, north of Baghdad.
162
 In 
order to sustain this project, it was important to maintain peace in Bosnia by granting the 
Bosniaks’ minor requests. One of these was the postponment of agrarian reforms that 
would confiscate Muslim arable lands and woodland to presumably distribute amongst the 
Christian population. The Bosniaks feared that land reorganisation would empower the 
Serbs. Granting a delay represented a manoeuvre by which Austria hoped to control the rise 
of Serbian nationalism and rebuff Russian influence in the region.  
However, Austria’s speedy ships, coupled with its well-equipped and 
technologically advanced railway system, proved a source of discontent amongst the other 
Great Powers, most notably Britain. In order to rein in Germany’s expansionist ambitions, 
Britain expedited the marriage between the British Princess Royal and her German 
counterpart, Wilhelm II, who shortly afterwards became kaiser. Young Kaiser Wilhelm, 
encouraged by the British, began to dream of colonies and imperial possessions, but to 
realise this dream he had to remove Bismarck, who, by means of a skilful diplomatic policy 
of moderation had managed to create an equilibrium of complex alliances, securing 
Germany’s peace and economic freedom (Taylor 1967). Bismarck’s removal would be fatal 
for peaceful diplomatic relations.  
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 At that time, oil was thought to only exist in Baku, Russia, Kirkuk and Pennsylvania in the US. For more 
on this topic, see Engdahl (2004). 
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Thus, by early 1914, the majority of imperialist powers had been thrown into 
turmoil, and they began to weave a tangled web of mutual defence treaties across Europe. 
This was when the years of careful nurturing of local despots and secret societies 
throughout the Balkans started to pay off.
163
 One of the foreign-sponsored secret 
organisations was the ‘Black Hand’, which operated from Belgrade. The Black Hand 
supplied Gavrilo Princip
164
 with a revolver, instructing him to assassinate the Austrian 
imperial heir, Franz Ferdinand, during his ill-advised visit to Sarajevo.
165
 Although the 
assassination was only superficially successful,
166
 it was adopted as a genuine causus belli, 
and by August 1914 all the Great Powers were at war. It is interesting to note that, during 
this period, the assassination of a political figure or even a monarch would not normally 
lead to war but instead result in the public execution of the perpetrator, as in the case of 
Emil Hoedel, who a few years earlier had attempted to kill the German emperor (Editorial 
Record 1878: 795). Why Ferdinand’s assassination was different is a matter of historical 
                                                 
163
 Operating through secret societies, Russia and Britain militarily and financially supported the Serbs, 
Bulgarians and Greeks during both Ottoman and Austrian reign in the Balkans, a tactic that was aimed at 
destabilising their respective regimes.  
164 
Princip was a Bosnian Serb and a member of the Youth Bosnia organisation.  
165
 Franz Ferdinand, an heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne, was ill-advised to visit Sarajevo in June 
1914. His visit was cynically arranged on St. Vitius’s Day in June 1914, the anniversary that Serbs celebrate 
as a symbolic spiritual and moral victory, despite the military defeat they suffered at the hands of the Turks at 
Kosovo Field in 1389. In the Serbian collective memory, this battle represents their five hundred year-long 
enslavement under the Turkish heel. ‘The Field of the Blackbird’, as it is called in Serbian folk culture, is an 
indispensable mythological element of Serbian literary epics, and it always appears as the centre-point of the 
resuscitation of Serbian nationalism. It represents a powerful icon in Serbian religious mythology: Prince 
Lazar, who was killed on the battlefield, was later canonised. After his death, Lazar became the 
personification of all Serbian suffering, and was transformed into a central historical figure in the collective 
image of the Serbian ‘trauma’. The story was constantly retold and passed down the generations, thus 
preserving the pseudo-memory of victimhood (Volkan 2002: 87-97).  
166
 Equipped with a revolver from Belgrade and given clear instructions by the Black Hand, young Princip 
attempted to shoot the Austrian heir. In order to create the perception of a brewing crisis, and to ensure that a 
plan B was in place, the route designated for the state visit ‘was lined with a half a dozen aspiring young 
assassins, each more incompetent then the next’. However, Princip was presented with a fairly easy target 
when the chauffer stopped the roofless royal car right in front of him. For a full account of Prinicp’s clumsy 
assassination attempt, see West (1936: chapter 1) and Johnstone (2003: 127).  
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speculation, but the British ruling elite, having secured the necessary funds for a war,
167
 
correctly calculated that it was the right time to finally demolish the tottering Ottoman 
Empire, whose destiny had long been governed by British financiers and creditors (as 
outlined in chapter three). The British wanted to pull the plug on the emerging German oil 
pipeline to Baghdad and gain control of the oilfields of Mesopotamia and Kirkuk (Engdahl 
2004; Nef 2007). In 1917 the British army marched into Baghdad and, with the use of 
poisoned gas, managed to secure the oilfields. The Ottoman Empire fell, and the 
continental European powers began to repay the debts accumulated during the lingering 
‘Eastern Crisis’ with dead bodies.  
The First World War caused the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
leaving a number of Balkan provinces available to be incorporated into the new system of 
nation-states. The problem was that some of these provinces were so insignificant that 
neither had they a fully formed sense of national consciousness, nor was their formation 
financially feasible. For example, the former Austrian colonies of Slovenia, Croatia, 
Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to gain political recognition, established a 
separate legal entity called the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, with a national 
parliament in Zagreb. The formidable international challenges and internal difficulties, 
however, forced this newly emerged state to seek help from the victorious Great Powers, 
but more immediately from the Kingdom of Serbia (Čaušević 1995: 5). The plea for 
Serbian help was openly submitted to the Regent Alexander in Belgrade by a parliamentary 
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 Engdahl (2004) claims that the US government helped Britain finance the war. The law creating the 
Federal Reserve was rushed through an almost empty Congress on 23 December 1913, only months before 
the outbreak of war. When the British government bought war goods in the US and paid in sterling, the 
American manufacturer sold the pounds on to the Fed, which did not exchange it into gold from the Bank of 
England but kept it as a reserve currency. The currency in circulation in the US at that time rose by about 45 
percent, resulting in high inflation and circulation of cash.  
  
186 
delegation; the regent replied in the affirmative, and a few months later the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed. The name of the new entity reflected the balance 
of power in the political and national representation of the newly formed polity. What is 
immediately obvious is that in neither of the names of the legally established region is the 
word ‘Bosniak’ mentioned. This can be explained in two ways: first, the Bosniaks were 
already politically exhausted and economically impoverished, and therefore unable to 
represent themselves; secondly, it was part of the endeavour to form a new Europe without 
a Muslim national presence. As a result, Bosniaks continued to emigrate to Turkey, and 
those who stayed were transformed into a defensive, closed and almost lethargic 
community, serving as ‘living proof’ that Bosnian Muslims did not deserve to become a 
fully fledged national entity. Despite this, their quest for national status continued.  
 
4.5 The Bosniaks: between the Serbs and the Croats, 1918-40 
The enforced suppression of a Bosniak national character recommenced during the 
Austrian occupation and continued with increased vigour during the life of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, whose name was changed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 
1929.
168
 During this period, both Serbs and Croats laid competitive claim to national 
kinship with the Bosniaks, with the aim of dominating the South Slav state (Friedman 
1996: 61-105).
169
 This is because neither a ‘Greater Serbia’ nor a separate ‘Greater Croatia’ 
would be viable without this centrally located territory (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977: 254). 
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 The Yugoslav kingdom ceased to exist in 1940 at the start of the Second World War, when the Yugoslav 
royal family escaped to the UK. 
169
 Domination would either materialise through becoming a majority nation or via the legitimation of 
territorial claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Bosniaks were assiduously courted and pressured to declare themselves as either Serbs or 
Croats. However, they persistently refused to do so.
170
  
To safeguard the identity of the Bosniaks and their economic interests, Mehmed 
Spaho,
171
 an influential lawyer, formed a political party in February 1919. Spaho proposed 
to call it the ‘Bosniak Muslim Organisation’ (Filipović 1996: 67-68), but reactionary 
elements within the Yugoslav Kingdom’s political elites fiercely objected, warning of the 
dangers of isolation (Zulfirkarpašić 1994: 110).172 Instead, using a tactical manoeuvre, 
Spaho named his organisation the ‘Yugoslav Muslim Organisation’, even though it was 
clear that its primary aim was not to represent the position of all Muslims in Yugoslavia but 
only that of Bosnian Muslims (Purivatra 1974: 483-489). Historical evidence points to the 
fact that it would not have been possible to represent a unified Yugoslav Muslim position, 
because the other Muslim communities within Yugoslavia were already assimilated into the 
newly emerged nation-states. This formed a political cleavage between the Bosnian 
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 Bosnian Muslims refused to acquiesce to either claim; they disagreed with the Serbs over the agrarian 
reforms, but were also afraid to anger them by acquiescing to Croat overtures. There was a tiny minority 
within the elite that proclaimed themselves either Serb or Croat, but the majority of the masses remained 
Bosniak and Islamic, without any clear support in place to enable them to develop a modern national 
consciousness fit for a new nation-state. Some, however, called for Habsburg tutelage as the only way to 
protect Bosnian Muslims and the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Banac 1984: 300-364).  
171
 Dr Mehmed Spaho was the most prominent and influential political figure in twentieth-century Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. For a long time, he did not have a biography, and many researchers relied on Purivatra’s (1974) 
impressive book for information related to Spaho. In recent times, however, the scarce, sporadic and almost 
anecdotal references have been converted into two useful and well-documented biographies of Spaho’s 
political life: Kamberović (2009) and Crnovršanin and Sadiković (2007). For a picture of Spaho built from 
personal memories, see Đulabić (1994). For a useful overview about Spaho’s political legacy, see Filandra 
(2001).  
172
 See also the statement by Adil Zulfikarparšić, a Bosniak politician and prominent public figure who lived 
in exile in Switzerland until 1990, and is now deceased. Zulfikarparšić claimed that Spaho’s son, Avdo 
Spaho, confided to him that his father wanted to name the party the ‘Bosniak Muslim Organisation’, and that 
he could corroborate this claim with written evidence (Đilas and Gaće 1994: 110). Avdo Spaho became a 
deputy leader of the Liberal Bosniak Party in the 1990s, a political party that fights for a Bosniak nationality 
‘without a Muslim component’. In other words, this party views all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
Bosniaks, regardless of religion, as was the case before the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, when 
Christians started to abandon the term ‘Bosniak’ as a description of their identity. For more on this subject, 
see Fočo (1994).  
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Muslims and other Muslim communities of the region, who saw their political interests 
bound up with the nation-states they lived in.
173
 In this respect, they did not need specific 
political representation, and did not rely on the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation; rather, they 
fought for their rights through the Islam Muhafazai Hukuk Cemiyeti (Islamic Society for the 
Preservation of the Legal Rights of Muslims).
174
 Thus, the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation 
dealt specifically with the Bosnian Muslim question, focusing on resistance to the 
competing nationalist claims of the Serbs and Croats, with the aim of preserving a unified 
Bosnian territory. The party’s leaders accurately perceived Serb and Croat chauvinism to be 
inimical to the improvement of the economic and social position of Bosnian Muslims; their 
threat to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina would render the Bosnian Muslims a 
permanently ineffectual minority (Imamović 1998). The continued migration of Bosnian 
Muslims to Turkey did not help. In 1934, the Young Turk government in Ankara 
announced a ‘repatriation policy’ for the Balkans, claiming that they expected 400,000 
Muslims from Romania, a million Bulgarian Muslims and 800,000 Muslims from 
Yugoslavia to ‘repatriate’ to Turkey.175  
Bosniak representatives, through the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, had to pursue 
a course appropriate for a vulnerable and insignificant political group. This entailed 
frequent switching of support to whichever ‘side’ was deemed to serve their best interests. 
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 To illustrate, Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish Muslims politically identified with whichever nation they 
happened to remain in after the nineteenth-century territorial carve-up, and demanded only religious 
autonomy and the preservation of their landholdings.  
174
 The Turkish name suggests that most probably the Muslims in question were Turkish minorities. The party 
had a brief life, due to the emigration of the remaining Muslim communities from Yugoslav lands.  
175
 Muslims migrated to Turkey from Macedonia, Sandžak (South Serbia) and Romania in large numbers, and 
also to some extent from Bulgaria. The least voluntary population movements occurred with Muslims from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the fact that, despite their sympathy towards the Turks, Bosniaks never really 
identified with them in a national sense. See: Bandžović (2006: 186). 
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Although, from a contemporary perspective, this might seem a natural course to adopt, the 
Bosniak leadership was often accused of political inconsistency, especially if they withheld 
their support to either the Serbs or the Croats in any given situation. It became fashionable 
among Serbs and Croats to refer to Bosniaks as unreliable and opportunistic, and therefore 
unsuitable as respected political opponents.
176
 However, it was only possible for the 
Bosniaks to continue juggling between the two parochial approaches as long as Serbs and 
Croats remained in competition over Muslim loyalty. When in 1939 Serb and Croat 
political leaders found a mutually beneficial solution, they rapidly struck a deal and, taking 
no account of Bosniak views, divided Bosnia and Herzegovina amongst themselves in the 
Cvetković-Maček Agreement.177 By proclaiming an autonomous Croatia (Banovina 
Hrvatska) and the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agreement effectively meant 
the federalisation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Partition, and the ultimate elimination of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, was met with vehement opposition from Bosniak leaders. Spaho 
even travelled to Belgrade to discuss these issues with the Yugoslav regent, only to be 
murdered in his hotel room in Belgrade (Kamberović 2009: 10-11; Đulabić 1994: 64-65).  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, was unintentionally saved from extinction by the 
raison d’état of the Great Powers. The British disliked the neutrality agreement that the 
Yugoslav prime minister, Stojadinović, had brokered with Hitler.178 As a result of British 
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 Croats often accused Bosniaks of supporting any Belgrade government that benefited the Muslims. This 
was especially the case in 1921, when Bosniaks decided to help the Serbs achieve a centralised rather than 
federal Yugoslav state by voting for the Vidovdan Constitution (Meštrović 1960: 50-51). This was often used 
as an explanation of all Yugoslavia’s subsequent problems.   
177
 The Cvetković-Maček Agreement was officially put into effect on 26 August 1939, with the formation of 
the Government of National Agreement (Vlada narodnog sporazuma).   
178
 In his post-war memoirs, Prime Minister Stojadinović claimed that Yugoslavia would have been preserved 
during the Second World War, just as Switzerland was, if his political legacy had been adopted (cited in 
Đulabić 1994: 63). Glenny (2000: 473) has produced an excellent account. He calls Yugoslavia’s entry into 
the Tripartite Agreement a ‘diplomatic triumph’.  
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interference,
179
 the Cvetković-Maček government was overthrown, and the British secret 
service removed Stojadinović to Madagascar. Yugoslav patriots were unaware of the extent 
of international involvement in the revolt and unanimously chanted ‘better grave than the 
slave’, with little expectation that international intervention in their political affairs would 
result in the bombardment of Yugoslavia and subsequent German occupation. Although 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was inadvertently preserved intact, it was nonetheless dragged into 
a ruthless civil war. In an effort to protect their autonomy, and their lives, the Bosniaks 
sought German protection, claiming that Bosnian Muslims did not have Slav origins but 
were descendants of Germanic Goths (Redžić 1987: 10, 73). This appeal met with failure, 
and the Bosniaks became prime targets for both Serb and Croat extreme nationalist forces 
throughout the war. In response, they formed a Muslim SS troop with generous Nazi 
support, creating still further animosity, and atrocities were committed on all sides 
(Dželetović Ivanov 1987; Lepre 1997). 
The Cvetković-Maček Agreement and its aftermath, however, are significant in 
another respect: in March 1991 Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian president, and Slobodan 
Milošević, the Serbian president, revisited this arrangement by agreeing the division of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ignoring the existence of the Bosnian Muslims.
180
 This resulted in 
the infamous Karadjordjevo Agreement, which the Serb and Croat nationalist leaderships 
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 Due to their traditional imperialistic rivalry with Germany, the British encouraged the Yugoslav entry into 
the Second World War. They engineered a military coup in Yugoslavia through the British minister in 
Belgrade. Winston Churchill, and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), jointly offered assistance to a 
receptive audience led by the Yugoslav director of military operations and intelligence, General Yanković. He 
assumed the alias ‘L.R. Hope’ (‘Last Ray of Hope’). For an informative and concise article on Anthony 
Eden’s Balkan mission, see Morewood (2008: 34-41). For further reading, see Balfour and Mackey (1980) 
and Lawlor (CUP 1994). 
180
 According to the testimony of Stipe Mesić, Tuđman offered north-west Bosnia (the Bihać, Cazin and 
Kalduša areas) to Milošević, saying that ‘he did not need that part of Bosnia’. The interview with Mesić, in a 
programme called ‘Oko’, was aired on Serbian National Television (RTS) on the 23 February 2009 at 18.00 
GMT.  
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saw as the solution to their historical disputes and a step towards the mutually agreed 
establishment of a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia. Even today, this theory has its 
sympathisers among contemporary scholars.
181
 To escape possible slaughter, once again 
Bosnian Muslims turned to an external force for protection; this time, they appealed to the 
UN and the ‘international community’ – without success. The Bosniaks became the 
principle victims of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The unwillingness of the UN to intervene 
was only the tip of the iceberg; the real cause lay in the way Bosnian Muslim identity was 
misrepresented during Yugoslavia’s socialist period, as discussed in the next section. 
 
4.6 The proclamation of a Yugoslav communist ‘Muslim’ nation    
During the modern period, Serbs and Croats continued to pursue their competing claims to 
control over the Bosnian republic and its resources in the federal Yugoslavia. This 
continued until 1969, when Bosniaks were recognised as a separate nation and attained the 
right to share in Yugoslavia’s resources. As a result, they became politically influential in 
the region for the first time. It was also the first time in post-1878 history that Bosniaks 
gained national recognition. However, they did not assume their historical name, but were 
bestowed with the new national designation of ‘Muslims’, in accordance with the 
conclusion of the 12
th
 Conference of the Central Committee of the League of Communists 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 17 May 1968 that ‘the Muslims are a distinct nation’ 
(Purivatra 1970: 30).  
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 Djokić (2007) is the prime example of this scholarship. He saw the failure of the agreement as a missed 
opportunity for Serbs and Croats to find a permanent solution to their perpetual disagreements. In his work, he 
analyses in depth the Cvetković-Maček Agreement without ever mentioning the Bosnian Muslims, except for 
a peripheral acknowledgment of their existence. Even during the launch of his book, when I asked him to 
elaborate on his views on the Bosnian Muslims, he refused to pay attention to the issue. This is further proof 
of the negation of Bosniak nationhood. 
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The category of ‘Muslim nationality’ – that is ‘Muslim’ in a national rather than 
religious sense – was used for the first time in the 1971 census.182 To separate the national 
meaning from the obvious religious connotation of the term, the Communist leadership 
decided to use a capital ‘M’ when specifying the ethnic group and a lower-case ‘m’ for 
religious purposes. Although specific care was taken to eliminate confusion, this 
designation immediately gave rise to three contradictions. First, the word ‘Muslim’ defines 
an adherent to Islam and literally means ‘one who submits to God’. Consequently, the fact 
that the atheist leadership, who vehemently opposed tawhid (Islamic monotheism) and 
rejected creationist theories, adopted a religious term to describe a nationality was 
exceptionally perplexing. Secondly, a follower of Islam who belonged to the Muslim nation 
would be categorised according to the ‘disturbing name’ ‘Muslim muslim’.183 The third 
point of confusion was the puzzle of who actually constituted this ‘Muslim’ nation. In other 
words, was the identification reserved for Bosnian Muslims or could the other Yugoslav 
‘muslims’ also belong to the Muslim nation?  
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 There were numerous other attempts to find a solution to the identification and classification of Bosnian 
Muslims. The census designation for Bosnian Muslims had been an issue ever since the post-war Yugoslavia 
was established. To illustrate, the 1948 census permitted Bosnian Muslims to declare themselves as 
‘undetermined Muslims’ if they failed to class themselves as either Serb Muslims or Croat Muslims. The 
results showed that the great majority of Bosnian Muslims used the category of ‘undetermined Muslim’. In 
the 1953 census, this category was eliminated and the new one of ‘Yugoslav undetermined’ was introduced, 
which was mainly used by Bosnian Muslims and some others who found the narrow nationalist definitions 
repugnant. In the 1961 census, alongside ‘Yugoslav undetermined’, there was a new category of ‘Muslim 
(ethnic membership)’, which eventually replaced the previous category. What is apparent is that Bosnian 
Muslims continued to identify themselves by whatever designation would permit them to demonstrate their 
separation from any of Yugoslavia’s dominant national groups, in contrast to those Muslims living in the 
other Yugoslav republics, who embraced the national designation of, for example, Macedonian or Albanian. 
Even when they gained the right to declare themselves nationally as ‘Muslims’, many remained decidedly 
Yugoslav in their orientation, and when given a chance to declare themselves as an ‘equal’, separate nation 
for the first time in more than a century, a large number continued to use the ‘Yugoslav’ category (Jahović 
1991, cited in Friedman 1996: 160). For the demographics of the population claiming Yugoslav national 
status, see Burg (1983: 22) and Bandžović (2010).             
183
 Hamdija Čemerlić, the provost of the Theological University, used this phrase in an interview in 1987 
(cited in Tanasković 2000: 171). 
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As mentioned previously, there was a tendency towards assimilation on the part of 
Muslims living in the other Yugoslav republics: according to census patterns, more than 
eighty percent of Muslims in Serbia identified themselves as ‘Serbs’, seventy percent of 
Muslims in Croatia identified themselves as ‘Croats’, and more than ninety percent of 
Muslims in Macedonia regarded themselves as ‘Macedonian’ (Burg 1983: 21). Tanasković 
(1992: 67-73), therefore, states that the term ‘Muslim’ was intended for Serbo-Croat-
speaking Muslims of Slavic origin, who were born or lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Sandžak or Montenegro, and considered Bosnia and Herzegovina their ethnic state. To 
paraphrase, the term was intended for the indigenous Muslim inhabitants of the pre-
Tanzimat Ottoman Bosnia Vilayeti – in short, Muslim Bosniaks. Indeed, just about the only 
campaigners for Muslim recognition were the Muslim political elites of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
184
 A good example is the Bosnian politician, Hamdija Pozderac,
185
 president 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1971 to 1974, whose contribution towards 
gaining constitutional recognition for Bosnian Muslims is immeasurable.
186
  
The logical question arises as to why the term ‘Muslim’ was adopted instead of the 
term ‘Bosniak’. Some prominent Bosniak scholars claimed that no term but ‘Muslim’ 
should be used to describe the national identity of Bosniaks.
187
 Legitimising the Bosniaks 
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 There were also Bosnian Serbs and Croats who supported the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims. 
Good examples are Branko Mikulić, a Bosnian Croat, and Milenko Renovica, a Bosnian Serb, who both 
fought alongside Muslim politicians for Muslim national recognition, as well as for greater autonomy for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina within a federal Yugoslavia. Ironically, the remaining family members of both 
politicians were ostracised by the neo-Islamist government, and they eventually emigrated to Croatia and 
Serbia, respectively.  
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 Pozderac was also vice-president of the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, and was in line to become 
president of Yugoslavia just before he was forced to resign from politics in 1987. 
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 For a personal insight into Pozderac’s devotion to the Bosnian cause, see Hadžišehović (2003: 171-178). 
He is important to mention for two interwoven reasons: first, he played an important role in curtailing neo-
Islamist penetration in the 1980s; and secondly, he suffered demonisation once the neo-Islamists came to 
power. This is discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
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as a separate nation would send the message that they claimed ‘ownership’ of the republic, 
which neither Croats nor Serbs would countenance. Yet, recognising the Bosniak nation 
under the name ‘Muslim’ enabled nationalists elements within both Serbs and Croats to 
continue their separatist, antagonistic discourse, contributing to the political unrest 
preceding the break-up and final collapse of Yugoslavia.   
One of the reasons behind the building of a ‘hollow Muslim nation’ (Redžić, 2000) 
was the lack of historiography and literature concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Yugoslav institutions of higher education. Their modules were burdened with Serbian and 
Croatian ‘spiritual imperialism’, forcing Bosnian Muslims into an unsustainable position by 
creating ‘a type of a unitary sandwich, in which they [Muslims] live in a vacuum, 
suffocated by that sandwich’ (Oljača 1979: 15). From the revolution of the 1940s onwards, 
the national existence of Bosnian Muslims was either negated or neglected, and the 
Communist leadership risked being regarded as unscrupulous in the position they adopted 
towards Muslims, hindering full affirmation of their national identity (Mikulić188 1978: 
372). Even though the Oriental Institute was established in the 1970s with a view to 
exploring Bosniak history and culture, its studies were very much confined to the Ottoman 
legacy. None of the other institutions of higher education contained a separate department 
for the history of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was studied as a part of the 
history of the peoples of Yugoslavia, which was deemed sufficient by the anti-Muslim 
elements within the educational heirarchy.
189
 Even when the Bosnian Academy of Science 
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 Some scholars were opposed to establishing a separate module dealing specifically with Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian historiography. For example, Milorad Ekmečić, a well-known Serbian scholar, opposed the 
establishment of a separate historiographic institution, although he wrote extensively on historical topics – for 
example, he was the only former-Yugoslav contemporary scholar to produce a comprehensive study in Serbo-
Croat on the Bosnian uprising of 1875-78.     
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and Arts embarked on an ambitious seven-year project covering the history of the people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, pledging to produce five books of five hundred pages each, it 
ended in fiasco (Filandra 1998: 281). Thus, the ‘Muslim question’ in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remained for the large part unexamined. This had major repercussions for 
Bosnian Muslims during the 1992-95 war, in which they were the principal victims.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter analyses the path of Bosniak national development, or lack of it. It reveals that 
historical records testify to a significant pre-Ottoman Islamic presence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and an analysis of medieval Bogumil beliefs and traditions shows that they 
possessed a symbiotic relationship with those of Islam. Although this claim would merit 
further study, the research in this thesis serves as an initial investigation into the widespread 
misconception that the Ottomans introduced Islam to the Balkans. The demographic and 
socio-political de-Ottomanisation of the Balkans is a complex question that, despite various 
interpretations during the post-communist period, begs for a multifaceted approach, 
liberated from ideological pressures and stereotypical historiography. This is particularly 
important for an understanding of why Bosnian Muslims were never recognised as a fully 
fledged nation. Since the rise of modern nationalism, they have far too frequently been 
regarded as the heirs of the old Ottoman Empire. This so-called ‘Turkish heritage’ was used 
as an alibi to deny Bosniaks national independence and curtail the autonomy they had 
fought for since the medieval crusades against the Bogumils, and achieved through their 
embrace of Islam in 1463, with the arrival of the Ottomans.  
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A great many scholars claim that it was Islam that obstructed the national 
development of the Bosniaks. This thesis has found that such an explanation is 
inappropriate – Islam aided the development of a separate ethnicity and identity, as did the 
other religions in the region. Instead, it argues that the roots of the Bosniaks’ lack of a 
national identity lie in the systematic, synchronised actions of the Great Powers and 
Tanzimat leaders: on the one hand, the Turkish profile was applied to Bosnian Muslims, 
and Balkan Muslims in general; on the other, the members of Christian millets were guided 
into national awareness by internationally orchestrated nationalist campaigns, whereby a 
harmonious coexistence with Islam was presented as inconceivable within the new ethno-
liberal setting envisaged for Europe. Muslims were neither accepted nor tolerated as equal 
inhabitants of the system of nations-states, and they were persecuted or forced to assimilate.  
This situation was readily exploited by Serb and Croat nationalists, who began to 
lay claim to Bosnian territory. Bosniaks were depicted as ‘repatriating Turks’ through the 
joint efforts of the Tanzimat leaders, European ‘de-Islamisers’ and the local Croat and Serb 
leaderships. Creating a vacuum around the identity of Bosnian Muslims, coupled with their 
resistance to the adoption of ‘Turkishness’ in the midst of a regional national awakening, 
rendered the status of the Bosniaks that of an unwanted religious community occupying 
Christian land. The political impoverishment of the Bosniak leadership continued 
throughout the twentieth century, encouraging the expansionist tendencies of their 
neighbours. The dominance of the Serbs and Croats was sustained in post-war Yugoslavia, 
creating a ‘nationalised historiography’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to borrow a phrase 
from Kamberović (2003: 67), which produced myth-building and the politicisation of 
Bosniak historical evidence. The result was a dichotomous national interpretation of 
  
197 
Bosniaks as either Serbs or Croats, accompanied by schemes to appropriate and divide 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia’s neighbours twice almost succeeded in achieving this 
partition, in 1939 and 1991. Both efforts would have effectively destroyed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. However, a complex constellation of international powers impeded the 
materialisation of these plans, and the geostrategic interests of global diplomacy overrode 
Serb and Croat intentions. As will be seen in the following chapter, the 1990s brought 
enormous political and economic changes in the arena of international affairs, and this 
influenced the response of the ‘international community’ to the Yugoslav crisis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NEO-ISLAM IN THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
This chapter offers an analysis of ‘neo-Islamism’ – a novel concept that is used by this 
thesis to describe the proliferating Islamist movements with neoliberal agendas. It argues 
that the modern neoliberal order would not have been possible without the neo-Islamists’ 
contribution to the new political economy. This argument is intellectually grounded in the 
idea that neo-Islamism is an incarnation of neoliberalism. As discussed in chapter two, 
neoliberalism has emerged as a leading paradigm in the international arena, and this chapter 
analyses its impact on the socio-economic order. However, it is neither within the scope nor 
the parameters of the chapter to engage with the theoretical debates around the definition of 
neoliberalism, its benefits and disadvantages – that has been done abundantly well 
elsewhere.
190
 Rather, it seeks to examine the degree of, and rationale behind, Islamic 
involvement in the modern neoliberal exercise, which appears to have led to an ongoing 
process that could be described as the ‘Islamisation’ of international relations, as already 
described in chapter two.  
The chapter develops the main argument of the thesis by explaining the way in 
which the symbiosis between neo-Islamised global politics and the neoliberal political 
economy influenced the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and determined the international 
and domestic response to the conflict. With the regard to the research question, this chapter 
provides a background for an analysis to what extent neo-Islamism construction shaped the 
events and the responses of the Bosnian leaders in the 1992-95 war. The purpose here is to 
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place the events preceding the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war in 
an international context, analysing their impact on the conflict and its aftermath. The 
chapter therefore proceeds in five sections: the first explains the context in which the 
neoliberal order emerged at the global level and later exported to Yugoslavia; the second 
defines the speculative character of the neoiberal economy and its implications for society; 
section three analysis the principles that form the basis of the Islamic economy and its 
social impact; the fourth section offers an account of the neo-Islamist response to 
neoliberalism, while section five concludes by highlighting their symbiotic relationship. 
 
5.1 Setting the scene for the neoliberal doctrine 
 
Neoliberalism, as an economic and political structure, emerged as the result of the 
revolutionary reconstruction that took place almost simultaneously in three key centres of 
global geopolitical power:
191
 the UK, the US and the former USSR. At all three focal 
points, the role of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and by implication the 
more conservative faction in the UK, seem to have been instrumental in planting the seeds 
of an emerging pattern of international relations dedicated to maintaining a well-established 
power structure (Castells 2000). Privatisation and deregulation in 1979 had severe 
implications for British society, particularly in regard to the rapidly widening gap between 
rich and poor (Newbery and Pollitt 1997). Despite opposition, President Reagan adopted 
identical policies in the 1980s (Chomsky 1997). The outcome was celebrated by the 
privileged elites, but went unacknowledged amongst the populace at large (Miller 1996: 
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144). Reagan, however, had the blessing of Pope John Paul II, whose political role in 
spreading free market liberalism is revealed by John O’Sullivan (2006), a pious Roman 
Catholic and one of Thatcher’s speechwriters. In his narrative, O’Sullivan emphasises the 
importance of the British example to both the US government and the Catholic hierarchy, 
and describes the way Christian rhetoric enabled the US president, the British prime 
minister and the pope to assert they were bringing ‘democracy’ to the ‘liberated countries’ 
of the former atheist Soviet bloc. President George W. Bush even bestowed the Medal of 
Freedom, America’s highest civilian honour, on Pope John Paul II for his ‘heroic’ efforts to 
topple communism – the emphasis appeared to be on the political-religious display. Indeed, 
the political use of religious metaphors was perhaps best exhibited in Bush’s well-known 
speech in 2001, in which he called for a ‘crusade’ against Islam.192  
The mobilisation of religious discourse amongst the neoliberal leadership in the 
West is relevant to the study of both neo-Islamism and the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Neo-
Islamists in Bosnia mirrored this religious rhetoric when they deployed a tangled maze of 
Islamic verbiage to justify their economic deregulations and political platform, as explained 
in more detail in the following sections. Similarly, when analysing the impact of neo-Islam 
in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is important to note the Western deployment of a 
religious pretext for military intervention. The violence perpetrated against civilians in the 
Bosnian conflict rapidly came to be perceived as taking the shape of religious wars. The 
practice of dressing the hostilities in religious clothing was a convenient representation of 
the nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the presence of Islam alongside the 
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two major Christian denominations. As illustrated in chapter two, Islam had already been 
presented as a potential threat to the stability of the Western world. Following this logic, it 
was only to be expected that it would clash with non-Muslim ‘others’ on European soil. 
National groups involved in the conflict were classified according to religious affiliation; 
the world’s media and the various ‘peace envoys’ dispatched by the ‘international 
community’ generally accentuated the religious affiliation of ‘Muslim Bosniaks’, and to a 
lesser extent, also referred to ‘Orthodox Serbs’ and ‘Catholic Croats’. Even though there 
was no empirical evidence to indicate that religious intolerance lay behind the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, this belief was maintained throughout the peace negotiations that 
were brokered by international intermediaries and adopted by the local nationalist leaders 
(as discussed in more detail in chapter six).  
Sections of academia propagate this idea that religious bigotry, a blending of 
neoliberalism and theology, was the causus belli. Other scholars argue that, on the contrary, 
it was the wars in Yugoslavia that opened the way for the spread of neoliberalism in Europe 
(von Werlhof, cited in Chossudovsky and Marshall 2010: 127; Johnstone 2003, Hudsone 
2004; Chomsky 2005). Neoliberalism, however, was already well established in Europe and 
the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav crisis, rather than triggering the 
whole neoliberal mission, represented the attempt to secure this last link in the neoliberal 
chain in Europe. The successful dismantling of Yugoslavia’s self-governing, socialist 
economy represented the removal of one of the few remaining obstacles to neoliberal 
dominance on a global level. Russian acquiescence to the neoliberal dogma served as a 
crucial precedent. The incorporation of Russia into the neoliberal fold, under the guidance 
of Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in the former USSR in 1985, was perhaps the 
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most decisive factor in the global spread of the neoliberal agenda. The socialist principle of 
distribution, albeit state-controlled, in the USSR presented the most viable challenge to the 
omnipresence of the neoliberal doctrine embraced by the capitalist regimes of the US and 
Britain. Once Russian opposition was dislodged, the Yugoslav countries could be easily 
eliminated.  
Gorbachev delivered a speech to the Council of Europe, two years before the Cold 
War ended, announcing huge changes: 
Perestroika is changing our country, advancing it to new horizons. That 
process will continue [to] extend and transform Soviet society in all 
dimensions: economic, social, political and spiritual, in all domestic affairs 
and human relations. We have firmly and irreversibly embarked on that 
road. This was confirmed by the resolution passed by the Congress of 
People’s Deputies on the ‘Basic guidelines of domestic and foreign policies 
of the USSR’. That document confirmed, in the name of the people, our 
choice, our path of perestroika. I commend this resolution to your attention. 
It has a fundamental and revolutionary significance for the destinies of the 
country to which you yourselves refer as a superpower. (Gorbachev 1998: 
205) 
 
Closer reading of Gorbachev’s speech demonstrates that, apart from dwelling on the 
coming of profound and all-encompassing revolutionary change, it did not once refer to a 
policy that would provide a better and more prosperous future for the Russian people; 
instead, by the careful choice of positive terminology Gorbachev succeeded in painting a 
vague but optimistic picture of the times to come. Moreover, in an oblique fashion, he also 
mentioned that – as is usual in totalitarian regimes – the decision had not been taken by 
means of a democratic process but had been endorsed by the ‘people of our choice’, who 
had passed the resolution at the Congress of People’s Deputies. Whether or not it was 
Gorbachev’s intention, a new capitalist clique, empowered by global neoliberal forces, had 
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emerged from the old communist elite who had swiftly shifted allegiance from the socialist 
economy to capitalist financial interests. The transfer from a socialist to a capitalist mode of 
government by the self-same governing elites subsequently emerged as a global pattern; 
Yugoslavia serves as a good example of this practice.  
Shortly after Gorbachev’s speech, the Soviet ‘superpower’ crumbled, leaving its 
newfound partner, the US, ‘the sole and dominant superpower, and all the other nations 
subordinated to it in one degree or the other’ (Friedman 1999: 11). However, it was not the 
US government per se, but corporate and financial elites within the leading global 
institutions who claimed the upper hand.
193
 In 1990 they elevated Gorbachev to the 
prestigious title of Nobel Laureate for his personal endeavours in fighting communism and 
building the new global agenda. In the same year, the Berlin Wall came down, signalling 
the demise of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and an end to the ideological division of the world. Many 
celebrated this event as heralding the birth of ‘globalisation’, only to recognise later that it 
bore the dominant features of neoliberalism.
194
 The search for a theoretical structure for a 
new system of international diplomatic relations began.  
Neo-realist theories failed to explain the fact that a ‘new’ alternative superpower 
failed to emerge to offset the power of the US (Layne 1993; Walls 2002). The theoretical 
gap was filled by constructivist theories, introduced into the field of international relations 
by Onuf (1989), who held that the international political system is based as much on beliefs 
and ideas as on material forces. According to this view, state interests are fundamentally 
formed by ideas and social interaction, as ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). 
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In other words, ideas define and interpret the meaning of material power within the larger 
context of the material world (Tannenwald 2005: 19). ‘Study on international relations 
must focus on the ideas that inform the actors on the international scene, as well as on the 
beliefs of shared understandings between them’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 162). 
However, in the hands of the prominent international organisations that controlled 
international dialogue and policy prescriptions, the norms of political behaviour became 
one-sided, institutionalised instruments (Finnemore 1996). Jackson and Sorensen (2006) 
explain why: 
The international system is not something ‘out there’ like a solar system. It 
is a human invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a 
purely intellectual and ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, 
a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a 
particular time and place. (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 162, my italics) 
 
The paradigms that gained prominence in international relations following the end of the 
Cold War need to be analysed using the parameters set by the constructivist theorists. The 
three sets of values most celebrated by the practitioners of the global neoliberal agenda are 
set out below. 
 
5.1.1 Defining the new world 
 
One of the first scholars to provide a lens through which to observe the new era was Francis 
Fukuyama (1992). Basing his approach on the doctrines of Hegel, he proclaimed the ‘End 
of History’ and the birth of the ‘Last Man’, whom he promptly emancipated to freely 
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indulge in liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.
195
 Fukuyama offered profit as the 
sole leitmotif of the newly formulated ideology, which was increasingly referred to as 
‘neoliberalism’. Boos (2000) criticises this view because it disregards the socio-cultural 
contexts of different societies, celebrating the swift enrichment of the privileged few – the 
shareholders who partake in the lucrative financial transactions. In other words, this 
ideology facilitates the monopolisation of the world market by the elite. Kimball (1992) 
observes that by ‘ending history’, Fukuyama wanted to signal the achievement of a state of 
fulfilment and ‘the final form of human government’ (Fukuyama 1992: xi), but this 
achievement was mainly reserved for the elite. Thus, the conclusion of Fukuyama’s process 
of liberation was ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ and the ‘total 
exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism’, marking ‘the end point 
of mankind’s ideological evolution’ (1992: xxi, xii, 212 ). In fact, it was the end point of 
human destiny. 
About a year later, another American foreign-policy guru, Samuel Huntington, 
proposed his definition of the post-Cold War era: the structure of international relations 
predicted a future in which the ‘great divisions among humankind and the dominating 
source of conflict would be cultural’ (Huntington 1993: 22). Although Huntington’s 
Weltanschaung is, in a somewhat simplistic style, divided into seven different 
civilisations,
196
 the conflicts he predicts are very much those between the Judeo-Christian 
West and the Islamic ‘Rest’, fought in the spirit of free-market capitalism. This economic 
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system is safeguarded by the West, primarily through its control of international institutions 
and its economic and military power (Huntington 1993: 26, 29). To preserve and maintain 
Western preeminence and the ‘universal supremacy of Western values of human rights’, 
Huntington’s policy prescription was the further increase of Western military power (1993: 
47). His advocacy of the militarisation of foreign relations can be better understood if 
perceived from the perspective of his professional background: he was coordinator of 
national security planning and deputy to President Carter’s national security advisor, 
Zbigniew Brezinski, who played a significant role in the aggressive advancement of neo-
Islamist power in the Middle East, as discussed later in the chapter.  
The third paradigm of the new structure of international relations is indebted to the 
legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, whose 1942 theory was enthusiastically embraced by 
neoliberal campaigners. Schumpeter proposed the theory of ‘creative destruction’, a 
perpetual cycle of the destruction of old, less efficient services and products and their 
replacement by new, more efficient ones: 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel 
illustrate the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that 
biological term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. 
This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It 
is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to 
live in. (Schumpeter 1942: 82) 
 
Thus, all three prophecies aimed to create global socio-economic stability through the 
supreme power of neoliberal theology, based on the pillars of free-market capitalism and 
the ‘creative destruction’ of market competition. The material impact of neoliberalism can 
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therefore be measured, and cannot be regarded as simply an ‘academic theory’, purporting 
to offer a form of impartial knowledge. Neoliberalism is a political process that provides an 
ideological veneer for the post-Cold War view on the conduct of international relations: 
Neo-liberalism is not a neutral description which generates a prescription for 
action – it is an ideology which serves particular interests and groups of 
people – and should be evaluated as such. As an ideology it serves to help 
determine ‘who gets what’ in the world economy, by legitimating certain 
structures, processes and behaviour, by reproducing a certain distribution of 
power and by laying out a framework for action based on particular 
intersubjective view of the world. [Neo-liberalism] has become the 
unquestioned ‘common sense’ of the world economy. (Tooze 1997: 227) 
 
During the Cold War, there was growing rivalry between the self-proclaimed ‘free 
world’ of market capitalism and the state-run economy of Soviet Russia. The differences in 
the two systems had a multiplicity of manifestations on the international level, whereas on 
the domestic level, paradoxically, both of these systems apparently pursued similar policies 
concerning the management of private ownership, which was accomplished either through 
state intervention using the Bretton Woods institutions in the case of the former, or state-
controlled income distribution in the case of the latter. The rise of uncontrollable corporate 
power was perceived as a threat by the democratic institutions of the West, whilst 
communist states considered it a bourgeois menace to their societies. To achieve 
equilibrium, and prevent the possible penetration of socialist ideas into their polities, the 
leaders of the market economies provided for the welfare of their citizens and supported 
policies that restricted the concentration of wealth by means of strong trade union 
movements – both of which, nowadays, seem somewhat distant, quaint phenomena.  
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The Yugoslav crisis was unfolding in the midst of the post-Cold War changes. 
Rather than assisting in overcoming the disputes that broke out, the Western response to the 
emerging conflict accelerated the break-up of Yugoslavia into mutually hostile and 
economically unviable statelets. This thesis contends that this was because Western 
capitalist elites were wary of the possible influence of the self-managed socialist economy 
of the former Yugoslavia on other states going through the transition to ‘economic 
democracy’. Their main apprehension was the potential adoption of the principal of just 
income distribution by the non-aligned states – Yugoslavia was a founding member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement.
197
 However, as the conflict took its toll and war appeared 
imminent, the corporate cadre appeared on the scene. By this time, most local 
policymakers, as well as their counterparts from the West, had already secured shares in 
financial portfolios. This is evident in the pattern of lucrative and strategic appointments 
they occupied, either as top-ranking government officials or decision-making corporate 
executives, or both simultaneously.
198
 Their counterparts in other ex-socialist and ex-non-
aligned states followed suit, abandoning the economic model of self-management and 
embarking on the road to a ‘transition economy’. The protocols they followed closed the 
door on economic policies of state intervention and opened it wide to neoliberalism.          
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 A good example was the European envoy during the Yugoslav conflict, Lord Carrington – a British 
diplomat with numerous national and international appointments, an academic career and shares in the Carlyle 
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5.2 Digital cash makes the world go round 
Once neoliberalism was established on a global scale, the corporate elites needed a 
structural environment, a form of ‘global governance’, that would incorporate all its 
cultural diversity. The main gatekeepers of the new system were the institutions of the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the transnational 
corporations (TNC), whose leaders teamed up in the powerful World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). These formed an ‘institutional trinity’, to borrow Chomsky’s (1995) phrase, which, 
through tight implementation of structural adjustment programmes and the effective 
manipulation of the world’s financial markets, controlled global economic relations and 
maintained the balance of power (Craven 1994). In exchange for loans, countries were 
forced to restructure in order to accommodate the uninhibited operation of private 
conglomerates and the sale of their natural resources. The end result was the unification of 
economies around a set of homogenous rules, which meant that capital, goods and services 
could flow in and out of countries according to the judgement of the market (Castells 2000: 
136). Consequently, capital markets were deregulated and, hampered by the fewest possible 
national laws or regulations, capital was able to move freely around the world (Mohamad 
1998: 2-6). Communication technologies enabled real-time trade in currency and capital 
assets on the global financial markets (Russell 2005). Advanced computer systems 
provided powerful mathematical models to manage complex financial products, performing 
transactions at high speed and leading to the explosion of cross-cultural financial flows that 
heralded ‘an era of financial integration around the planet as investors from everywhere 
sought opportunities of high return’ (Castells 2000: 136). A relentless flow of shareholders 
of no particular domicile marginalised the market regulators, galvanising what O’Brien 
(1992) calls the ‘End of Geography’.   
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In response, the World Bank coined a new term: ‘emerging markets’. This 
designation signalled a country’s openness to speculative investment – a trend that planted 
the seeds for the financial crisis that swept the economies of Latin America, Asia and 
Russia in the 1990s (Castells 2000: 137). What followed was a mutual agreement on 
economic policies between the World Bank and IMF, which postulated ‘that the best path 
to economic development was through financial and trade liberalization and that 
international institutions should persuade countries to adopt such measures as quickly as 
possible’ (O’Brien and Williams 2007: 224). The concept was simple: a system of market 
liberalisation allows financial capital to flow freely into a given market; it keeps feeding the 
system through foreign currency transactions until the currency reserves have been almost 
depleted, causing a speculative bubble; the forces behind this speculative venture pull their 
financial investment out, leaving the economy in ruins; then, following this series of events, 
the IMF and World Bank arrive with a rescue mission in the form of an emergency loan, 
with the condition that the national government agrees to implement the IMF prescription 
for economic health.  
The conditions imposed on countries that sign up to these structural adjustment 
programmes include lowering budget deficits, devaluing the currency, limiting government 
borrowing from the central bank, liberalising foreign trade, reducing public sector wages 
and introducing price liberalisation, deregulation and the alteration of interest rates 
(Williams 1994: 85). In order to reduce budget deficits, precise ‘ceilings’ are placed on all 
categories of expenditure and the state is no longer permitted to mobilise its own resources 
to build public infrastructure (Chossudovsky 2003: 52). In other words, if the country is to 
maintain its infrastructure, it has to continue borrowing from its global creditors or start 
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selling off public enterprises and natural resources to foreign conglomerates or newly 
enriched domestic oligarchs.
199
 What this prescription effectively implies is that political 
and economic reforms internal to nation-states, such as privatisation, deregulation and 
decentralisation, have diminished central governments’ powers at the same time as they 
have liberated big business (Schmidt 1995).
200
 This is because the elites who monopolise 
the possession of capital are also responsible for its mobilisation and migration from certain 
markets, and they lay down the terms and conditions of re-financialisation, imposing policy 
prescriptions on national governments. Stiglitz (2003: 43-44), a former chief economist at 
the World Bank, writes that these conditions went beyond economics into areas that 
properly belong to the realm of politics, as ‘agreements stipulated what laws the country’s 
Parliament would have to pass to meet IMF requirements or “targets” – and by when’.  
Some researchers argue that neoliberal strategy was first tested in Chile, following 
the formula of the Chicago School of economists, headed by Milton Friedman, and was 
exported to other Latin American and African countries, which embarked on austerity 
policies in the attempt to service their debts (Marshall 2010; Von Werlhof 2010)
201
. Russia 
and Eastern Europe also jumped on the neoliberal bandwagon in their transition to a market 
economy (Chomsky 2003; Castells 2000, 2004). China, however, never adopted neoliberal 
policies per se, but developed its own mix of state capitalism and the free market – ‘a 
system of Leninist corporatism’ (Hutton 2007: 26). When the newly independent republics 
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 Structural adjustment programmes have been extensively analysed – for example, see Kilick (1995) and 
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995).  
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For the opposing view, which counters that the rise of regional and international trade organisations would 
eventually have strengthened the nation-state by reinforcing executive power and reinvigorating the rule of 
law, see Milward (1992) and Moravscik (1993).  
201
 There are other opinions too. Harvey (2005), for example, considers 1976 to be the year that marked the 
advent of neoliberalism in Britain. 
  
212 
of the former Yugoslav lands joined the trend, the neoliberalisation of Europe was finally 
accomplished.  
O’Brien and Williams (2007: 224) argue that neoliberal austerity policies have had 
devastating implications for the populations of developing countries – and on any country 
that has joined the neoliberal scheme. They state that many developing countries’ 
economies were smaller and more impoverished in the 1990s than in the 1980s, for which 
reason the 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade of development’ (O’Brien and 
Williams 2007: 224). Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, debt in many of the 
developing countries was so great that their governments had few resources to spare for 
social services or development. George (2007) argues that within twenty-five years the debt 
stocks of developing countries increased nearly five times, from $540 billion to $2,600 
billion, and further emphasises that over the same period these indebted countries had 
reimbursed their creditors almost ten times what they originally owed, so that by 2007 they 
were paying back $28,000 a minute in accrued interest. World Bank data (2010: 12) has 
corroborated this estimate of the increase in indebtedness of poor countries, which rose 
from $1,324 billion in 2007 to $1,373 billion in 2008, then to $1,459 billion in 2009. It still 
continues to rise, due to the unremitting pressure from creditors on national governments to 
adopt structural adjustment policies. With the debt crisis, countries in the developing world 
were ‘starved of international finance, [and] states had little choice but to open their 
[economies to] investors and trade’ (O’Brien and Williams 2003: 225).  
The financial markets have been identified as the major source of the vulnerability 
of developing countries, ‘exposing large swathes of their populations to sudden falls in real 
incomes and depressing national growth rates’ (Wade 2006: 47). Acemoğlu and Ziliboti 
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(1997), in their detailed study on the impact of financial markets on wealth enhancement, 
note that agents from poorer countries do not enjoy the same access to the financial markets 
as those from rich ones, augmenting the inequality between nations. They conclude that 
richer countries have better financial markets than poor countries, providing more 
opportunities to diversify and encouraging greater investment, which in turn makes them 
even richer (Acemoğlu and Ziliboti 1997: 709-751). The global integration of financial 
markets means that interest rates must move together as a unit in real time. Hence, 
Matsuyama (2003: 4) argues, when poor countries are hit by a setback on the financial 
markets, they are unable to offset this through changes in domestic interest rates. This 
creates a disadvantageous environment, and domestic investment in these countries 
declines, creating a downward spiral of low wealth/low investment. As Agnew and 
Corbridge (1995: 177-178) observe, ‘markets can defeat even the most concerted efforts by 
a government, or even groups of governments, to defend particular exchange rates and 
interest rates’.  
Generally, most studies agree that the poor are getting poorer and the rich richer,
202
 
and global output is smaller than in the Bretton Woods era. The trade output is small 
because most of the exchange transactions are speculative rather than trade or long-term 
exchange-driven transactions. Cook (2010: 356) suggests that when shortages and crises 
occur, this is not due to failure of the world’s productive capacity, but ‘the result of 
financial-system manipulation by the world’s richest people’. A case in point is the 
speculative trade on the food market index, where options and futures funds push the price 
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 There are alternative explanations, but this is not the focus of this study, nor is there space to air this 
discussion in this thesis. For more on this subject see, for example, Leidler (1981, 2008), Hoover (1984), 
Kindleberger (2006). For an excellent overview of the various interpretations of neoliberalism, see Chorev 
(2007). 
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of food up artificially, creating a demand that triggers scarcity of food supplies.
203
 The 
transactions are artificial because the trade in commodities can occur without an actual 
transactional exchange taking place. Instead, the speculators place ‘put’ or ‘call’ options, 
betting on the price going either up or down, and the prices generally follow these 
speculative generic evaluations.
204
 Consequently, not only are these assets worthless in real 
terms, but the speculative transactions are also based on the manipulated value the bets 
were ‘hedged’ at, creating an uncertain outcome for investors and putting them at a 
potential disadvantage. This practice is repudiated by Islamic doctrine, a point to bear in 
mind in the examination of the neo-Islamists’ response to neoliberalism later in the chapter. 
This type of deregulated market economy has had two immediate impacts: the de-
industrialisation of societies (Hudson 2010) and an increase in the wealth gap, not only 
between rich and poor countries, but also rich and poor individuals within the developed 
economies. This has a bearing on the discussion of the neo-Islamist embracement of 
neoliberal policies, because Islam denounces the concentration of wealth and adopts two 
significant economic measures to achieve equity of income distribution, as discussed in 
more detail in the next section. The wealth gap is due to income disparities and high 
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 For more on the concern over food prices and its impact on poverty, see World Bank Food Price Watch 
(February 2010).   
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 Speculative capital movements are at the heart of the neoliberal economic system. According to data 
compiled by the World Federation of Exchanges in 2010, 22.4 billion derivative contracts with a value 
estimated in trillions of dollars were traded on the global exchange markets – a massive 25 percent rise 
compared with the year before. World Bank data, published regularly online, shows this volume greatly 
exceeds the global value of trade in goods and services. Despite the official definition, which states that these 
are financial contracts that ‘derive’ their value from an underlying asset, exchange rate, interest level or 
market index, trade derivatives have no real depository assets. They are just financial instruments derived 
from the speculative evaluation of interest rates, credit default swaps (deregulated insurance premiums), 
equities, bonds and the commodity markets. Most of the time, the sellers do not possess the ‘goods’, but 
simply the ‘legal tender’ to handle them, and the money exists only on computer screens. A good illustration 
of this are prison bonds: according to Forbes’ Tax Investor, these are the safest ‘investment’, because it is a 
growing ‘industry’ based on securely incarcerated prisoners, who will remain so until the debt of the lease has 
matured sufficiently (Anderson [online] 2010).  
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unemployment rates, and poses a risk to social cohesion (OECD 2008). Studying the 
income distribution in the world’s richest countries in the 1990s, Robinson (1993: 64) has 
noted that the scale of the gap is very striking if the subject under scrutiny is not the income 
of rich and poor nations, but that of rich and poor people. Applying a theoretical model that 
explores the phenomenon of inequality and explains why inequality differs across 
countries, Benabou (1990: 96-129) observes that those nations that pursue broadly similar 
neoliberal restructuring policy programmes tend to have the highest inequality ratio.  
Weeks (2005) was commissioned by the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA) to measure trends in inequality, according to the Gini coefficient, in 
seventeen developed OECD countries. He observed two tendencies: firstly, the most 
striking trends towards inequality were demonstrated in four ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries (the 
US, UK, New Zealand and Australia), in which the Gini ratio was at its height during the 
1980s and 1990s when the neoliberal policy agenda was pursued most vigorously (Weeks 
2005: 8). Secondly, there was only an insignificant rise, or no rise at all, in the Gini 
coefficient of those countries whose governments had reduced levels of social protection 
associated with the welfare state but had not consistently adopted neoliberal policies 
(Weeks 2005: 9). In many developed neoliberal economies there was a tangible tendency 
for the wealth of the rich to rise sharply, accompanied by a meltdown of the middle classes 
(OECD 2008). This suggests that economic instability is inherent in neoliberal economic 
policies.  
Political policies that champion redistribution have come to seem like anachronisms 
as, under the corporate flag of the neoliberal market economy, governments around the 
world continue to pursue policies of privatisation and market liberation. The result has been 
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twofold: on the one hand, employment cuts, large reductions in public spending, the 
collapse of pension funds, scarcity of jobs and their replacement by part-time or flexible 
work; on the other, a steep rise in top executive salaries and the demand for ultra-luxury 
products.
205
 Neoliberalism engages in the practice of reducing the resources for 
consumption through either neglecting the development of the infrastructure or transferring 
it into private hands, rendering it susceptible to monopolisation. This is mainly due to the 
lack of broad political support for policies that restrict the concentration of wealth.    
The major impact of an economy organised in this way is the concentration of 
economic power due to the global character of accumulation (Burnham, P. 1994: 229). 
Robinson and Harris (2000: 11-30) argue that the mobility of capital and the global 
decentralisation of accumulation circuits have created a‘transnational capitalist class’, 
which controls global decision-making through international neoliberal establishments. 
Rothkopf (2008) similarly demonstrates that there is an increasingly internationalised 
‘superclass’ that has succeeded in monopolising the great majority of the world’s resources. 
It seems that the transfer and accumulation of wealth has been an ongoing process since the 
inception of capitalism, but that this has happened in stages. For example, in the 1940s, the 
British economist Rothschild, a relative of the well-known Rothschild banking family, 
discussed the tendency towards the concentration of economic power in the major 
international markets. He made the insightful observation that there was a predisposition 
for the growth of an elite group on a global scale: 
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To illustrate, in April 2007 workers across the Pacific, from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India to New 
Zealand, Fiji and Australia, united in a common protest over working conditions and inadequate payment. 
Meanwhile, Ford’s new CEO earned $39.1 million for four months of work in 2006. For more on this subject, 
see the World Socialist Web Site (2007). 
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The most violent aspects of the oligopolistic struggle are the attempts of the 
biggest oligopolistic groupings to regroup their forces on a world scale, and 
finally to strike out in order to change the world market situation in their 
favour. (Rothschild 1947: 318) 
Friedman (1999: 5-6) describes the concentration of wealth and unrivalled power of 
neoliberal ideology as a one-size-fits-all ‘Golden Straitjacket’, designed by the ‘Super-
empowered Individuals’ organised in the governmental ‘Electronic Herd’, where people’s 
political choices are reduced to those of either ‘Pepsi or Coke’. Islam has played a 
formative part in these developments. Before discussing the neo-Islamist response to the 
neoliberal ideology, however, it is important to explain the Islamic worldview in relation to 
the economy and society.  
 
5.3 The Islamic socio-economic worldview  
To speak of a significant Islamic contribution to the creation of a global neoliberal 
economic structure seems counterintuitive. Muslims, as much as anyone, are on the 
receiving end of neoliberal policies. In addition, the exclusive prerogatives of power and 
wealth concentration are, prima facie, incompatible with the Islamic world-view of 
tawhid
206
 and its higher purpose. Human beings are but God’s agents on earth, who have 
been assigned the role of enhancing life in all its aspects, whilst full sovereignty over life is 
entirely divine (Qur’an 6: 165, 2: 284). In the ideal Islamic vision, everything in the world 
exists for the benefit and welfare of all mankind. Hence, the fundamental principles of 
Islam focus on the establishment of a naturally just society, where everyone acknowledges 
their relationship with each other and behaves in a spirit of cooperation. The Prophet is 
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 The tawhid is the important Islamic principle of the ‘Oneness of God’. It stipulates that God is one (wahid) 
and unique (ahad). 
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reported to have said: ‘I am witness to the fact that all servants (of God) are brethren’, and 
he urged his followers to live accordingly. Muslims have an obligation to expound this 
Islamic world-view and implement the values of brotherhood, equality, justice and 
benevolence – the fard kifayah (Sidiqqui 1996: 8).  
The Islamic conscience is guided by a system of social ethics that prioritises the 
community (Ramadan 2001: 39). However, two mechanisms in particular are used to 
prevent the concentration of wealth and alleviate income disparities: the qard (loan) and the 
zakat (a ‘purifying’ social tax on wealth but not on revenue). A loan, according to Islam, is 
a charitable deed; almost all the verses in the Qur’an refer to ‘qard hasan’ as a medium 
through which to help fellow Muslims in distress. Similarly, almost all the Sunnah consider 
qard as a sadaqa (charity), and it is highly encouraged (Bukhari, Sahih III
207
: 335). 
Borrowing, on the other hand, is discouraged, and advocated only as a last resort to 
alleviate dire personal stress. The Prophet was reported to have prayed: ‘O Allah relieve me 
of debt and enrich me from poverty’ (Al-Muwatta 15: 8/27). To relieve a person from the 
burden of debt is considered an act of charity, in the same way as it is haram (a sin) to die 
in debt, leaving the repayment to coming generations. The Qur’an (2: 280) also demands 
that Muslims do not saddle debtors with any undue burden, but give them extra time in 
which to repay, or pardon the debt altogether. The qard mechanism was thus 
institutionalised to help those in need and was not intended to evolve into a commodity, 
subject to business transactions.   
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 Imam Bukhari (full name, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail bin Ibrahim bin al-Mughira al-Ja'fai) was 
born in 194 A.H (810) and died in 256 A.H (870). He collected more than 300,000 ahadeeth and his huge 
collection is considered to be of utmost importance. 
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Zakat is the third of the five pillars of Islam and is part of the essential, sacred act of 
worship. The books of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) place chapters on zakat immediately 
after those on prayer in the sections devoted to worship. In a uniquely comprehensive study 
of zakat, Al-Qardawi (1999: 536) comments that it is ‘an unbreakable bond of association’ 
and is known as ‘the sister of prayer’. Zakat is the cornerstone of social security in Islam, a 
way to narrow the gap between rich and poor by facilitating the equitable distribution of 
wealth. Garaudy (cited in Ramadan 2001) explains that the objective of fixing the rate of 
zakat at two-and-a-half percent per annum is to prevent the accumulation of wealth: 
This means that in 40 years (a generation) a private ‘property’ is entirely 
abolished and returned to the community (the social fund constituted by 
Zakat being consecrated to the needs of the community and to help the 
needy). Hence, no one can live an idle life solely [through] the inheritance of 
his family. (Garaudy, cited in Ramadan 2001: 149) 
 
This form of charitable giving has effects on three levels: on the spiritual level, it 
purifies an individual’s faith and elevates them closer to God; on the individual level, it 
cleanses their spiritual consciousness and places them on a higher moral plane, going 
‘beyond the mere material aspect to include the spiritual, psychological, moral, cultural and 
civic aspects of a person’s life’; and on the level of the community, it signifies social 
engagement, as the tax is levied for the benefit of mankind, ‘fostering solidarity and mutual 
cooperation among [the] members of Islamic society’ (Al-Qaradwi 1999: 550). Islam, 
therefore, tackles the problems of poverty and socio-economic disparity through legislation, 
social institutions and economic directives that have been put in place to achieve a just 
distribution of wealth and income:  
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Whatever [tribute] Allah gives to his Messenger from city dwellers belongs 
to Allah and to his Messenger and to near relatives and orphans and the very 
poor and travellers, so that it does not become something which merely 
circulates among the rich among you. (Qur’an 59: 7, translated by Tariq 
Ramadan 2001) 
In terms of business transactions, Islam repudiates the practices outlined in the 
previous section, because the medium of exchange in Islamic terms is based on qimar, 
gharar and riba. Qimar, literally translated, means to gamble. Islam’s disapproval of 
gambling is made clear in the following verse: 
O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] 
stone altars [to gods other than Allah] and divining arrows are but 
defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful. 
(Qur’an 5: 90, translated by Ibrahim Walk) 
 
Since most neoliberal financial transactions are pure speculation rather than the exchange 
of tangible goods and services, they are equivalent to the transactions involved in betting, 
which is unequivocally prohibited in the Qur’an. Islamic jurists and scholars are unanimous 
on this, and shar’iah law regards speculative trade as a prohibited practice.  
The Arabic word gharar
208
 is not the same as qimar (gambling) but is related to it. 
Gharar is adopted in Islamic finance to mean any transaction which is neither certain, due 
to lack of information on the item’s existence, nor transparent, due to either party lacking 
essential information concerning the transaction, nor probable, if there is doubt that either 
of the parties concerned would honour the contract. For a Muslim, there are two 
fundamental considerations when entering into a commercial exchange. The first is the 
adequate and accurate disclosure of all relevant information. This implies that the goods 
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 In a literal sense, gharar refers to deceit, fraud, uncertainty, danger, peril, delusion or hazard, leading to 
destruction or loss.  
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intended for sale are the lawful possession of the seller and they are present and available 
for inspection. Hence, the speculative trade in forwards, futures, options and index 
commodities would be rendered invalid because of the fact that the goods are not present at 
the time of the transaction. Moreover, most of these transactions are not transparent and the 
buyer/investor is not given full information concerning the products, the absence of which 
renders a trade susceptible to prohibition. The second consideration concerns lack of 
knowledge about the future benefits of the business transaction that would mean the 
buyer/investor is placed at a disadvantage. Islamic jurists unanimously distinguish between 
the normal element of risk involved in any business transaction and highly speculative 
deals, with unknown future benefits, which are prohibited in Islam. A classic example cited 
by Islamic jurists from all five schools of fiqh are insurance premiums, which carry a level 
of uncertainty that may trigger a prohibition based on gharar, because the claim may or 
may not occur. Insurance itself is not considered to be a valid medium for commercial 
exchange. In addition, insurance is maintained by riba (usury or excess), as it is funded by 
investments in the bond markets.  
Riba is the excess realised in a business transaction and is prohibited in Islam in all 
its forms. Generally, it is divided into two types: riba al-fadl (excessive surplus) and riba 
al-nasiah (excessive delay in payment). Riba al-fadl is usury or interest charged on a loan, 
a practice unanimously repudiated in Islam. Its prohibition is mentioned in a few places in 
the Qur’an, but is explicitly forbidden in the following four verses: 
O you who have attained to faith! Do not gorge yourselves on usury, 
doubling and re-doubling it – but remain conscious of God, so that you 
might attain to a happy state. (Qur’an 3: 130, translated by Muhammad 
Asad) 
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Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] 
except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is 
because they say, ‘Trade is [just] like interest.’ But Allah has permitted trade 
and has forbidden interest. So whoever has received an admonition from his 
Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But 
whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] – those are the companions 
of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein. (Qur’an 2: 275, translated by 
Ibrahim Walk) 
 
God deprives usurious gains of all blessing, whereas He blesses charitable 
deeds with manifold increase. And God does not love anyone who is 
stubbornly ingrate and persists in sinful ways. (Qur’an 2: 276, translated by 
Muhammad Asad) 
 
And what you give in usury, that it may increase upon the people’s wealth, 
increases not with God; but what you give in alms, desiring God’s Face, 
those they receive recompense manifold. (Qur’an 30: 39, translated by 
Arthur J. Arberry)  
 
Riba was considered sinful even to the extent that God and Muhammad declared war on 
those who did not wish to abandon the practice of charging interest: 
O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] 
of interest, if you should be believers. And if you do not, then be informed 
of a war [against you] from Allah and His Messenger. But if you repent, you 
may have your principal – [thus] you do no wrong, nor are you wronged. 
(Qur’an 2: 278-279, translated by Ibrahim Walk) 
 
Riba al-nasiah is a delay in kind or an artificial delay to the transaction that corrupts 
the nature of the business. It refers to an unjustified delay in ayn (possession) and dayn 
(non-possession/debt), since the basic principle in Islamic business transactions is that the 
goods and payments must be both present and exchanged at the time of transaction, unless 
the transaction is a loan mutually agreed between debtor and creditor. Imam Malik Al-
Mutawwa (93-179 CE) collected a great number of ahadith (the plural of hadith) in his 
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work, Al-Muwatta Book 31, that corroborate that a promise to pay a debt or a receipt that 
promises future payment for a transaction that has already taken place is riba al-nasiah and 
prohibited. Riba-al nasiah has been extensively studied by Vardillo (2004), who takes the 
stance that modern paper currency is nothing but debt, created out of thin air and existing 
merely on a computer screen, and not only falls into the category of gharar but is also 
dayn, because it is ‘a promise to pay the bearer on demand’. The commercial exchange is 
thus rendered invalid because the money is not in the seller’s possession.  
Issuing a promise to pay on a paper receipt also adds to the delay on a transaction, 
triggering the prohibition of riba. On this basis, Vardillo has produced two works, Fatwa 
on Paper Money (1991) and Fatwa on Banking (2006), both of which examine the rationale 
for disallowing paying zakat with paper money, using paper money as a medium of 
exchange in commercial transactions and dealing with banks in general, as they are nothing 
less than pillars of usury. On the other hand, the former grand mufti of Egypt, Muhammad 
Tantawy, proclaimed a fatwa (a legal pronouncement) in 1989 that describes some forms of 
financial interest as tolerable, such as those paid by government bonds and those on 
ordinary savings accounts (as narrated in Mallat 1996). The Hidaya Foundation’s website, 
amongst others, also offers instructions on the permitted percentage payable for zakat on 
stocks, options, trusts, pensions funds and an array of other speculative investments. This is 
illustrative of a deep rift among Muslims living and operating in the modern world, a 
conflict that has dogged the ummah since the demise of the Ottoman Empire .     
The concept of riba has posed a great challenge for Muslim jurists, scholars and 
religious leaders ever since the advent of capitalism, and most particularly at the time 
usurious practices were introduced into Muslims lands through the colonisation of the 
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former Ottoman territories in the early nineteenth century. Muslim scholars and jurists 
struggled to come to terms not only with interest-bearing institutions, but also with the non-
Muslim rulers of their countries, who instituted national legal norms. In response, an 
Islamic reformation began to emerge in the field of political economy throughout the 
Muslim world. It attempted to dispense with the fixity and finality of the traditional fiqh, 
reviving ijtihad,
209
 a call for independent thinking as opposed to the resort to taqlid 
(imitation) and slavish adherence to a particular school of thought. Leading reformers 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad ’Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida wanted to 
accommodate some of the forms of interest ingrained in the Western colonial system with 
Islamic principles (Homoud 1985: 115), while simultaneously promoting the pan-Islamic 
movement. Islamic rhetoric combined with non-Islamic principles was an important feature 
that was transferred from pan-Islamism to neo-Islamism, as illustrated later. Analysing the 
views of ’Abduh and Rida on riba, Saleh (1986: 29) suggests that they believed the first 
increase on a termed loan would be lawful, whereas any further increase in the event of a 
delayed maturity date was prohibited. Mallat (1988: 74), who studied ’Abduh’s and Rida’s 
views on the permissibility of charging interest, concludes that neither were comfortable 
with interest yielded on deposits, but were prepared to see it as a mudaraba, a special 
partnership operating at a pre-arranged profit ratio known to both buyer and the seller.  
These early reformers were extremely important as they represent the continuing 
bifurcation among Muslim scholars on the issue of Islamic finance, and specifically on the 
question of riba, an inevitable element of the capitalist neoliberal economy. One faction 
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 Since the tenth century, Sunni leaders have considered the apparatus of the figh as finalised. Thus, the 
gates of ijtihad (the new interpretation of the main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the Sunnah) were 
regarded by many jurists as closed. For more on ijtihad, see Khan (2006).  
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adheres to the ‘modernist movement’, in which Muslim scholars (Badawi 1964; Rahman 
1964; Ali 1975; Assad 1984; al-Najjar 1989; al-Namir 1989; Saeed 1999) promote the 
incorporation of Islamic principles into the debt-based, interest-charging economy. They 
find justification in four main arguments: firstly, the prohibition of interests on loans 
concerns individuals and not institutions, companies or governments; secondly, there is a 
semantic distinction between usury and interest; third, certain riba is permissible as it can 
be justified by a hadith in which the Prophet was recorded as paying his debts in excess, 
saying, ‘The best amongst the people is he who repays his debt in the best manner’ 
(Bukhari Sahih III: 339); and finally, Islam is not familiar with non-humanitarian loans, so 
in loan-operated economies, there is a need for Islamic bankers, financiers, scholars and 
jurists to re-interpret the rulings on riba in a more selective manner.  
A second group of scholars (Uzair 1973; Sadiqqi 1983; Chapra 1985; Ahmad 2000), 
however, belong to the ‘neo-revivalist movement’. They base their approach on exclusivist 
interpretations of Mawdudi and Qutb,
210
 totally refuting the permissibility of charging 
interest in Islamic business transactions of any shape or form. The debates on riba continue 
to occupy contemporary Muslim discussions. A case in point is the First International 
Conference on Riba, convened at Kuala Lumpur in November 2010. As previously 
mentioned, Malaysia pioneered the production of contemporary Islamic works on global 
economics, and established an alternative currency, the golden e-dinar, based on the Islamic 
principle of gold and silver coins.   
The Islamic mechanisms described above were put in place to create a just and 
equitable world. The presence of poverty, and the accumulation and concentration of 
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 For more on both these figures, see chapter two.  
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wealth in individual hands, are calamities that Islam does not tolerate. To eradicate these 
practices, Muslims are encouraged to work for their income and to gain self-sufficiency 
through their own efforts. Ramadan (2001: 228-230) states that Islam offers a holistic 
approach to life: it emphasises the presence of God, the absence of a clergy and the 
individual’s responsibility for their own actions, and raises awareness of the individual’s 
relationship with God and the sacred dimension of the universe in the harmony of 
rabbaniyya (attaining the Hereafter through knowledge of the Divine).
211
   
However, the Qur’an also warns that ‘people are prone to selfish greed’ (Qur’an 4: 
128, translated by Arthur J. Arberry), and that ‘man is ever niggardly’ (Qur’an 17: 100, 
translated by Arthur J. Arberry). The socio-economic state of a wide spectrum of Muslim 
countries mirrors these verses, as the practices incorporated in Muslims’ everyday lives do 
not necessarily conform to the fundamental principles of Islam. Major Islamic players, such 
as the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, act without moral scruple, disrespecting sacred Islamic 
practices (Ramadan 2001: 136). The norms of governance of the majority of Muslim rulers, 
with a few exceptions, has incapacitated Islamic development, and many Muslim societies 
remain stultified by memories of former golden times, locked into archaic local traditions 
mixed with imperfect interpretations of the Qur’an. Neo-Islamism has thus merged with 
neoliberalism.   
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 The individual is wholly accountable for their deeds and actions, which should always testify to the divine 
presence. This contemplative view must be constantly renewed in the struggle against the habit to neglect the 
omnipresence of rabbaniyya, ‘which consists of placing action in a permanent [relationship] with the 
remembrance of the Divine ordinances’ (Ramadan 2001: 80). To illustrate the sovereign dimension of divine 
authority and individual duty, Muslim scholars generally rely on the following verse: ‘Surely in the creation 
of the heaven and earth and in alternation of night and day there are signs for men possessed of minds who 
remember God, standing and sitting, and on their sides, and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and earth: 
“Our Lord, Thou hast not created this for vanity. Glory be to Thee! Guard us against the chastisement of the 
Fire’” (Qur’an 3: 190-191).  
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5.4 The Islamic response to neoliberalism 
The origins of neoliberal policies in the Muslim world date back to the era of oil wealthe 
and the ‘oil crisis’ in the 1970s, the birth of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and 
the subsequent rise of neo-Islamism. During this period, three milestones triggered a new 
framework for the Islamic ummah and shaped its development, under the patronage of King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The first reason was the newfound Saudi wealth, which stemmed 
from oil production and its export to the West, and particularly to the US, with whom it 
built a strong relationship,
212
 the second was the death of the Egyptian president, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, in 1970, and the third, the burning of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Israeli-
occupied Jerusalem.  
President Nasser, a co-founder with Tito and Nehru of the Non-Aligned 
Movement,
213
 was regarded as a champion of the Third World’s struggle against Western 
colonialism. For scholars who opposed the idea of neutrality, he was perceived as the 
Muslim leader responsible for the newly independent Islamic states, from Algeria to 
Indonesia, embracing ‘his brand of nationalism, secularism and socialism’ (Warde 2000: 
90). Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were the Arab focal points of the Cold War, and they 
were sucked in as proxies of the two opposing ideological enemies. While Saudi Arabia 
advocated the doctrines of capitalism, using its control of the pan-Islamic movement, the 
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 US companies have been allowed to prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia since May 1933.  
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 The Non-Aligned Movement was established by a conference convened in Belgrade in September 1961, 
largely on the initiative of Yugoslavia’s President Tito. The movement wanted to remain independent of the 
Soviet bloc and its state-run society, but it did not want to unite with the imperialist West, as it was very 
critical of Western colonialism. The movement’s administration was, and still remains, non-hierarchical, 
rotational and inclusive, providing all member states, regardless of size and importance, with an opportunity 
to participate in global decision-making and world politics. The movement was especially popular during the 
1970s and 1980s, but with the end of the Cold War and with the prevailing capitalist hegemony, it lost its 
voice, and its member states were taken over by neoliberal structural adjustment programmes. For more on 
the Non-Aligned Movement, visit http://www.nam.gov.za.  
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Muslim World League and the pilgrimage to Mecca to reinforce its ties with other Islamic 
leaders, Egypt under Nasser promoted the struggle against colonialism both inside and 
outside the Arab world, without reference to religion. To undermine Nasser’s message of 
Arab and Third-World solidarity, Faisal therefore portrayed himself as a zealous patron of 
Islamic solidarity (Mortimer 1982: 170-188). The dramatic Egyptian losses during the war 
in Yemen, and its subsequent defeat in the 1967 six-day war with Israel, became common 
justifications for the claims, fuelled by Saudi Arabia, that the Arabs had been punished for 
straying from the true path of Islam (Mortimer 1982: 178).  
When, in 1969, the Al-Aqsa mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem was set on fire, it 
presented Faisal with the pretext to call for the wider unity of the Islamic ummah. Under his 
auspices, the Islamic Summit was convened in Morocco, out of which the permanent 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was born the following year,
214
 the same 
year that Nasser died. The absence of his major opponent, coupled with the Saudis’ 
enormous oil wealth, left Faisal unchallenged. He was able to unleash his version of the 
Islamic response to the changing political arena. The availability of large disposable sums 
of money from Saudi Arabia, and lack of any other viable political option, persuaded 
otherwise secular Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan, to introduce the theme of 
Islamic solidarity into their foreign policies. They hoped to provide manpower for the 
Islamic cause in return for cash (Mortimer 1982: 218). On a strategic level, however, both 
countries had their own political agendas.  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president of Pakistan and zealous supporter of the Islamic 
cause, hoped to succeed in exporting ‘Islamic socialism’ to the network of supranational 
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Islamic institutions, in order to achieve his motto of ‘food, clothing and shelter’.215 The 
raison d’être of the Islamic state is to cover these basic needs so as to free the individual to 
worship, contemplate and work to attain spiritual development. The Turkish concern, 
however, was with the growing power of an increasingly militant left. The Turkish Workers 
Party had taken fifteen seats in parliament in 1965 (Rustow, cited in Herper and Evin 1994: 
3-12). ‘As the left’s power grew in the 1970s, the state backed both hard-right nationalist 
vigilantes and Islamist groups against them’ (Tugal 2007: 9). Through a combination of 
Islamic rhetoric and concessions to, and increasingly open support for, pro-Islamic parties, 
the Turkish state was able to prevent the spread of the ‘socialist virus’.    
When Nasser died, he was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who immediately embarked 
on a policy of ‘de-Nasserisation’, which included distancing Egypt from the Soviet Union 
by expelling Soviet advisers, abandoning socialism and implementing the policy of infitah 
or ‘open door’ – that is, ‘opening the door’ to foreign capital, allowing it to purchase 
Egyptian assets. The generous patronage of King Faisal resulted in lavish financial 
assistance, and the two countries embarked on an era of close cooperation (Warde 2000: 
92). In order to derail the protests of the growing working class and leftist opposition 
movements, Sadat employed a rhetoric full of de-contextualised Islamic references and 
euphemistic slogans, such as ‘Islam is the solution’, designed to soothe rather than offer a 
viable remedy. It worked, as it often appears to do, the previous Turkish example being a 
case in point. 
                                                 
215
 For more information, see www.bhutto.org, a website dedicated to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom many 
considered a martyr (shaheed). 
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Muslim countries incorporated into the neoliberal system were forced to adopt 
privatisation policies, the main prerequisite for membership of the neoliberal club and 
access to the funds necessary for industrial development. Saudi Arabia, however, was not 
obliged by the same conditionality, and was therefore able to nationalise its oil company. 
Some scholars, Warde (2000) for example, praise this successful nationalisation in the 
midst of a global privatisation campaign and booming oil revenues. The rationale behind 
the move was that Saudi Arabia being an absolutist monarchy, which claims possession of 
all the assets in its country, nationalisation – in absolutist terms – is in fact privatisation.216  
The oil prices rose during the Ramadan or Yom Kippur war
217
 in October 1973, 
quadrupling over the course of a few months. Sadat decided to use the Israeli and American 
dependence on oil as a weapon against them, and maintained the high price of petrol 
(Yergin 2001: 595). The Shah of Iran adopted the same policy, considering it to be 
consistent with the rules and logic of the free market, and professing concern about the 
West’s overconsumption of oil in an economic environment of high inflation and a falling 
dollar (Lenczowski 1980: 214). During this period, the balance of power between oil 
producers and consumers shifted. The former were enriched by huge oil revenues and 
gained greater control over energy policy, which enabled them to gradually nationalise their 
oil industries, transforming the foreign oil companies into hired service providers (Yergin 
1991: 563-587). In this respect, Muslim countries regained their strength through the 
transfer of oil wealth – the largest transfer of wealth in the whole of the twentieth 
                                                 
216
 Aramco was a US-Saudi joint-owned company, which was brought under Saudi control – that is, it passed 
into the hands of the Saudi monarchy.  
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 The OPEC countries raised oil prices by up to 400 percent. However, according to some scholars, this was 
orchestrated by the bankers and neoliberal governments, particularly in the US and UK (Oppenheim 1977). 
For an interesting account of the 1970s’ ‘oil crisis’ and price rises, see Marshall (2009). 
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century.
218
 This promised a new relationship between ‘Islam and the West’, and the 
potential for Islamic solidarity in formulating policies vis-à-vis the West and rising oil 
revenues.  
During the oil bonanza, the oil-producing Muslim countries gained large amounts of 
hard currency that needed to be reinvested. Because the increase in petro-dollars challenged 
their economies’ capacity to absorb such large sums, this presented itself as a ‘problem’ 
(Saeed 1999). According to Ali (1986), the money was spent in three main ways: buying 
Western consumer goods, military hardware and industrial equipment; investing in 
development projects at home and abroad; and lending money to countries without oil. 
Indeed, the non-oil-exporting countries, who were mainly poor countries from the South, 
many of them Muslim, needed money to procure oil. Islamic obligations would suggest that 
the exchange between the two would be made in the most ingenuous and mutually 
beneficial way. In a sense, this is what happened, but with the difference that the oil-
producing countries did not recycle the money directly but employed intermediaries: 
private banks in London and New York. The wealthy petro-monarchies in the Gulf invited 
Western bankers to administer their disposable hard currency in the form of loans that 
incurred interest rates, a practice unequivocally repudiated by Islamic law. All the pious 
Islamic references recited by a chorus of Muslim leaders, their official ulama and 
subservient media belied the codes they really followed.  
By divorcing the fundamental Islamic principles from their context, these so-called 
‘Muslim’ rulers ‘offered a weapon of absolute force to banks’ (George 2005), and thus 
                                                 
218
 For a good analysis of this question, see Chomsky (1995) and also Ramadan (2001). 
 
  
232 
were complicit in trapping poorer Muslim countries into a cycle of permanent indebtedness, 
as discussed earlier in the chapter. Algeria gives an exemplary illustration of this pattern: 
by 1990 it had an external debt of over $24 billion, and service payments were regularly 
absorbing more than half of all its export earnings (Howe 1992). The Saudi offer of loans 
via the banks prevented the creation of a different model of economic relations that might 
be Islamic but would offer advantages to both parties. By creating colonial-style 
dependence, perpetually accruable interest placed both the poor countries and the oil-
producing ones in an unfavourable situation. Ramadan (2001: 137) criticises the way 
Islamic finance was conducted, calling it hypocritical, because scattered references to the 
glory of Islam disguised disreputable financial practices. Warde (2000: 90), on the other 
hand, claims that Islamic principles were firmly embedded within these Western banking 
practices, and it was precisely ‘this new global economy which has emerged with the end of 
the Cold War [that] has allowed Islamic banking to thrive’.  
Many scholars recognise that oil revenues did help create a network of Islamic 
banks around the Middle East (Sidiqqi 2000; Ahmad, Iqbal and Khan 1983). Yet, analysis 
of the Islamicity of these banks reveals that they remained Islamic in name only (Saeed 
1999). The high-risk involvement and profit-and-loss-sharing ratio that are essential 
elements of Islamic finance, and of any Islamic business transaction, simply could not be 
accommodated in the low-risk, high-return neoliberal economic model based on debt. 
Moreover, banks are usury-operating institutions that completely depend on the system of 
interest rates for their existence. The religious body that supervises Islamic banks, 
therefore, was required to conduct their neo-Islamisation in order to incorporate them into 
the neoliberal economy. To ensure that this move would be generally accepted, selected 
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scholars were called upon to supply its intellectual groundwork, a practice adopted from the 
proponents of neoliberalism (see section one of the chapter). Warde (2000: 93), for 
example, describes private property as ‘an economic pillar … that Islam shields against 
arbitrary confiscation of the state’, in order to emphasise Islamic commitment to free 
enterprise and private property. Yet, he simultaneously praises the Saudi state’s 
confiscation of the privately owned oil refineries (Warde 2000: 98). However, even if the 
transfer of ownership was only nominal, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
Saudi royal family is still worthy of Islamic critique. Similarly, in 1992-93 the Sudanese 
minister of the economy, a disciple of Milton Friedman and a former London banker, 
decided to implement the harshest of free-market remedies dictated by the IMF. He claimed 
he was committed to transforming the heretofore statist economy ‘according to free-market 
rules, because this is how an Islamic economy should function’ (Miller 1996: 144) – a 
prime example of straightforward opportunism wrapped in the flag of Islam.  
Warde also attempts to justify the Saudi decision to maintain low oil prices in the 
wake of the 1973 ‘oil shock’, despite the fact that it missed an opportunity to break the 
political deadlock and achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth according to Islamic 
principles of social justice : ‘It was sparsely populated and did not need all the additional 
income’ (Warde 2000: 94, my italics). He also states that Saudi Arabia, along with the other 
Gulf states, was heavily invested in international markets, and economically and militarily 
dependant on the US. The fact of their increasing reliance on Western protection seems to 
be part of a scholarly consensus (Chaudhry 1997: 7). However, these states’ neo-Islamist 
elites required protection not against external opponents – by the late 1970s Muslim 
countries were in the main already incorporated into the established system, each with their 
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own neo-Islamist ruler – but against the dissatisfied masses at home, who were increasingly 
susceptible to socialist ideas coming from Russia and revolutionary messages from Iran. 
Hence, the ruling petro-monarchies significantly increased their purchase of Western 
weapons (Mortimer 1982: 180). These were to be used in defence of the Islamic ummah 
and the ‘People of the Christian Book’, preserving the ‘free world’ against the atheist 
menace of the ‘communist infidels’. Indoctrinated Islamic ‘freedom fighters’, or 
mujahideens, were dispatched to Afghanistan on a mission of jihad to fight the Russian 
occupying forces. Meanwhile, the Saudi monarchy chose to further invest its newfound 
wealth in US treasury bonds and place most of its deposits in American banks (Lenczowski 
1980: 609). The fact that these are usury-earning establishments seems not to have bothered 
the official guardian of the two most sacred mosques in Islam.  
To ensure an uninterrupted exchange of cash and petroleum between the two 
ideological partners, the Shah of Iran bolstered the oil markets by keeping prices as high as 
possible. In return, he was given a blank cheque to indulge in a lavish shopping spree, 
purchasing Western commodities, from weapons through to the most luxurious consumer 
items. The agreement lasted until the second ‘oil shock’ of 1979, when the Iranian 
Revolution, triggered by the economic upheaval, overthrew the Shah’s regime. As they 
enjoyed the status of Western protégés, the Shah and his trusted followers found refuge in 
the ‘free world’ of Western Europe. The same year, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Saudi 
Arabia, together with Pakistan’s General Zia, provided ‘Islamic martyrs’ to defend the Dar-
ul-Islam against the ‘heathens’. Fearing that Iran’s anti-imperialist revolution held an 
electrifying example for its own impoverished population, Saudi Arabia called upon 
President Carter to deliver the following threatening message: 
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Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (Carter 1979) 
 
As the Saudis were especially apprehensive about the revolutionary message coming from 
their major regional rival, they took steps to ensure that their neo-Islamist demagogic 
rhetoric was spread throughout the Muslim world. In Pakistan, Bhutto was hanged, having 
been found guilty by Pakistan’s Supreme Court of authorising the killing of a government 
opponent. He was succeeded by General Zia, infamous for establishing one of the most 
violent and oppressive regimes in the region, which he institutionalised through his version 
of shari’a law. His Western allies turned a blind eye to his despotism, as in the words of 
Lewis (2004),  
[I]t is not the West’s business to correct them, still less to change them, but 
merely to ensure that the despots are friendly rather than hostile to Western 
interests. (Lewis 2004: 91) 
A military coup d’état in Turkey in 1980, prompted by the proximity of Soviet-
occupied Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, violently suppressed the increasingly 
influential left-wing movements and embarked on ‘three years of state terror, during which 
executions, torture and imprisonment effected a permanent alteration in the political 
landscape’ (Tugal 2007: 9). Coups, as opposed to revolutions, are the preferred method for 
replacing disobedient regimes (Lewis 2004: 92-93); their results are predictable and usually 
more desirable, leaving room for the installation of a more cooperative dictator. The 
Turkish military dictatorship encouraged the Islamist parties, and the definition of the 
secular Turkish national identity in its 1982 constitution contained unprecedented 
references to Islam (Tugal 2007: 9) With the left effectively decimated, and the Islamists 
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appeased with carefully planned concessions, the military coup had ‘rendered neoliberal 
reform possible’ (Tugal 2007: 12).  
Meanwhile, President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in 1981; the indications were 
he was preparing to withdraw his obedience to Saudi-defined Islamic socio-economic 
concepts. He was replaced by Hosni Mubarak, whose son was subsequently groomed to 
inherit the presidential pedestal (Smiley 2007: 90), a safer way of transferring government 
‘than fac[ing] the unpredictable hazards of regime change, especially of a change brought 
about by the will of the people expressed in a free election’ (Lewis 2004: 91). Meanwhile, 
in 1982 Saudi Arabia, having secured backing from its Islamist-secularist Turkish 
neighbour, sponsored the intifada of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, in an attempt to 
overthrow its ‘heathen communist’ regime and return its people to the true Islamic path. 
The uprising, however, was brutally crushed, with huge loss of life; the Syrian army 
flattened entire village with tanks, and hundreds of ‘brothers in Islam’ were imprisoned. 
Those who managed to escape, with the help of the Western foreign agents who had 
sponsored the intifada, fled to Europe, notably to the UK, France and Germany, where they 
enjoyed the protection of political asylum. Even though the intifada was extinguished, and 
with it the secret foreign operations,
219
 the uprising had seriously affected the Syrian 
economy, hampering its future growth. However, the leaders of other Muslim countries, 
from Morocco to Indonesia, with very few exceptions, gave their blessing to the neoliberal 
system, in the name of Islam. It is only after decades of misery and spiralling debt, that 
people are now starting to demand what is rightfully theirs – better living standards, justice 
and a share in their nations’ resources.  
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 I incidentally met one of the rebels’ sons in London via my Bosnian friends’ network. He said that his 
father was saved at the last moment by the French embassy, which sent him to safety in Germany. 
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5.5 Conclusion: the symbiosis between neo-Islamists and neoliberals 
With the regard to the research question, this chapter detailed the construction of Neo-
Islamism. Although  it might at first appear to be unrelated, the success of the neoliberal 
doctrine was sustained by the neo-Islamists. As illustrated above, the two seemingly 
opposed ideologies are in fact complementary, having far more in common than meets the 
eye. In both East and West, the attention of a media-saturated public is directed away from 
pressing social and economic problems towards allegedly inimical ideological beliefs. The 
fact that both feed on each other goes unreported for the most part. It often seems as if the 
neo-Islamists have ‘effectively conspired with the Western media and their Enlightenment 
rhetoric to create a culture war that perpetuates itself from one event to the next’ (Luticken 
2007: 107). There was a brief period in the 1970s that raised Muslims’ hopes of 
constructing an independent, just and ethical economic system, based on the values of 
Islam and in tune with the contemporary world. However, it soon became obvious that the 
‘transnational capitalist’ alliance is difficult to thwart. Institutionalised corruption and 
inefficiency has crippled various Muslim countries and caused them to deviate from Islamic 
principles. Islamic banks and credit institutions have been plagued by scandals. These 
institutions, established with the rise of neoliberalism, were Islamic insofar as they 
functioned according to the principle of participation in risk and not according to the 
guarantee of interest, but not in terms of the moral obligations prescribed by Islam. They 
played on the credulity of their customers and helped spread the doctrine of a liberal free-
market economy.    
Muslim countries, with the exception of Malaysia, have embraced the neoliberal 
policies of controlling wages, curtailing unions, imposing austerity, encouraging the 
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concentration of wealth amongst an elite and ensuring the unequal distribution of income. 
In all of these practices, they have bowed before institutional trinity of the IMF, World 
Bank and WTO. Due to the recipe of excessive market liberalisation, many countries 
plunged into severe debt. Aggressive privatisation programmes have pushed governments 
to change policy, and even to resort to disseminating misleading information. A case in 
point is Turkey’s AK Party, whose policies are presented with an Islamic veneer. For 
example, it has undertaken the task of forest privatisation, claiming it would only sell off 
tracts that had lost their ‘quality’ as forests. Real-estate speculators, however, describe how 
‘there were 829 fires in the first seven months of 2003, which scorched 1,775 hectares of 
forest, qualifying them fit for privatisation’ (Tugal 2007: 21).   
The absence of any supreme judicial body that could achieve consensus on 
economic principles based on Islamic values has seemingly created confusion. While it 
may be an advantage in terms of giving each country the freedom to adapt its system 
according to specific cultural demands, it also leaves room for a variety of 
misinterpretations. The neoliberal doctrine promotes speculative practices, facilitated by 
government policies that encourage the growth of a debt economy and the deregulation of 
financial markets that allow government bonds to float freely, accruing interest. This is not 
how an Islamic economy should function. Shari’a law explicitly forbids the corrupt 
practices of qimar (speculation), gharar (delayed exchange) and riba (usury).  
The distortion of shari’a by neo-Islamists, and the introduction of the malpractices 
of speculative economic transactions, social oppression and the mistreatment of women 
should not be associated with the Islamic model. Likewise, the harsh consequences of 
neoliberal structural adjustment programmes should not be confused with the good 
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governance of a functioning democracy. The neoliberals remain in power because they 
have curtailed trade union movements, facilitated future profits through market 
liberalisation and, by means of the multiplying laws against terrorism, limited the civil 
liberties of their own citizens.
220
 The neo-Islamists remain in power through repression and 
advocating submission, coupled with their adherence to a neoliberal theocracy and the 
disenchantment with the very religion they invoke. Neoliberalsm and neo-Islamism are two 
sides of the same coin – on the face of it, one side may appear more attractive than the 
other, but the value of the coin nonetheless remains the same. Admittedly, members of 
neoliberal societies enjoy a better life, but this is due to the laws of evolution: they began 
from an unequal position. For the West, neoliberalism was the next step for a well-
developed, post-industrial capitalist region; for Muslim countries, neo-Islamism represented 
an enormous transformation at a time when they were still grappling with the legacy of 
colonialism.  
Once the neo-Islamists had adopted the neoliberal economic programme, it was 
possible to export the model to other parts of the world. The first step for Western 
neoliberals was to identify local allies. Yugoslavia was a target for a number of reasons: it 
was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement; it adhered to anti-colonial policies; 
its economy was organised according to socialist distributive principles; it was secular; and 
Tito, the Yugoslav president, was a good friend and supporter of Nasser. Moreover, it was 
the last remaining country in Europe that was not completely incorporated into the global 
neoliberal system. Structural adjustment policies were insufficient, however, and the neo-
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Islamists’ assistance was essential. During the 1970s, Yugoslavia experienced its own 
Islamic revival. After decades of religious persecution, Islam entered a progressive period 
in Yugoslavia. Bosnian Muslims, who gained political and national recognition, lived 
through an exceptionally prosperous time. The next chapter deals with this period and the 
question of the Islamic rebirth of the 1970s, and analyses events preceding the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, including the arrest of a group accused of infiltrating Islamism into 
Yugoslavia. It also analyses the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the international 
response to the conflict.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ROLE OF NEO-ISLAM IN THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
This chapter deals with the international aspect of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, analysing joint 
Western and neo-Islamist involvement in the conflict. The purpose of the chapter is to 
assess whether neo-Islamism construction shaped the events and responses of Bosnian 
leaders in the 1990s. It examines events, which, despite their significant impact on the 
international community’s choice of resolution for the Bosnian crisis, have been widely 
neglected in the available literature (outlined in chapter one). One of the subjects this 
chapter investigates is the resilient Western view of an apparently united Muslim 
community, working towards the common goal of the ummah. This is taken to be the 
rationale underlying any political actions on the part of Muslims and those who support 
them. Although deeply flawed, this approach persists in its failure to acknowledge that 
Muslim forces can be as brutal towards each other as those of its rival ideologies. This 
chapter is particularly significant because it represents a culmination of the observations 
made in the previous chapters, pointing to the repetition of internal Bosnian disputes that 
have kept Bosnia and Herzegovina in the position of an international protectorate.  
 The focus of the chapter is the Western and neo-Islamist penetrations over the two 
decades preceding the Bosnian war, as well as during the conflict. To facilitate a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the success of neo-Islamist influence, the first section 
examines the political position of Bosnian Muslims in the 1970s. One of the areas analysed 
in this section, which bears particular relevance for the thesis as a whole, is the relationship 
between Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Muslim states. Section two deals with the first neo-
Islamist infiltration into Yugoslavia, recounting the events immediately preceding the war. 
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The original tape transcripts from the Sarajevo city archives are examined in more details in 
this section through the analysis of the neo-Islamist influences in the event known as 
‘Sarajevo Process’. Section three assesses the efforts of international mediators and their 
intelligence networks to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnically. Section four examines 
the power of the neo-Islamist groups by analysing Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a prime example 
of a feud fought by proxies on the Bosnian stage. Section five describes the way clandestine 
operations contributed to the neo-Islamisation of the conflict, and section six concludes that 
the infiltration of neo-Islamist networks in post-Tito Yugoslavia was not part of a natural 
process, whereby Yugoslav Muslims attempted to come to terms with modernity, but an 
imported phenomenon that ultimately led to the break-up of the country and the partitioning 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to the derogation of the Bosnian Muslims themselves. 
 
6.1 The rationale behind the Islamic renaissance of the 1970s  
‘It is good that you have taken strict measures against the inflammatory activities of some 
clerical groups’ (Tito, cited in Tanasković 2000: 24). President Tito uttered these words of 
encouragement to a political delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising its most 
influential political cadres, during a visit to Bugojno, a town in central-western Bosnia, on 
Yugoslavia’s ‘Nation Day’. ‘If necessary,’ he continued, ‘those attempts should be rooted 
out with the strictest measures. Nobody can [hold] it against you’ (Tito, cited in Tanasković 
2000: 24). When Tito delivered this speech on the 25 November 1979, he was referring to 
the preceding decade, which had witnessed a rise in pan-Islamic voices throughout Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
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The 1970s and 1980s featured the remarkable but ambiguous political development 
of the Bosnian Muslims, which held two apparent contradictions. Bosnian Muslims, for the 
first time since the nation-building process of the nineteenth century, were recognised as a 
separate nation and given constitutional rights, making them equal to the other Yugoslav 
peoples. As detailed in chapter four, they were designated as ‘Muslims’, a religious title 
that was, nevertheless, supposed to represent the purely secular notion of their newly 
attained national status. The concept of the ‘Muslim nation’ was carefully designed to 
include only Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo.221 Indeed, 
Bosniaks were, for the most part, assimilated into secular society and looked to their 
Islamic heritage for their traditions and values rather than religious dogma (Bringa, cited in 
Shtazmiller 2002: 24-34). They were often declared as more educated, liberal and 
cosmopolitan than other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Goodwin 2006; Simms 
2001; Hadžiselimović 2007). 
 However, in contrast to this process of secularisation, the same period witnessed a 
type of Islamic renaissance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent, other parts of 
Yugoslavia. It manifested itself in the reconstruction of mosques, increased religious 
education and a considerable number of Islamic publications (Karčić 1997: 570-574). The 
Islamic Religious Community began to distribute literature of general Islamic concern, as 
well as manuscripts in Arabic dealing with contemporary issues in the Arab Muslim world. 
Between 1969 and 1983, up to three thousand Yugoslav, mainly Bosnian, Muslims 
performed the annual hajj pilgrimage (Friedman 1996: 189-191). The social and economic 
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 Izetbegović reiterated this notion of a ‘Muslim nation’ when he expressed his concern for ‘all three million 
Muslims’. This figure equated to the number of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak (a province in 
the south of Serbia), and Kosovo (one of the two autonomous provinces of former Yugoslavia), but excluded 
many Albanian, Macedonian and other Yugoslav Muslims (Doder 1993:s 13).  
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position of members of the Islamic community had significantly improved. In 1977 the 
head of the Islamic community, the re’is ul-ulema, proclaimed:   
The material position of our religious employees has never been better. All 
imams are covered by health, pension and invalidity insurance. A large 
number of very beautiful mosques have been built – there are more than 500. 
(cited in Impact International 1997: 14) 
 
 Hundreds of new or renovated mosques and masjids were opened, to service the religious 
practices that until then had been suppressed and confined to the privacy of people’s homes 
(Karčić 1999a: 546). It was the first time since the Ottoman era that new mosques were 
built and long-forgotten masjids and tekkes
222
 refurbished.  
The mosques were ready to accommodate new Islamic cadres – many of the 
Bosnian Muslim students who had gone abroad to the Middle East, North Africa and Asia 
to pursue Islamic studies returned home to spread their newly acquired knowledge,
223
 some 
bringing with them an echo of international neo-Islamist doctrines. At the same time, 
institutions of Islamic education were established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Gazi 
Husrevbeg madrasah
224
 in Sarajevo opened its girls’ division in 1977 (Karčić 1999a: 546), 
and the faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo was founded in order to resume the tradition 
of Islamic higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had ceased after the Second 
World War. The faculty is the oldest, largest and possibly most prestigious Islamic 
educational institution in south-east Europe. By the end of the 1970s, Yugoslavia was the 
only European country that could boast an Islamic theological school, three thousand 
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 Masjid are smaller mosques, and a tekke is a place of worship for the members of the tasawwuf tariqats 
(Sufi orders).  
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 For example, in 1978, over 150 Yugoslav Muslim students pursued their Islamic education abroad. For 
more figures, see Smajlović (1978: 562).  
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 The Islamic high school bears the name of the founder of Sarajevo, Gazi Husrevbeg.  
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mosques and several Islamic middle schools, as well as a number of Muslim periodicals 
(Ivanković 1984: 14).  
The reason for this Islamic renaissance can be explained by two events that emerged 
coincidentally on the global and the local level. As previously discussed in chapter one, the 
Yugoslav Communist Party had considered Muslims to be a separate ethnic group since its 
1937 political declaration on the issue, but it was unable to grant them more rights until the 
nationalist Serb and Croat factions disappeared from the political scene in the late 1960s. 
On the international level, these changes coincided with the proliferation of neo-Islamist 
networks. The state authorities endeavoured to curtail their influence by granting more 
religious and political freedoms to Bosnian Muslims. Funding for the rash of rebuilding and 
refurbishment of Islamic places of worship and education derived almost entirely from the 
federal Yugoslav budget and the League of Communists from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
225
 
The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant contributor to the budget of 
the Islamic Religious Community (Hadžijahić, Traljić and Šukrić 1977: 163). More than 
half the cost of restoring the Gazi Husrevbeg mosque was absorbed by the Sarajevo local 
government and the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Burg and 
Shoup 1999: 47). The League of Communists from Bosnia and Herzegovina also 
subsidised the dissemination and preparation of manuscripts of interest to the Islamic 
community in Arabic, Persian and Turkish (Kamberović 2003).  
 
The availability of international Islamic literature, coupled with the annual hajj 
pilgrimage, acquainted Bosnian Muslims with the experiences of Muslims abroad. This is 
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significant as the same period witnessed the rise of neo-Islamism in other Muslim 
countries. It is further noteworthy because these contacts enabled Bosniaks to compare their 
far better living standards and liberal political environment with those of Muslims in other 
countries.
226
 Another channel of information about the external Muslim world was the 
practice of international student exchange. International students
227
 were commonplace in 
Yugoslavia because Tito practiced an open, independent foreign policy, beholden to neither 
the Soviet nor the capitalist bloc.
228
 As Tito was known, historically, as the founder of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia became an attractive destination for many students 
from other non-aligned countries, which were mainly majority-Muslim states (Tanasković 
2000: 20-24).
229
 Tito’s warm relations with these Muslim states was the driving force 
behind the greater political acknowledgement of Bosnian Muslims and their enhanced 
position in the Yugoslav polity, as well as the main culprit behind the subsequent spread of 
Islamist tendencies amongst certain segments of the Bosniak population.  
Tito’s ties to Muslim countries abroad, and his personal patronage and 
encouragement of the Muslim population in Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnian Muslims, 
have dominated debates amongst scholars, policymakers and the general public for a 
number of years. The relationship has been a source of many inspired hypotheses. This 
debate gained greater prominence in light of the victimisation of Bosnian Muslims, as well 
as their subsequent Islamisation that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The 
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 I personally know a few people who were exchange students to Bosnia in the 1980s, and who recounted 
their experiences to me. I also had the opportunity to be a Bosnian student in Turkey a decade later. During 
this period, I travelled extensively in the Middle East, and was astonished to find that, even then, Muslim 
youth in Turkey and some Arab countries suffered from low living standards and an illiberal atmosphere.     
227
 From predominantly developing countries.  
228
 In 1948 Tito gave a historic ‘No’ to Stalin and officially broke away from the Soviet grip. For more 
discussion on Yugoslavia’s international position and domestic arrangements, see chapter one.  
229
 Tito founded the Non-Aligned Movement with Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Gamal Abdel Nasser of 
Egypt.  
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elevated and relatively protected position of Muslims in Yugoslavia during Tito’s lifetime 
was often contrasted with their degradation after his death, the massacres committed during 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a federal state, and the tacit acceptance of this slaughter 
by the ‘international community’.230 Many Yugoslav Muslims, especially the Islamic 
Community of Kosovo, support the theory that Tito was a crypto-Muslim, believing this 
was the reason behind his inclination towards a resolution of the ‘Muslim question’ in 
Yugoslavia. As proof, they cite a book written by Ertuğrul, a Turkish author and Islamic 
publicist, called Kendini Arayan Adam (The Man in Search for Himself), which alleges that 
Tito, at the end, confessed his Muslim faith. The evidence the author uses is a letter written 
by Salih Gökkaya, president of the Turkish Communist Youth Organisation, who visited 
Tito in Belgrade in the months before his death. During this visit, Tito is cited as confessing 
his belief in ‘God, the Prophet and the Ahiret [the world after death]’ (Ertuğrul 2005: 105). 
Furthermore, Tito curtailed Serb and Croat claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina by making it 
a separate republic within the Yugoslav federation in 1943. In return, the Bosnian Muslims 
were always the most ‘Titoist’ of ‘Titoists’. Even today, after the war, there is a coffee shop 
in the former Museum of Antifascist Revolution in Sarajevo that is called ‘Tito’, which is 
apparently one of the favourite venues for Bosnian youth.
231
  
There have been other scholarly attempts to explain the rationale behind the 
elevation of Muslims to the status of a nation and the endorsement of an Islamic revival in 
Yugoslavia. In general, scholars consider the advancement of Tito’s foreign policy and his 
quest for dominance within the Non-Aligned Movement as a credible reason for his interest 
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 The international aspect of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is discussed 
in more detail in the chapter seven.  
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 For examples on modern Bosnian ‘Titoism’, see Bećirbašić (2008: 30-31).    
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in the fortunes of Bosnian Muslims. For example, Friedman (1996: 188-189) asserts that 
Tito was trying to woo Muslim leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement, using the ‘status of 
his own Muslims’, in order to increase his popularity as a leader and advance his foreign 
policy goals. She further claims that by elevating the status of Yugoslav Muslims, Tito 
attempted to endear Yugoslavia to Middle Eastern and North African Arab states so as to 
persuade them to support him against Fidel Castro, who was trying to dominate and 
radicalise the the Non-Aligned Movement (Friedman 1996: 167). Cviić (1980: 110) 
maintains that, in order to further Yugoslavia’s foreign policy aims, Tito would always 
include a Muslim representative from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the delegation 
despatched to a Muslim country, and when Muslim foreign leaders paid a visit to 
Yugoslavia, Tito would host them in Sarajevo. Meanwhile, Bringa (2002: 32) argues that 
the Islamic revival, as well as the cultural and national elevation of Bosnian Muslims, was 
due to Tito’s extensive cooperation with the non-aligned Muslim countries, particularly the 
oil-producing ones, while Stanković (1983: 3) states that Tito ‘cleverly used his Muslims’ 
to his own advantage by acting as if Yugoslavia were ‘the second-strongest Moslem [sic] 
country in Europe, after Turkey’. However, Hunt (2004: 3) claims that Tito established the 
Islamic Theological University with the view to nurturing the compatibility of Bosnian 
Islams with the West.  
While the arguments above appear persuasive explanations, they appear less 
plausible when subject to closer scrutiny. For example, none of the leaders of the non-
aligned Muslim countries that Tito was associated with formally possessed a religiously 
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oriented foreign policy.
232
 On the contrary, these countries were socialist, more or less 
independent, and led by decidedly non-aligned political elites with secular policies. 
Furthermore, the Islamic revival in Yugoslavia occurred at the moment when the socialist 
non-aligned countries were facing internal problems, with the proliferation of neo-Islamist 
movements instigated by Saudi Arabia with a view to overthrowing the ‘heathen 
communists’.233 The context and timing of the Islamic revival suggests that these leaders, in 
contrast to the claims made above, would be less than impressed with a  reinvigoration of 
Islam in Yugoslavia at a time when they were attempting to purge their countries of neo-
Islamist networks. In relation to Hunt’s argument that Tito was concerned with the  
promotion of a brand of tolerant Yugoslav Islam to the West, it is important to point out 
two facts that nullify such a claim. Firstly, until the recent war, Bosnian Muslims were little 
known in international circles, especially in the West. For example, in The New 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, published as late as 1987 (1047, 1057), Bosniaks were 
ommitted from the map featuring the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia, and were 
mentioned only marginally, under the entry for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bringa (2002: 25) 
reveals that when she started her research into the Bosniaks in the early 1980s, she found 
astonishingly little information, and what she did discover proved ‘at best contradictory and 
at worst misleading’. This suggests that Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina was of too little 
significance, as far as the West was concerned, for Tito to expend much effort on its 
promotion.
234
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 For example, Egypt under Nasser, Syria under Hafez al-Assad, the father of the incumbent Syrian 
president. The exception to this rule was Libya, but Gadafi was outside the neo-Islamist sphere and was 
considered an ‘Islamic socialist.’  
233
 See chapter five. 
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 Tito enjoyed a relatively amicable relationship with the West, and had no reason to try and prove himself 
to any Western leader.  
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Furthermore, the establishment of the Theological University in Sarajevo coincided 
with the rise of neo-Islamist networks around the world under the patronage of Saudi 
Arabia. As mentioned earlier, Bosniaks began to be exposed to the neo-Islamist trends in 
the wider Muslim world through their contacts as either students or as pilgrims. Tanasković 
(2000: 21) observes that Muslim students who graduated from the madrasah left in large 
numbers for the Islamic universities of the Middle East and Asia because the resources for 
training and educating future Islamic religious leaders in Yugoslavia, and by implication in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, were non-existent prior to 1977 (Ceranić, cited in Frid 1971: 29). 
Even when the faculty was established, its educational capacity remained somewhat weak. 
Consequently, even in 1978, over one hundred and fifty Muslim students from Yugoslavia 
were pursuing Islamic studies abroad (Smajlović 1978: 562). There were also reports that 
some Bosnian Muslim youth, returning from their studies in the Muslim lands, ‘had ceased 
being communist’ and were dedicated to destroying communism (Stanković 1983: 2-3).  
By the 1980s, neo-Islamists had consolidated their political power in a number of 
countries and had developed a neo-Islamist network comprising an array of organisations. 
Having spent many years in the Muslim world, the Bosnian students who returned were 
naturally influenced by the prevalent neo-Islamist atmosphere of the countries where they 
studied.
235
 It is interesting to note, however, that rather than capitalising on the elevated 
situation of the Muslim population back home, the students seem to have embraced 
international Islamist ideas. Cvitković (cited in Burg and Shoup 1999: 2), executive 
secretary of the Presidium of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Central Committee, claimed there 
were about three hundred returning Bosnian Muslim students preaching Islamist ideas at 
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 Many students did not return, but remained in the countries in which they studied to serve as translators for 
Yugoslav enterprises (Burg and Shoup 1999: 33).  
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the time, and they were part of a transnational Islamist network. The neo-Islamist groups 
mainly used students to advance their political vision and ideology and, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, their prime targets were the non-aligned socialist countries that had not 
succumbed to the neoliberal regime.  
By 1980, Yugoslavia was one of the last pillars of independent self-managed 
socialism in the region (as discussed earlier in chapter one). In this respect, it served as a 
prime target for both neoliberals and neo-Islamists. Neoliberalism did not have much 
success in penetrating Yugoslavia, and the knock-on effects of the global austerity 
measures imposed upon Third World countries during the 1970s were domestically 
insignificant. On the contrary, in Yugoslavia, the decade was marked by industrial growth 
and the development of coal and hydro-electric resources (Singleton and Carter 1982: 250). 
In fact, it was not until 1982 that Yugoslavia succumbed to the loan-economy, securing its 
second loan from the IMF on the usual conditions of trade liberalisation and institutional 
austerity (Woodward 1995: 52). The first loan had been taken out in 1979 to balance the 
trade deficit (Hudson 2003: 59), but it had had less significant repercussions upon the 
economy. Neoliberalism only materialised in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, and emerged 
predominantly as the result of political skirmishes between supporters of self-managed 
socialism and advocates of market-oriented liberalism. Some scholars claim it was this 
fundamental rift between opposing domestic ideologies that opened the way for 
internationally operated centrifugal forces to initiate the the break-up of Yugoslavia 
(Johnstone 2003; Hudson 2003; Parenti 2002). In this respect, a discussion on 
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neoliberalism in Yugoslavia during the 1980s would be limited, if not insignificant, since at 
that time it met with little success.
236
  
If neoliberalism was a late-comer to Yugoslavia, neo-Islamism was not; it appeared 
to be more efficient in spreading its dogma across the country. Thus, the neoliberal, neo-
Islamist analysis above lends support to the conclusion that Tito did not encourage an 
Islamic revival because he wished to impress his non-aligned Muslim peers by the elevated 
status of ‘his’ Muslims, nor to convince his Western counterparts that Yugoslavia bred a 
more occidentally compatible brand of Islam. The liberalisation of the ‘Muslim question’ 
and the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims appear to have been part of a strategic 
manoeuvre to curtail neo-Islamist penetration; the neo-Islamists were seen as a Trojan 
horse that could potentially lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia as an entity. For example, 
after the Islamic Theological University was established, it was placed under the patronage 
of the Islamic Religious Community, which was in turn closely monitored by the 
Communist Party leadership and infiltrated by agents from the department of intelligence 
(Bešlić 2003; Spahić 2004). However, despite these efforts, neo-Islamists did succeed in 
infiltrating the country, as will be seen in the next section. 
 
6.2 Neo-Islamism in Yugoslavia, 1970-90 
In 1975, Branko Mikulić, president of the Federation of Communists of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, wrote to Tito informing him of the existence in Bosnia and Herzegovina of a 
                                                 
236
 Analyses of the phenomemon have been made by, for example, Fyson, Malapanis and Silberman (1993), 
Woodward (1995), Hudson (2003) and Johnstone (2003), with the focus on the few years immediately 
preceding the war of the 1990s, because it is only then that neoliberal repercussions can be discerned.  
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group of ‘Muslim nationalists’.237 Even though the group referred to was a far cry from a 
neo-Islamist network, and was simply demanding a more fair representation of the part 
Muslim partisans played in eastern Bosnia during the Second World War, they were subject 
to draconian measures, due to the fear of Islamist penetration and the potential spread of 
imported neo-Islamism amongst Bosnian Muslims.
238
 The most prominent campaigners for 
the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims, and for the elevation of the status of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were concerned that the activities of the proponents of so-
called ‘Islamic clericalism’ or ‘Islamic nationalism’ were specifically dangerous for the 
position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concern was of equal gravity for Bosnian 
Muslims, Serbs and Croats who considered Bosnia and Herzegovina their home. The 
events of the 1992-95 conflict proved their fears to be justified.  
When the influence of the neo-Islamists increased during the 1980s, after the death 
of Tito, the Bosnian leadership launched a major purge, investigating several hundred 
people. They based their suspicions on a report entitled, ‘Political Islam in International 
Movements’, distributed by the intelligence unit of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for 
Foreign Affairs (City of Sarajevo Archives, 16 September 1983).
239
 The title and content of 
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 In the former Yugoslavia, ‘Muslim nationalism’ was equated with Islamic fundamentalism or so-called 
‘clerical nationalism’. The original of the letter can be found in the Sarajevo city archives (Central Committee 
of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President’s Office, Classified. No 03-39/1-
75, Sarajevo, 14 February 1975). 
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 The group was led by Pašaga Mandžić, a member of the partisan antifascist movement. See the records of 
the 43
rd
 meeting of the Extended Executive Committee of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the 
Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place on the 14 February 1975 (City of 
Sarajevo Archives, The Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
The President’s Office). 
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 ‘Political Islam in International Movements’ (the Yugoslav Communist Alliance, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Alliance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission for International Affairs and Co-
operation with Labour and Progressive Movements in the World, Classified No. 01./1- 11/3-83, Sarajevo 
District Committee Archives SK Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: September 16, 1983). The report was 
submitted on 23 September 1983, and classified under # 02/4-7-3. 
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the report were indicative of the Yugoslav government’s weariness of the heightened 
attention directed towards Muslims in Yugoslavia, and the possibility that external forces 
could attempt to influence domestic Muslim affairs. The report pointed to the OIC 
conference in Niger in August 1982, which had adopted a resolution committing it to 
research and examine the position of Muslims in countries that were not members of the 
OIC, referring in particular to the Muslims in Yugoslavia (that is, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo). Simultaneously, OIC consultations on the targets of 
‘political Islam’ were held in Cairo, focusing on Islam in Yugoslavia. These concluded that 
the dissemination of Islam in Yugoslavia would facilitate closer contacts with the Muslim 
minority in the Balkans and Western European countries. The distribution of these reports 
launched the political saga known as ‘Sarajevo Process’, which I explain in more details 
below. 
6.2.1 ‘Sarajevo Process’ 
On the 23 March 1983, members of the national security service of the Secretariat of 
Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina indicted thirteen people for 
spreading Islamic fundamentalism and attempting to create ‘an ethnically pure Muslim 
state in Yugoslavia’ (Stanković 1983: 1; Izetbegović 2001: 39-50).240 This is important to 
mention because, during the 1992-95 Bosnian war and its aftermath, the leadership was 
accused of covertly working to establish a Muslim state. It is of further significance that all 
thirteen were members of Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims), an Islamist organisation 
formed in 1939 on the model of the Muslim Brotherhood that had strong ties with the grand 
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 The following were arrested: Alija Izetbegović, Omer Behmen, Hasan Čengić, Ismet Kasumagić, Edhem 
Bičakćić, Rušid Prguda, Salih Behmen, Mustafa Spahić, Husein Živalj, Džemal Latić, Melika Salihbegović, 
Derviš Đurđević and Đula Bičakčić. 
  
255 
mufti of Jerusalem, Amin Al-Husseini.
241 Among those indicted was Alija Izetbegović, who 
later became the president of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hasan Čengić, his 
chief aide and a major link in the covert supply of money and weapons during the Bosnian 
war. 
 Following the arrests, the presidency of the Central Committee of the Federation 
of the Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina convened a meeting. The most prominent 
members of the Bosnian leadership, comprising Muslims, Serbs and Croats, took part 
(transcripts from the City of Sarajevo Archives, 8 April 1983).
242
 The meeting was chaired 
by Hamdija Pozderac, the Bosnian Muslim politician who did the most for the recognition 
of Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation. It may seem surprising to find a prominent 
Bosnian politician, who was a Muslim and a devoted campaigner and advocate of the 
Muslim position, chairing a panel that voiced its concern about so-called ‘Muslim 
intellectuals’. Using Sarajevo’s archival documents, it is possible to reconstruct the 
activities of the neo-Islamist group and their main targets, as well as the major concerns of 
the Bosnian authorities. The most striking objective of the group seemed to be the 
destabilisation of Yugoslavia through the erosion of the policies of ‘brotherhood and unity’, 
in which Bosnia and Herzegovina played an important role, as discussed extensively in 
chapter one. Hamdija Pozderac accused the group of making demands for ‘an ethnically 
clean Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempts to organise an Islamic state as a way of 
expressing a moral concept of the religion’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.2: 2). He 
further claimed that with the aim to Islamise Bosnia and Herzegovina and create an Islamic 
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 Haj Amin Al-Husseini was known to be a Nazi supporter.  
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 The meeting took place on the 8 April 1983 and the audio transcripts can be found in the Sarajevo city 
archives (32
nd
 Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Federation of the Communists of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, City of Sarajevo Archives).  
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state, the group was well intertwined with the international intelligence networks via which 
links they maintained an informed liaison of the politico-social trends in the external 
Muslim world’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.2: 2). Hamdija Pozdrerac reiterated 
that the group’s long-term goal was to ethnically cleanse Bosnia and Herzegovina and seize 
control of the Islamic Religious Community in order to form an Islamic state in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This observation is very relevant for this thesis because it highlights neo-
Islamist intentions that became a reality during the 1992-95 Bosnian conflict and its 
aftermath.
243
  
 
  Views of Hamdija Pozderac were underpinned by the report of the Minister for 
Police, Duško Zgonjanin, himself a Bosnian Serb. He presented a detailed account about 
the covert operations of various groups who worked diligently and covertly on dismantling 
Yugoslavia and eroding the inter-ethnic relations (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.4: 
2).
244 The Minister also revealed that this particular group was connected to the 
international operative centres in Riyadh, Istanbul and Vienna as well as collaborated with 
the anti-communistic émigré networks exiled in the West. He concluded in his report that 
the group was working on the ‘politicisation of religious life, seizing the control of the 
Islamic Religious Community with the aim to establish an Islamic state on the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.5: 3).  Savo Čečur, a 
Bosnian Serb and the President of the Legislature, reasoned that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
represented a multi-ethnic core of Yugoslavia and that ‘destabilisation of Bosnia and 
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 The group took power over the Islamic Religious Community through a ‘coup’ against the more moderate 
faction in 1993. For the full story, see Peranić (1994). It also conducted the Islamisation of the Bosnian army 
and state (Bougarel 1999) during the conflict and its aftermath, as discussed in chapter one. 
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 Minister of Police pointed out that the State Security Service discovered and foiled the anti-state attack 
operations of fifteen groups, which size varied from three to fifteen members. The groups were of various 
nationalistic affiliations whose primary aim was political destabilisation of Yugoslavia. 
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Herzegovina due to its multi-ethnic character would represent the greatest factor in 
destabilisation of Yugoslavia’ (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.7: 3). Raif Dizdareviċ, 
another Bosnian Muslim and the Chairman of Federal Assembly, characterized this 
particular group as a very different from the groups previously foiled in that it had supreme 
organisation, clearly designed political platform and political aim as well as support and 
connection with the foreign operative centers (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.19: 2)245 
He further noted that the available information indicated an organised activity designed to 
undermine the fundamental pillars of the Yugoslav system, ‘pointing to an orchestrated 
political subversion’(City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.21: 3). Branko Mikuliċ, a 
prominent Bosnian campaigner and a Bosnian Croat, was also convinced that the aim of the 
group was incrimination of inter-ethnic relations by ‘eroding the brotherhood and unity’ 
(City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.22: 5). To confirm this allegation he ordered 
investigation into all available scientific and political literature dealing with the spread of 
Islam (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No.14: 2).
  Hrvoje Ištuk, a Bosnian Croat who was 
a Secretary of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, argued that this 
group differed in its approach to the political platform from the extremist and nationalistic 
groups in that showed no signs of impatience, but rather nurtured a long-term aim, which 
was the concept of Islamisation within the context of a long-term activity (City of Sarajevo 
Archives, 1983, No.11: 4-5).
 
This observation is most interesting as Neo-Islamisation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued with the accelerated vigour through the 1992-95 
war and its aftermath dispite the efforts to curtail it, showing no sign it will abate in the 
foreseeable future. 
                                                 
245
 Between 1982-1983 he was a Chairman of the Assembly, He was also Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Yugoslavia between 1984 - 1988, as well as the Chairman of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia 1988 – 
1989. 
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The evidence submitted by the participants of the meeting reveals that the group 
enjoyed generous support from transnational neo-Islamist networks. These allegations are 
significant because they show that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationalised 
from the outset. Bosnia and Herzegovina became victim of a conflict between the 
geostrategic interests of various states and their agents, as characterised by the heavy 
presence of foreign intelligence networks on her territory.   
 
 As a result, the group stood trial. This took place behind closed doors, in order to 
prevent the further involvement of foreign operatives (City of Sarajevo Archives, 1983, No. 
6: 4). The Chief Public Prosecutor, Edina Rešidović, read out the indictment for treasonable 
activities against the state, and on the 18 July 1983 there began a saga that is remembered 
as the ‘Sarajevo Process.’ The indictment was based on Articles 114 and 133 of the 
Criminal Code of Socialist Yugoslavia: ‘association with a view to undermining the 
constitutional order,’ and ‘verbal delict.’ According to it, the group was charged with 
conducting anti-state Islamist activities posing a counter-revolutionary threat to the social 
order in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was claimed that their aims were 
contained in the ‘Islamic Declaration’, which appeared in a pamphlet called, A Programme 
for the Islamisation of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, whose author is believed to be 
Izetbegović (Izetbegović 1990).246 Since the early stages of the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, this document has been quoted on numerous occasions to either defend or 
condemn it; hence, it would be tedious to repeat overused citations. However, what has 
been arguably less emphasised is the fact that this political manifesto, in many respects, 
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resembled the platforms of neo-Islamists elsewhere. It was written in 1970, when neo-
Islamist seeds were being planted all around those countries controlled by ‘heathen 
communists’.  
 
The pamphlet, however, was created as a theocratic-political appeal directed not 
only at its immediate constituency, but also at Muslims around the world. Its contents 
appeared to be similar to that of numerous other pamphlets and manifestos commonplace in 
neo-Islamist circles at the time. Interestingly, it was written at a time when Izetbegoviċ was 
often travelling between Belgrade and Sarajevo to visit his friend, al-Hassanein, a member 
of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. A director of the Third World Relief Agency 
(TWRA), a Saudi-financed charity used for covert arms supply, al-Hassanein’s contribution 
to the neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was of prime importance. Avdić (2009: 
7), an investigative journalist, asserts that the ‘Islamic Declaration’ was the ‘preposterous 
folly of foreign Islamists’ to which ‘Izetbegović “courageously” put his signature’.  
It is rather obscure how the document itself came to be in circulation, and the 
evidence concerning this is anecdotal. The wide range of literature that liberally cites the 
manifesto does not appear to be interested in the origins of the document, nor in the 
international political trends at the time of its writing.
247
As far as the evidence suggests, 
however, it was not widely available. The general public was informed of its contents 
through extensive media coverage that unanimously condemned the group’s attempted 
subversion (Presidential Archives, 1983, No. 30-49). The evidence suggests that the public 
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 The literature does not explain either why there was a thirteen-year gap between publication of the work 
and the trial. One reasons is perhaps that, after the Tito’s death, the forces actively attempting to weaken 
Yugoslavia were at their height.  
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was generally appalled by the entire incident, and was astonished and perplexed by the 
group’s anti-state activities, offering the accused neither sympathy nor support.248  
However, it seemed that the group did enjoy significant support from neo-Islamist 
governments and organisations in the Middle East, Asia and the US. They used the trial as 
an excuse to demonise the Yugoslav communist regime. For instance, the Association for 
the Support to the Muslim Minorities in Eastern Europe in Pakistan, and later the Pakistani 
government itself, sent a note to the Yugoslav embassy in Islamabad entitled, ‘The New 
Terror Campaign against the Muslims in Yugoslavia’, in which they accused the Yugoslav 
government of discrimination against Muslims (Archives of the Republican Commission 
for International Affairs, 7 July 1983).
249
 A similar protest was presented by the Islamic 
Society in Florida, which published material related to the trial in both English and Arabic, 
accusing the regime of planning the extermination of Muslims. Alleged mistreatment of 
Muslims compelled the Egyptian media to call for greater help from the Muslim world to 
their Yugoslav brethren, and, to restore Bosnian Muslim spirituality, Saudi Arabia offered a 
donation for the repair of the Gazi Husrevbeg Mosque.
250
 This international campaign is 
significant in that its use of the so-called plight of Bosnian Muslims to instigate a 
vilification of the communist regime was similar to the tactics it deployed in the post-Cold 
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 Friends and members of my family who remember the ‘Sarajevo Process’ report being at a loss as to how 
to comprehend the actions of the group. They were unable to grasp why some Muslims, albeit peripheral 
ones, were dissatisfied with their position in Yugoslavia. This was especially so in the light of Muslim 
national recognition, after almost a century of struggle. 
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 Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Herzegovina, Republički Komitet za odnose sa inostranstvom [The 
Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republican Commission for International Relations], 
Classified No. 94-387, Sarajevo, 7 July 1983.  
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 Apparently, there were no strings attached to this donation. However, the government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as the Islamic Religious Community, refused the offer. For more on this incident, see 
the notes of the conversation between Dr Ahmed Smajlović, the president of the elders of the Islamic 
Religious Community, and Milan Vučićević, the president of the executive committee for relations with the 
religious bodies (The Archives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Executive Assembly, 
Commission for Inter-Faith Relations, Classified No. 055-70/83, Sarajevo, 16 May 1983).  
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War environment to radicalise Muslims worldwide whilst simultaneously spreading 
neoliberal economic reforms. Critical analysis confirms that the politicisation of Islam and 
its utilisation for neoliberal purposes formed the essence of neo-Islamism, which was 
striving for absolute power and demanded absolute submission to the neoliberal theocracy. 
After the trial, sentences ranging from six months to fourteen years were 
pronounced – a total of eighty-nine years in prison.251 Serb nationalists facilitated the early 
release of the members of this group, enabling them to compete for the Bosnian presidential 
chair soon after leaving their prison cells. In 1986 the Serbian Assembly for Freedom of 
Thought and Expression, led by Dobrica Ćosić,252 initiated a petition for the release of the 
‘Muslim intellectuals’ from detention. To help their Muslims counterparts, twenty-three 
‘Serbian intellectuals’ requested parole for the imprisoned neo-Islamists in a letter to the 
Yugoslav Presidium, describing the trial as a monstrous hoax that had been orchestrated to 
mislead the public and to incriminate those in favour of free speech.
253
 In addition, 
members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) organised a banquet for the 
family members of the convicted group, in order to discuss ‘future Serb-Muslim relations 
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 Izetbegović was convicted to fourteen years in prison, later reduced to six. The other Young Muslims also 
had their sentences reduced. For details on the length of the sentences and the judiciary process for the request 
for a pardon, see Danilović (2006: 226-231). 
252
 Dobrica Ćosić was the first president of the rump Yugoslavia from 1992-93. He is considered to be the 
ideological father of the infamous Memorandum SANU of 1986, a Serbian nationalist manifesto thought to be 
responsible for inciting ethnic intolerance and persecution. Evidence of the authorship of the memorandum is 
anecdotal, as the document was written and signed by the members of the Serbian Academy of Science and 
Arts (SANU), and it remains unclear who exactly claimed ownership of its contents and how it was leaked to 
the public. It remained unfinished, but it is considered to be a driving force behind the rise of Serbian 
nationalism in the late 1980s, as its composition is charged with nationalistic rhetoric and it outlines an 
ethnically based national programme (Memorandum Srpske Akademije Nauka i Umetnosti 1989: 128-163). 
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 See Danilović (2006: 228). By contrast to the pro-Muslim campaign in the 1980s, all the signatories ran a 
fierce anti-Muslim campaign preceding and during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Paradoxically, they accused 
Izetbegović of Islamic fundamentalism, the very reason why he was placed in prison.  
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in a New Yugoslavia’.254 As soon as the group was released, Ćosić not only received them 
at his grand house, but also organised the first publication of the ‘Islamic Declaration’ by a 
Belgrade publishing house owned by Šešelj (Borogovac 1995: 23; Stojić 2004: 16-17). 
During the 1992-95 war, Šešelj became a hard-core Serbian ultra-nationalist, and is now 
facing charges of war crimes at The Hague.  
The interest of the Serb nationalists in the Sarajevo Process
255
 and the plight of the 
accused is suggestive of the trajectories of both parties. Serb nationalists used the group’s 
Islamist rhetoric as a reason to promote Bosnian Serb secession from an increasingly 
‘Islamic Bosnia’, claiming they would otherwise become either dhimmies (a minority under 
the protection of the Qur’an) or converts. The second, related reason, which they used when 
attempting to justify the crimes they committed against civilians, was the ploy that they 
were ‘defending’ Europe against Islamic penetration.256 On the other hand, the Serb 
nationalists’ ‘martyrdom’ propaganda propelled the Muslim group from the margins of 
society and endowed them with the image of credible and worthy leaders of the Bosniaks at 
the moment when the socialist system was crumbling and there were no real alternatives for 
the succession to the Bosniak political leadership. When the released members of the 
Muslim group seized power, they capitalised on the myth of alleged Muslim victimisation 
during the communist period, citing it as a major point of reference for Muslims suffering 
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 According to the account of Halid Čengić, the father of Hasan Čengić, the dinner was organised at the 
house of one of the SANU members. Ćosić sat next to Izetbegović’s daughter, Lejla Akšamija. They 
discussed the ‘new Yugoslavia’ in the New World Order, a Yugoslavia which seemingly would be without 
Croats and Slovenes. Izetbegović later talked about his friendship with Ćosić. It is unclear why they could not 
capitalise on their good relations to find an amicable alternative to war. For more on Halid Čengić’s story, see 
Halilović (1998: 80). 
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 Munir Alibabić, a chief investigator during the process, stated that he was shocked to have discovered so 
much information in relation to the trial to the Young Muslims at the museum in Pančevo. He said that the 
prosecutors did not have this amount of information at their disposal at the time.  
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 Counting on the European bias against Islam, the common justification was ‘saving Europe from Islamic 
attack’. For an abundance of articles on this topic, see the website http://www.serbianna.com/columns/. 
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under the ‘heathen’ regime.257 It was time for a change, they claimed, and religion was thus 
turned into an institutionalised asset, as with all other forms of cultural life in a neoliberal 
setting. The neoliberalisation of Yugoslavia commenced, and was further endorsed through 
the adoption of a loan economy and reduction of state welfare, as discussed in chapters one 
and five. These neoliberal policies remained in place up to the outbreak of the Yugoslav 
crisis.  
The  neo-Islamist group, augmented by those who opportunistically switched sides 
from the communists, was allowed to found the first non-communist political party, a 
Muslim one – a move that would previously have warranted a minimum of ten years in 
prison.
258
 The subsequent electoral campaign of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 
which the neo-Islamists organised with the help of Serb nationalists, who also claimed to be 
‘victims’ of the communist regime, added weight to their legitimacy amongst the 
population; they managed to win the great majority of Muslim votes at the first multiparty 
elections in 1990.
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 The attack on Hamdija Pozderac and Branko Mikulić continued with the famous ‘Agrokomerc affair’. 
Fikret Abdić, the director of this exceptionally productive socialist enterprise, ended up in prison because of 
his alleged use of unsupported credits – a practice that was, in fact, widespread at the time among Yugoslav 
enterprises. This political process, orchestrated by the Serb nationalists and supported by the media, produced 
the desired results. Pozderac, Bosnia’s most important leader, who had done the most for the elevation of the 
status of Bosnian Muslims, and who was also a member of the Yugoslav federal presidency and next in line to 
become its president, was forced to resign, and died soon after. With his resignation, communists, especially 
Muslim ones, lost their credibility among the Bosniak population, and their place was taken by the SDA. 
258 
In addition, the parliament had to manage the ethnic post-communist reality of the region and, in its efforts 
not to exacerbate ethnic tensions, passed a law forbidding the establishment of parties under a nationalist 
pretext. The republic’s constitutional court overruled the prohibition imposed by the law of April 1990 
(Pavković 1997: 113). 
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 The first multiparty elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina with two rounds of votes in November 
and December 1990. The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) won 86 seats in the parliament, the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS) won 44, and 33 seats were allocated to the members of the Croatian Democratic 
Party (HDZ) (Nizich 1993: 16).  
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 The dissolution of Yugoslavia could now begin: the Serb nationalists offered 
support to the Yugoslav People’s Army, positioning itself in the hills around Sarajevo; the 
international community emphasised the conclusions of the Badinter Commission
260
 and 
advised the adoption of a divisive ethnic roadmap; and the SDA elite prepared themselves 
for the neo-Islamisation of those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they agreed with 
their Serb and Croat counterparts would fall under their control.  
 
6.3 War and the Great Powers’ negotiated settlement for the protectorate of 
‘Bosnistan’ 
When, in early December 1990, the nationalist parties won the largest number of seats in 
the first multiparty election, they started negotiating the ethnic division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
261
 The first such plan of division was the Lisbon Agreement, also known as 
Cutileiro Plan, which carefully chosen SDA delegates signed with their Serb and Croat 
nationalist counterparts before the Bosnian war began in February 1992.
262
 Even though the 
ethnic partition was warranted by the signatures of all three nationalist parties, in essence 
nothing would have changed because the population would have been as mixed as ever.  
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 A commission set up by the European Union to evaluate the situation in Yugoslavia on the eve of its 
break-up. For a critique of the Badinter Commission, see Johnstone (2003: 36-40). 
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 According to the statement of Alija Delimustafić, minister of the interior during the war, which he gave at 
the war-crimes trial of of Momčilo Mandić (his counterpart from the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska) at 
The Hague, the internal division of Bosnia and Herzegovina had already begun before the war, with the 
mutual agreement of Izetbegović and Karadžić. For more on this subject, see Mijatović (2007: 18-22).  
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 This was the first-known publically announced proposal to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was 
named after the Portuguese diplomat who presided, on behalf of the European Union, over the negotiations on 
Bosnia’s constitutional re-organisation, conducted in Sarajevo, Lisbon and Brussels between 13 February and 
27 May 1992. The plan proposed Bosnia’s division into three ethnic ghettoes: Muslim, Serb and Croat. The 
‘Muslim canton’, as these gettoes were to be called, was supposed to contain a 56.5 percent majority-Muslim 
population; the Serb canton, in which Serbs would have a 61.5 percent majority, and the Croat canton, with a 
65.7 percent Croat majority. For more on these figures, see Velikonja (2003: 238). For an overview of the 
Cuteliero Plan, see Hodge (2006: 28-29).  
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Colonel Stewart (1994: 64), a British army officer, observes that when he found 
himself in villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he realised that it would be impossible to 
divide the country as planned. Stewart’s account conveys an outsider’s pertinent reflection 
on the impossibility of peacefully dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnic cantons. 
The only way to achieve ethnically homogenous units was through bloody ethnic purges; 
only a campaign of fear and persecution could force people to leave their homes. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically divisible 
persisted, making its division the only criteria for ‘peace’ efforts during the war. Partition 
according to ethnic criteria remained an objective in itself, under the pretence that all three 
Bosnian nationalist groups, albeit supervised by the international community, were 
negotiating to stop the conflict.
263
 All the ‘peace plans’ that the international community 
suggested were underpinned by the insistence on irreconcilable national identities that 
helped embed the logic of partition (Campbell 1998: 80, 155).
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 Six months after the failure of the Cutileiro Plan, another conference was convened in London to address 
the question that had apparently persisted since the Enlightenment in Europe: what to do with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? (Borogovac 1995: 134). The paradox was that the UN, and many other countries, already 
recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign multiethnic state within its own borders, and any further 
negotiations about its status would annul this already established international recognition. Despite this, the 
rhetoric of division continued, and every partition plan took Bosnia and Herzegovina a step closer to a final 
split along ethnic lines.  
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 The next plans for ethnic partition were the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) and the Owen-Stoltenberg 
plan. The VOPP was initiated in early January 1993. It involved division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten 
semi-autonomous regions, and received the backing of the UN. In May, however, the self-proclaimed Bosnian 
Serb assembly rejected the Vance-Owen plan, and on 18 June Lord Owen declared that the plan was ‘dead’. 
For a thorough analysis of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, see Burg and Shoup (1999: 214-262). The Bosnian 
delegation was against signing the plan, and they also refused to sign it in Geneva. However, in March 1993 
Izetbegović travelled to Geneva and signed it himself, without the consent of the Bosnian parliament. The 
Owen-Stoltenberg plan followed in July 1993. It proposed three ethnic states, joined in a weak federation, but 
the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were free to hold plebiscites to secede from the federation and join Serbia or 
Croatia at a later stage. The Bosnian Muslims were parcelled into four separate, remote, landlocked territories, 
with no easy access to the main routes in the region and no exit to the sea. Sarajevo would become a separate 
region, demilitarised and placed under UN administration for two years (Bercovitch 1995: 179-192). 
Although Izetbegović signed this plan too, the Bosnian parliament unanimously rejected it. A further doomed 
round of negotiations was proposed, dubbed the ‘Invincible Peace Plan’, the name of the British warship HMS 
Invincible that hosted the negotiations in September 1993. It was officially known as the Union of Three 
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It is interesting to observe that after each proposal for a new peace plan the 
conflict gained in its intensity.
265
 Moreover, as the negotiations took place, numerous 
crimes continued to be committed against civilians all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In one 
parliamentary session, President Izetbegović (1994) attempted to appease the public: ‘We 
have also succeeded in maintaining the focus of the world’s attention on Bosnia throughout, 
thereby making the task of the [aggressors] and criminals more difficult.’ However, the 
truth was that ‘focus of the world’ was elsewhere, and the crimes continued with the same, 
if not worse, ferocity. Every time an agreement was signed, a mass murder was 
committed,
266
 mainly involving Bosniaks, the principal victims of the conflict. This pattern 
did not seem to capture the attention of the international mediators; after each mass 
slaughter of Bosniaks, they would proceed to invite the Bosnian delegation to sit at the 
negotiating table with those under whose command the atrocities had been committed.  
These prolonged negotiations with the aggressor, amidst the continuing 
commission of crimes against civilians, essentially equalised the status of the aggressors 
and the victims, creating an impression of civil war. This, along with the persistent 
nationalist-religious rhetoric, transformed the conflict into a perpetual battle between Islam 
and Christianity. For ordinary citizens, this meant that in addition to enduring constant 
shelling and sniper fire, they would continue to struggle to survive without food, electricity, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Republics Peace Plan. Its proposal rested on the idea of territorial homogeneity that was supposed to be 
achieved through a territory swap between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. For more details on this plan, see 
Silber and Little (1997: 306). When this failed, its main components were incorporated into the EU-sponsored 
Action Plan, presented in December 1993, but that plan also collapsed irretrievably in January 1994.  
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 A case in point is the war between Bosniaks and Croats that started after Izetbegović, contrary to the 
advice of his delegation, signed the VOPP. 
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 Based on personal experience and the experience of others who lived through the war.  
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water or gas.
267
 In such a climate, the peace talks continued with little to show for their 
efforts, until the reconfigured proposal known as the Contact Group Plan was put forward 
between February and October 1994. A new round of negotiations started, the Geneva 
Peace Talks, which eventually culminated in the Dayton Agreement, the signing of which, 
in 1995, put an end to the war through the final division of the country.  
Thus, the international community dismantled the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at Dayton, and proclaimed Bosnia to be an international protectorate under the 
rule of the UN High Representative, who was assigned the upper hand in the decision-
making process (as discussed in chapter one). The Contact Group consisted of the US, 
Russia, France, Britain and Germany, a Great Power quintet reminiscent of that of the late-
nineteenth century ‘Eastern Question’.268 The reason why this proposal contributed to the 
implementation of a negotiated settlement of the conflict was the fact that Russia joined the 
negotiating table. As all the Great Powers were now present and the fate of the Yugoslav 
Republic could be settled, in much the same way as they had negotiated over the deathbed 
of the shattered Ottoman Empire. The ‘Bosnian issue’ was on the negotiating table again, 
and the old quarrels of the Great Powers were reincarnated. It was a continuation of the 
carve-up which began at the Berlin Congress, and the return to ‘the world of big power 
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 Only privileged people close to the SDA ruling elite were provided with special generators. This, coupled 
with the fact that every day people were forced to search for food and water, braving sniper fire and random 
shelling, ensured a watertight information blockade. There was one daily Bosnian newspaper, Oslobođenje, 
but it was not easily obtainable, at least not in Sarajevo, due to its position as an enclosed city, surrounded by 
hills from which bombs were raining day in and day out. People were afraid to leave the shelter of their 
homes. The situation was so bad that, during the first winter of the war, a grim joke appeared, which 
explained that the main difference between Auschwitz and Sarajevo was that Auschwitz had gas. Apart from 
the daily bombing, the worst thing was the virtual lack of food and humanitarian aid. These were stolen and 
sold on the black market at sky-high prices. People were far too preoccupied with their everyday struggle for 
survival to think about the politics driving the war in Bosnia . 
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 See chapter three for an in-depth analysis of the international politics at the end of the nineteenth century, 
and the way it influenced the solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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politics, and that is not kind to [those] nations’269 that are peripheral and unable to influence 
opinions or exercise pressure.  
For Bosniaks, this signalled betrayal by those whom they trusted most: in Berlin, 
this was the Turkish Tanzimatçilar representatives, who gave Bosnia to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and prepared the way for the influx of Bosnian refugees to Turkey;
270
 in 
Dayton, it was the Muslim leadership who annihilated the Bosnian Republic and signed up 
to its ethnic division, blessed by the representative from the OIC who was present as an 
observer. During the ‘Eastern Question’, the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
essential to keep the balance of power, whereas at Dayton its division guaranteed a 
satisfactory settlement amongst the Great Powers. In fact, the behest to negotiate a 
resolution to the Bosnian war became the pretext under cover of which the Great Powers 
attempted to settle their current, and former, disputes. However, the international climate 
and the neo-Islamisation of international relations meant that Muslim allies were essential 
to advancing their respective interests in the region. The motives and mode of operation of 
both the Great Powers and the neo-Islamists are discussed in the next section.     
 
6.4. The symbiosis between the Great Powers and the neo-Islamists 
The operations of the Great Powers took place covertly through a web of interconnected 
security and intelligence networks, turning Bosnia and Herzegovina into a hive of foreign 
espionage agents throughout the war and its aftermath (Wiebes 2006: 2).
 
In light of the joint 
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 This phrase is taken from a Canadian context. A Canadian functionary replied indignantly to the question 
of Canada’s probable reaction to the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying: 
‘We are back to a world of big power politics and that is not kind to nations like Canada. We are just another 
troop contributor now, and no one is asking our opinion.’ (Hillmer and Oliver, cited in Schmidt 2001: 82).  
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 For a more detailed analysis, see chapters three and four.  
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peacekeeping efforts, the various agencies were supposed to collaborate and share the 
information they gathered. This, however, was not always the case. This is not altogether 
surprising: research into the various crises that afflicted Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 
nineteenth century onwards reveals that rival foreign agents often played an indispensable 
role.
271
 In the same way, during the 1992-5 war, Bosnia and Herzegovina played host to a 
large number of secret service operatives from around the world. However, it was only with 
the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that international intelligence networks 
paid any serious attention to the unrest in Yugoslavia (Wiebes 2006: 54). The evidence 
suggests that the majority of international intelligence services considered Yugoslavia as a 
subsidiary task, and generally engaged in it while focusing on different areas. The 
emergence of the Bosnian conflict quickly changed this attitude, and the entire territory 
began to swarm with spies.
272
  
Following the fall of Berlin Wall, the overall intelligence climate, especially 
amongst the Western secret services, was somewhat chilled, with operatives increasingly 
withholding information from, and spying on, each other.
273
 For example, the Scandinavian 
peacekeeping unit, composed of Swedish and Danish peacekeepers, suffered casualties 
because the French intelligence agencies refused to disclose the location of Bosnian army 
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 The first major crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875 was started by a provocateur from Russia. For 
more on this incident, see chapter three. 
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 For example, the French foreign intelligence service recruited 500 civilians in the five years from the start 
of the war. For more details on this subject, see Wiebes (2006: 69).  
273
 The European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was the most common cover for the intelligence 
personnel. It was agreed that the observers would not report to their national capitals but exclusively through 
the head of the mission to the president of the European Commission (the executive body of the EU). This 
was not the case, however, as many of the observers kept to a national agenda and reported back to their 
capitals via independently installed satellite dishes on the balconies of their hotel rooms (Wiebes 2006: 88). 
For information on the concentration of intelligence services in Yugoslavia immediately preceding its break-
up, see Wiebes (2006: 70-89).  
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snipers.
274
 Moreover, the mindset of the intelligence personnel was still oriented towards a 
Cold-War-style East-versus-West  scenario, and this was reflected in their reportage and in 
the national policies of their countries,
275
 and led to the occasional feud by proxies, 
whereby any information they obtained was used for vindictive purposes against the 
interests of their rivals.
276
  
 Western and Russian intelligence, however, would have had limited operational 
capacity without their neo-Islamist allies. These were Turkish, Pakistani, Iranian and Saudi 
Arabian intelligence personnel, who were equally wary of each other’s presence, due to 
their allegiance to the respective Western or Russian intelligence networks. This was not 
only conducive to the old East-versus-West mentality lingering on from the Cold War, but 
also to the animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which offers the most telling example 
of the presence of feuds by proxy during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Analysis of the Saudi-
Iranian rivalry not only reveals the complex political constellation of third parties involved 
in the war, but also indicates the blind spots of the available research to date.  
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 The French established the most effective intelligence network in Sarajevo, but they refused to share 
information. Their service was able to locate Bosnian army snipers, as well as those on the Bosnian Serb side, 
and they were even capable of deploying ‘black teams’ to take out snipers at night. The French Direction de 
Renseignment Militaire had agents in the highest ranks of the government cabinets of all three warring sides. 
They also infiltrated the UN and UNPROFOR units. For example, an advisor of Yasushi Akashi, the UN 
Secretary General’s special representative, was a member of the French foreign intelligence service. See: 
Wiebes (2006: 80-81).  
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 For more on the general Western intelligence mindset as regards the Bosnian war, see Wiebes (2006: 85, 
52-55). 
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 For example, Russian military intelligence exaggerated Bosnian Serb military power after the summer of 
1994, ‘out of a wish to strike a blow at NATO hegemony and out of revenge for having lost the Cold War’ 
(Corvin 1995: 127). Similarly, the American administration, albeit for quite different reasons, exaggerated 
Serb military power during the same period (Wiebes 2006: 127).  
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6.4.1 The Saudi-Iranian feud by proxy in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Party officials in the inner circle of the SDA enjoyed close ties with both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, benefiting from their economic and political support.
277
 Saudi finance was 
channelled through the aforementioned al-Hassanian, who became a member of a 
prominent neo-Islamist organisation, the Sudanese National Islamic Front. In 1990, he 
established an Islamic charity under the name of The Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) 
in Vienna, whose single largest donor was Saudi Arabia (Pomfret 1996: A01).
278
 Wiebes 
(2006: 158) states that, in 1991, President Izetbegović sent the Bosnian minister of the 
interior
279
, his close ally and namesake, to Vienna to purchase kalashnikovs and 
ammunition with Saudi money channelled through the TWRA. Al-Hassanein, as TWRA 
director, opened an account at the Die Erste Bank, which was overseen by a five-man 
committee, comprising Al-Hassanein and four SDA officials; the committee initiated 
money transfers to Sarajevo months before the war began (Schindler 2007: 149).
280
  
In the same fashion, the TWRA opened offices in Zagreb, prior to the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were manned by members of the SDA’s inner circle.281 Al-
Hassanein was also stationed in Zagreb where he worked as a clerk at the Sudanese 
Embassy. The diplomatic employment of al-Hassanein is significant because Sudan was the 
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 The SDA had good relations with the majority of Muslim counties. The only exception was Libya, who 
was more inclined to be supportive to Serbia, perhaps due to the intelligence cooperation it had enjoyed with 
pre-war Yugoslavia.  
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 Fatih al-Hassanian left Yugoslavia in the early 1980s and moved to Vienna.  
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 The minister of interior, Alija Delimusatfić, had already established, prior to the war, a private company, 
Cenex, which was involved in smuggling weapons, as well as other miscellaneous trading ventures of dubious 
legality.  
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Alongside Fatih al-Hassanein, the other four members, who were SDA officials, had access to the account. 
Three were Young Muslims co-defendants: Hasan Čengić, Husein Živalj and Derviš Đurđević. 
281
 It was Hasan Čengić, who at that time worked as an imam in the Zagreb mosque, and Mustafa Cerić, who 
became a naibu re’is (temporary head) of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. It was 
alleged that Mustafa Cerić became re’is ul-ulema through a ‘coup’ against the former re’is ul-ulema, Jakub 
Selimoski, a moderate Macedonian (Hećimović 2008: 3).  
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main transit link for the procurement and transportation of the weapons smuggled to the 
SDA party leadership (Kohlmann 2004: 46). The TWRA also opened offices in Istanbul, 
where it again maintained a relationship with its SDA confidants, who were government 
officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as being members of the supervisory body of 
the TWRA.
282
 The major focus of the agency was the neo-Islamisation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through the putative mission of stimulating the spread of Islam, albeit a 
certain version of Islam, throughout Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. The 
research points to the collaboration between SDA confidants and the Saudi-nominated 
representative.
283
 It has been estimated that the TWRA sent about $2.5 billion to the SDA 
between 1992-95, in the name of Islamic aid to the ‘Bosnian brethren’, although the real 
balance remains unknown due to non-existent bookkeeping and a lack of accountability on 
the part of the SDA officials.
284
 Cash-filled suitcases, carried by individuals who enjoyed 
diplomatic immunity, were the main method of money transfer.
285
  
The SDA was also an addressee of the Saudi High Commission, which disclosed 
that over nine years it had collected over $600 million for its programme in Bosnia 
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 For example, TWRA staff in Istanbul had access to confidential material belonging to the embassy, and 
even carried its stamp in case they had to endorse some documents that were purported to carry the 
government’s credentials. 
283
 Izetbegović and his closest intimates were granted a blank cheque by al-Hassanein, who, throughout the 
war and its aftermath, remained the major link for transactions between the top circle of SDA officials and his 
bosses in Saudi Arabia – the TWRA’s single largest donor (Pomfret 1996: A01).  
284
 The TWRA had already started sending money to the SDA’s top officials a few months before the war. 
The operation was headed from the Zagreb Office by Mustafa Cerić, an imam in the Zagreb Islamic Centre, 
who was proclaimed as re’is ul-ulema in 1993. During the war, the money transfers intensified, with weekly 
cash payments of between $3 and $5 million, stowed in suitcases of carefully selected diplomats or SDA 
representatives. For the full names of the SDA officials who had access to the funds, and for more on the cash 
transactions, see Schindler (2007: 149-152).  
285
 In one instance, a Saudi royal emissary suddenly arrived at the Die Erste bank in Vienna clutching two 
large suitcases filled with $5 million in cash (Schindler 2007; Napoleoni 2006; Wiebes 2006).      
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(Shwartz 2003: 189-190). It is unknown where the lion’s share of the money went.286 
Another two influential, well-funded Saudi NGOs were the International Islamic Relief 
Organisation (IIRO) and the Al-Muwafaq Foundation, both based in Sarajevo and both 
major financial sub-branches of the Muslim World League, the main arm of neo-Islamist 
ideology. It is noteworthy that despite the seemingly well-documented allegations that aid 
was sent to the Bosniak leadership during the war, ordinary citizens were, nonetheless, 
starving and facing daily danger of being killed or maimed, and Bosnian soldiers went 
without modern weapons, ammunition and even basic protective clothing. It is probable 
that Saudi Arabia aimed to score political points rather than expedite help to the Bosniaks. 
Aside from numerous conferences convened by the OIC to discuss Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the only outcome was a draft resolution that, apart from the usual 
condemnations, contained neither specific commitments nor an action plan for the suffering 
‘brethren’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The resolution that did emerge was a replica of the 
non-binding motion introduced by the OIC and approved by the UN General Assembly in 
August 1992, in which the OIC requested that the UN Security Council take further action 
to defend the Bosnian population and restore Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity 
(Bell 2002: 644). This call emerged in flagrant opposition to the ongoing ‘peace talks’ 
discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s division.  
Despite the increasing suffering of their Muslim ‘brethren’ and the SDA’s 
political impotence when it came to obstructing the territorial division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Saudi government awarded Izetebegović the King Faisal Foundation 
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 It was reported that the Saudi Commission was caring for 500 war orphans, and paying the utility bills for 
many Bosnian families impoverished by the war. The rest of the money remains unaccounted for (Whitmore 
2002). 
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award for services to Islam in 1993, which he received with pride (Izetbegović 1995: 101). 
The award came at the time of mass killings and intensified persecution of Muslims, when 
those who survived were barely subsisting on a minimal amount of humanitarian aid, 
distributed on a monthly basis.
287
 The following year, thought to be the hardest for the army 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the hungriest for the civilians besieged in Sarajevo, the 
president visited his patrons in Mecca for a second time. Through his frequent trips to the 
Middle East and Saudi publicity, Izetbegović became a political icon in the Muslim world.  
However, while some countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan, supported 
Izetbegović in order to cooperate with the Saudis and boost their Islamic credentials in the 
eyes of their populations, others offered their support in order to diminish Saudi influence. 
One such country was Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main rival in the Middle East. Iran supplied the 
SDA with war materiel, and the relationship between Iran and the SDA seemed 
exceptionally close.
288
 Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Iranian link pre-dated 
the conflict: in 1989 Yugoslav state security noted the suspicious presence of many Iranian 
nationals (Lučić 2001: 132), and the Iranian secret services had a distinguished record of 
cooperation with the Bosnian intelligence agencies, which were tightly controlled by the 
SDA. An agreement for the supply of arms and other war materiel seems to have been 
concluded at a meeting that took place before the war, in March 1992, which secured the 
shipment of Iranian weapons and ammunition to Bosnia (Schindler 2007: 138; Wiebes 
2006; Napoleoni 2005). 
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 For example, the monthly allowance of humanitarian aid distributed across households in Sarajevo was100 
grams of sugar and 250 grams of flour per head. As a young teenager I was responsible for the distribution of 
this aid in my quarter.   
288
 This was perhaps due to the influence of Hasan Čengić, the head of army logistics, who, due to his links 
with Iran, earned the title of ‘Minister for Iran’, and Omer Behmen, a Young Muslim confidant and close aide 
to Izetbegović, who spent much of the war as Bosnian ambassador to Teheran.  
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It appears that it was not until five months after the war had already begun that 
Western intelligence learned of the flow of arms to the Bosnian Muslims. By contrast, it 
was common knowledge at that time that the Bosnian Serbs had already received weapons 
(Čekić 1995: 86-88). An arms contingent destined for the Bosnian Muslims was discovered 
on 4 September 1992, when the CIA ambushed an Iran Air Boeing 747 at Zagreb airport 
(Wiebes 2006: 159). According to an additional source, the plane also contained forty 
Iranian ‘volunteers’, who had been dispatched to Bosnia and Herzegovina on a government 
salary of $4,000 a month (Gordon 1992: 3). Following this interception, Western 
intelligence officials initiated other investigations in Croatia, in which they learned of 
another Iranian arms transport to the Bosnian Muslims via Sudan and Slovenia to Croatia, 
which contained ammunition, mortars, mines and assault rifles (Pomfret 1996: A01). The 
reason for their interest was that all of the 125 tons of war materiel supplied by Iran was 
manufactured in Russia. News of the Iranian consignments spread quickly, eliciting various 
reactions. Lord Owen (1996: 47), an international mediator, reported that the Croatian 
president, Franjo Tuđman, had informed him immediately, as Tuđman seemed opposed to 
Iranian involvement in the Bosnian conflict.  
In response to the discovery of the Russian-made weaponry, the Bush 
administration delivered its fiercest protests to Zagreb, prompting the Croats to heighten 
control of their airspace and halt all helicopter flights through its territory (Kohlmann 2004: 
46). Following Tuđman’s instruction to interrupt the flow of these ‘humanitarian transfers’, 
Izetbegović paid a visit to Teheran in October 1992, and was assured by President 
Rafsanjani that more ‘significant aid’ would be forthcoming (Gordon 1992). A month later, 
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another Iranian Boeing 747 landed in Zagreb, with 60 tons of ‘humanitarian goods’, 
followed by a $3.3 million donation from Ayatollah Ali Khomeini (Schindler 2007: 139).  
Tuđman’s initial objection to the continuation of the flow Iranian arms through 
Croatian territory, however, seems to have been successfully muted by Germany. The 
German secret services – the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) – were cooperating with 
their Iranian opposite number, whose officers were sent to Munich in 1992 for specialised 
training (Džamić 2001: 220)289 Germany had nourished a particular interest in the region 
since the Second World War, and chose Iran as an ally because it did not want any 
European, predominantly French or British, competitors challenging its influence in 
Croatia. Iran, on the other hand, was interested in gaining greater influence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, if only to frustrate Saudi penetration in the region, which in turn would 
improve the position of Iran in the Middle East. It was this mutually beneficial combination 
of interests that resulted in Germany putting pressure on the Croatians to agree to the 
Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Ali Akbar Velayeti, arriving in Zagreb in November 
1992 to discuss the logistics of further armaments missions (Pomfret 1996: A01). Lengthy 
negotiations between the Bosnians, Croats and Iranians followed, during the next six 
months, over the nature of future Iranian consignments. It was agreed in subsequent 
meetings, attended by Rafsanjani and Izetbegović, that the Croats would continue to 
transport arms in exchange for Bosnian electricity supplies (Wiebes 2006: 164).
290
 They 
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 Johnstone (2003) dedicates chapter four of her book to an analysis of German aims and aspirations during 
the Yugoslav wars. The account gives a general idea of the level of German involvement, although it needs to 
be read with reservations as it is based on the relativist principle that ‘all are equally guilty’.  
290
 This is significant to note as throughout the war most of Bosnia and Herzegovina was without electricity. 
The official response to Bosnian citizens was that the Serbs had cut the supply lines, which obviously was not 
the case. This further supports the belief that the government intended to create an information blockade.  
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also consented to abandon the obstructive practices they occasionally exercised, in return 
for the right to appropriate fifty percent of the total consignments.291  
Tuđman, however, still appeared distrustful of any pact with the Iranians for two 
reasons: first, there was an unexplained personal animosity between him and 
Izetbegović;292 secondly, he was weary of Izetbegović’s chief aide and main link with the 
Iranian suppliers, Čengić, who was noted for advocating a deal between the Bosnian 
Muslims and the Serbs against the Catholic Croats. Tuđman knew that this campaign was 
consistent with the views of the rulers in Teheran, who believed that Islam and the 
Orthodox Church, represented by Russia, had a common interest in fighting the West. The 
Croatian Catholics were counted as belonging to the West (Wiebes 2006: 179). The Iranian 
choice of geostrategic ally reflected its rhetoric, and it continued its close cooperation with 
Russia. Unsurprisingly, Tuđman was apprehensive of the possibility that the Bosnian 
Muslims, under Iranian influence, might sign a pact with the Serbs.  
Perhaps, it was this anxiety that prompted Tuđman to travel to Turkey, an Iranian 
rival in the region, to secretly brief the Turks about the recent talks with the Iranians. Of the 
most interest to Turkey, and its American ally, was the news that the Iranians proposed to 
supply Croatia and Bosnia with old Russian weapons, on condition that the Bosnian 
Muslims arrange their transport (Wiebes 2006: 163). To assist with the transport, the Croats 
purchased Russian helicopters with money from an uncertain source (Bazola 1996: 36)
293
 – 
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 On occasion, Croats would halt convoys of goods to Bosnian Muslims in Herzegovina. Sometimes, even 
genuine humanitarian goods, such as food and medicines, were not allowed to pass through ‘Croatian’ 
territory. For the percentage the Croats would skim off these convoys, see Owen (1996: 47). 
292
 Izetbegović wrote in his memoirs that from the day they first met, before the war, their ‘discords and 
disagreements’ were to last for years. For his account of the personal animosity between the two, see 
Izetbegović (2003: 84). 
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Austrian government agents reported that the TWRA was financing these consignments 
(Farah and Braun 2007: 50-51, 268-169). 
294
 The discovery of the supply of Russian-
manufactured arms by the Iranians to the SDA government was anathema to the 
Americans, British, Turks and Saudis alike, albeit for different reasons.  
The Americans seemed very disquieted by these negotiations, because the 
Pentagon also planned to clear out the arms stocks of the former Warsaw Pact countries, 
using a third party – preferably a Muslim ally. As far as Anthony Lake, the national 
security adviser, was concerned, any country apart from Iran could supply arms to the 
Bosnian government (Wiebes 2006: 162). This was not down to the ideological distaste the 
Western administration felt for the Iranians, but to realpolitik, as all the weapons Iran was 
supplying originated from the old Anglo-American foe, Russia. It is possible that the US 
and Britain considered Iran a Trojan horse for Russian penetration into the region. Saudi 
Arabia, a major Anglo-American Muslim ally, was equally horrified by the involvement of 
its only remaining regional rival. After Iraq had been weakened by the tight economic 
sanctions imposed by the Saudis’ Western allies throughout the 1990s, the only other 
regional power that posed a menace to Saudi dominance in the Middle East was Iran.  
Meanwhile, Turkey, another important Muslim and semi-European Western ally, 
was also apprehensive of Iranian influence for two reasons: Iranian relations with 
Hezbollah threatened to aggravate internal instability in the Turkish provinces bordering 
Iran, and the close relationship Iran enjoyed with the Bosnian government diminished 
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 However, this report might have been a part of the intelligence bluff: the purchase of helicopters 
incidentally occurred at the same time the BND was searching for a reliable transfer for a clandestine supply 
of old East German weapons, which were supposed to be sent to Bosnia and Croatia using a Catholic relief 
organisation as cover (Wiebes 2006: 160).  
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Turkey’s involvement in the resolution of the Bosnian conflict, a right that Turkey 
considered belonged to it by default, due its five-hundred-year-old Ottoman history in the 
Balkans. Turkey’s strategic importance rested on its strong presence in the Balkans, and it 
was for this reason that it interacted with international institutions and was a part of the 
security governance of the region from the very start of the process of dissolution in 
Yugoslavia (Tangor 2008: 161). A weakened position in the Bosnian security discourse 
would challenge Turkey’s political relevance in Europe.295  
Due to all of the above reasons, the Russo-Farsi alliance had to be eliminated. To 
achieve this, Britain and America mobilised both of its readily available Muslim allies to 
approach President Izetbegović and offer their military assistance, on the clear condition 
that he immediately terminate any type of Iranian involvement (Wiebes 2006: 160; Cohen 
2008: 408). The military goods would of course originate from the US, but would be 
supplied by Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan – in other words, by trusted neo-Islamist 
allies. This method had been tried and tested in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when Saudi 
Arabia provided a $500-million’s worth of arms to the mujahideen fighting the Russians 
(Napoleoni 2005: 190-191).
296
 The logic behind the offer was that if it worked in 
Afghanistan, why should it not work in Bosnia? It was thought that if Saudi Arabia 
approached Izetbegović with the American offer, he would be more likely to acquiesce. 
However, according to the former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, 
Pauline Neville-Jones, Izetebegović was ‘less tied to the apron strings of the United States 
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 For Turkey's relations with the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE preceding and during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, with a special focus on Turkish policies concerning the crisis in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, 
see Tangor (2008: 160-220).  
296
 See also the US former secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s interview with Fox TV online at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_doxgN-V5Fg  
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than anyone else thought’ (Wiebes 2006: 160). Even the pleas of his main financial donors 
from Saudi Arabia did not dissuade Izetbegović from continuing relations with Iran, and he 
continued to simultaneously profit from both Saudi Arabian and Iranian assistance. Wiebes 
(2006: 176-177) reports that the British secret service was of the opinion that Izetbegović 
was a clever politician when it came to his personal interests, as it seemed he was prepared 
to play the parties off against each other.
297
 
However, alarm bells rang when the SDA began to team up with Iranian 
intelligence personnel. The British discovered that the Iranians had developed an 
extraordinarily close working relationship with the SDA government, insinuating 
themselves with the Bosnian political leadership to a remarkable degree, and were 
providing not only financial support but also political direction.
298 
This also caused the 
Saudis alarm; they perceived it as a threat to their interests. For Britain and the US, it was a 
turning point that offered a more than adequate indicator that the Iranian link would not 
easily disappear from the SDA’s political menu. When it became clear that Saudi shuttle 
diplomacy had failed to coax Izetbegović to ‘America’s side’, the head of Saudi 
intelligence, Prince Turki al Faisal, paid President Clinton a visit, urging him to take the 
                                                 
297 Perhaps the best illustration of the skilful way Izetbegović used diplomacy is to be found in his memoirs, 
in which, rather than acknowledging the deep rift, he praises the unity of the Muslim world over the Bosnian 
case, misleading the reader into believing the truth of his assertion. He finds evidence for his claim in 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory: ‘Muslim countries ... provided significant political, material and 
military aid. Never, in the last hundred years, had the Muslim world been so united as in the case of Bosnia, 
claimed Samuel L. Huntington ... his assertion of the unity of the Islamic world in the case of Bosnia was 
accurate’ (Izetbegović 2003: 200).  
298
 The Select Committee of the US House of Representatives issued a report in which it warned that the 
Vevak and Pasdaran, the Iranian intelligence services, had ‘developed an extraordinarily close working 
relationship with the Bosnian intelligence service which it largely set up. In addition to training, the Iranians 
provided political direction and financial support.’ (25 October 1996:167). For more on this subject, see Final 
Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia, 
(The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Washington DC Report October 1996: 165,167; 175-178). For more on the Vevak’s and 
Pasdaran’s European operations, see Schindler (2007: 131-137).    
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lead in providing military assistance to Bosnia (Wiebes 2006: 163). The US saw the Iranian 
entrée in the region as a threat to their vital interests, due to the danger of Russia lurking in 
the background. It readily accepted the offer, and started exploring avenues by which to 
win the hearts and minds of the Bosnian SDA leadership. Politically speaking, the affair 
activated the American attempt to recreate the balance of power in the region and ensure a 
geostrategic settlement in the interests of the Western allies. This exercise brought the 
Saudis into the equation, leading to the commencement of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s neo-
Islamisation, under the aegis of the Great Powers. How this was done, and its implications 
for the role of Islam in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is discussed in the next section.  
 
6.5 The Croatian arms pipeline and the ‘black flights’ 
The neo-Islamisation of the conflict began in March 1994, opening ‘the most curious 
chapter in the muddled history of U.S. attempts to end Europe’s worst bloodletting since 
World War II’ (Beelman 1997).299 In March 1994, Charles Redman, the US ambassador to 
Germany, established the Muslim-Croat Federation, ending the war between the Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats. Whilst it represented a fragile alliance against the Serbs, it was, 
nonetheless, the first step in the Anglo-American strategic manoeuvre towards better 
control over the conflict.
300
 The war between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims had 
disrupted the arms flow from Iran, mainly due to the distrust between the Iranians and 
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 Maude Beelman is an extremely valuable source. Her observations hold weight due to her presence during 
the Bosnian conflict as an Associated Press correspondent. She was one of the first journalists to uncover the 
Serb-run concentration camps in northern Bosnia, and her merits are highlighted by her colleague Vulliamy 
(2012).  
300
 The creation of the federation came at the time when a third of Croatia and 70 percent of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were under Serb control. This offered a singular platform for the US to control and obfuscate 
Russian aspirations. For more on the Muslim-Croat Federation, see the testimony of its architect, Charles 
Redman, Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the US Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to 
Croatia and Bosnia, (The Iranian Green Light Subcommittee, Committee on International Relations, U.S. 
House of Representatives, Washington DC Report 25 October 1996: 10-67; 133-137; 466-476).  
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Croats. However, with the establishment of the federation, the arms flow could be resumed. 
Re-activating the Iranian weapon supply should have been anathema to the Americans, but 
it seemed to have been well received, and even welcomed.  
In April 1994, the US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, met with Imam 
Omerbašić, a religious leader of the Muslims in Croatia and a trusted SDA confidant, in 
Zagreb. Galbraith urged Omerbašić to purchase arms for the Bosnian army (Beelman 
1997). The ambassador’s choice of interlocutor hardly seems a coincidence, since well-
informed American sources knew that he was the main ‘Iran-link’ in Zagreb, and there is 
no doubt that the ambassador was briefed on this.
301
 Furthermore, based on previous 
experience, the Americans trusted that this conversation would be reported directly to the 
SDA leadership in Sarajevo, and that rumours would quickly spread beyond the bounds of 
confidentiality. The American calculations were correct: Omerbašić immediately relayed 
the news to the Iranian ambassador to Croatia (Wiebes 2006: 166). The message the SDA 
government picked up was that the Americans were giving the ‘green light’ to the arms-
supply pipeline from Iran to Croatia (Williams and Lippman 1995). These impressions 
were confirmed when Galbraith asked his station chief to confirm to Croatian intelligence 
that the US did not object to Iran establishing an arms pipeline to the SDA-led government 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Beelman 1997).  
Both the Croatians and the CIA station chief were stunned by American 
encouragement of Iranian arms shipments. Whilst the station chief checked with his 
headquarters to confirm there had been a shift in policy concerning the arms embargo in 
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 The New Republic article ‘Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the Real Story’ (28 October 1996), reported that 
the CIA pinpointed Imam Omerbašić as ‘an intermediary for Iran’. For the full story, see Craig (1997). 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tuđman personally visited Galbraith to obtain formal 
reassurance. Because the Croatians themselves were divided on whether to permit arms 
deliveries to the Bosnian Muslims, the president wanted to know whether the US would 
object to the Iranian arms flow through Croatia.
302
 The ambassador gave him an answer 
that later became known as a ‘no-instruction policy’, a diplomatic way of saying the US 
would do nothing.’303 Indeed, throughout the course of the Iranian shipments, the 
Americans took a hands-off approach, having no intention of either interfering with or 
obstructing the pipeline. Galbraith appeared to be working in its favour when he 
approached three different CIA officials to ask about the possibility of covertly arming the 
Bosnians. Moreover, in March, one month before the ‘no-instructions’ decision, he had 
wanted to know how much weaponry $250 million would buy, and in December 1994 he 
had asked the CIA station chief what he thought would happen if the US looked the other 
way when the Iranians supplied arms (Beelman 1997).  
For all these reasons, the station chief in Croatia thought he had uncovered a 
terrible secret: the American ambassador was involved in a rogue operation to smuggle 
Iranian weapons to Bosnia’s Muslims in defiance of a worldwide arms embargo. What 
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 The Croatian minister of defence, Gojko Šušak, was a fervent supporter of the Iranian arms pipeline 
because of the opportunity it represented for‘skimming’, whereby large quantities of weapons could remain in 
Croatian hands. On the other hand, Miroslav Tuđman, son of the president and head of the Croatian 
intelligence service, together with the minister of foreign affairs, Mate Granić, were both vehemently opposed 
to the resumption of supplies as they feared extensive Iranian influence, due to the aforementioned Iranian 
policy on an Islamic alliance with the Orthodox Church via Russia. For more on the personal views of the 
Croatian officials, see Wiebes (2006: 166-167).  
303
 When President Tuđman asked Galbraith about the American reaction to the Iranian arms flow, the 
ambassador cabled home, seeking guidance. The answer came back, approved by the president, ‘tell Mr. 
Tudjman you have “no instructions’” – a way of saying that the US would do nothing. When Tudjman heard 
this, in April 1994, he was confused. The next day, Galbraith told him again: ‘No instructions – and this time 
pay attention to what I didn’t say.’ Still uncertain, Tudjman asked Charles Redman, a special envoy working 
on the Balkans war. ‘It means,’ Redman said, ‘we have no objections.’ See: Weiner and Bonner (1996) and 
Wiebes (2006: 167-177). 
 
  
284 
seemed to escape his attention was the fact that at every possible opportunity the 
supposedly classified information was, in effect, volunteered by Galbraith. Oblivious of 
this, the station chief spent hours at his computer terminal, tapping out coded messages to 
Washington, bluntly describing his suspicions about Galbraith (Weiner and Bonner 1996) – 
a state department official reported that the station chief was filing reports on conversations 
with the ambassador even when they had no relevance. As a result, the CIA and the 
networks of spies belonging to their partners intensified surveillance operations, observing 
and counting Iranian planeloads, which climbed to approximately eight flights per month 
(Wiebes 2006: 169).  
Under the pretext of offering assistance in the form of intelligence on Serbian 
defensive positions to Croat and Bosniak forces, the CIA initiated surveillance flights. The 
spy planes were, in reality, gathering information on the Iranian consignments (Wiebes 
2006: 174-214). Yet, spying was not the prerogative of the CIA operatives; others were 
concerned to uncover the slightest indication of American involvement in the Iranian link. 
As everyone was spying on everyone else, those who were spying on the CIA turned their 
attention towards the Iranian shipments too. Reports from a great variety of sources were 
pouring in, describing the size and degree of Iranian shipments, and the tacit American 
involvement. A ship, sailing under a Panamanian flag and carrying surface-to-surface 
missiles, 25,000 machine guns and seven million rounds of ammunition, was intercepted in 
the Mediterranean, and another operation in Slovenia, smuggling military goods worth $15 
million, was uncovered (Napoleoni 2005: 190). Incidentally, more peripheral, opportunistic 
supplies of arms from quite unexpected sources were also intercepted – for example, a 
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Maltese battalion, which only possessed four mortars but had ordered four thousand mortar 
shells, obviously intended for future re-sale.
304
  
What remained largely under-reported, however, were the American night flights 
carrying weapons directly to the airfield in Tuzla, a town in north-east Bosnia. It is also 
possible that some air cargos were landing at the American-built airport in Visoko. The air 
operations were named ‘black flights’ because, in the main, it remained unclear who 
exactly was operating them. Some of those who witnessed these ‘black flights’ were of the 
strong opinion that they were carried out by private companies from the US, such as Tepper 
Aviation and Intermountain Aviation (Wiebes 2006: 193-194). However, the fact that they 
were specialised aircraft, adapted for night-time operations, pointed to Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a US-based mercenary company, well connected to the 
US State Department and the Ministry of Defense, probably due to the fact that the 
company was run by retired US army generals. More significant is the fact that the 
company won ‘Equip and Train’, a multi-billion military contract to train the army of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Isenberg 1997).
305
  
It is interesting to note that the State Department pledged $200,000 to train the 
Bosnian military at American facilities, while the largest single donor of armaments and of 
the entire military programme was Saudi Arabia, who granted funds in excess of $140 
billion (Isenberg 1997). It is also important to note that, unlike the weapons procurement 
from Iran, the entire mission surrounding the ‘black flights’ was shrouded in secrecy, and 
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 There were also Bangladeshi and Malaysian units involved in selling light arms and ammunition. In the 
meantime, Ukrainians were busy dealing in petrol, cans of coca cola and women.   
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 The contract took place following the signing of the peace agreement at Dayton, which divided Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into two parts: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The army of Republika 
Srpska was not included in the ‘Eqip and Train’ military programme.  
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the US was adamant that it should be kept that way.
306
 The veil of secrecy illustrates that 
this was a controversial state of affairs, and underlines the disparity in the way the 
Americans dealt with allegations of their involvement in the ‘Iranian pipeline’ on one hand, 
and the ‘black flights’ on the other. The relaxed manner in which they volunteered 
information about, and proposed entanglement in, the Iranian arms shipments was in 
marked contrast to their aggressive efforts to cover up their association with the weapons 
being flown directly to Tuzla. This becomes even more puzzling when the fact that 
American officials felt relaxed enough to pronounce a ‘no-instruction’ policy concerning 
Iran’s smuggling operations, which was ‘still officially isolated as a terrorist state’ 
(Beelman 1997), is taken into consideration.  
Careful analysis of the international context within which these two operations 
evolved, however, reveals that the ‘no-instruction’ instruction was a ‘red herring’,307  
orchestrated by a close circle of officials from the National Security Council and the State 
Department (Weiner and Bonner 1996). It appears that they disguised it so well that even 
their colleagues at the CIA and the Pentagon were left in the dark. By issuing a ‘no-
instruction’ guidance, and ensuring that knowledge of its existence spread expediently and 
widely by word-of-mouth, the Americans, together with the Saudis, created a smokescreen 
for the unrestricted operation of the ‘black flights’. By staging these flights concurrently 
with the Iranian arms shipment, they deluded the media, who busied itself in reporting a 
hoax. Even when they believed that they had uncovered a ‘covert operation’, the only 
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 For example, when a Norwegian colonel, C.A Le Hardy, drafted a report for UNPROFOR, in which he 
described the specific high-spec capabilities of the intercepted flights, he concluded that they were 
characteristic of American advanced night-time technology. Apparently, it was said that the Americans were 
so alarmed by this report that they put pressure on Le Hardy to retract it and produce a new one (Wiebes 
2006: 185, 192).  
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 A ‘red herring’ is a fallacy in which an irrelevant topic is presented in order to divert attention from the 
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discovery journalists were able to report was a ‘no-instruction’ fallacy, constructed by top 
State Department officials. In fact, the ‘no-instruction’ decision was a masterpiece of covert 
operations, representing a diplomatic victory that enabled the West to regain control over 
the conflict, put its firm signature on the Dayton Agreement, and portray the Dayton 
proforma as the only possible resolution for subsequent conflicts, such as Iraq and 
Kosovo.
308
  
This is how the then-deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, summarised the 
‘no-instruction’ instruction at the Congressional hearing on the shipment of arms from Iran 
to Bosnia:  
We bought time for a combination of American diplomacy, NATO 
airpower, and Croatian and Bosnian military victories to reach an historic 
peace agreement under U.S. leadership at Dayton. The United States is 
leading an international effort to arm Bosnia today. The Iranian presence 
there is down to a handful and is increasingly marginalized. (Talbott 1996) 
 
In other words, the military and financial assistance of the ‘black flights’ facilitated the 
return of Anglo-American Muslim allies, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to a prominent 
place in the political picture, securing a balance of power that predetermined the way in 
which the Bosnian conflict was settled and Bosnia’s internal affairs reorganised. Redman 
(1996), a confidant in the ‘no-instruction’ policy and the mastermind behind the Muslim-
Croat Federation, has affirmed that the decision not to overtly oppose Iranian shipments 
was crucial to all that followed in the Balkans. In answer to the accusation that the ‘no-
instruction’ decision opened the door to Iranian involvement, Talbott explains:  
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settlement. 
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That door was already open. Had we tried to slam it shut, we might very 
well have also, as a consequence, shut down the relationship that we 
developed between Croatia and the federation. And that result could have – I 
believe almost certainly would have – kept us from ever getting to Dayton. 
(Talbott 1996) 
 
An overlooked phenomenon is the significance of the Dayton Agreement on the 
international realpolitik of rival political forces. It was Dayton that enabled the resumption 
of Anglo-American geostrategic predominance in the Balkans, which they were in danger 
of losing to Russia through its proxy, Iran. This was only made possible by utilising the 
Saudi alliance. Saudi Arabia’s power and influence over the SDA leadership managed to 
bluff the Iranians out of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
309
 Its position in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina expedited the strategic goals of both Saudi Arabia and its Western partners: 
the Saudis fortified their stance as a regional power and furthered their aspirations to be the 
spiritual leaders of the Muslims in the Balkans, and the West was able to step in and 
obstruct the Russians and their proxies from penetrating further into the Balkans – a 
Russian ambition since the Berlin Congress.  
At the Berlin Congress, Bosnia and Herzegovina, although converted into an 
Austro-Hungarian protectorate, was preserved from annihilation and allowed to remain 
intact in order to keep Russia at bay, thus closing the last chapter of the ‘Eastern Question’. 
By contrast, the settlement of the contemporary conflict required the division of Bosnia in 
order to solve ‘the problem from hell’, to borrow a phrase of a former secretary of state, 
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Warren Christopher (cited in Blank 1995). It was this division that created the balance of 
power, by way of the diplomatic compromises of the international community. In both 
instances, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina became an international protectorate, 
administered by a foreign representative with unlimited ruling powers, and its destiny 
subject to an imported resolution and not decided by its people.
310
  
Owing to its openness to foreign influences, however, the problems evolving 
around Bosnia and Herzegovina, far from being indisputably resolved, were set aside and 
the war was transformed into a ‘frozen conflict’ (Boyd 1998: 48).311 The subsequent neo-
Islamisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought with it further ethnic divisions, and 
diminished still further the prospect of the Bosnian population enjoying long-lasting 
peaceful coexistence in a multicultural environment. On the international level, however, 
the Dayton Agreement ensured the maintenance of a form of peace among the rival 
members of the international community, even if it was only temporary. 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has dealt with international aspect of the 1992-95 Bosnian war: it has 
examined the infiltration of neo-Islamism in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the three decades 
preceding the conflict, as well as critically analysed the Western deployment of calculated 
neutrality in adopting secessionist policies in an effort to settle the war. With the regard to 
the research question the chapter explored whether neo-Islamism construction shaped 
recent events and the responses of Bosnian leaders in the 1990s. Even though the Bosniaks 
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 Former US General Charles Boyd (1998: 48) states that what the Dayton Accord did was to ‘freeze in 
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represented a well-educated, secular and sophisticated ethnic group during Yugoslav times, 
their political maturity in the democratic period was at an embryonic stage. This was 
mainly due to the rapid removal of former communist, mainly Muslim, cadres from the 
political scene by the SDA, the party that won the most Bosniak votes at the first multiparty 
election in 1991. The SDA justified its actions by portraying their removal as vindication 
for alleged victimisation under Muslim-communist rule. 
As soon as the SDA and the other nationalists in Yugoslavia came to power, they 
started negotiating the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of these 
agreements had already been signed prior to the start of the war in 1992. The nationalists’ 
negotiations were supervised by the members of the international community, whose 
intelligence services only became interested in the break-up of Yugoslavia with the onset 
of the Bosnian crisis. The fact that Dayton was signed not only by Serbia and Croatia, but 
also by the Contact Group (the US, Britain, France and Russia), as well as a representative 
from the OIC, reveals the complexity of the Bosnian War and the significant level of 
international involvement in the management of its conflict and its resolution. In spite of 
the presence of the leading Western powers and their Muslim allies, the break-up of 
Yugoslavia turned bloodiest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosniaks became the 
principal victims of the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a hive of foreign and 
domestic espionage networks, working in collaboration with and against each other. 
Various interest groups formed, and the whole Bosnian war was conducted in a theatre of 
conflicting interests. The exit from the crisis was born out of the shuttle diplomacy of the 
neo-Islamist allies and a series of clandestine operations. 
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One such covert activity was the supply of arms. It appears that there has been no 
critical examination of the bizarre affairs surrounding these operations. Although the sheer 
size of the literature and media reports on alleged American involvement in arming the 
Bosnian Muslims is impressive, an examination of their arguments reveals that the copious 
content lacks any rigorous attempt to plausibly reconstruct the chain of events. The best 
illustration of this is the assertion that the US sided with the Iranians to arm the Bosnian 
Muslims, without any analysis of why it would collaborate with a state it had officially 
designated as terrorist. This assertion begs a number of further questions that have been left 
unexamined. For example, if these countries were collaborating, why would the US insist 
that Iran left Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the signing of the Dayton Agreement, risking 
the discontinuation of a multibillion-dollar military project?
312
 If the potential threat was 
terrorism, why did the West not pressure Saudi Arabia to leave as well, instead of allowing 
the Saudis to liberally propagate their version of Islamic practices and dogma?  
Also, an explanation of the contradiction between the fact that the supposedly ‘best-
kept secret’ of America’s tacit approval of Iranian arms shipments was revealed in almost 
every ‘slip of the tongue’ by the US ambassador, and the way the ‘black flights’ were kept 
in utter secrecy, is nowhere to be found. Although the data collected from leaked 
intelligence information is abundant, there have been no attempts to offer any explanation 
for the alleged US-Iranian alliance. Furthermore, all the available works consulted on this 
topic appear to follow the same pattern, for the simple reason that they are largely 
dependent on media reports. Even the literature that includes confidential interviews and 
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other publicly unavailable resources does not attempt to elucidate the American decision 
not to forestall Iranian arms shipments.  
The literature also fails to recognise the tensions and animosity amongst the various 
Muslim countries that were acknowledged donors to the Bosnian Muslims.
313
 Rather than 
representing the rancour that existed amongst the Muslim factions and setting it within the 
context of a complex, antagonistic pursuit of realpolitik, the position generally taken places 
the Muslim countries together in one harmonious basket, out of which they putatively, in a 
unanimous fashion, afflicted terror upon the West. The Bosniaks, by virtue of the fact they 
are Muslims, are depicted as harbouring the potential for developing a fundamentalist 
alliance with their co-religionists. Careful analysis of the various texts points to three main 
reasons behind these errors: firstly, the complexity of the contemporary international 
context in relation to Muslim countries is often ignored; secondly, the history of Islam in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Muslims remains a terra incognita, causing 
many inadvertent misconceptions; and thirdly, a perpetual Western bias that borders on 
Islamophobia, in which Muslims are seen as comprising a united anti-Western front, has 
occluded the fact that the ‘Muslim world’ is as fragmented as the ‘Christian world’ or 
‘Buddhist world’, if it is possible to speak of ‘worlds’ in this manner.    
The Bosnian leadership during the war, nevertheless, did adopt an increasingly 
overt Islamic discourse and orientation that played directly into the hands of the 
Islamophobic peace envoys. These envoys referred to the leadership as the ‘Muslim-led’ 
Sarajevo government, and it did not refute this designation. The Bosniak regime’s decision 
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to apply for Bosnian membership of the OIC in July 1991 only served to compound the 
Western perception of their ‘Islamicism’. The Bosniak leadership and the Bosnian army, 
despite its strong multiethnic component, had become largely ‘Muslim’ and organised 
according to ‘Islamic principles’ by the end of the war in 1995. Examination of the events, 
and the literature relating to them, suggests that the Islamic development of the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was not predestined but was determined by the politics of its 
leadership. It is also important to note that although the leadership were formally 
committed to a unified multiethnic state, the establishment of an Islamic state out of the 
partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a covert goal. To achieve a Muslim state, the 
Bosnian regime even accepted the huge territorial compromises proposed by the numerous 
doomed intervention plans of the international community. The international community 
proposed a secessionist amalgam to settle the conflict; it effectively endorsed the partition 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, securing the annexation of two-thirds of the 
country to a ‘Greater Serbia’ and a ‘Greater Croatia’, and the formation of a Muslim 
national state from the remainder. To enhance its Islamist character, the Bosniak leadership 
retained tight links with transnational Islamist networks, resulting in the proliferation of 
neo-Islamist groups and activities, such as the secret supply of weapons.  
The international community remained silent and ‘neutral’ in regard to the spread of 
neo-Islamist influences in Bosnia, just as it did over the massacres committed throughout 
the war. In both scenarios, calculated neutrality became complaisance about the 
commission of crimes. Throughout the entire discussion, one lesson is apparent: unless 
Western interests are fundamentally endangered, there is no viable solution for the Bosnian 
protectorate – it will remain another ‘frozen conflict’ in the Third World, just as it remained 
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the only unanswered problem of the ‘Eastern Question’. The final chapter will offer the 
conclusions of this thesis concerning what Bassuener and Lyon (2009) call the ‘unfinished 
business’ in Bosnia. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis provided re-consideration of Bosnian Muslim identity and the development of 
political consciousness in the period up until and during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In this 
regard, it set out to explore the consequences of the Muslim identity and neo-Islamism 
construction in the 1992-95 Bosnian war that was often cited as the dirtiest and bloodiest 
modern conflict on European soil since the Second World War (Vulliamy 2012). The prime 
question that motivated this quest, and steered the analysis throughout, seeks to explain 
whether the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the particular legacies 
of Ottoman rule and subsequent construction of the concept I have termed neo-Islam 
shaped events and the responses during the 1992-95 Bosnian conflict. An aim of this 
investigation was to assess the effects of the secessionist policies of the international 
community, whose numerous ‘peace talks’ were, essentially, concerned with partitioning 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The adoption of secessionist methods by both 
international and local forces expedited Bosnian settlement as an international protectorate, 
a mode replicated from the nineteenth century nation-building process which refrained to 
recognise Bosniaks as a sovereign nation.   
Although the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started as an act of aggression, it was 
later transformed into an inter-religious conflict, largely due to the political stance of the 
local leadership, which was encouraged to spread nationalist rhetoric by the secessionist 
policies of the international community. Thousands of Bosnians who believed in the 
multiethnic, pluralistic and unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had their convictions 
shattered. Applying the doctrine of ‘moral equivalence’ to the Bosnian bloodshed, the 
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international community negotiated a ‘peace’ agreement that did not end the war but simply 
froze the conflict. Representatives of the international community agreed among 
themselves to run the country as an international protectorate, and endowed the 
internationally appointed Office of the High Representative supreme authority in the post-
war semi-colonial Bosnian theatre.  
The results of this investigation show that the once-celebrated model of Yugoslav 
multiculturalism and pluralist coexistence – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – was 
dismantled by a combination of myopic international diplomacy and local nationalism. The 
ultimate result of these polices was the birth of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
divided Bosnia into two ethnically defined entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the 
Serb Republic. The operational dysfunction of the Dayton ‘peace plan’ is an intriguing 
subject, which is discussed in chapter one, but this thesis was not specifically designed to 
deal with this issue. Its focus has been the rationale behind the decision on the part of the 
international community to adopt this particular method of conflict resolution for the 
Bosnian crisis. However, the reasons for drawing up clauses that continue to cripple 
Bosnian state building and national development to this day could be usefully explored in 
further research. 
The historical analysis conducted in this investigation has demonstrated that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was frequently subject to international interventions in the past, both in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of 
the research, it is now possible to reaffirm that the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
can be viewed as a continuation of the ‘Eastern Crisis’ at the end of the nineteenth century. 
At the Berlin Congress in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only former Ottoman 
  
297 
province to become an international protectorate; all the others were declared independent 
nation-states. When the self-inflicted 1839-78 Tanzimat reforms, discussed in chapter three, 
ruined the Ottoman Empire and forced it to begin its retreat from the Balkans, the Great 
Powers sponsored a whole array of secret societies in the region to raise national awareness 
amongst the Christian intelligentsia and peasantry. This signalled the conceptualisation of a 
‘New World Order’, established by the successful spread of the capitalist loan economy, as 
explained in chapter two, and the replacement of the old multicultural empires with a 
system of homogenised nation-states. The emerging states were exclusively Christian and 
exercised little if any tolerance towards Muslims. This practice was in accordance with 
nineteenth-century European law, which offered Muslims no protection (Ekmečić 1996), 
with the result that they fell victim to persecution, expulsion and the annexation of their 
territory, as discussed in both chapters three and four. Many Bosniaks were forced to 
acquiesce to organised emigration to Turkey. Once there, the Tanzimatçılar forbad their 
return, as they were forging a new Turkish nation comprising both local Muslims and those 
expelled from Europe and Central Asia, as analysed in chapter four. This treatment set the 
precedent for dealing with Muslims in most subsequent conflicts, right through to the 
pogroms against the Bosniaks in the 1990s. 
Solving the ‘Eastern Question’ demanded a re-interpretation of Islam after the 
Ottomans withdrew from European lands. Those Muslims who stayed behind were not 
envisaged as part of the ‘new Enlightened Europe’, regardless of the fact they were already 
in possession of a compact, homogenised territorial unit, suitable for further development in 
a modern national sense – a case in point being the quasi-national independence of the 
Bogumils in medieval Bosnia, discussed in chapter four. The development of national 
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awareness required diligent guidance, but the Bosniaks were denied such Western-
sponsored initiatives. The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that the 
Bosniaks did not lack self-awareness as regards their separate ethno-national identity, but 
they were neither presented with the opportunity nor given the appropriate tools to build a 
modern nation. Even when they attempted to attain national recognition through armed 
struggle, their resistance was severely crushed. Most critically, they lacked the support of 
the Great Powers in their attempts to achieve national recognition.  
In the political carve-up that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia, the approach of 
the international community, led by the major European powers (the UK, France and 
Germany), remained unchanged. This needs to be observed in the context of the political 
continuation of nineteenth-century ethno-nationalism, which never recognised Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a sovereign nation-state or incorporated the Bosniaks into the contemporary 
system of independent nation-states. The Bosniaks were consistently regarded as belonging 
to an Islamic past, and only partially allowed to find their place in the new Europe. 
Reduced to ethnic enclaves and observed through a neo-Islamist lens, they were confined to 
a deeply segregated international protectorate run by neoliberal institutions. As a result, 
they never truly achieved independence and are still fighting for national recognition as a 
fully fledged nation today. The historical analysis points to the fact that, in the absence of 
an independent Islamic polity, the Bosniaks’ success as an independent nation has 
depended on the centrifugal forces of an ‘enlightened’ Europe to either endorse or reject 
them. This association of factors represents a suitable subject for future investigation. 
The research in this thesis could serve as a base for such studies as it adds 
substantially to an understanding of the symbiosis between neo-Islamist countries and the 
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most affluent Western governments, predominantly the Anglo-Saxon ones. A neo-Islamist 
and neoliberal alliance was conceived during the Cold War to rebuff Soviet penetration and 
establish a neoliberal economic hegemony, as detailed in chapter five. The governments of 
Muslim countries perceived to be unfriendly towards the West were often replaced by neo-
Islamist regimes by means of military coups, revolutions or manipulated elections with 
predetermined results. Saudi Arabia, a major Western ally in the region and the least 
democratic Muslim country in the world, was enlisted to ensure that these regimes 
remained faithful to Western values and democratic principles. The research conducted in 
this thesis has confirmed that this partnership displays two main features, both of which are 
severely condemned in Islamic teaching. The first is the administration of interest-incurring 
loans to poor, mainly Muslim countries, under extremely onerous conditions, with the 
result that most of them are still deeply entrenched in their economic predicament. The 
second characteristic is the widespread adoption by neo-Islamist governments of the 
speculative capital movements that lie at the heart of the neoliberal economic system.  
The most immediate outcome is that the volume of speculative transactions in the 
world now greatly exceeds the value of trade in goods and service. Trade derivatives, the 
name under which these transactions became better known, have no real depository assets 
but are simply financial instruments derived from the speculative evaluation of interest 
rates, credit-default swaps (deregulated insurance premiums), equities, bonds and the 
commodity markets. Most of the time, the sellers do not possess the ‘goods’ but only the 
‘legal tender’ to handle them, and the money exists only on computer screens. Not only are 
these assets worthless in real terms, but they are also speculative exchange transactions 
based on the manipulated value that the ‘bets were hedged at’, thus they bear an uncertain 
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outcome and give a potential undue advantage to the ‘investor’. This practice is strongly 
repudiated in Islamic teachings, but appears to be tolerated and even promoted by neo-
Islamists, as discussed in chapter five.  
One of the objectives of an ideal Islamic society is the eradication of poverty at all 
levels and the creation of a prosperous life for all human beings. As discussed in chapter 
five, zakat is not only a tool that provides immediate relief to the poor, but aspires to 
extricate impoverished people from the category of the needy by providing them with the 
machinery and equipment for productive work, to enable them to eventually break the cycle 
of destitution and become self-reliant. Arguably, the creation of self-sufficiency is also the 
aim of those projects directed by neoliberal institutions towards the relief of poverty in the 
Third World. However, while this may appear to be the case as regards their general 
structure, at their core lies an essential difference with the Islamic approach. They lack the 
divine, spiritual component of the deed itself and do not ordain an adequate and equal 
social order. The main point of divergence is that a market economy views the betterment 
of material life as a goal in itself, whereas the Islamic system sees it as a means of spiritual 
elevation that liberates human energy from devotion to seeking bread and directs it toward 
worshipping and glorifying God.  
However, accounts of discrimination, illiteracy, expedient justice, enormous poverty 
and the absolute prerogatives of kings and presidents in Muslim countries show how these 
Islamic values have been betrayed. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the victory of 
Western imperialism in a world in which the paradigm of nationhood – otherwise wholly 
alien to the ‘oneness of the Ummah’, as discussed in chapter two – has flourished, Muslim 
countries seem ‘reduced to a position of economic dependence and backwardness from 
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which they find it difficult to extricate themselves’ (Sidiqqui 1996: 98). The great majority 
have become integrated  into a global economy that administers interest rates and employs 
excessive speculative practices (Sidiqi 2000: 59-81), riba and qimar (usury and gambling), 
both of which are explicitly prohibited and considered corrupt in Islam, as illustrated in 
chapter five. It is legitimate to enquire why countries with Islamic traditions are in such a 
poor state, and why unlawful commercial practices have become commonplace in their 
everyday life when these are not inherent in Islamic teaching. Many scholars – voices of the 
current Islamic reawakening – point to a lack of responsibility on the part of Muslim 
leaders. This study suggests that unless Muslim governments reject the adoption of 
detrimental neoliberal policies, social justice, in conformity with Islamic financial 
principles, will never be attained. 
Taking all these findings together, it is possible to finally revisit the purpose stated 
in the title of this project: an evaluation of the impact of political development of Bosniak 
Muslim identity and the construction of neo-Islam in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Neo-Islam influenced conflict on two levels – domestic and international. On 
the domestic level, it served in two consequential ways: the division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina finally occurred due to the affirmation of a Bosniak-Muslim identity and the 
Bosniak leadership’s acceptance of the reduction of the territory Bosniaks had occupied for 
centuries to those parts where they formed the majority, either naturally or through the 
exchange of population achieved by ethnic cleansing and genocide. With this 
‘nationalisation of Islam’, the nation-building process of the nineteenth century, based on 
the principle of ‘nation equals state’, was concluded. Islam had found its place in Europe, 
but only in the form of neo-Islamism, which comprises an indispensable part of an 
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internationally dominant neoliberalism. In relation to this, on the international level, the 
impact of neo-Islam on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina served the purpose of creating 
the impression of a religious war and upheld the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory discussed in 
chapter five. Bosnia was a case in point. Unless, this thesis challenged it otherwise. 
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